Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Tuesday, September 8, 2026

AI Summary. In New York City, income shares at the top of the distribution rose faster than nationally, with nearly two-thirds of real income growth accruing to the top 1% versus under 40% nationally, a divergence driven predominantly by non-wage income. Real median income fell, and real average income for the bottom 90% was essentially flat.

Jonathan Siegel and Jason Bram Office of the New York City Comptroller
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Btw 2019 and 2024, pre-tax, pre-transfer real median income in New York City fell 3.2%. The top .1% tax units, ~ households, (mean income ~$24mm) saw real growth of ~25%, whereas the bottom 90% (mean income ~$45,000) fell 0.8%.

Is rising income concentration in a major city driven by non-wage income?

Core argument: Nearly two-thirds of New York City's real income growth between 2019 and 2024 accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally, a result that holds when volatile capital gains are excluded.

Between 2019 and 2024, the New York City’s income shares at the top of the distribution rose faster than the nation's, and nearly two-thirds of the real income growth over the period accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally. The result also holds when volatile capital gains are excluded. Real median income fell over the period, and real average income for the bottom 90% of tax units was essentially flat. Adjusted for local prices (but not for transfer programs), the purchasing power of income for the lower 90% of New Yorkers is close to one-fifth below that of the bottom 90% nationally. The divergence at the top is predominantly a story of non-wage income. Wage and salary income shows a much milder widening, and occupational wage data that exclude bonuses show base pay growing faster in lower-wage occupations than in higher-wage ones, and within many occupational groups wages are converging rather than growing more unequal.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly two-thirds of New York City's real income growth between 2019 and 2024 accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally, a result that holds when volatile capital gains are excluded.
  2. Real median income in New York City fell between 2019 and 2024 and real average income for the bottom 90% of tax units was essentially flat, with local-price-adjusted purchasing power for the lower 90% of New Yorkers close to one-fifth below that of the bottom 90% nationally.
  3. The divergence at the top of New York City's distribution is predominantly a story of non-wage income, with wage and salary income widening much more mildly and occupational wage data excluding bonuses showing base pay growing faster in lower-wage occupations than higher-wage ones.

Related Articles:

  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — New York state's share of US taxpayers reporting over $1m in income fell from 12.7% in 2010 to 8.7% in 2022, and the Citizens Budget Commission estimates state and city income tax receipts from that group would have been $13bn higher had the share held. Job growth has concentrated in lower-paid health care and social assistance.
  • Where is Standard of Living the Highest? Local Prices and the Geography of Consumption — The authors estimate that geographical differences in cost of living are especially large for low-income US households, and that expensive cities offer college graduates a standard of living similar to affordable cities while offering less-educated households a lower one. A high school dropout household moving from the most affordable to the most expensive commuting zone would see consumption fall 18.5%.
  • The Demographic Trends That Shaped Mamdani’s Win — In New York City's mayoral race, Mamdani's average margin was 30 points in precincts with a median age under 45, and voters under 45 made up 43% of in-person ballots versus 36% in the prior governor's race. He won by over 50 points in neighborhoods where the white population share grew and the Black or Hispanic share declined.

AI Summary. International student assessment results show mathematics performance held near earlier levels for about 15 years before falling sharply, with mean scores down 9 points in math and about 14 in reading in the latest cycle. Reported student motivation and school engagement declined, and hasty incorrect answering rose to 11%.

OECD Staff Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
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Mean OECD math and reading scores fell roughly 25 PISA points—about a year of schooling—between 2018 and 2025, alongside reduced motivation and engagement and increased carelessness, exemplified by a near-doubling of “hasty readers.”

Are international student test scores falling alongside declining motivation and engagement?

Core argument: PISA 2025 mean performance fell by 9 score points in mathematics and about 14 points in reading between 2022 and 2025, after mathematics scores had remained close to their 2003 level through 2018.

In math, performance remained close to the 2003 level up to 2018, then dropped sharply btw 2018 and 2025. Mean performance dropped by 9 score points in mathematics and about 14 score points in reading btw 2022 and 2025. Over the 2018-2025 period, the largest drops [in reading] were among the most advantaged 25% of socio-economic status, and the socio-economic gap with the most disadvantaged students reduced somewhat, by 11 points, on average across 35 OECD countries. In mathematics, the share of disadvantaged students scoring below proficiency Level 2 increased in previous cycles and remained high in 2025; among advantaged students, the share scoring below proficiency Level 2 increased, reaching 18% in 2025, about 4pp. Students’ reports of their motivation for learning and engagement with school also declined between 2022 and 2025. The proportion of “hasty readers” – those who gave fast and incorrect responses – increased by about five percentage points, on average, from almost 7% in 2018 to 11% in 2025. Analyses for math, also show an increase in the proportion of hasty responses between 2022 and 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. PISA 2025 mean performance fell by 9 score points in mathematics and about 14 points in reading between 2022 and 2025, after mathematics scores had remained close to their 2003 level through 2018.
  2. Over 2018–2025, the largest reading declines came among the most advantaged 25% by socio-economic status, and the gap with the most disadvantaged students narrowed by 11 points on average across 35 OECD countries.
  3. The share of "hasty readers," who gave fast and incorrect responses, rose about five percentage points, from almost 7% in 2018 to 11% in 2025, with hasty responses in mathematics also increasing between 2022 and 2025.

Related Articles:

  • Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
  • Are China’s Students Really Number One? A Statistical Riddle — China's reported 65-point jump in mean international student test scores between testing rounds coincided with a change in which provinces represented the country, swapping the most populous province for a richer, much smaller one. The author argues such swings, including a fall in low performers from 43% to 19% in reading, are unmatched elsewhere.
  • Have Humans Passed Peak Brain Power? — The share of Americans reporting they read a book in the past year has fallen below half, alongside declining performance in numeracy and problem-solving in most countries. The share of adults unable to use mathematical reasoning to evaluate the validity of statements averages 25% in high-income countries and 35% in the US.

AI Summary. The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 without a college degree has rarely been lower in the past two decades, and relative to their own historical ranges the job market looks much better for blue-collar and manual-service workers. Degree-holders still face lower unemployment rates overall.

Theo Francis and Ray Smith Wall Street Journal
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In 2026, the 12-month moving-average unemployment for college-educated 22–34-year-olds is above its post-2003 mean, while the rate for non-college peers is historically low. Prime-age college grads still have lower unemployment than those with no degree.

Is the job market unusually strong for workers without college degrees?

Core argument: The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 who never graduated from college has rarely been lower in the past two decades, based on data through July.

The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 who never graduated from college has rarely been lower in the past two decades. To gauge how the job market has shifted for each cohort, [Gad Levanon, Burning Glass’s chief economist] compared current unemployment rates for the different groups with their own range of unemployment rates since 2003. The analysis included data through July. By that measure, the job market looks much better for blue-collar workers, including those in construction and on manufacturing lines, and manual-service workers. It is [however] still easier to find a job with a college degree. The unemployment rate for degree-holders in their prime working years—ages 25 to 54—averaged 2.7% for the 12 months ending in July - well below the 3.6% rate for workers with just some college education, and 4.7% for people with a high-school diploma only.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 who never graduated from college has rarely been lower in the past two decades, based on data through July.
  2. Burning Glass chief economist Gad Levanon compared each cohort's current unemployment rate against its own range since 2003, and by that measure the job market looks much better for blue-collar workers in construction and manufacturing and for manual-service workers.
  3. College graduates ages 25 to 54 averaged a 2.7% unemployment rate for the 12 months ending in July, below the 3.6% rate for workers with some college education and 4.7% for those with only a high-school diploma.

Related Articles:

  • College Grads Struggle to Find Jobs. Non-Grads Are Giving Up — The narrowing gap in unemployment rates between young college graduates and non-graduates appears driven mainly by non-graduates dropping out of the labor force rather than by diplomas losing value, since people not seeking work aren't counted as unemployed. The share of young non-graduates employed is 1.7 percentage points below pre-pandemic levels.
  • To Fix Education, Fix The Economy First — 30% of US adults have literacy skills typical of a 10-year-old, yet US workers scoring at that low level earn an average of nearly $30 an hour and two-thirds are employed, compared with about $20 and fewer than half employed in Britain. The author argues this reflects stronger economic growth rather than vocational education policy.
  • The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era — The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 after four decades of expansion, implying the first sustained negative growth in relative demand for college-educated labor. The authors estimate that weaker wage growth in occupations highly exposed to artificial intelligence accounts for roughly 28% of that decline, though the patterns are not causal.

AI Summary. Posts across Chinese social media platforms including RedNote, Douyin and Weibo describe low wages, scarce jobs, falling property values and fear about the future, with some users turning hardship into dark humor or mocking official propaganda. The volume of pessimistic and sarcastic posts is striking given that China's internet censorship has grown more ruthless over the past decade.

Li Yuan New York Times
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Attitudes expressed on Chinese social media are increasingly negative. Given that the “censorship apparatus still controls the internet,” the increasingly negative online sentiment, much of it about “economic despair,” is “striking,” Li Yuan remarks.

Are Chinese social media users voicing growing economic pessimism despite censorship?

Core argument: Li Yuan reports that the first roughly 30 posts on her RedNote feed were nearly all about economic despair, many drawing hundreds or thousands of likes, with suggested searches including "Is there a future for employment in China?".

Across RedNote, Douyin, Weibo and other popular platforms, you can scroll endless posts about meager wages, scarce jobs, falling property values and fear about the future. Some turn their hardships into dark humor. Others hijack official posts and hashtags and turn propaganda into spectacles of mockery. China’s internet censorship has grown increasingly ruthless over the past decade. That makes the sheer volume of the pessimistic posts and sarcastic comments all the more striking. When [Li Yuan opened her] RedNote in recent weeks, [she] was surprised to find that the first 30 or so posts were nearly all about economic despair, many with hundreds or thousands of likes. The suggested searches could be even gloomier. “Is there a future for employment in China?” read one.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Li Yuan reports that the first roughly 30 posts on her RedNote feed were nearly all about economic despair, many drawing hundreds or thousands of likes, with suggested searches including "Is there a future for employment in China?".
  2. Posts across RedNote, Douyin, Weibo and other Chinese platforms describe meager wages, scarce jobs, falling property values and fear about the future, with some users turning hardship into dark humor.
  3. Chinese users hijack official posts and hashtags to turn propaganda into spectacles of mockery, a volume of pessimistic and sarcastic commentary made striking by censorship that has grown increasingly ruthless over the past decade.

Related Articles:

  • Record Graduate Influx Lifts China’s Youth Jobless Rate To 17.9% In July — China's jobless rate for 16-to-24-year-olds excluding students rose to 17.9% from 14.9% the prior month, according to the National Bureau of Statistics, as a record wave of university graduates entered an already crowded labor market.
  • Chinese Student High-Flyers Set Sights On Police and Military Academies — High-achieving Chinese high school graduates are increasingly applying to police and military academies and other schools offering a clear path to public-sector jobs, pushing required entrance-exam scores up. Some programs now demand more than 650 points out of 750, rivaling the least competitive courses at China's most prestigious universities.
  • The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism — About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.

Wednesday, September 9, 2026

AI Summary. Comparing weighted survey estimates with targets built from published administrative totals, the authors find that household survey means of income received are systematically biased downward, with the understatement reaching 40% or more for nearly half the measures examined. Bias is under 15% for Social Security benefits but exceeds 40% for pensions, unemployment insurance, and food stamps.

Bruce Meyer, Nikolas Mittag, Derek Wu, Anthony Tatarka, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
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CPS reports of receipts in dollar terms are 40–60% below administrative benchmarks for income sources such as SNAP and pensions. Linked records show most of the gap comes from recipients reporting no receipt at all, not underestimating amounts.

How large is the downward bias in household survey income estimates?

Core argument: Total survey error in the Current Population Survey from 1984 to 2022 is almost always negative for both recipients and dollars, indicating survey means are biased downward, with bias of 40% or more for nearly half the variables.

To directly measure bias in survey estimates, we calculate the difference between the weighted survey estimate and the survey target constructed from published totals [TSE or total survey error], using public-data adjustments for intentional coverage differences for average dollars received and the recipient share of the population across our income sources. Figures 1 and 2 summarize TSE in the CPS from 1984 to 2022, expressed as a share of the survey target for our measures of recipients (seven income sources) and dollars (eight income sources). In levels, TSE is almost always negative for both recipients and dollars (with SSI dollars an exception in recent years), indicating that survey means are systematically biased downward. For nearly half of the variables the bias is 40% or more. Yet, there is substantial heterogeneity across income sources. TSE tends to be more modest for SSA programs (specifically OASDI and OASI, for which the net bias is below 15% for recipients and dollars), while it is much larger for income sources such as pensions, UI, and SNAP (for which the net understatement exceeds 40%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Total survey error in the Current Population Survey from 1984 to 2022 is almost always negative for both recipients and dollars, indicating survey means are biased downward, with bias of 40% or more for nearly half the variables.
  2. Net understatement exceeds 40% for pensions, unemployment insurance, and SNAP, while net bias for the Social Security programs OASDI and OASI stays below 15% for both recipients and dollars.
  3. Bias is measured as the difference between the weighted survey estimate and a survey target built from published totals, with public-data adjustments for intentional coverage differences across seven income sources for recipients and eight for dollars.

Related Articles:

  • Poverty and Dependency in the United States, 1939–2023 — Extending a consistent poverty measure back to 1939, the authors estimate US absolute poverty fell from 48.5% to 19.5% between 1939 and 1963, driven by growth in market income rather than government transfers net of taxes. Poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty than before.
  • Government Benefit Programs Already Do A Lot To Help Low Income Families — For a two-adult, three-child family, existing taxes and government benefits bring take-home resources to about $58,000 with no earnings, $79,000 with $20,000 of earnings, and $90,000 with $80,000 of earnings plus $15,000 in employer health premiums. A $75,000 gap in earnings and work-related benefits narrows to $11,000 in take-home pay.
  • Beyond the Myths: A Clearer Path to Poverty Alleviation in America — Consumption-based poverty in the U.S. fell 10.6 percentage points (81%) since 1980 and income poverty measured by an anchored Supplemental Poverty Measure fell 6.9 points (53%), while the Official Poverty Measure fell less than 2 points, suggesting the official measure understates long-run progress. The authors attribute part of the divergence to worsening underreporting of income.

AI Summary. The US Treasury tripled the size of a planned buyback of longer-dated government debt, saying it will purchase up to $6bn of outstanding securities maturing in the 10- to 20-year sector, up from the $2bn initially communicated to investors. Treasuries extended declines after the announcement, with 10-year yields rising.

Greg Ritchie and Alex Harris Bloomberg
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The 10-year Treasury yield rose to ~4.85%, its highest level since 2023, after the Treasury announced a planned buyback of $6B, less than many market participants had expected, despite being 3x the size of the previous operation.

Do larger Treasury buybacks of longer-dated debt lower long-term yields?

Core argument: The US Treasury will buy up to $6 billion of outstanding securities maturing in the 10- to 20-year sector, triple the $2 billion initially communicated to investors.

The US Treasury tripled the initial size of its next buyback of longer-dated government debt, in an announcement that was met with initial disappointment by investors. The Treasury Department said it will buy up to $6 billion of outstanding securities set to mature in the 10- to 20-year sector. It’s the first such operation under an expanded buybacks program that showcases Secretary Scott Bessent’s resolve to stem the recent rise in borrowing costs. The new figure is triple the amount initially communicated to investors of $2 billion. Treasuries extended an earlier decline after the release, with the yield on 10-year notes up about 6 basis points to 4.85% as of 11:35 a.m. in New York — their highest level since 2023.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US Treasury will buy up to $6 billion of outstanding securities maturing in the 10- to 20-year sector, triple the $2 billion initially communicated to investors.
  2. Treasuries extended an earlier decline after the announcement, with the 10-year yield up about 6 basis points to 4.85%, its highest level since 2023.
  3. The operation is the first under an expanded buyback program that showcases Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's resolve to stem the recent rise in borrowing costs.

Related Articles:

  • Bessent’s Bond Gains Wiped Out as Treasury Yields Jump Again — Yields on the longest-dated US government bonds returned to levels seen just before the Treasury Department expanded a bond buyback program aimed at halting their rise, with the 30-year yield at 5.27%. The 10-year yield, a benchmark for borrowing costs across loan types, stands at roughly 4.8%.
  • America’s Risky Debt: What Markets See That Policymakers Don’t — Two market-based measures suggest the safety premium investors pay to hold US Treasuries has compressed toward zero and at times reversed: the spread between top-rated corporate bonds and Treasuries after stripping out default risk, and the gap between currency-hedged foreign G10 government yields and Treasury yields at the same maturity, where longer-maturity comparisons now favor foreign bonds.
  • Rising Bond Yields Are Good, Actually — Interest rates remain low relative to reasonable expectations of inflation and growth, with incomes and spending rising about 7% a year in dollar terms. Absent idle workers, machines, and materials, higher rates can help shift resources toward business equipment and nonresidential construction by discouraging consumer spending and housing or attracting foreign goods and services today.

AI Summary. Norway's sovereign wealth fund is reallocating its fixed income portfolio in a way that likely shifts from US Treasuries toward Japanese government bonds, prompting speculation that more international money will return to Japan's newly competitive yields. Japanese overnight interest rates are forecast to rise by a full percentage point over 12 months, to 1.9%.

John Authers Bloomberg
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Authers pictures Japan exiting its ultra-low rate regime that helped drive the real effective yen to ~ half its 1990 level. Higher yields should curb yen carry, raise demand for Japanese assets, and force the “world …to do without Japanese funding.”

Are rising Japanese yields drawing global bond money back to Japan?

Core argument: Japanese overnight rates are forecast to rise by a full percentage point over the next 12 months, to 1.9%, following a shift in perception of Japan's economy.

For decades, finance has treated Japan as the exception to all rules. While the rest of the world surged and collapsed, Japan trudged on with minimal interest rates and sluggish growth — a safe place to borrow money cheap, through any number of elaborate trades. Last week’s news that Norway’s Norges Fund, one of the biggest sovereign wealth pools, was reallocating its fixed income portfolio in a way that likely shifts from Treasuries to Japanese bonds prompted speculation that more international money would move back to Tokyo and its newly competitive yields. Overnight rates are now forecast to go up by a full percentage point over the next 12 months, to 1.9%, following a shift in perception of the economy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Japanese overnight rates are forecast to rise by a full percentage point over the next 12 months, to 1.9%, following a shift in perception of Japan's economy.
  2. Norway's Norges Fund, one of the biggest sovereign wealth pools, is reallocating its fixed income portfolio in a way that likely shifts from Treasuries to Japanese bonds, prompting speculation that more international money would return to Tokyo's newly competitive yields.
  3. Finance has treated Japan for decades as an exception, with minimal interest rates and sluggish growth making it a safe place to borrow cheaply through elaborate trades.

Related Articles:

  • Japan’s 10-Year Bond Yield Hits 3% for First Time Since 1996 — Japan's 10-year government bond yield reached 3%, its highest since 1996, after years near zero. The yield was half that level a year earlier, and the speed of the shift is reverberating through Japan's economy and global financial markets.
  • Where is the Global Debt Crisis Most Acute? — A proxy for strain at the long end of government bond markets — the gap between the 10-year yield expected in 10 years' time and today's 10-year yield, scored against its own history — shows Japan as an outlier among the G10 economies.
  • Japan’s Debt Puzzle: Sovereign Wealth Fund from Borrowed Money — Japan's public sector operates as a highly leveraged sovereign wealth fund, funding risky assets by borrowing from banks and depositors at below-market rates, with returns sustaining its debt-to-GDP ratio above 200% without primary surpluses. The authors argue the resulting duration and currency mismatches expose Japan to mark-to-market losses that could trigger a fiscal crisis or a run on the yen.

AI Summary. Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, including electrical contracting and equipment manufacturing, has risen roughly 320,000 above what broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest. Engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists have added about 730,000 jobs above the trend for professional employment overall.

Economist Staff The Economist
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The Economist estimates that so far the AI boom has created ~1mm new jobs in the US, exceeding their estimate of ~200,000 layoffs attributed to AI since mid-2023.

Is the AI build-out adding jobs above trend?

Core argument: Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing, has risen by roughly 320,000 more since 2023 than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest.

[We] tracked five industries at the heart of the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing. Since 2023 employment in them has risen by roughly 320,000 more than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest. Not all of those jobs owe their existence to AI—grid upgrades and other factory building matters too. [We also] tracked employment in professional occupations closest to the AI boom—engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists—and compared their growth since 2022 with professional employment overall. These roles have added roughly 730,000 jobs above trend in recent years. AI will not have created every single one of them. But it has almost certainly created quite a few.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing, has risen by roughly 320,000 more since 2023 than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest.
  2. Professional occupations closest to the AI boom—engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists—have added roughly 730,000 jobs above the trend for professional employment overall since 2022.
  3. Not all of these above-trend gains are attributable to AI, since grid upgrades and other factory building also matter, though AI has almost certainly created quite a few of them.

Related Articles:

  • The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era — The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 after four decades of expansion, implying the first sustained negative growth in relative demand for college-educated labor. The authors estimate that weaker wage growth in occupations highly exposed to artificial intelligence accounts for roughly 28% of that decline, though the patterns are not causal.
  • Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence — Employment for workers aged 22–25 in the occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence has declined roughly 18pp relative to less-exposed peers, with no comparable decline in other age groups. The authors find this operates mainly through reduced hiring, concentrated where AI substitutes for human tasks rather than complements them.
  • Looking for the Ladder — The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.

AI Summary. Defense start-up Covenant plans to produce 1,000 Anthem deep-strike missiles a year at each of its German and US plants in 2027, rising to 5,000 a year at each site from 2028. At mid-six-figure euros each, versus roughly $4mn-$6mn for Tomahawks, the company says militaries could fire saturating barrages.

Laura Pitel Financial Times
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Covenant, a defense start-up, is opening manufacturing facilities in the US, Germany, and Israel to manufacture its new deep-strike munition at scale, with a production target of 5,000 annually at its US and German sites in 2028.

Can cheaper mass-produced missiles let militaries saturate targets with barrages?

Core argument: Covenant plans to produce 1,000 Anthem missiles a year at each of its German and US plants in 2027, rising to 5,000 a year at each site from 2028.

Covenant aims to produce 1,000 Anthem missiles a year at each of its German and US plants in 2027, and 5,000 a year at each site from 2028. [Anthem] would cost in the “mid six-figure” euros — a fraction of the price of Tomahawks, which are sold to overseas governments for roughly $4mn-$6mn apiece. Covenant declined to state the range of the Anthem but [Covenant's CEO] said the concept was partly a response to a German-British plan to jointly develop “deep precision strike” weapons with a range of more than 2,000km. Anthem will carry a warhead weighing up to 250kg half the 450kg payload of a Tomahawk. But Covenant said the lower cost and ability to be produced at scale would allow militaries to fire large barrages of the missiles to “saturate” targets such as weapons factories or military bases.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Covenant plans to produce 1,000 Anthem missiles a year at each of its German and US plants in 2027, rising to 5,000 a year at each site from 2028.
  2. Covenant prices the Anthem in the mid six-figure euros, a fraction of the roughly $4mn–$6mn that Tomahawks are sold for to overseas governments.
  3. The Anthem will carry a warhead of up to 250kg, half the 450kg payload of a Tomahawk, and Covenant says its lower cost and scale would let militaries fire large barrages to saturate targets such as weapons factories or military bases.

Related Articles:

  • How Quickly Can the DOD Rebuild and Recast the Munitions Industrial Base? — The US Department of Defense's budget documents indicate low-cost munitions will reach scale before most advanced systems, with multi-year agreements projected to raise PAC-3 MSE interceptor capacity 233% to 2,000 per year, THAAD interceptors 317% to 400, and Precision Strike Missile output fourfold to about 550.
  • Is the Industrial Base on a Wartime Footing? A Progress Report — About 10,000 new firms have entered the US defense market in two years, and nontraditional companies received over $120bn in contract obligations in fiscal 2025, while munitions contract obligations have risen 330% since fiscal 2010. The Defense Department is signing large-scale multiyear munitions agreements and backing a rare earth supply chain outside Chinese control.
  • The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers — The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.