Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, August 20, 2026

AI Summary. US Treasuries erased nearly all gains that followed the Treasury Department's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, with the 30-year yield rising above 5.27% and the 10-year touching 4.71%. The reversal signals the move has done little to ease concern about surging government debt.

Michael MacKenzie and Alice Gledhill Bloomberg
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The 30-year yield rose ~7bps to as much as 5.27%, and the 10-year yield hit 4.71%, erasing “almost all” the gains that followed Treasury’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds.

Do bigger bond buybacks ease concerns about surging government debt?

Core argument: The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.

US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, signaling the move has done little to alleviate the angst about the surging government debt that has pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades. The 30-year yield on Thursday rose over seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, where it was just ahead of the US Treasury Department’s announcement early Wednesday, before paring the gain. The 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.
  2. US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, suggesting the move has done little to alleviate angst about surging government debt.
  3. The US 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025, as angst over government debt pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades.

Related Articles:

  • Bessent Boosts Debt Buybacks After Climb in Treasury Yields — The US Treasury announced it is at least doubling the size of its liquidity support buyback operations for government debt maturing in 10 to 30 years, following long-dated yields reaching their highest levels in years. Yields on the longest bond fell nearly 10 basis points to 5.185%.
  • The Coming Great Repression? — Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
  • The United States Capital Structure — Because Social Security and Medicare benefits are politically untouchable, retirees effectively hold the most senior claim on US government resources while Treasury bondholders hold the riskiest one. On this argument, bondholders absorb adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or both.

AI Summary. A US Treasury intervention in the bond market pushed the 30-year yield down eight basis points before it returned to roughly its prior level, while the dollar fell below its 200-day moving average and gold posted its best day in six months. The author argues only an unequivocal move to reduce the deficit will bring yields down.

John Authers Bloomberg
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Reacting to Bessent’s effort to bring down the long end of the yield curve, Authors warns that in the absence of fiscal consolidation, “yields aren’t coming down.”

Can Treasury intervention lower long-term yields without deficit reduction?

Core argument: The 30-year Treasury yield, at its highest since the eve of the 2007 crisis, fell eight basis points after Bessent's intervention before returning essentially to its prior level, leaving the upward trend intact.

The 30-year yield — at its highest since the eve of the crisis in 2007 — dropped eight basis points [in response to Bessent’s intervention, later returning essentially to its previous level.] But the upward trend remains intact. Investors heeded Bessent’s warning flare, but told him he would need to do much more to ease conditions substantially. The maneuver did have a dramatic impact on the dollar, which had its worst day in months and dropped below its 200-day moving average. Gold was the clearest tell that investors are concerned by Bessent’s move. Wednesday’s intervention drove the metal’s best day in six months, bringing it back up to the 200-day moving average. More maneuvers like this will likely weaken the dollar further and increase the pressure on a central bank whose independence is currently in question. It remains hard to see what gets bond yields down other than an unequivocal move to reduce the deficit. The more it hurts politically, the more seriously it will be taken. Without any pain, it appears, yields aren’t coming down.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The 30-year Treasury yield, at its highest since the eve of the 2007 crisis, fell eight basis points after Bessent's intervention before returning essentially to its prior level, leaving the upward trend intact.
  2. The dollar had its worst day in months and dropped below its 200-day moving average following Bessent's maneuver, while gold posted its best day in six months, returning to its own 200-day moving average.
  3. Further maneuvers of this kind will likely weaken the dollar and increase pressure on a central bank whose independence is in question, and it remains hard to see what lowers bond yields other than an unequivocal move to reduce the deficit.

Related Articles:

  • The Coming Great Repression? — Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
  • The United States Capital Structure — Because Social Security and Medicare benefits are politically untouchable, retirees effectively hold the most senior claim on US government resources while Treasury bondholders hold the riskiest one. On this argument, bondholders absorb adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or both.
  • Fiscal Dominance and the Return of Zero-Interest Bank Reserve Requirements — Fiscal dominance requires governments to fund deficits at the margin with non-interest-bearing debt, and the revenue from inflation taxation—both expected and unexpected—is limited. The authors argue a US fiscal dominance episode could end the payment of interest on bank reserves and restore requirements that banks hold large zero-interest reserves against deposits.

AI Summary. A U.S. Treasury buyback of long-dated off-the-run bonds produced only a small decline in long-term yields that was subsequently reversed, leaving the upward trend in yields intact. The dollar fell steeply against both developed-market and emerging-market currencies while gold and other precious metals rose, suggesting markets are positioned for further dollar debasement.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
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As Treasury intervened to lower long bond yields yesterday, the dollar fell against G10 and EM currencies. Brooks fears Treasury’s move is the “clearest sign yet that the US is following Japan on its path towards currency debasement.”

Do bond buybacks lower long-term yields or weaken the dollar?

Core argument: The Treasury's buyback of long-dated off-the-run bonds produced only a small decline in yields that was subsequently completely reversed, leaving the upward trend in long-term yields in place, in the author's assessment.

The key question is whether the Treasury got a good bang for the buck yesterday [from its intervention in the market for long-dated off-the-run bonds]. I’m not sure it did. This thing fell but the drop isn’t going to impress anyone. [It was subsequently completely reversed]. The upward trend in long-term yields is clearly still in place. The dollar absolutely cratered against the G10 (blue line) and EM (black line). Furthermore, gold jumped yesterday, as did other precious metals. Markets are primed for dollar debasement to resume and - as Japan shows - it can be next to impossible to stabilize a currency once it enters a devaluation spiral. The US is playing with fire with this buyback.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Treasury's buyback of long-dated off-the-run bonds produced only a small decline in yields that was subsequently completely reversed, leaving the upward trend in long-term yields in place, in the author's assessment.
  2. The dollar fell sharply against both G10 and emerging-market currencies following the Treasury's intervention, while gold and other precious metals jumped.
  3. The author argues markets are primed for dollar debasement to resume and that, as Japan shows, stabilizing a currency once it enters a devaluation spiral is next to impossible.

Related Articles:

  • Peak Dollar Strength — Net positioning across major currencies shows markets are broadly long the US dollar. The author argues this bullishness is misplaced because the Federal Reserve is less hawkish than markets assume and falling oil prices should pull inflation down, leaving the dollar at peak strength.
  • The Dollar’s Hidden Dependence on the AI Trade — Net foreign inflows into US equities have reached a record high, driven in large part by overseas investors seeking artificial intelligence exposure unavailable in their home markets. Because most foreign equity investors leave currency risk unhedged, a pullback in these inflows if AI disappoints poses a significant downside risk to the US dollar.
  • The Real Message In The Yen Intervention — A US-backed intervention to support the yen was funded largely by selling euros rather than dollars, limiting the volume of dollar sales required. The author argues this signals that Washington, fearing the consequences for US financial markets, is reluctant to see foreign central banks deploy their dollar reserves in unlimited quantities.

AI Summary. An analysis of X (formerly Twitter) posts finds that the share of sentences expressing anger rose among both Democratic- and Republican-affiliated users, with Republicans starting from a higher baseline of about 38% versus 27% for Democrats and reaching roughly 50%. The increase was larger among Democrats, narrowing the partisan gap.

Eva Davoine, Stefanie Stantcheva, Thomas Renault and Yann Algan Harvard University
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Davoine, et al. show that angry policy-related tweets among voters rose from 34% to 46% over 2013–2025. Angry posts got ~60% more retweets, and experiments that induced anger showed it can move views on trade, immigration, redistribution and climate.

Is anger rising among partisans on social media?

Core argument: Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.

Figure 6 illustrates the monthly evolution of anger among Democratic- and Republican-affiliated X [Twitter] users. Each line reports the share of sentences classified as expressing anger within each political affiliation, and the plotted series are shown as six-month moving averages. It shows that Republican voters start with a higher baseline level of anger at the beginning of the period (about 38% compared to 27% for Democrats). Anger rises sharply for both groups after the 2016 election, but much more among Democrats. As a result, the initial partisan gap is much smaller by 2019. Both series then plateau from 2019 to 2022. Among Democratic partisans, anger declines slightly after Biden’s election but remains well above pre-2016 levels. Republican anger continues to rise during the Biden presidency, reaching approximately 50% by 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.
  2. Democratic-affiliated X users start with anger in about 27% of sentences, then rise sharply after the 2016 election by much more than Republicans, narrowing the partisan gap by 2019.
  3. Both partisan anger series plateau from 2019 to 2022, with Democratic anger declining slightly after Biden's election while remaining well above pre-2016 levels.

Related Articles:

  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.

AI Summary. A large survey found symptoms of cannabis use disorder rose to more than 9% of men and nearly 6% of women, up from about 7% and 5% three years earlier, as cannabis use increased among adults overall. About 30% of cannabis users showed disorder symptoms, versus under 20% of drinkers for alcohol.

Roni Caryn Rabin New York Times
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A study of 186,823 Americans found 26% of men and 21% of women reported using cannabis in 2024, up 4 and 3pp respectively from 2021; 9% of men and 6% of women reported symptoms of cannabis use disorder.

Is problem cannabis use rising as more Americans use the drug?

Core argument: More than 9% of men reported symptoms of cannabis use disorder in 2024, up from about 7% in 2021, while prevalence among women rose to nearly 6% from about 5%, according to a large study.

A growing number of Americans say their cannabis use is problematic, according to a large new study [which found] more than 9% of the men reported symptoms of cannabis use disorder in 2024, up from about 7% in 2021. The prevalence of cannabis use disorder also rose among women, increasing to nearly 6% in 2024, up from about 5% in 2021. Symptoms of the disorder include not being able to cut back or quit, or continuing to use the drug despite it leading to interpersonal problems. Overall, cannabis use rose among all adults during this time. In 2024, 26% of men reported using the drug, up from 22% in 2021. Among women, 21% said they used cannabis in 2024, up from nearly 18% in 2021. Of the survey participants who said they used cannabis, about 30% showed symptoms consistent with cannabis use disorder. Those findings suggested that those who used cannabis were at higher risk of developing problematic use than those who drank alcohol, as fewer than 20% of those who reported drinking in the survey showed symptoms of alcohol use disorder.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. More than 9% of men reported symptoms of cannabis use disorder in 2024, up from about 7% in 2021, while prevalence among women rose to nearly 6% from about 5%, according to a large study.
  2. Cannabis use rose among U.S. adults, with 26% of men reporting use in 2024 versus 22% in 2021, and 21% of women versus nearly 18%.
  3. About 30% of survey participants who used cannabis showed symptoms consistent with cannabis use disorder, compared with fewer than 20% of those who reported drinking showing symptoms of alcohol use disorder, suggesting higher risk of problematic use.

Related Articles:

  • As America’s Marijuana Use Grows, So Do the Harms — An analysis of federal survey data estimates that about 18m US adults — nearly a third of adult cannabis users — report symptoms of cannabis use disorder, with roughly 3m considered addicted. Among those aged 18 to 25, the cannabis use disorder rate of 16.6% matches the alcohol use disorder rate of 15.1%.
  • Disconnected: The Growing Class Divide in American Civic Life — 17% of Americans report having no close friends, and survey data show a wide educational gap: 24% of those with a high school education or less have no close friends versus 10% of college graduates. Three decades ago, Americans with less formal education reported social circles at least as large.
  • The Case for Prohibiting Vice — A record 62m Americans used marijuana in a single year, 17m of them daily or near daily, while half of American men now hold sports-betting accounts, up from almost zero seven years earlier. The author argues vice and addiction undermine citizens' capacity for free action, justifying state regulation beyond individual-harm criteria.

AI Summary. Iran's economy is on track for its largest annual contraction since the mid-1980s, with inflation above 50% — the highest in nearly 70 years of records — and food and other necessities costing double a year earlier. Its currency has fallen to a record low of about 1.85m rials per dollar on the black market.

Javier Blas Bloomberg
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Inflation in Iran is running at at least ~69%, its highest annual rate in 70 years. The black market exchange value of a rial hit a record low of ~1.85mm rials to the dollar, relative to 50,000 per dollar five years ago.

Is Iran's economy contracting at its fastest rate in decades?

Core argument: Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.

[Iran's] economy is on track to suffer the biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s. Inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records start nearly 70 years ago. Worse, the cost of food and other necessities has already doubled from a year ago. Its currency, the rial, is worthless. In the black market, the exchange rate has collapsed to a record low of about 1.85 million rials to the dollar; five years ago, roughly 50,000 rials were enough to buy a greenback.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.
  2. Iranian inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records began nearly 70 years ago, with the cost of food and other necessities already double year-ago levels.
  3. The rial has fallen to a record low of about 1.85 million to the dollar on the black market, compared with roughly 50,000 rials per dollar five years ago.

Related Articles:

  • Soaring Diesel Prices Rip Across The US Economy — US diesel pump prices reached $5.47 a gallon, approaching a nominal record of $5.82 ($6.64 adjusted for inflation), after rising 8% in a month as wars in the Middle East and Europe constrain production and global supplies. The gap between diesel and crude oil prices has hit a record high.
  • For the Oil Market, the Strait of Hormuz Isn’t Closed — Tanker tracking data identify at least 5m barrels a day of oil still transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and allowing for vessels crossing undetected the true figure could reach 7m–9m. Growing oil spills visible on satellite imagery indicate attacks on tankers alongside efforts to keep the waterway open.
  • U.S. Economy Less Vulnerable To Geopolitical Oil Price Shocks Than In The Past — The United States became a net oil exporter in late 2019, and oil and oil product spending fell from near 8% of GDP in 1980 to 3% in 2024. The authors estimate a 15% global oil supply disruption would now cut annualized U.S. real GDP growth by 0.3pp, versus 1.7pp in the rest of the world.

Friday, August 21, 2026

AI Summary. Two market-based measures suggest the safety premium investors pay to hold US Treasuries has compressed toward zero and at times reversed: the spread between top-rated corporate bonds and Treasuries after stripping out default risk, and the gap between currency-hedged foreign G10 government yields and Treasury yields at the same maturity, where longer-maturity comparisons now favor foreign bonds.

Hanno Lustig Aspen Economic Strategy Group
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Lustig shows the premium investors pay for Treasurys over substitutes such as AAA corporate debt and G10 sovereign debt has compressed post 2020. “Investors are now indifferent between [Treasurys] and close substitutes.”

Is the safety premium investors pay for Treasuries disappearing?

Core argument: The credit risk-adjusted AAA-Treasury spread, built by using credit default swaps to strip default-risk compensation out of corporate-bond yields, estimates the safety premium investors pay for Treasurys; since 2022 it has compressed toward zero and at points reversed.

The top panel uses the credit risk-adjusted AAA-Treasury spread. We use the CDS to strip the default-risk compensation out of the corporate-bond yield. What remains is a clean estimate of the safety premium that investors pay for Treasurys over otherwise-equivalent corporate exposure. Post-2022, it has compressed toward zero, and at points, has reversed. The bottom panel uses the Treasury Premium, defined as the difference between the synthetic-dollar foreign sovereign yield and the US Treasury yield at the same maturity. The synthetic-dollar foreign yield is constructed by swapping the coupon payments on foreign G10 sovereign bonds into dollars using the foreign-exchange forward market. This eliminates currency risk over the life of the bond, so the resulting dollar cash-flow stream is directly comparable to a US Treasury yield of the same maturity. At longer maturities, global investors now seem to prefer the safety of foreign G10 bonds.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The credit risk-adjusted AAA-Treasury spread, built by using credit default swaps to strip default-risk compensation out of corporate-bond yields, estimates the safety premium investors pay for Treasurys; since 2022 it has compressed toward zero and at points reversed.
  2. The Treasury Premium, the gap between synthetic-dollar G10 sovereign yields — foreign sovereign coupons swapped into dollars via the foreign-exchange forward market to eliminate currency risk — and US Treasury yields at the same maturity, suggests global investors now prefer foreign G10 bonds at longer maturities.

Related Articles:

  • The United States Capital Structure — Because Social Security and Medicare benefits are politically untouchable, retirees effectively hold the most senior claim on US government resources while Treasury bondholders hold the riskiest one. On this argument, bondholders absorb adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or both.
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • U.S. Treasury Investors Are Long in AI — The authors find U.S. government debt has a large positive productivity beta, because the tax code makes federal revenue highly sensitive to productivity growth while spending commitments change little, leaving bondholders implicitly long productivity growth. They argue greater market confidence in sustained productivity gains from AI could substantially reprice government debt, lowering nominal yields.

AI Summary. Estimated underlying trend job growth slowed to about 5k, below the estimated 50k breakeven pace, so similar readings would likely reverse part of the unemployment rate's decline from 4.5% to 4.1%. The authors argue that decline reflects lower labor force participation rather than higher employment, with wage growth still weak.

Jan Hatzius Goldman Sachs
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The decline in unemployment has been driven by lower labor force participation, not an increase in employment. Hatzius stresses continued weakness in wage growth as evidence that the labor market is not tightening, and sees no hikes on the horizon.

Does the falling unemployment rate signal a tightening labor market?

Core argument: Underlying trend job growth slowed to an estimated 5k in July as nonfarm payrolls and household employment both fell on the month, below the estimated breakeven pace of 50k.

With nonfarm payrolls and household employment down on the month, our estimate of underlying trend job growth slowed further to just 5k in July. Since this is below our estimate of breakeven job growth of 50k, similar numbers in coming months would probably reverse some of the decline in the unemployment rate from 4.5% in December to 4.1% in July. We think this decline deserves less weight than it normally would because it has been driven by lower labor force participation, not higher employment. This is visible not only in the headline employment/population ratio (whose sharp decline is partly driven by changes in the age structure of the population) but to some degree also in a composition-adjusted version that holds the age structure constant over time. The continued weakness in wage growth also argues against the notion that the labor market is tightening.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Underlying trend job growth slowed to an estimated 5k in July as nonfarm payrolls and household employment both fell on the month, below the estimated breakeven pace of 50k.
  2. Similar job gains in coming months would probably reverse some of the decline in the unemployment rate from 4.5% in December to 4.1% in July.
  3. The decline in unemployment deserves less weight because lower labor force participation rather than higher employment has driven it, and continued weak wage growth argues against the notion that the labor market is tightening.

Related Articles:

  • Labor Force Participation Is High If You Measure It Right — The headline labor force participation rate — the share of people 16 and older working or looking for work — is a limited gauge of labor market health because participation varies greatly by age. Aging baby boomers and the addition of nearly 1.7m Americans 65 and older to population estimates add distortion.
  • The Jobless Boom Has Arrived — Corporate earnings have risen faster than stock prices, with earnings excluding Amazon and Alphabet up 32%, evidence against a bubble explanation for the stock market's disconnect from GDP. Bank of America calculates median S&P 500 earnings growth has accelerated to 13% from 8%, with real revenue up around 8%.
  • AI, Immigration, and Collapsing Labor Force Participation — As labor force participation falls, a shrinking group of workers generates the income, taxes, and innovation supporting a growing number of non-workers, leaving the economy more fragile because labor shocks are concentrated among fewer participants. Labor scarcity raises the return on automation, robotics, and software, making growth depend on productivity rather than participation.

AI Summary. More than 60% of Americans oppose new data centers in their area, up from 49% earlier in the year, according to a University of Pennsylvania poll, and dozens of states and localities have imposed bans or pauses on new projects. Texas halted approvals of roughly 1,800 new data centers worth billions of dollars.

Amrith Ramkumar and Sabrina Rodriguez Wall Street Journal
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A UPenn survey found ~60% of Americans oppose new data centers in their area, up from 49% in March. In Texas, previously supportive governor Greg Abbott halted approval of ~1,800 datacenters in the state.

Is public opposition to new data centers rising sharply?

Core argument: More than 60% of Americans oppose new data centers in their area, up from 49% in March, according to a University of Pennsylvania poll.

In November Greg Abbott declared his state the “epicenter of AI development” while announcing a $40 billion investment by Google. Less than a year later, the Republican said he halted approvals of some 1,800 new data centers worth billions of dollars. More than 60% of Americans now oppose new data centers in their area, up from 49% in March, a University of Pennsylvania poll found. The backlash is a crisis for AI companies, which are facing bans or pauses on new projects in dozens of states and localities. [The bans or pauses] pose a risk to investors heading into the 2028 presidential election, analysts at Evercore ISI said in a note to clients.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. More than 60% of Americans oppose new data centers in their area, up from 49% in March, according to a University of Pennsylvania poll.
  2. Texas Governor Greg Abbott, who declared his state the "epicenter of AI development" while announcing a $40 billion Google investment, said he halted approvals of some 1,800 new data centers worth billions of dollars.
  3. Evercore ISI analysts told clients that bans or pauses on new data center projects across dozens of states and localities pose a risk to investors heading into the 2028 presidential election.

Related Articles:

  • AI is the Democratic Party’s Next Villain — Mentions of billionaires in Democratic fundraising emails quadrupled to a peak above 20% of all emails sent and have held near 15%, making anti-billionaire messaging a mainstay. Anti-AI populism remains far smaller and is entering Democratic rhetoric not as a jobs or safety issue but as something billionaires are building.
  • This Doommaxxing Has Got to Stop — The author argues that negative narratives, including pessimism about new technology, played an underappreciated role in the economic climate of the Great Depression, alongside more widely studied causes such as sweeping bank failures, a weak initial Federal Reserve response, and a tariff regime that reduced global trade.
  • America’s Data Center Build-Out Is Falling Way Behind Schedule — A JPMorgan analysis found that more than 60% of US data-center capacity planned for completion in 2027 has not yet begun construction, with another 7% delayed. Analysts and power-industry experts say Google's strategy of owning generation—including its $4.75bn purchase of wind and solar developer Intersect—and shifting computing loads to follow power supply could speed its grid connections.

AI Summary. Israel is the only affluent democracy where estimated fertility rose over the past generation, from 2.9 births per woman in 1991 to 3 in 2021, driven by a rise in Jewish fertility from about 2.6 in 1995 to 3.1 in 2024. Excluding the Haredi community, fertility among secular, traditional and national-religious Jews averages about 2.5.

Nicholas Eberstadt and Patrick Norrick American Enterprise Institute
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The rise in Israeli Jewish fertility is an exception to the collapse across advanced economies. TFR is 1.9 among secular Jews, 2.1–2.7 among traditional Jews and 3.7 among Dati Jews. Eberstadt suggests mimetics—social imitation—may help explain it.

Is there an affluent democracy where fertility has risen?

Core argument: Israel is the only affluent democracy where estimated total fertility rose over the past generation, edging up from 2.9 in 1991 to 3 in 2021, powered wholly by Jewish fertility rising from about 2.6 in 1995 to 3.1 in 2024.

[Israel is] the lone affluent democracy where national fertility (estimated TFR) actually rose over the past generation (albeit slightly—from 2.9 in 1991 to 3 in 2021). This was powered wholly by a rise in Jewish fertility, from about 2.6 births per woman in 1995 to 3.1 in 2024. In 2022–24 fertility in Israel was over 20% higher for Jews than Muslims. Much has been made of Israel’s extraordinarily prolific Haredi community and its six-plus-children-per-woman estimated TFR. But fertility for the rest of Israeli Jewry is unique for modernity too. For secular, natural-religious and traditional Jews combined, the current average TFR is about 2.5 births per woman. And for secular Israeli Jews, per se, it is almost two births per woman.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Israel is the only affluent democracy where estimated total fertility rose over the past generation, edging up from 2.9 in 1991 to 3 in 2021, powered wholly by Jewish fertility rising from about 2.6 in 1995 to 3.1 in 2024.
  2. Israeli Jewish fertility in 2022–24 ran over 20% higher than Israeli Muslim fertility.
  3. Beyond Israel's Haredi community, whose estimated TFR exceeds six children per woman, secular, natural-religious and traditional Jews combined average about 2.5 births per woman, with secular Israeli Jews alone at almost two.

Related Articles:

  • Terra Incognita: The Economics of a Shrinking World — Global fertility is likely below the replacement level needed to keep population constant in the long run, though population momentum from large cohorts of women now having children means world population will keep growing for roughly another 30 years. Unless trends change, it is projected to peak near 9bn around 2056 and then decline.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
  • The Worldwide Fertility Crash Is Bringing Countries Back to Pre-Industrial Birth Levels — Japan's annual births have fallen to roughly a quarter of their 1947 peak — about 686,000 versus over 2.7m — and are also below the level recorded in 1873, when Japan first began collecting such numbers. Fertility levels around the world are still falling.