Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, August 19, 2026

AI Summary. The US Treasury announced it is at least doubling the size of its liquidity support buyback operations for government debt maturing in 10 to 30 years, following long-dated yields reaching their highest levels in years. Yields on the longest bond fell nearly 10 basis points to 5.185%.

Michael MacKenzie and Greg Ritchie Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The US Treasury “unexpectedly” announced it is “at least doubling” buybacks of 10-year to 30-year bonds in the hope of stemming rises in yields. Yields on the 30-year fell ~10bps to 5.185% in response, pulling back from their highest level since 2007.

Does the Treasury increase debt buybacks when long-term yields rise?

Core argument: The US Treasury said it is "increasing, by at least double, the size of liquidity support buyback operations" for securities in the 10-year to 30-year sector, an unexpected announcement two weeks after it released the quarter's planned buyback schedule.

The US Treasury unexpectedly announced it’s ramping up buybacks of long-dated government debt, taking the action in the wake of yields on such securities hitting the highest levels in years. Just two weeks after releasing its planned schedule for buybacks this quarter, the Treasury Department on Wednesday said it’s “increasing, by at least double, the size of liquidity support buyback operations” for securities dated from the 10-year to the 30-year sector. Yields on the longest bond dropped nearly 10 basis points to 5.185%, pulling back from their highest level since 2007.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US Treasury said it is "increasing, by at least double, the size of liquidity support buyback operations" for securities in the 10-year to 30-year sector, an unexpected announcement two weeks after it released the quarter's planned buyback schedule.
  2. Yields on the longest-dated Treasury bond fell nearly 10 basis points to 5.185%, pulling back from their highest level since 2007.
  3. The Treasury's move to ramp up buybacks of long-dated government debt followed yields on such securities reaching their highest levels in years.

Related Articles:

  • US Bond Selloff Drives 30-Year Yields to Highest Since 2007 — The yield on 30-year US Treasury bonds rose to as high as 5.34%, its highest level since 2007, amid investor concern over rising government spending, heavy sales of long-dated bonds, and inflation that has run above the Federal Reserve's target for five years. Long-term yields also rose in Canada and Europe.
  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
  • The Coming Great Repression? — Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.

AI Summary. There is little evidence that fears of a Greek-style solvency crisis are driving U.S. interest rates, since long-term "breakeven" inflation expectations have changed little. Prices for credit default swaps, which insure against a U.S. government default, have also moved little.

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:

Citing the stable long-term breakeven inflation rate and minimal rise in Treasury CDS prices, Krugman argues that high long-term rates reflect heavy federal borrowing, but not fears of outright default or inflation-induced debasement.

Are bond markets signaling fears about government solvency?

Core argument: Bond markets show very little evidence that fears of a Greek-style solvency crisis are driving U.S. interest rates.

There is very little evidence that fears of a Greek-style crisis are driving interest rates now. For example, if markets were really worried about U.S. solvency and the potential for the government to inflate the debt away, this should be reflected in measures that track inflation. But there has been, in fact, very little change in the “breakeven” inflation rate, a measure of long-term inflation expectations. Another indicator is the price of credit default swaps — insurance against a possible US default. These also haven’t moved much.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bond markets show very little evidence that fears of a Greek-style solvency crisis are driving U.S. interest rates.
  2. The breakeven inflation rate, a measure of long-term inflation expectations, has changed very little, which would be expected to move if markets feared the U.S. government would inflate away its debt.
  3. Prices of credit default swaps, which insure against a possible U.S. default, also have not moved much.

Related Articles:

  • US Bond Selloff Drives 30-Year Yields to Highest Since 2007 — The yield on 30-year US Treasury bonds rose to as high as 5.34%, its highest level since 2007, amid investor concern over rising government spending, heavy sales of long-dated bonds, and inflation that has run above the Federal Reserve's target for five years. Long-term yields also rose in Canada and Europe.
  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
  • AI Is Driving Up Treasury Yields: ‘It Just Touches Everything’ — Investment-grade companies have sold nearly $1.5tn of bonds, up 36% from a year earlier, and some investors have sold US Treasuries to buy higher-yielding corporate debt. Bank of America economists estimate the surge in corporate-debt sales, along with more mortgage-backed securities issuance, pushed 10-year rates up by about 0.3 percentage point.

AI Summary. Inflation-protected U.S. Treasury yields rose from about 3.5% in early 1997 to about 4.5% by 2000, compared with roughly 2.4% on the 10-year and 3% on the 30-year today. The author argues that this 1990s experience helps calibrate expectations if new software technologies produce a comparable acceleration in productivity growth.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:

Klein compares measures of real rates from the 1990s productivity boom to today’s real rates, using TIPS, as well as “synthetic TIPS” derived by subtracting inflation expectations from nominal rates. Current real rates are very low by comparison.

Would faster productivity growth from new software technologies push real yields higher?

Core argument: Real yields on TIPS were roughly 3.5% when the securities were introduced at the start of 1997 and rose gradually to about 4.5% by the peak of the bubble in 2000.

Real yields on actual TIPS were ~3.5% when they first arrived at the beginning of 1997, and then rose gradually to ~4.5% by the peak of the bubble in 2000. Yields on “synthetic” TIPS derived by removing estimates of inflation expectations from nominal yields were also around 3.5% in early 1997 and 4.5% in the first half of 2000, though they were more volatile in between. The yield on the benchmark 10y TIPS is currently 2.4% while the yield on the 30y TIPS is around 3%. Knowing what actually happened in the 1990s is helpful for calibrating expectations about what could happen in the next decade, if new software technologies lead to a comparable acceleration in productivity growth.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Real yields on TIPS were roughly 3.5% when the securities were introduced at the start of 1997 and rose gradually to about 4.5% by the peak of the bubble in 2000.
  2. "Synthetic" TIPS yields, derived by stripping estimates of inflation expectations out of nominal yields, also stood near 3.5% in early 1997 and 4.5% in the first half of 2000, with more volatility in between.
  3. The benchmark 10-year TIPS yields 2.4% and the 30-year TIPS around 3%, while the 1990s experience offers a guide for calibrating expectations if new software technologies deliver a comparable acceleration in productivity growth.

Related Articles:

  • AI, Productivity, and Rates: Part I — A San Francisco Federal Reserve model estimates that the growth contribution from rising resource utilization in recent quarters has been larger than in almost any comparable five-quarter stretch since 1947 outside recoveries from downturns. That measure is based on a modified version of the average worker's weekly hours rather than unemployment or capacity utilization.
  • AI and Productivity — The recent pickup in US labor productivity appears driven by higher utilization of existing capital—running factories, server racks, and hotel rooms harder—rather than by firm-level efficiency gains from AI. Adoption remains too thin and the cross-sectional evidence too weak to conclude that AI-driven productivity gains are already widespread.
  • Have We Entered an Era of High Productivity Growth? — Labor productivity has grown solidly while the San Francisco Federal Reserve's total factor productivity index, which adjusts for the equipment and technology workers use, has grown modestly, suggesting gains so far reflect better tools rather than broader advances. A regime-switching model puts the probability of a high-productivity regime at 57% using labor productivity and 21% using total factor productivity.

AI Summary. US diesel pump prices reached $5.47 a gallon, approaching a nominal record of $5.82 ($6.64 adjusted for inflation), after rising 8% in a month as wars in the Middle East and Europe constrain production and global supplies. The gap between diesel and crude oil prices has hit a record high.

Myles McCormick and Jamie Smyth Financial Times
Date Posted:

Diesel prices in the US have risen 8% over the last month to $5.47, largely reflecting a record-high “crack” spread, the premium of diesel over crude.

Are wars abroad driving US diesel prices toward record highs?

Core argument: U.S. pump diesel prices reached $5.47 a gallon on Tuesday, approaching the nominal record of $5.82, equal to $6.64 adjusted for inflation.

The pump price of diesel — the lifeblood of the economy because of its essential role in powering industry and agriculture — hit $5.47 a gallon on Tuesday, approaching its all-time [nominal] high of $5.82 ($6.64 inflation adjusted) as wars in the Middle East and Europe hobble production and throttle global supplies. Prices have jumped 8% in the past month, while the gap between the cost of diesel and crude oil, known as the “crack spread,” has hit a record high in recent days.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. pump diesel prices reached $5.47 a gallon on Tuesday, approaching the nominal record of $5.82, equal to $6.64 adjusted for inflation.
  2. Diesel prices have risen 8% over the past month as wars in the Middle East and Europe hobble production and throttle global supplies.
  3. The "crack spread," the gap between diesel and crude oil prices, has hit a record high, with diesel powering industry and agriculture.

Related Articles:

  • Why Isn’t the Price of Oil Even Higher? — The gap between crude oil prices and the prices of refined products has widened by about $35/barrel, because much of the world's refining capacity is either trapped behind the Strait of Hormuz or knocked offline by drone strikes. That refining shortage holds crude prices down, since buyers won't pay high prices for oil they cannot refine.
  • For the Oil Market, the Strait of Hormuz Isn’t Closed — Tanker tracking data identify at least 5m barrels a day of oil still transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and allowing for vessels crossing undetected the true figure could reach 7m–9m. Growing oil spills visible on satellite imagery indicate attacks on tankers alongside efforts to keep the waterway open.
  • U.S. Economy Less Vulnerable To Geopolitical Oil Price Shocks Than In The Past — The United States became a net oil exporter in late 2019, and oil and oil product spending fell from near 8% of GDP in 1980 to 3% in 2024. The authors estimate a 15% global oil supply disruption would now cut annualized U.S. real GDP growth by 0.3pp, versus 1.7pp in the rest of the world.

AI Summary. China's jobless rate for 16-to-24-year-olds excluding students rose to 17.9% from 14.9% the prior month, according to the National Bureau of Statistics, as a record wave of university graduates entered an already crowded labor market.

Sherry Wang South China Morning Post
Date Posted:

China’s youth unemployment (16–24) climbed to 17.9% in July, on par with July 2025 and up 3pp from the previous month, as 12.7mm new university graduates entered the workforce – ~4% more than last year, superimposed on a slowing economy.

Is China's youth unemployment rising as record graduates enter the labor market?

Core argument: China's jobless rate for those aged 16–24 excluding students rose to 17.9% in July, up 3 percentage points from 14.9% in June, as a record wave of university graduates entered an already crowded labour market, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.

China’s youth jobless rate climbed to 17.9% in July, as a record wave of university graduates enters an already crowded labour market. The jobless rate for those aged 16 to 24, excluding students, rose 3 percentage points from 14.9% in June – the last of three straight months of contraction – according to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics on Wednesday. The rate last July was 17.8% and it then climbed to 18.9% the following month – the highest level since Beijing revised its methodology to exclude students in December 2023.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's jobless rate for those aged 16–24 excluding students rose to 17.9% in July, up 3 percentage points from 14.9% in June, as a record wave of university graduates entered an already crowded labour market, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.
  2. June's 14.9% reading marked the last of three straight months of contraction in China's youth jobless rate, according to National Bureau of Statistics data.
  3. China's youth jobless rate stood at 17.8% last July before climbing to 18.9% the following month, the highest level since Beijing revised its methodology to exclude students in December 2023.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Great Jobs Squeeze — China's "flexible employment" — a loosely defined official category spanning part-time work, self-employment, and new work forms — is estimated at 320mn people, up from 280mn a year earlier, with more than 53mn working as food delivery or ridesharing drivers. Analysts argue this reflects broad labour-market weakness, as low aggregate demand weakens workers' bargaining power.
  • The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism — About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.
  • Chinese Student High-Flyers Set Sights On Police and Military Academies — High-achieving Chinese high school graduates are increasingly applying to police and military academies and other schools offering a clear path to public-sector jobs, pushing required entrance-exam scores up. Some programs now demand more than 650 points out of 750, rivaling the least competitive courses at China's most prestigious universities.

Thursday, August 20, 2026

AI Summary. US Treasuries erased nearly all gains that followed the Treasury Department's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, with the 30-year yield rising above 5.27% and the 10-year touching 4.71%. The reversal signals the move has done little to ease concern about surging government debt.

Michael MacKenzie and Alice Gledhill Bloomberg
Date Posted:
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The 30-year yield rose ~7bps to as much as 5.27%, and the 10-year yield hit 4.71%, erasing “almost all” the gains that followed Treasury’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds.

Do bigger bond buybacks ease concerns about surging government debt?

Core argument: The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.

US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, signaling the move has done little to alleviate the angst about the surging government debt that has pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades. The 30-year yield on Thursday rose over seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, where it was just ahead of the US Treasury Department’s announcement early Wednesday, before paring the gain. The 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.
  2. US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, suggesting the move has done little to alleviate angst about surging government debt.
  3. The US 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025, as angst over government debt pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades.

Related Articles:

  • Bessent Boosts Debt Buybacks After Climb in Treasury Yields — The US Treasury announced it is at least doubling the size of its liquidity support buyback operations for government debt maturing in 10 to 30 years, following long-dated yields reaching their highest levels in years. Yields on the longest bond fell nearly 10 basis points to 5.185%.
  • The Coming Great Repression? — Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
  • The United States Capital Structure — Because Social Security and Medicare benefits are politically untouchable, retirees effectively hold the most senior claim on US government resources while Treasury bondholders hold the riskiest one. On this argument, bondholders absorb adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or both.

AI Summary. A US Treasury intervention in the bond market pushed the 30-year yield down eight basis points before it returned to roughly its prior level, while the dollar fell below its 200-day moving average and gold posted its best day in six months. The author argues only an unequivocal move to reduce the deficit will bring yields down.

John Authers Bloomberg
Date Posted:

Reacting to Bessent’s effort to bring down the long end of the yield curve, Authors warns that in the absence of fiscal consolidation, “yields aren’t coming down.”

Can Treasury intervention lower long-term yields without deficit reduction?

Core argument: The 30-year Treasury yield, at its highest since the eve of the 2007 crisis, fell eight basis points after Bessent's intervention before returning essentially to its prior level, leaving the upward trend intact.

The 30-year yield — at its highest since the eve of the crisis in 2007 — dropped eight basis points [in response to Bessent’s intervention, later returning essentially to its previous level.] But the upward trend remains intact. Investors heeded Bessent’s warning flare, but told him he would need to do much more to ease conditions substantially. The maneuver did have a dramatic impact on the dollar, which had its worst day in months and dropped below its 200-day moving average. Gold was the clearest tell that investors are concerned by Bessent’s move. Wednesday’s intervention drove the metal’s best day in six months, bringing it back up to the 200-day moving average. More maneuvers like this will likely weaken the dollar further and increase the pressure on a central bank whose independence is currently in question. It remains hard to see what gets bond yields down other than an unequivocal move to reduce the deficit. The more it hurts politically, the more seriously it will be taken. Without any pain, it appears, yields aren’t coming down.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The 30-year Treasury yield, at its highest since the eve of the 2007 crisis, fell eight basis points after Bessent's intervention before returning essentially to its prior level, leaving the upward trend intact.
  2. The dollar had its worst day in months and dropped below its 200-day moving average following Bessent's maneuver, while gold posted its best day in six months, returning to its own 200-day moving average.
  3. Further maneuvers of this kind will likely weaken the dollar and increase pressure on a central bank whose independence is in question, and it remains hard to see what lowers bond yields other than an unequivocal move to reduce the deficit.

Related Articles:

  • The Coming Great Repression? — Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
  • The United States Capital Structure — Because Social Security and Medicare benefits are politically untouchable, retirees effectively hold the most senior claim on US government resources while Treasury bondholders hold the riskiest one. On this argument, bondholders absorb adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or both.
  • Fiscal Dominance and the Return of Zero-Interest Bank Reserve Requirements — Fiscal dominance requires governments to fund deficits at the margin with non-interest-bearing debt, and the revenue from inflation taxation—both expected and unexpected—is limited. The authors argue a US fiscal dominance episode could end the payment of interest on bank reserves and restore requirements that banks hold large zero-interest reserves against deposits.

AI Summary. A U.S. Treasury buyback of long-dated off-the-run bonds produced only a small decline in long-term yields that was subsequently reversed, leaving the upward trend in yields intact. The dollar fell steeply against both developed-market and emerging-market currencies while gold and other precious metals rose, suggesting markets are positioned for further dollar debasement.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:

As Treasury intervened to lower long bond yields yesterday, the dollar fell against G10 and EM currencies. Brooks fears Treasury’s move is the “clearest sign yet that the US is following Japan on its path towards currency debasement.”

Do bond buybacks lower long-term yields or weaken the dollar?

Core argument: The Treasury's buyback of long-dated off-the-run bonds produced only a small decline in yields that was subsequently completely reversed, leaving the upward trend in long-term yields in place, in the author's assessment.

The key question is whether the Treasury got a good bang for the buck yesterday [from its intervention in the market for long-dated off-the-run bonds]. I’m not sure it did. This thing fell but the drop isn’t going to impress anyone. [It was subsequently completely reversed]. The upward trend in long-term yields is clearly still in place. The dollar absolutely cratered against the G10 (blue line) and EM (black line). Furthermore, gold jumped yesterday, as did other precious metals. Markets are primed for dollar debasement to resume and - as Japan shows - it can be next to impossible to stabilize a currency once it enters a devaluation spiral. The US is playing with fire with this buyback.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Treasury's buyback of long-dated off-the-run bonds produced only a small decline in yields that was subsequently completely reversed, leaving the upward trend in long-term yields in place, in the author's assessment.
  2. The dollar fell sharply against both G10 and emerging-market currencies following the Treasury's intervention, while gold and other precious metals jumped.
  3. The author argues markets are primed for dollar debasement to resume and that, as Japan shows, stabilizing a currency once it enters a devaluation spiral is next to impossible.

Related Articles:

  • Peak Dollar Strength — Net positioning across major currencies shows markets are broadly long the US dollar. The author argues this bullishness is misplaced because the Federal Reserve is less hawkish than markets assume and falling oil prices should pull inflation down, leaving the dollar at peak strength.
  • The Dollar’s Hidden Dependence on the AI Trade — Net foreign inflows into US equities have reached a record high, driven in large part by overseas investors seeking artificial intelligence exposure unavailable in their home markets. Because most foreign equity investors leave currency risk unhedged, a pullback in these inflows if AI disappoints poses a significant downside risk to the US dollar.
  • The Real Message In The Yen Intervention — A US-backed intervention to support the yen was funded largely by selling euros rather than dollars, limiting the volume of dollar sales required. The author argues this signals that Washington, fearing the consequences for US financial markets, is reluctant to see foreign central banks deploy their dollar reserves in unlimited quantities.

AI Summary. An analysis of X (formerly Twitter) posts finds that the share of sentences expressing anger rose among both Democratic- and Republican-affiliated users, with Republicans starting from a higher baseline of about 38% versus 27% for Democrats and reaching roughly 50%. The increase was larger among Democrats, narrowing the partisan gap.

Eva Davoine, Stefanie Stantcheva, Thomas Renault and Yann Algan Harvard University
Date Posted:
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Davoine, et al. show that angry policy-related tweets among voters rose from 34% to 46% over 2013–2025. Angry posts got ~60% more retweets, and experiments that induced anger showed it can move views on trade, immigration, redistribution and climate.

Is anger rising among partisans on social media?

Core argument: Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.

Figure 6 illustrates the monthly evolution of anger among Democratic- and Republican-affiliated X [Twitter] users. Each line reports the share of sentences classified as expressing anger within each political affiliation, and the plotted series are shown as six-month moving averages. It shows that Republican voters start with a higher baseline level of anger at the beginning of the period (about 38% compared to 27% for Democrats). Anger rises sharply for both groups after the 2016 election, but much more among Democrats. As a result, the initial partisan gap is much smaller by 2019. Both series then plateau from 2019 to 2022. Among Democratic partisans, anger declines slightly after Biden’s election but remains well above pre-2016 levels. Republican anger continues to rise during the Biden presidency, reaching approximately 50% by 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.
  2. Democratic-affiliated X users start with anger in about 27% of sentences, then rise sharply after the 2016 election by much more than Republicans, narrowing the partisan gap by 2019.
  3. Both partisan anger series plateau from 2019 to 2022, with Democratic anger declining slightly after Biden's election while remaining well above pre-2016 levels.

Related Articles:

  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.

AI Summary. A large survey found symptoms of cannabis use disorder rose to more than 9% of men and nearly 6% of women, up from about 7% and 5% three years earlier, as cannabis use increased among adults overall. About 30% of cannabis users showed disorder symptoms, versus under 20% of drinkers for alcohol.

Roni Caryn Rabin New York Times
Date Posted:

A study of 186,823 Americans found 26% of men and 21% of women reported using cannabis in 2024, up 4 and 3pp respectively from 2021; 9% of men and 6% of women reported symptoms of cannabis use disorder.

Is problem cannabis use rising as more Americans use the drug?

Core argument: More than 9% of men reported symptoms of cannabis use disorder in 2024, up from about 7% in 2021, while prevalence among women rose to nearly 6% from about 5%, according to a large study.

A growing number of Americans say their cannabis use is problematic, according to a large new study [which found] more than 9% of the men reported symptoms of cannabis use disorder in 2024, up from about 7% in 2021. The prevalence of cannabis use disorder also rose among women, increasing to nearly 6% in 2024, up from about 5% in 2021. Symptoms of the disorder include not being able to cut back or quit, or continuing to use the drug despite it leading to interpersonal problems. Overall, cannabis use rose among all adults during this time. In 2024, 26% of men reported using the drug, up from 22% in 2021. Among women, 21% said they used cannabis in 2024, up from nearly 18% in 2021. Of the survey participants who said they used cannabis, about 30% showed symptoms consistent with cannabis use disorder. Those findings suggested that those who used cannabis were at higher risk of developing problematic use than those who drank alcohol, as fewer than 20% of those who reported drinking in the survey showed symptoms of alcohol use disorder.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. More than 9% of men reported symptoms of cannabis use disorder in 2024, up from about 7% in 2021, while prevalence among women rose to nearly 6% from about 5%, according to a large study.
  2. Cannabis use rose among U.S. adults, with 26% of men reporting use in 2024 versus 22% in 2021, and 21% of women versus nearly 18%.
  3. About 30% of survey participants who used cannabis showed symptoms consistent with cannabis use disorder, compared with fewer than 20% of those who reported drinking showing symptoms of alcohol use disorder, suggesting higher risk of problematic use.

Related Articles:

  • As America’s Marijuana Use Grows, So Do the Harms — An analysis of federal survey data estimates that about 18m US adults — nearly a third of adult cannabis users — report symptoms of cannabis use disorder, with roughly 3m considered addicted. Among those aged 18 to 25, the cannabis use disorder rate of 16.6% matches the alcohol use disorder rate of 15.1%.
  • Disconnected: The Growing Class Divide in American Civic Life — 17% of Americans report having no close friends, and survey data show a wide educational gap: 24% of those with a high school education or less have no close friends versus 10% of college graduates. Three decades ago, Americans with less formal education reported social circles at least as large.
  • The Case for Prohibiting Vice — A record 62m Americans used marijuana in a single year, 17m of them daily or near daily, while half of American men now hold sports-betting accounts, up from almost zero seven years earlier. The author argues vice and addiction undermine citizens' capacity for free action, justifying state regulation beyond individual-harm criteria.

AI Summary. Iran's economy is on track for its largest annual contraction since the mid-1980s, with inflation above 50% — the highest in nearly 70 years of records — and food and other necessities costing double a year earlier. Its currency has fallen to a record low of about 1.85m rials per dollar on the black market.

Javier Blas Bloomberg
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Inflation in Iran is running at at least ~69%, its highest annual rate in 70 years. The black market exchange value of a rial hit a record low of ~1.85mm rials to the dollar, relative to 50,000 per dollar five years ago.

Is Iran's economy contracting at its fastest rate in decades?

Core argument: Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.

[Iran's] economy is on track to suffer the biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s. Inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records start nearly 70 years ago. Worse, the cost of food and other necessities has already doubled from a year ago. Its currency, the rial, is worthless. In the black market, the exchange rate has collapsed to a record low of about 1.85 million rials to the dollar; five years ago, roughly 50,000 rials were enough to buy a greenback.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.
  2. Iranian inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records began nearly 70 years ago, with the cost of food and other necessities already double year-ago levels.
  3. The rial has fallen to a record low of about 1.85 million to the dollar on the black market, compared with roughly 50,000 rials per dollar five years ago.

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