Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Tuesday, August 18, 2026

AI Summary. The yield on 30-year US Treasury bonds rose to as high as 5.34%, its highest level since 2007, amid investor concern over rising government spending, heavy sales of long-dated bonds, and inflation that has run above the Federal Reserve's target for five years. Long-term yields also rose in Canada and Europe.

Greg Ritchie Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The 30-year Treasury yield climbed more than 5bps to as high as 5.34%, its highest level since 2007.

Are rising government spending and inflation pushing long-term yields higher?

Core argument: The 30-year US Treasury yield rose five basis points to as high as 5.34%, surpassing the prior month's high and reaching its highest level since 2007.

The yield on 30-year US Treasuries hit the highest in almost two decades, reflecting investor angst over surging government spending, a flood of long-dated bond sales, and inflation that has been stuck over the Federal Reserve’s target for the past five years. The interest rate on the so-called long bond rose five basis points to as high as 5.34%, surpassing a high from last month to reach the loftiest since 2007. The move was echoed in the Canadian bond market, where the yield on 30-year securities rose to the highest since 2010, as well as in those in Europe.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The 30-year US Treasury yield rose five basis points to as high as 5.34%, surpassing the prior month's high and reaching its highest level since 2007.
  2. The long-bond selloff reflects investor angst over surging government spending, a flood of long-dated bond sales, and inflation stuck above the Federal Reserve's target for the past five years.
  3. Canada's 30-year bond yield rose to its highest since 2010, with European long-dated yields echoing the move.

Related Articles:

  • AI Is Driving Up Treasury Yields: ‘It Just Touches Everything’ — Investment-grade companies have sold nearly $1.5tn of bonds, up 36% from a year earlier, and some investors have sold US Treasuries to buy higher-yielding corporate debt. Bank of America economists estimate the surge in corporate-debt sales, along with more mortgage-backed securities issuance, pushed 10-year rates up by about 0.3 percentage point.
  • U.S. Treasury Investors Are Long in AI — The authors find U.S. government debt has a large positive productivity beta, because the tax code makes federal revenue highly sensitive to productivity growth while spending commitments change little, leaving bondholders implicitly long productivity growth. They argue greater market confidence in sustained productivity gains from AI could substantially reprice government debt, lowering nominal yields.
  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.

AI Summary. The author proposes a medium-run natural interest rate measure that averages short-run projections with more weight on fluctuations up to five years ahead, and estimates the current medium-run real natural rate at about 1.5%. With the federal funds target at 3.5–3.75% and inflation near 3%, the implied real rate of 0.5–0.75% suggests a somewhat accommodative policy stance.

Vasco Cúrdia Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Date Posted:

Curdia estimates the US medium-run real natural rate over the next 2 years is ~1.5%, up from .84% in Q4 2019. With FFR at ~3.5 to 3.75%, and inflation at ~3%, the real rate is .5 to .75bps below the natural rate, and policy is accommodative.

Is current monetary policy accommodative relative to the medium-run natural rate?

Core argument: The medium-run real natural rate of interest is estimated at approximately 1.5%, above the implied real federal funds rate of 0.5–0.75% derived from a 3.5–3.75% target and 3% inflation, suggesting a somewhat accommodative policy stance.

Short-run estimates of the natural rate track recent economic developments closely but are notoriously volatile and imprecise. Long-run estimates that reflect the expected natural rate after temporary economic pressures fade are more stable but provide limited guidance for current policy decisions. I propose a medium-run measure that averages short-run natural rate projections into the future, putting more weight on fluctuations up to five years ahead. The medium-run natural rate estimate captures the lowest points of economic activity, known as business cycle troughs, in the early 2000s, the 2008 financial crisis, and the 2020 pandemic. During the 2008 financial crisis,the medium-run natural rate fell nearly 5 percentage points in the first year, driven primarily by persistent disruptions from the financial crisis. The current estimate of the medium-run real natural rate is approximately 1.5%. With the federal funds rate target at 3.5 to 3.75% and inflation hovering at 3%, the implied real rate of 0.5 to 0.75% is below the natural rate, which suggests a somewhat accommodative monetary policy stance.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The medium-run real natural rate of interest is estimated at approximately 1.5%, above the implied real federal funds rate of 0.5–0.75% derived from a 3.5–3.75% target and 3% inflation, suggesting a somewhat accommodative policy stance.
  2. The proposed medium-run measure averages short-run natural rate projections into the future with more weight on fluctuations up to five years ahead, capturing business cycle troughs in the early 2000s, the 2008 financial crisis, and the 2020 pandemic.
  3. During the 2008 financial crisis, the medium-run natural rate fell nearly 5 percentage points in the first year, driven primarily by persistent disruptions from the crisis.

Related Articles:

  • The Post‑Pandemic Global R* — Using an econometric model extracting the common trend in real interest rates across advanced economies, the authors estimate that the global neutral real interest rate fell about 3.5 percentage points from 1990 to 2019, then rose about 1 percentage point after COVID, leaving global and U.S. estimates near 0.5%.
  • Recent Movements in R*: The Most Important Interest Rate That You Have Never Heard Of — The natural rate of interest — the inflation-adjusted rate prevailing when the economy grows at trend with inflation at target — is unobservable and uncertain, but most estimates have risen and sit above pre-pandemic levels. The data lean toward a long-run natural rate higher than pre-pandemic and possibly above Federal Reserve projections.
  • The Race Between Asset Supply and Asset Demand — The authors estimate that demand for assets has outpaced supply by roughly 400% of GDP versus 100%, making rising asset demand the leading contributor to falling interest rates. They project that debt sustainability requires fiscal consolidation exceeding 10% of GDP, though debt could reach 250% of GDP without raising interest rates.

AI Summary. Long-term forward bond yields, which began rising when central banks raised rates to counter pandemic-era inflation, are now being driven by risk and term premia rather than expectations for monetary policy. Countries with high debt and political dysfunction, including Japan, the UK, and France, are affected more than low-debt countries such as Switzerland.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:

Contrasting high-debt countries, on the one hand, with Switzerland and a few other low-debt outliers on the other, Brooks infers that the rise in 10y10y forward yields globally is “all about risk and term premia, not monetary policy expectations.”

Are rising long-term yields now driven by risk premia rather than policy?

Core argument: Long-term global yields, measured by 10y10y forwards, began rising in 2022 as central banks hiked to rein in COVID inflation, but the increase has shifted from front-end-driven to long-term yields rising autonomously.

The chart shows what’s going on with 10y10y forward yields. Long-term yields started rising in 2022 when central banks were hiking to rein in COVID inflation. That rise was driven by the front end of the yield curve, but that’s morphed into long-term yields rising autonomously. What’s happening now is all about risk and term premia, not monetary policy expectations. Countries with lots of debt and political dysfunction - like Japan, the UK, and France - are being hit harder than others. Initial conditions turn out to be massively important. The only outlier in all this is Switzerland and a handful of other low-debt countries. The benefits of responsible fiscal policy and things like Germany’s debt brake (that’s been hollowed out in recent years) have never been more apparent.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Long-term global yields, measured by 10y10y forwards, began rising in 2022 as central banks hiked to rein in COVID inflation, but the increase has shifted from front-end-driven to long-term yields rising autonomously.
  2. The rise in long-term yields now reflects risk and term premia rather than monetary policy expectations, with heavily indebted, politically dysfunctional countries such as Japan, the UK, and France hit harder than others.
  3. Switzerland and a handful of other low-debt countries stand as outliers to the global rise in long-term yields, pointing to the benefits of responsible fiscal policy and measures like Germany's debt brake, which has been hollowed out in recent years.

Related Articles:

  • The Coming Great Repression? — Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • Global Debt Report 2026 — Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.

AI Summary. American Time Use Survey diary data show that on an average day in 2023, one in 10 Americans aged 23 to 29 spent no time interacting face to face with another person. The most isolated group's time around others fell from roughly a third of the day to essentially zero.

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
Date Posted:

According to American Time Use Survey data, on a three-year rolling average basis in 2023, 10% of Americans aged between 23 and 29 reported spending zero time interacting face-to-face with another person.

How isolated have young Americans become in daily face-to-face contact?

Core argument: On an average day in 2023, one in 10 Americans aged 23–29 spent no time at all interacting face to face with another person, according to American Time Use Survey diary data.

While exploring data from the American Time Use Survey, which draws on detailed diaries to track how and with whom people spend every minute of a randomly selected day, I came across the following: on an average day in 2023, one in 10 young Americans aged between 23 and 29 did not spend a single minute interacting face to face with another person. The most socially connected quarter of young people used to spend 87% of their day with other people, whether family, friends, co-workers, or others. During the pandemic, that dipped to 78%, but it has rebounded to 83%. The most isolated segment used to still spend roughly a third of their day around others, but that has now collapsed to essentially zero.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. On an average day in 2023, one in 10 Americans aged 23–29 spent no time at all interacting face to face with another person, according to American Time Use Survey diary data.
  2. The most isolated segment of young Americans once spent roughly a third of the day around other people, a share that has collapsed to essentially zero.
  3. The most socially connected quarter of young Americans spent 87% of the day with others before the pandemic, dipping to 78% during it and rebounding to 83%.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Business records show revenue scale varies widely across industries: of 21,622 new-car dealerships with employees, more than half are estimated to take in at least $5m a year, versus about a quarter of 4,742 beer, wine, and spirits wholesalers and roughly 4% of 780,257 construction businesses.

Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick The Everywhere Millionaire
Date Posted:

Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick estimate that as of 2021, 4,075 American auto dealers, 479 beverage distributors, and 6,418 contractors generated at least $25mm in annual revenue

Which local businesses most often generate millions in revenue?

Core argument: Of the 21,622 new-car dealerships with employees in the Census's County Business Patterns, an estimated more than half take in at least $5 million a year; Dun & Bradstreet records show 13,826 dealer locations above $5 million and 4,114 above $25 million.

There are 21,622 new-car dealerships with employees, according to the Census’s County Business Patterns. We estimate that more than half of them take in at least $5 million a year; in the Dun & Bradstreet business records, 13,826 dealer locations clear $5 million and 4,114 clear $25 million. There are 4,742 beer, wine, and spirits wholesalers with employees, according to the Census’s County Business Patterns. We estimate that about a quarter of them take in at least $5 million a year; in the Dun & Bradstreet business records, 1,232 distributor locations clear $5 million and 491 clear $25 million. There are 780,257 construction businesses with employees, according to the Census’s County Business Patterns—building, heavy civil, and specialty trade contractors. Anyone with a truck and a license can enter. We estimate that only about 4% of them take in at least $5 million a year. In the Dun & Bradstreet business records, 33,752 contractor locations clear $5 million and 6,525 clear $25 million.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Of the 21,622 new-car dealerships with employees in the Census's County Business Patterns, an estimated more than half take in at least $5 million a year; Dun & Bradstreet records show 13,826 dealer locations above $5 million and 4,114 above $25 million.
  2. Among the 780,257 construction businesses with employees in the Census's County Business Patterns—building, heavy civil, and specialty trade contractors—an estimated 4% take in at least $5 million a year; Dun & Bradstreet records show 33,752 contractor locations above $5 million and 6,525 above $25 million.
  3. Of the 4,742 beer, wine, and spirits wholesalers with employees in the Census's County Business Patterns, an estimated quarter take in at least $5 million a year; Dun & Bradstreet records show 1,232 distributor locations above $5 million and 491 above $25 million.

Related Articles:

  • What’s Missing in the Fed’s Data about Ultrarich Portfolios — The Federal Reserve's Distribution of Financial Accounts defines "private business" narrowly as proprietor's equity in noncorporate, nonfinancial businesses, excluding S-corporations, other private corporations, and private equity and hedge fund partnerships, which are lumped into "corporate equities." The Survey of Consumer Finances instead shows private business is roughly 45–50% of top 0.1% wealth.
  • Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century — Most income at the top of the US distribution is non-wage income, primarily profits from closely-held, mid-market firms in skill-intensive industries owned by working-age individuals. The authors find private business profit falls by three-quarters after an owner retires or dies prematurely, indicating most top earners are "working rich" deriving income from human capital.
  • They’re Rich but Not Famous—and They’re Suddenly Everywhere — An analysis of Federal Reserve data estimates about 430,000 U.S. households are worth $30m or more, including roughly 74,000 worth at least $100m, with growth in the number of very rich households outpacing overall population growth over recent decades. Nearly 72% of the top 0.1%'s wealth consists of corporate equities, mutual fund shares, and private businesses.

Wednesday, August 19, 2026

AI Summary. The US Treasury announced it is at least doubling the size of its liquidity support buyback operations for government debt maturing in 10 to 30 years, following long-dated yields reaching their highest levels in years. Yields on the longest bond fell nearly 10 basis points to 5.185%.

Michael MacKenzie and Greg Ritchie Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The US Treasury “unexpectedly” announced it is “at least doubling” buybacks of 10-year to 30-year bonds in the hope of stemming rises in yields. Yields on the 30-year fell ~10bps to 5.185% in response, pulling back from their highest level since 2007.

Does the Treasury increase debt buybacks when long-term yields rise?

Core argument: The US Treasury said it is "increasing, by at least double, the size of liquidity support buyback operations" for securities in the 10-year to 30-year sector, an unexpected announcement two weeks after it released the quarter's planned buyback schedule.

The US Treasury unexpectedly announced it’s ramping up buybacks of long-dated government debt, taking the action in the wake of yields on such securities hitting the highest levels in years. Just two weeks after releasing its planned schedule for buybacks this quarter, the Treasury Department on Wednesday said it’s “increasing, by at least double, the size of liquidity support buyback operations” for securities dated from the 10-year to the 30-year sector. Yields on the longest bond dropped nearly 10 basis points to 5.185%, pulling back from their highest level since 2007.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US Treasury said it is "increasing, by at least double, the size of liquidity support buyback operations" for securities in the 10-year to 30-year sector, an unexpected announcement two weeks after it released the quarter's planned buyback schedule.
  2. Yields on the longest-dated Treasury bond fell nearly 10 basis points to 5.185%, pulling back from their highest level since 2007.
  3. The Treasury's move to ramp up buybacks of long-dated government debt followed yields on such securities reaching their highest levels in years.

Related Articles:

  • US Bond Selloff Drives 30-Year Yields to Highest Since 2007 — The yield on 30-year US Treasury bonds rose to as high as 5.34%, its highest level since 2007, amid investor concern over rising government spending, heavy sales of long-dated bonds, and inflation that has run above the Federal Reserve's target for five years. Long-term yields also rose in Canada and Europe.
  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
  • The Coming Great Repression? — Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.

AI Summary. There is little evidence that fears of a Greek-style solvency crisis are driving U.S. interest rates, since long-term "breakeven" inflation expectations have changed little. Prices for credit default swaps, which insure against a U.S. government default, have also moved little.

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:

Citing the stable long-term breakeven inflation rate and minimal rise in Treasury CDS prices, Krugman argues that high long-term rates reflect heavy federal borrowing, but not fears of outright default or inflation-induced debasement.

Are bond markets signaling fears about government solvency?

Core argument: Bond markets show very little evidence that fears of a Greek-style solvency crisis are driving U.S. interest rates.

There is very little evidence that fears of a Greek-style crisis are driving interest rates now. For example, if markets were really worried about U.S. solvency and the potential for the government to inflate the debt away, this should be reflected in measures that track inflation. But there has been, in fact, very little change in the “breakeven” inflation rate, a measure of long-term inflation expectations. Another indicator is the price of credit default swaps — insurance against a possible US default. These also haven’t moved much.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bond markets show very little evidence that fears of a Greek-style solvency crisis are driving U.S. interest rates.
  2. The breakeven inflation rate, a measure of long-term inflation expectations, has changed very little, which would be expected to move if markets feared the U.S. government would inflate away its debt.
  3. Prices of credit default swaps, which insure against a possible U.S. default, also have not moved much.

Related Articles:

  • US Bond Selloff Drives 30-Year Yields to Highest Since 2007 — The yield on 30-year US Treasury bonds rose to as high as 5.34%, its highest level since 2007, amid investor concern over rising government spending, heavy sales of long-dated bonds, and inflation that has run above the Federal Reserve's target for five years. Long-term yields also rose in Canada and Europe.
  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
  • AI Is Driving Up Treasury Yields: ‘It Just Touches Everything’ — Investment-grade companies have sold nearly $1.5tn of bonds, up 36% from a year earlier, and some investors have sold US Treasuries to buy higher-yielding corporate debt. Bank of America economists estimate the surge in corporate-debt sales, along with more mortgage-backed securities issuance, pushed 10-year rates up by about 0.3 percentage point.

AI Summary. Inflation-protected U.S. Treasury yields rose from about 3.5% in early 1997 to about 4.5% by 2000, compared with roughly 2.4% on the 10-year and 3% on the 30-year today. The author argues that this 1990s experience helps calibrate expectations if new software technologies produce a comparable acceleration in productivity growth.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:

Klein compares measures of real rates from the 1990s productivity boom to today’s real rates, using TIPS, as well as “synthetic TIPS” derived by subtracting inflation expectations from nominal rates. Current real rates are very low by comparison.

Would faster productivity growth from new software technologies push real yields higher?

Core argument: Real yields on TIPS were roughly 3.5% when the securities were introduced at the start of 1997 and rose gradually to about 4.5% by the peak of the bubble in 2000.

Real yields on actual TIPS were ~3.5% when they first arrived at the beginning of 1997, and then rose gradually to ~4.5% by the peak of the bubble in 2000. Yields on “synthetic” TIPS derived by removing estimates of inflation expectations from nominal yields were also around 3.5% in early 1997 and 4.5% in the first half of 2000, though they were more volatile in between. The yield on the benchmark 10y TIPS is currently 2.4% while the yield on the 30y TIPS is around 3%. Knowing what actually happened in the 1990s is helpful for calibrating expectations about what could happen in the next decade, if new software technologies lead to a comparable acceleration in productivity growth.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Real yields on TIPS were roughly 3.5% when the securities were introduced at the start of 1997 and rose gradually to about 4.5% by the peak of the bubble in 2000.
  2. "Synthetic" TIPS yields, derived by stripping estimates of inflation expectations out of nominal yields, also stood near 3.5% in early 1997 and 4.5% in the first half of 2000, with more volatility in between.
  3. The benchmark 10-year TIPS yields 2.4% and the 30-year TIPS around 3%, while the 1990s experience offers a guide for calibrating expectations if new software technologies deliver a comparable acceleration in productivity growth.

Related Articles:

  • AI, Productivity, and Rates: Part I — A San Francisco Federal Reserve model estimates that the growth contribution from rising resource utilization in recent quarters has been larger than in almost any comparable five-quarter stretch since 1947 outside recoveries from downturns. That measure is based on a modified version of the average worker's weekly hours rather than unemployment or capacity utilization.
  • AI and Productivity — The recent pickup in US labor productivity appears driven by higher utilization of existing capital—running factories, server racks, and hotel rooms harder—rather than by firm-level efficiency gains from AI. Adoption remains too thin and the cross-sectional evidence too weak to conclude that AI-driven productivity gains are already widespread.
  • Have We Entered an Era of High Productivity Growth? — Labor productivity has grown solidly while the San Francisco Federal Reserve's total factor productivity index, which adjusts for the equipment and technology workers use, has grown modestly, suggesting gains so far reflect better tools rather than broader advances. A regime-switching model puts the probability of a high-productivity regime at 57% using labor productivity and 21% using total factor productivity.

AI Summary. US diesel pump prices reached $5.47 a gallon, approaching a nominal record of $5.82 ($6.64 adjusted for inflation), after rising 8% in a month as wars in the Middle East and Europe constrain production and global supplies. The gap between diesel and crude oil prices has hit a record high.

Myles McCormick and Jamie Smyth Financial Times
Date Posted:

Diesel prices in the US have risen 8% over the last month to $5.47, largely reflecting a record-high “crack” spread, the premium of diesel over crude.

Are wars abroad driving US diesel prices toward record highs?

Core argument: U.S. pump diesel prices reached $5.47 a gallon on Tuesday, approaching the nominal record of $5.82, equal to $6.64 adjusted for inflation.

The pump price of diesel — the lifeblood of the economy because of its essential role in powering industry and agriculture — hit $5.47 a gallon on Tuesday, approaching its all-time [nominal] high of $5.82 ($6.64 inflation adjusted) as wars in the Middle East and Europe hobble production and throttle global supplies. Prices have jumped 8% in the past month, while the gap between the cost of diesel and crude oil, known as the “crack spread,” has hit a record high in recent days.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. pump diesel prices reached $5.47 a gallon on Tuesday, approaching the nominal record of $5.82, equal to $6.64 adjusted for inflation.
  2. Diesel prices have risen 8% over the past month as wars in the Middle East and Europe hobble production and throttle global supplies.
  3. The "crack spread," the gap between diesel and crude oil prices, has hit a record high, with diesel powering industry and agriculture.

Related Articles:

  • Why Isn’t the Price of Oil Even Higher? — The gap between crude oil prices and the prices of refined products has widened by about $35/barrel, because much of the world's refining capacity is either trapped behind the Strait of Hormuz or knocked offline by drone strikes. That refining shortage holds crude prices down, since buyers won't pay high prices for oil they cannot refine.
  • For the Oil Market, the Strait of Hormuz Isn’t Closed — Tanker tracking data identify at least 5m barrels a day of oil still transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and allowing for vessels crossing undetected the true figure could reach 7m–9m. Growing oil spills visible on satellite imagery indicate attacks on tankers alongside efforts to keep the waterway open.
  • U.S. Economy Less Vulnerable To Geopolitical Oil Price Shocks Than In The Past — The United States became a net oil exporter in late 2019, and oil and oil product spending fell from near 8% of GDP in 1980 to 3% in 2024. The authors estimate a 15% global oil supply disruption would now cut annualized U.S. real GDP growth by 0.3pp, versus 1.7pp in the rest of the world.

AI Summary. China's jobless rate for 16-to-24-year-olds excluding students rose to 17.9% from 14.9% the prior month, according to the National Bureau of Statistics, as a record wave of university graduates entered an already crowded labor market.

Sherry Wang South China Morning Post
Date Posted:

China’s youth unemployment (16–24) climbed to 17.9% in July, on par with July 2025 and up 3pp from the previous month, as 12.7mm new university graduates entered the workforce – ~4% more than last year, superimposed on a slowing economy.

Is China's youth unemployment rising as record graduates enter the labor market?

Core argument: China's jobless rate for those aged 16–24 excluding students rose to 17.9% in July, up 3 percentage points from 14.9% in June, as a record wave of university graduates entered an already crowded labour market, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.

China’s youth jobless rate climbed to 17.9% in July, as a record wave of university graduates enters an already crowded labour market. The jobless rate for those aged 16 to 24, excluding students, rose 3 percentage points from 14.9% in June – the last of three straight months of contraction – according to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics on Wednesday. The rate last July was 17.8% and it then climbed to 18.9% the following month – the highest level since Beijing revised its methodology to exclude students in December 2023.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's jobless rate for those aged 16–24 excluding students rose to 17.9% in July, up 3 percentage points from 14.9% in June, as a record wave of university graduates entered an already crowded labour market, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.
  2. June's 14.9% reading marked the last of three straight months of contraction in China's youth jobless rate, according to National Bureau of Statistics data.
  3. China's youth jobless rate stood at 17.8% last July before climbing to 18.9% the following month, the highest level since Beijing revised its methodology to exclude students in December 2023.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Great Jobs Squeeze — China's "flexible employment" — a loosely defined official category spanning part-time work, self-employment, and new work forms — is estimated at 320mn people, up from 280mn a year earlier, with more than 53mn working as food delivery or ridesharing drivers. Analysts argue this reflects broad labour-market weakness, as low aggregate demand weakens workers' bargaining power.
  • The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism — About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.
  • Chinese Student High-Flyers Set Sights On Police and Military Academies — High-achieving Chinese high school graduates are increasingly applying to police and military academies and other schools offering a clear path to public-sector jobs, pushing required entrance-exam scores up. Some programs now demand more than 650 points out of 750, rivaling the least competitive courses at China's most prestigious universities.