Edward Conard

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  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
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Friday, July 24, 2026

The U.S. Mortality Crisis as a Preston Curve Reversal

AI Summary. Across U.S. states and counties, income and life expectancy rose together from 1980 through 2010, but after 2010 incomes kept rising without commensurate longevity gains, and places diverged in life expectancy. The authors attribute this to a weakened relationship between socioeconomic conditions—income, education, wealth, insurance coverage—and longevity rather than deterioration in those conditions.

Ritikaa Khanna, Rourke O'Brien, Andrew Stokes, Atheendar Venkataramani, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
July 24, 2026

Between 2010 and 2019, states and counties became richer, but did not experience the commensurate longevity gains seen btw 1980 and 2009. This is not “because income, education, wealth, or insurance coverage simply moved in the wrong direction.”

Has rising income stopped translating into longer life expectancy?

Core argument: U.S. Preston curves relating life expectancy to log real per capita income shifted upward across states from 1980 to 2010 and across counties from 2000 to 2010, but stopped shifting upward between 2010 and 2019 even as incomes kept rising.

Figure 1 shows Preston curves relating life expectancy to log real per capita income across U.S. states and counties. Among states, the curves follow the classic pattern from 1980 through 2010: states became richer and longer-lived [as did counties from 2000 to 2010]. That pattern changed after 2010. Between 2010 and 2019, states and counties continued to become richer, but the curves did not shift upward: resource accumulation continued, but commensurate longevity gains did not. The post-2010 period involved both decoupling and divergence: rising income no longer translated into broad longevity improvement, and places became more unequal in their capacity to convert aggregate resources into longer lives. Figure 4 asks a simple counterfactual question: if earlier covariate–life expectancy relationships had persisted, how much life expectancy would later years have achieved, given the actual changes in these covariates? Together, the decomposition results sharpen the central interpretation. The 2010s mortality crisis did not occur because income, education, wealth, or insurance coverage simply moved in the wrong direction. In many respects, aggregate socioeconomic conditions improved. Instead, what changed was the relationship between those conditions and longevity. The United States became less successful at converting collective resources into population-level longevity gains.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. Preston curves relating life expectancy to log real per capita income shifted upward across states from 1980 to 2010 and across counties from 2000 to 2010, but stopped shifting upward between 2010 and 2019 even as incomes kept rising.
  2. The post-2010 period combined decoupling and divergence: rising income no longer translated into broad longevity improvement, and places became more unequal in their capacity to convert aggregate resources into longer lives.
  3. Decomposition results indicate the 2010s mortality crisis did not stem from income, education, wealth, or insurance coverage moving in the wrong direction — many aggregate socioeconomic conditions improved — but from a changed relationship between those conditions and longevity.

Related Articles:

  • The Geography of American Exceptionalism — The US population is split evenly among urban, suburban, and rural areas, but 64% of those living at suburban densities reside in prosperous or comfortable ZIP codes, versus 36% in rural and 38% in urban ones. County distress scores correlate strongly with life expectancy, with prosperous counties averaging 5.3 years longer.
  • Comments On: “Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA” By Anne Case and Angus Deaton — Selection plausibly accounts for most or all of the widening mortality gap between US adults with and without a bachelor's degree: high school achievement measures have not risen since the early 1970s while the share earning degrees rose, and national youth survey data show non-graduates increasingly negatively selected on aptitude scores.
  • Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA — The mortality gap between American adults with and without a four-year college degree widened across three periods—falling mortality for both with larger gains for graduates, then diverging, then rising faster for the less educated during the pandemic—reaching an 8.5-year difference in adult life expectancy. Americans with a degree, treated as a separate country, would rank just below Japan.
  • Demographics
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

The Rise Of The Deserving Rich

AI Summary. An analysis of about 7,000 billionaires over the past 25 years classifies wealth as "uncompetitive" when it derives from inheritance or from sectors such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials that often depend on political access. The authors find half of global billionaire wealth now comes from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, an all-time high.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
July 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

An Economist analysis of the wealth of 7,000 billionaires finds that over the past decade, the share of billionaire wealth “derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high.”

Is a growing share of billionaire wealth self-made in competitive industries?

Core argument: For the first time, half the wealth of the world's billionaires is reasonably fairly earned, with the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors reaching an all-time high over the past decade.

Drawing on data from Forbes, a magazine, Hurun, a research firm, and Gapminder, a Swedish foundation, we have assembled a list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years. We call a billionaire’s wealth “uncompetitive” when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials. These sectors often depend on political access. We count inheritors in the “uncompetitive” category. From 2001, when our data begin, to 2014, the uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth rose slightly. Yet over the past decade, the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high. For the first time, half the wealth of the world’s billionaires is reasonably fairly earned. And since 2021, the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. For the first time, half the wealth of the world's billionaires is reasonably fairly earned, with the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors reaching an all-time high over the past decade.
  2. A list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years, assembled from Forbes, Hurun and Gapminder data, classifies wealth as "uncompetitive" when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence and raw materials, which often depend on political access.
  3. The uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth, which counts inheritors, rose slightly from 2001 to 2014, and the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined since 2021.

Related Articles:

  • AI is the Democratic Party’s Next Villain — Mentions of billionaires in Democratic fundraising emails quadrupled to a peak above 20% of all emails sent and have held near 15%, making anti-billionaire messaging a mainstay. Anti-AI populism remains far smaller and is entering Democratic rhetoric not as a jobs or safety issue but as something billionaires are building.
  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce

AI and Productivity

AI Summary. The recent pickup in US labor productivity appears driven by higher utilization of existing capital—running factories, server racks, and hotel rooms harder—rather than by firm-level efficiency gains from AI. Adoption remains too thin and the cross-sectional evidence too weak to conclude that AI-driven productivity gains are already widespread.

Ernie Tedeschi Stripe Economics
Date Posted:
July 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database

AI is showing up in the macro numbers primarily in increased utilization and labor and capital deepening rather than true total factor productivity gains.

Is the recent productivity pickup driven by AI or higher capital utilization?

Core argument: The rise in US labor productivity appears to reflect macroproductivity gains from higher capital utilization — longer runs at existing factories, fuller use of already-paid-for server racks and GPU clusters, and higher occupancy of existing hotel rooms — rather than microproductivity gains.

What appears to be lifting US labor productivity, rather than microproductivity gains, are macroproductivity gains from AI—specifically companies running their existing capital harder. Think longer runs of factories already built, more utilization of server racks and GPU clusters already paid for, and more occupancy of existing hotel rooms. Economists call this “capital intensity” or “utilization.” Higher capital utilization represents real economic gains, but it’s not the same as microproductivity. This is not the same as “capital deepening” (growth in measured productivity from expanding capital supply—for example, through capital investment). What the current numbers do not yet support is the claim that this transmission is already well underway at the aggregate level: adoption is too thin, the cross-sectional signal is too weak, downstream bottlenecks remain, and the productivity pickup is too attributable to utilization to be confident in that conclusion. Instead, the acceleration we’re seeing so far is largely a result of companies trying to meet the demand for AI capacity by pushing the limits of their existing infrastructure.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The rise in US labor productivity appears to reflect macroproductivity gains from higher capital utilization — longer runs at existing factories, fuller use of already-paid-for server racks and GPU clusters, and higher occupancy of existing hotel rooms — rather than microproductivity gains.
  2. Higher capital utilization represents real economic gains but differs from both microproductivity and capital deepening, the growth in measured productivity that comes from expanding capital supply through investment.
  3. The current numbers do not yet support the claim that AI's productivity transmission is well underway at the aggregate level, given thin adoption, a weak cross-sectional signal, downstream bottlenecks, and a pickup largely attributable to utilization.

Related Articles:

  • Have We Entered an Era of High Productivity Growth? — Labor productivity has grown solidly while the San Francisco Federal Reserve's total factor productivity index, which adjusts for the equipment and technology workers use, has grown modestly, suggesting gains so far reflect better tools rather than broader advances. A regime-switching model puts the probability of a high-productivity regime at 57% using labor productivity and 21% using total factor productivity.
  • America Is Experiencing A Productivity Miracle — America's post-2019 productivity acceleration came largely from professional services and management—about 10% of output and heavy users rather than producers of new technology—and from oil and gas. The information industry grew productivity around 6% annually, no faster than its 2000-19 average, with its output share steady at 5.3–5.5%.
  • AI and the Pitfalls of Innovation — The post-World War II productivity boom, which doubled real wages and living standards in a generation, came largely from technologies that already existed decades earlier rather than radical new inventions. It was followed by sluggish productivity growth from 1973 to 1995, then an information-technology boom that lasted roughly a decade before measured productivity growth slowed again.
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

The Big Exceptions To The American Manufacturing Jobs Decline

AI Summary. Aerospace leads all US manufacturing industries in job growth and posted the largest manufacturing trade surplus at $116.7bn, supported by strong commercial airline demand and a record-high order backlog. Electrical equipment and components employment has also grown, with dedicated data centers more than doubling their real consumption of electrical equipment and components.

Jiaxin (Jason) He Agglomerations
Date Posted:
July 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The US has lost 300,000 manufacturing jobs since their recent peak in Q2 2023. Two subsectors have seen strong job growth: aerospace manufacturing added 43,000 jobs, and electrical equipment, cable and battery manufacturing added 36,200.

Which US manufacturing industries are adding jobs despite the overall decline?

Core argument: Aerospace leads all U.S. manufacturing industries in job growth since 2023 and posted the largest nominal trade surplus of any manufacturing industry last year, at $116.7 billion.

Aerospace leads all manufacturing industries in job growth since 2023. Last year it also posted the largest nominal trade surplus of any manufacturing industry, at $116.7 billion. Driving the growth has been strong commercial and passenger airline demand, including a record-high order backlog. Boeing, the world’s leading airplane manufacturer, returned to profitability and high delivery volumes in 2025. The employment surge in the electrical components subsector tells a different story. It owes its strength to two industries: electrical equipment manufacturing and batteries, wires, cables, and miscellaneous electrical components. These are among the industries that bore the brunt of the China Shock and suffered acute decline in the 2000s. Green energy and electric vehicles likely contributed to their initial recovery, raising demand for batteries and electrical infrastructure. But their continued growth even after the cancellation of EV subsidies in 2025 points to a different, potent, and entirely unsurprising driver: Artificial Intelligence. AI’s manufacturing footprint runs the length of the supply chain. Dedicated data centers more than doubled their real consumption of electrical equipment and components from 2019 to 2024.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Aerospace leads all U.S. manufacturing industries in job growth since 2023 and posted the largest nominal trade surplus of any manufacturing industry last year, at $116.7 billion.
  2. Strong commercial and passenger airline demand, including a record-high order backlog, has driven aerospace growth, and Boeing returned to profitability and high delivery volumes in 2025.
  3. Employment growth in electrical equipment manufacturing and in batteries, wires, cables, and miscellaneous electrical components continued after the 2025 cancellation of EV subsidies, pointing to artificial intelligence as a driver, with dedicated data centers more than doubling real consumption of electrical equipment and components from 2019 to 2024.

Related Articles:

  • Does the Import Invasion Explain the Mysterious Disappearance of Productivity Growth in U.S. Manufacturing? — The authors trace a channel from rising imports to lower domestic sales, employment, plant closures, profits, capacity utilization, and reduced investment in fixed capital and research. They note the computer and electronic products industry, which contributed most to the US manufacturing productivity slowdown, offshored production to Asia, reaching 84% import penetration.
  • Midyear Outlook — Tech-related investment rose 30% from year-ago levels while all other capital spending fell, a divergence the author argues reflects the AI boom bidding away scarce physical inputs such as electricians, grid capacity, metals, and construction labor. With hyperscalers' free cash flow now exhausted, over 80% of projected capital spending in coming years will require external financing.
  • What Would It Take to Bring Back US Manufacturing? Part 1: America’s Structural Headwinds — The US imports roughly 40% of the goods it consumes, directly and through imported inputs, with labor-intensive goods like apparel almost entirely imported. The authors argue America's main comparative disadvantage is its cost of production, driven mainly by labor costs, with real estate costs and a strong dollar also contributing.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Productivity
    • Investment
  • Workforce

The State of U.S. Tariffs July 24, 2026

AI Summary. The average statutory US tariff rate stands at 11.1% and, under current law including scheduled increases, is projected to reach 11.8% by year-end. The authors estimate current-law tariffs will raise consumer prices by about 0.7% and generate roughly $1.9tn over ten years, with revenue somewhat lower after accounting for tariffs' negative effect on economic output.

John Iselin Yale University
Date Posted:
July 24, 2026

The US’s average statutory tariff rate stands at 11.1% and is set to rise to 11.8% by the end of year. John Iselin projects that the current regime will raise ~$1.9T in revenue over 10 years.

How much will current tariffs raise prices and revenue?

Core argument: The average U.S. statutory tariff rate stands at 11.1%, down about 0.3pp after Section 122 tariffs expired and were replaced with new tariffs under Section 301.

As of July 24th, the average statutory tariff rate stands at 11.1% after falling by about 0.3pp when Section 122 tariffs expired and were replaced with new tariffs under Section 301. Under current law, which includes several scheduled tariff increases in the coming months, this figure is set to be 11.8% by the end of this year. We estimate the ultimate consumer price impact of current-law tariff policy to be about 0.7%. Over the next ten years, we estimate that current-law tariffs will raise about $1.9 trillion. These numbers are somewhat lower, though, after taking into account the negative impact of tariffs on GDP.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The average U.S. statutory tariff rate stands at 11.1%, down about 0.3pp after Section 122 tariffs expired and were replaced with new tariffs under Section 301.
  2. Under current law, which includes several scheduled tariff increases in the coming months, the average statutory tariff rate is set to reach 11.8% by the end of this year.
  3. Current-law tariff policy is estimated to raise consumer prices by about 0.7% and to bring in about $1.9 trillion over ten years, with both figures somewhat lower after accounting for the negative impact of tariffs on GDP.

Related Articles:

  • Who Is Paying for the 2025 U.S. Tariffs? — The authors estimate that 94% of U.S. tariff costs were borne domestically over the first eight months of 2025, with a 10% tariff associated with only a 0.6 percentage point decline in foreign export prices. Pass-through into U.S. import prices later declined to 86%, shifting more of the burden to foreign exporters.
  • The Global Economy Is Threatened Again by Trade Imbalances — The International Monetary Fund calculates that global current-account deficits plus surpluses reached 3.7% of world gross domestic product, after fluctuating between 1% and 3% until the early 2000s. The US deficit of $1.1tn is the largest single imbalance, and the Fund estimates a budget deficit of 2% of GDP raises the current-account deficit by 0.5% of GDP.
  • Help for the Heartland? The Employment and Electoral Effects of the Trump Tariffs in the United States — The authors find that the combined effect of U.S.-China trade war import tariffs, retaliatory tariffs, and farm subsidies on employment in exposed U.S. locations was at best a wash and possibly mildly negative, while residents of tariff-protected areas became less likely to identify as Democrats and more likely to vote Republican.
  • Trade (not deficits)
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • GDP

Monday, July 27, 2026

Google’s AI & Economy ATLAS v1.0: Mapping Gemini Usage in the Economy

AI Summary. Google's ATLAS data show workplace AI use spans over 68% of occupations representing above 88% of US employment, but depth is shallow: AI is used for only 21% of tasks in the median occupation with any use, mostly collaborative rather than automating. Over 86% of conversational AI interactions occur outside work.

Fabien Curto Millet, Zanna Iscenko, Scott Strand, et al. Google
Date Posted:
July 27, 2026

Google’s new AI & Economy ATLAS maps 15M AI interactions to occupations, tasks, and activities, showing AI use is pervasive but not intensive, collaborative more than autonomous, and used mostly at home, suggesting GDP accounting understates its value.

How broad and deep is workplace AI adoption across occupations?

Core argument: Google's ATLAS v1.0 finds AI adoption in the workplace spans over 68% of all occupations, representing just above 88% of total US employment, including software developers and market researchers as well as farmers, industrial engineers, and foresters.

AI has diffused very broadly in both work and life. Adoption in the workplace spans over 68% of all occupations that collectively represent just above 88% of total US employment, including both much-discussed occupations such as software developers and market researchers, and those less-discussed such as farmers, industrial engineers, and foresters. Though broadly used at work, the overall depth of AI’s use is shallow. ATLAS data shows that AI is used for only 21% of total tasks in the median occupation with any AI use. Only 3% of occupations showed AI usage for over 75% of their tasks. While there is some task automation, the vast majority of use so far is collaborative and assistive to tasks and work. ATLAS points to a complex relationship between AI usage and expertise. When classified according to expertise levels, tasks requiring lower-to-middle levels of expertise tend to see relatively higher AI usage than the highest expertise level tasks, despite ATLAS data also suggesting high-earning workers—and therefore those with more scarce skills and expertise—adopt AI at the highest rates. AI is delivering real utility at home that standard economic metrics may miss. Over 86% of interactions with conversational AI happen outside of work, and humans’ daily time allocation strongly and positively predicts where people direct their AI questions.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Google's ATLAS v1.0 finds AI adoption in the workplace spans over 68% of all occupations, representing just above 88% of total US employment, including software developers and market researchers as well as farmers, industrial engineers, and foresters.
  2. AI's use is shallow, covering only 21% of total tasks in the median occupation with any AI use, with just 3% of occupations showing AI usage for over 75% of their tasks and the vast majority of use collaborative and assistive.
  3. Over 86% of interactions with conversational AI happen outside of work, and humans' daily time allocation strongly and positively predicts where people direct their AI questions, utility that standard economic metrics may miss.

Related Articles:

  • Expertise — The authors' model of automation predicts that occupations with rising expertise requirements see higher wages but falling employment, while those with declining requirements see lower wages alongside rising employment. Analyzing employment and earnings data by occupation across four decades, they find changes in occupational expertise strongly predict changes in occupational wages.
  • Generative AI and Entrepreneurship — The authors find that startups with a larger share of tasks doable by generative AI cut employment beginning immediately after ChatGPT's release, with technically proficient founders restructuring teams toward higher-skill roles. Venture investors made smaller but more numerous deals, and new firm entry offset the decline in total startup employment.
  • America Is Experiencing A Productivity Miracle — America's post-2019 productivity acceleration came largely from professional services and management—about 10% of output and heavy users rather than producers of new technology—and from oil and gas. The information industry grew productivity around 6% annually, no faster than its 2000-19 average, with its output share steady at 5.3–5.5%.

    Why Wages And Productivity Look Set To Diverge Further

    AI Summary. In the US, Europe and Japan, pay growth has decoupled from productivity growth, with productivity pulling ahead. US labor productivity, measured as real GDP per hour worked, is more than 5x its 1947 level while real hourly compensation is only about 3x, and median wage growth lags even further behind.

    Joel Suss Financial Times
    Date Posted:
    July 27, 2026
    Is Database:
    Database
    Is Important:
    Important

    In advanced economies, increases in labor productivity growth have decoupled from real wage growth, especially post-1980.

    Are wages falling further behind productivity growth in advanced economies?

    Core argument: US labour productivity, measured as real GDP per hour worked, is more than five times its 1947 level, while real hourly compensation is only about three times greater.

    In the US, Europe and Japan, pay growth has decoupled from productivity growth, with the latter having pulled ahead. US Labour productivity — measured as real GDP per hour worked — is now more than five times greater than in 1947, whereas real hourly compensation is only about three times greater. Median wage growth has lagged even further behind productivity growth, with inequality pushing the average wage higher than the median. (The figures above show average rather than median wages; plotting median wages would show an even greater divergence.)

    Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

    1. US labour productivity, measured as real GDP per hour worked, is more than five times its 1947 level, while real hourly compensation is only about three times greater.
    2. Pay growth has decoupled from productivity growth in the US, Europe and Japan, with productivity pulling ahead in all three.
    3. Median wage growth has lagged productivity growth by even more than average wage growth, as inequality pushes the average wage above the median.

    Related Articles:

    • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of gross domestic income fell to 51%, the lowest since records began in 1947, while profits' share rose to 12.1%, the highest since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages are up 3% since the end of 2019, compared with a 50% rise in profits.
    • AI and Productivity — The recent pickup in US labor productivity appears driven by higher utilization of existing capital—running factories, server racks, and hotel rooms harder—rather than by firm-level efficiency gains from AI. Adoption remains too thin and the cross-sectional evidence too weak to conclude that AI-driven productivity gains are already widespread.
    • Understanding Trends in Worker Pay over the Past 50 Years — Productivity growth has been unequal across industries, across firms within industries, and across workers within firms, slowing growth in both the productivity and the pay of the median worker. The authors argue that working- and middle-class men earlier received "breadwinner rents"—pay above their marginal value to employers—and then endured slow wage growth as women's workforce participation rose.
    • Growth
    • Productivity
    • Workforce
      • Inequality
      • Wages/Income

    The Global Balance Sheet 2026: Imbalance And Divergence

    AI Summary. Only 20% of global household wealth growth came from net new investment in real assets such as machinery, housing, infrastructure and intellectual property, down from a 30% average over the prior quarter century. Nearly 60% came from asset prices rising faster than inflation and negative net worth in other sectors.

    Rebecca Anderson, Jan Mischke, Arvind Govindarajan, Sylvain Johansson, et al. McKinsey
    Date Posted:
    July 27, 2026
    Is Database:
    Database
    Is Important:
    Important

    A McKinsey analysis finds global wealth is increasingly composed of “paper wealth,” driven by the rise of US equity values to 2.4x the book value of net corporate assets, and the debt of Chinese corporations, which grew to 80% of their real asset value.

    Is household wealth growth driven more by asset prices than investment?

    Core argument: Only 20% of global household wealth growth in 2025 came from net new investment in real assets such as machinery, homes, infrastructure, and intellectual property less depreciation, versus a 30% average over 2000–2024.

    In 2025, global wealth growth was driven to a greater extent by paper wealth, or nominal asset value growth decoupled from the real economy. Only 20% of household wealth growth was based on net new investment (real assets including machinery and equipment, homes and buildings, infrastructure, and intellectual property, less depreciation), compared to 30% on average from 2000 to 2024. Nearly 60% came from asset price growth above and beyond general inflation and negative net worth positions from other sectors. [For example, this includes equity value growth above net assets for corporations as well as government bonds greater than the book value of government assets]. This was a marked increase over the average from 2000 to 2024, when paper gains drove one-third of global wealth growth.

    Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

    1. Only 20% of global household wealth growth in 2025 came from net new investment in real assets such as machinery, homes, infrastructure, and intellectual property less depreciation, versus a 30% average over 2000–2024.
    2. Nearly 60% of 2025 global household wealth growth came from asset price gains above general inflation plus negative net worth positions in other sectors, compared with about one-third on average over 2000–2024.
    3. Paper wealth, meaning nominal asset value growth decoupled from the real economy, drove a greater share of global wealth growth in 2025, including equity values above corporate net assets and government bonds exceeding the book value of government assets.

    Related Articles:

    • The Next Crash: Why This Time Might Not Be Different — The "excess CAPE yield" — the gap between cyclically adjusted earnings yields on stocks and inflation-adjusted Treasury bond yields — stands at 1.4%, far below its long-run average of 4.7%. Historically, a low excess yield has been associated with poor subsequent 10-year excess returns on stocks, though it does not reliably predict an imminent crash.
    • The Summer I Turned Pretty — A warning sign in a boom cycle is when companies closest to final demand weaken while capital spending beneficiaries keep thriving, as when telecom operators' shares rolled over while communications equipment stocks kept rising. Semiconductor stock prices and free cash flow are soaring while large cloud providers' shares stagnate and their free cash flow plummets.
    • One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets — Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.
    • Financial Markets
    • GDP
      • Growth
    • Productivity
      • Innovation/Research
      • Investment

    America’s Big Cities Are Rapidly Losing Kids

    AI Summary. An analysis of census data found the number of children under 18 in large U.S. cities fell 6% over a decade, versus 1% nationwide, with children under 5 down 15% in big cities versus 7% nationally. The number of children declined in about two-thirds of the 38 U.S. cities with more than 500,000 residents, including some cities gaining population overall.

    Rachel Louise Ensign and Paul Overberg Wall Street Journal
    Date Posted:
    July 27, 2026

    The number of children living in the US declined 1% overall btw 2015 and 2024, while the number living in large American cities fell 6%. The number of American children under the age of 5 fell 7%, while the number living in big cities fell 15%.

    Are large U.S. cities losing children faster than the nation overall?

    Core argument: The number of children under 18 living in big U.S. cities fell 6% over the past decade, versus a 1% decline nationwide, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of census data from 2015 through 2024.

    The number of children under 18 living in big U.S. cities is down 6% in the past decade, the Journal found, compared with a 1% decline nationwide. The drop is especially stark among families with little kids: The number of children under age 5 in big cities fell 15%, compared with a drop of 7% nationwide. Even cities that are gaining population are losing children. In all, the number of children declined in about two-thirds of the 38 U.S. cities with more than 500,000 residents. The Journal analyzed census data from 2015 through 2024, the most recent data available.

    Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

    1. The number of children under 18 living in big U.S. cities fell 6% over the past decade, versus a 1% decline nationwide, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of census data from 2015 through 2024.
    2. The number of children under age 5 in big U.S. cities declined 15%, compared with a 7% drop nationwide, the Wall Street Journal found.
    3. The number of children declined in about two-thirds of the 38 U.S. cities with more than 500,000 residents, including cities that are gaining population overall.

    Related Articles:

    • Young Families Have Stopped Leaving Big Cities, For Now — New data show the population of children under five in large U.S. urban counties fell 0.2%, matching the national rate of decline and ending a stretch in which big cities lost young children faster than the country as a whole. Every large urban county with under-five growth since 2020 is in Texas, North Carolina, or Florida.
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    Defence Giants Provide Record Backing For Military Start-Ups

    AI Summary. Established defence contractors including Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems have participated in a record $4.1bn of venture capital rounds, according to data compiled by Dealroom, as they seek early-stage exposure to potentially lucrative technologies. Thirteen of the largest arms makers are estimated to have raised internal research and development spending by more than 25% to $11.6bn.

    Aaron Kirchfeld and Sylvia Pfeifer Financial Times
    Date Posted:
    July 27, 2026

    According to an analysis by Vertical Research Partners, 13 of the largest defense firms (not including Airbus and Boeing) have increased internal R&D spending by more than 25% since 2021. Large defense firms have also increased their venture investments.

    Are established defense contractors ramping up investment in military start-ups?

    Core argument: Defence primes including Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems have participated in a record $4.1bn of venture capital rounds so far this year, according to data compiled by Dealroom.

    So-called defence primes, with longstanding ties to western governments and militaries including Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems, have participated in a record $4.1bn in venture capital rounds so far this year, according to data compiled by Dealroom. [The] shift was on display at this year’s flagship industry event in Farnborough outside London, where a record half of the 1,636 exhibitors were from the defence sector, where traditionally civil aerospace dominated. The defence primes have increased investments into research and development activities, as well as into venture capital funds to gain early-stage exposure to potentially lucrative technologies. Thirteen of the world’s biggest arms makers, excluding Airbus and Boeing due to their large civil operations, are estimated to have increased their internal R&D spending by more than 25% to $11.6bn from 2021 to 2026, according to analysis by Vertical Research Partners.

    Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

    1. Defence primes including Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems have participated in a record $4.1bn of venture capital rounds so far this year, according to data compiled by Dealroom.
    2. Vertical Research Partners estimates that 13 of the world's biggest arms makers, excluding Airbus and Boeing because of their large civil operations, raised internal R&D spending by more than 25% to $11.6bn from 2021 to 2026.
    3. At the Farnborough industry event outside London, a record half of the 1,636 exhibitors came from the defence sector, at a show traditionally dominated by civil aerospace.

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