Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, July 9, 2026

AI Summary. Across 22 countries, the gap between women's and men's daily hours of housework and caregiving is strongly correlated with lower total fertility rates. Countries that modernized rapidly show larger gender gaps in home work and lower fertility than those with more continuous economic growth since 1920.

Claudia Goldin National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

Goldin puts forth a “mismatch” theory of low fertility in countries that moved from stagnation to rapid growth such as Japan and southern Europe. “These countries have an excess number of unpaid hours worked by women. They also have lower birth rates.”

Do larger gender gaps in housework correspond with lower fertility?

Core argument: Across 22 nations, the correlation between total fertility rate and the gender difference in household and care hours is strong, with larger female excess burdens at home accompanying lower fertility.

Group 1 nations had fairly steady increases in economic growth across the long period from 1920 to 2022. Group 2 nations did not. Men in these currently developed countries that modernized rapidly do considerably less housework and care for others in their homes, relative to women, than do men in countries that had more continuous growth experiences. That fact can be seen in Figure 12, which provides data for 22 nations on women’s excess burdens at home. On the horizontal axis is the difference in household and care hours per day done by the average woman minus that done by the average man. On the vertical axis is the total fertility rate. All six Group 1 nations are in the upper left of Figure 12, with higher fertility and lower time differences between the genders. All six Group 2 nations are in the lower right, with lower fertility and higher time differences between the genders. The difference in hours of house- and care-work for Japan, for example, is 3.1 hours and is 3 hours for Italy. Their TFRs (in 2019) were 1.36 and 1.27 respectively. But the hours difference was 0.8 for Sweden and 0.9 for Denmark. Their TFRs (in 2019) were both 1.7. The correlation between the country’s TFR and the gender difference in household and caring hours is strong.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Across 22 nations, the correlation between total fertility rate and the gender difference in household and care hours is strong, with larger female excess burdens at home accompanying lower fertility.
  2. Japan and Italy show gender gaps of 3.1 and 3 hours per day in house- and care-work with 2019 total fertility rates of 1.36 and 1.27, while Sweden and Denmark show gaps of 0.8 and 0.9 hours with rates of 1.7 each.
  3. The six Group 1 nations, with fairly steady economic growth from 1920 to 2022, cluster at higher fertility and smaller gender time differences, while the six rapidly modernizing Group 2 nations cluster at lower fertility and larger differences.

Related Articles:

  • The Downside of Fertility — In developed countries that modernized very rapidly, men do considerably less housework and care for others at home relative to women than in countries with more continuous growth. Larger gender gaps in household and caring hours are strongly correlated with lower fertility rates across these countries.
  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
  • Babies and the Macroeconomy — Fertility rates have fallen in nearly every country, but timing differed: some developed nations fell below the 2.1 replacement level as early as the 1970s, while others dropped to "lowest low" levels below 1.3. The author argues nations with rapid, discontinuous growth saw sharper declines as women's expectations outpaced tradition-bound men's willingness to share family time.

AI Summary. If artificial intelligence profits arrive later than expected, committed capital spending and depreciation would still hit on schedule, squeezing margins, stretching balance sheets toward more debt and possible ratings downgrades, and repricing equities. Because a handful of large technology firms dominate the indices, the author argues the damage would spread to chips, power, data centers and the broader market.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:

Noting that falling token prices and ground-gaining Chinese open source models put the hyperscalers’ free cash flow projections at risk, Slok suggests that the lower payoff to the data center buildout would risk “tipping the economy into recession.”

What happens to markets and the economy if AI profits arrive later?

Core argument: A slower-than-expected AI payoff would push the projected free cash flow surge later while committed capital expenditure and heavy depreciation hit on schedule, squeezing margins and marking down forecasts.

What are the consequences if the AI payoff comes slower than expected? 1) Cash flows and earnings disappoint: the projected free cash flow surge slips later while committed capex and heavy depreciation hit on schedule, squeezing margins and marking down [forecasts]. 2) A Mag 7 sell-off that takes the market with it: equity prices built on a fast payoff re-rate, and because the Magnificent 7 now account for so much of the indices, the pain can't stay contained, it spreads to chips, power, data centers and the S&P 500 as a whole. 3) Balance sheets stretch and credit risk rises: with internal cash unable to cover spending, hyperscalers lean further on debt, raising leverage and inviting possible ratings downgrades if profits lag. The bottom line is that AI has been the one thing holding up both the economy and markets, and with so much riding on so few names, a slower payoff wouldn't just be a sector problem, it would risk tipping the economy into recession and the S&P 500 into a correction.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A slower-than-expected AI payoff would push the projected free cash flow surge later while committed capital expenditure and heavy depreciation hit on schedule, squeezing margins and marking down forecasts.
  2. Because the Magnificent 7 account for so much of the indices, a re-rating of equity prices built on a fast AI payoff would spread to chips, power, data centers and the S&P 500 as a whole.
  3. Hyperscalers whose internal cash cannot cover spending would lean further on debt, raising leverage and inviting possible ratings downgrades if profits lag, with a slower payoff risking recession and an S&P 500 correction.

Related Articles:

  • AI: The ROI Runway Could Be Long Outside the Tech Sector — AI company valuations rest on the assumption that profit margins across non-tech firms will eventually rise, but outside a handful of sectors adoption is slow, creating a divergence between front-loaded valuations and slower cash flows. If the per-use costs of AI models converge toward zero, revenue may be insufficient for all major cloud providers.
  • The State of the AI Economy — An analysis estimates the AI ecosystem generated $110bn in revenue over 12 months excluding double-counting, with the most recent month annualizing to a $175bn run rate. After separating AI-specific capital spending from the roughly $120bn hyperscalers already spent annually and depreciating compute over 6 years, revenues attributable to hyperscalers roughly cover depreciation.
  • Why .400 Hitters Disappeared — and What It Means for AI — Artificial intelligence models' capability gains are shrinking in percentage terms, falling from about 15% relative to the baseline early on to roughly 10% for the same absolute increment, narrowing the gap between frontier and good-enough models. The author argues this points to a commoditizing market where price, not minor model differences, becomes the main differentiator, pressuring frontier firms' margins.

AI Summary. Chinese officials have discussed with domestic AI labs how to safeguard their most powerful models' proprietary technology, out of concern that sharing it could aid adversaries and be weaponized against China. Models from Chinese companies such as DeepSeek and Moonshot AI are widely used by US firms as a cheaper alternative to OpenAI and Anthropic.

Raffaele Huang and Tina Li Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Beijing is considering export controls on its open-source LLMs, fearing “they may ultimately get weaponized against China.” This marks a sea-change, as until recently China promoted its models world-wide as a form of “soft power.”

Will China restrict open access to its most powerful AI models?

Core argument: Chinese officials have held discussions with domestic AI labs producing the country's most powerful models about safeguarding their proprietary technology, according to people familiar with the matter.

Across Silicon Valley, models made by Chinese companies such as DeepSeek and Moonshot AI have become core to daily work at companies large and small, offering a less costly alternative and supplement to the products of OpenAI and Anthropic. Chinese officials have recently held discussions with domestic AI labs that produce the country’s most powerful models about how to safeguard their valuable proprietary technology, according to people familiar with the matter. Beijing is concerned that sharing some of this technology could help adversaries or other malicious actors and ultimately get weaponized against China, the people said. Until recently, Beijing wanted to encourage the rapid spread of Chinese AI models globally, believing this represented a form of Chinese soft power.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Chinese officials have held discussions with domestic AI labs producing the country's most powerful models about safeguarding their proprietary technology, according to people familiar with the matter.
  2. Beijing is concerned that sharing some Chinese AI technology could help adversaries or other malicious actors and ultimately be weaponized against China, according to people familiar with the matter.
  3. Models from Chinese companies including DeepSeek and Moonshot AI have become core to daily work at Silicon Valley firms large and small, serving as a less costly alternative and supplement to OpenAI and Anthropic products.

Related Articles:

  • Semiquincententacles — Leading artificial-intelligence labs are moving to usage-based token pricing on a cost-plus basis that includes total ownership costs, pushing token prices higher and giving some enterprises reason to migrate to cheaper open models. Frontier models remain necessary for cybersecurity, distillation training, agents, and scientific discovery, where maximum performance is required.
  • Why .400 Hitters Disappeared — and What It Means for AI — Artificial intelligence models' capability gains are shrinking in percentage terms, falling from about 15% relative to the baseline early on to roughly 10% for the same absolute increment, narrowing the gap between frontier and good-enough models. The author argues this points to a commoditizing market where price, not minor model differences, becomes the main differentiator, pressuring frontier firms' margins.
  • The AI Trade Is Losing One of Its Key Signals — An index blending artificial intelligence token prices and usage is ambiguous when it softens, since token prices have fallen more than 90% since 2023 while total spending has roughly doubled over the past year. Allianz Research measures a nearly 46% growth gap between artificial intelligence investment and sales, wider than the 32% divergence during the 2001 telecom bust.

AI Summary. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.

Aaron Zitner Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
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A new WSJ poll finds only 35% of Americans think the assertion that “if you work hard, you’ll get ahead” still holds. Only 42% of respondents aged 18–34 think capitalism is working very or somewhat well, relative to 56% of those 65 or older.

Has American confidence in capitalism and democracy declined?

Core argument: Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey.

Americans are losing confidence in two main pillars of society: capitalism and democracy. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very well or even somewhat well, down from 60% who said so about a decade ago, according to a new Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 35% are even fairly sure that the nation offers people the ability to get good jobs and achieve the American dream. Confidence in the nation’s system of government is even lower. Only 12% say democracy is working very well or extremely well, and a mere 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the share of Democrats who said so. And Republicans in the survey stood apart in their belief in American exceptionalism, the long-held idea that the U.S. is unique or superior among nations. Nearly half of Republicans said that America stands above all other countries in the world, compared with only 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey.
  2. Only 12% of Americans say democracy is working very or extremely well, 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics, and 35% are fairly sure the nation offers good jobs and the American dream.
  3. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the Democratic share, and nearly half said America stands above all other countries, compared with 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Related Articles:

  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.

AI Summary. Germany has reached an agreement with the United States to purchase American Tomahawk cruise missiles, part of an effort to strengthen its deterrence against Russia after Washington dropped plans to station a Tomahawk-equipped battalion in Germany. Europe has no immediately available ground-launched long-range missile systems.

Aysun Bora and Anne-Sylvaine Chassany Financial Times
Date Posted:

Berlin has struck a deal with Washington to buy Tomahawk cruise missiles. No timeline for delivery was announced; as American production capacity remains strained.

Is Germany buying US cruise missiles to strengthen deterrence against Russia?

Core argument: Germany has struck a deal with Washington to buy US Tomahawk cruise missiles, Chancellor Friedrich Merz says, capping months-long efforts to strengthen German deterrence against Russia after the US scrapped plans to deploy a Tomahawk-equipped battalion in Germany.

Berlin has struck a deal with Washington to buy American Tomahawk cruise missiles, capping months-long efforts to improve its deterrence against Russia after the US scrapped plans to deploy a battalion equipped with the weapons in Germany. Europe currently has no immediately available ground-launched long-range systems. The UK has submarine-launched Tomahawks, which have a range of 1,600km, and France has deployed a domestically built cruise missile with a range of 1,000km on its submarines. The German government sought to persuade the Trump administration to sell the Tomahawks together with their Typhon ground launchers, according to people with knowledge of their strategy. Berlin had initially made a request a year ago, left unanswered.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Germany has struck a deal with Washington to buy US Tomahawk cruise missiles, Chancellor Friedrich Merz says, capping months-long efforts to strengthen German deterrence against Russia after the US scrapped plans to deploy a Tomahawk-equipped battalion in Germany.
  2. Europe has no immediately available ground-launched long-range systems, with the UK relying on submarine-launched Tomahawks with a 1,600km range and France on a domestically built submarine-launched cruise missile with a 1,000km range.
  3. Berlin sought to persuade the Trump administration to sell the Tomahawks together with their Typhon ground launchers, according to people with knowledge of the strategy, after an initial German request a year ago went unanswered.

Related Articles:

  • US Warns Japan Of Severe Delays In Tomahawk Deliveries Due To Iran War — The US has warned Japan that deliveries of 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles, expected by April 2028, could be delayed by as much as two years. The Center for Strategic and International Studies says the US fired more than 1,000 Tomahawks from an estimated prewar inventory of 3,100 during five weeks of operations against Iran.
  • Trump Invokes Cold War-Era Law to Boost Munitions Production — The U.S. has invoked the Defense Production Act to expand munitions output amid doubts that American weapons makers can meet increased demand. U.S. officials say more than 1,000 long-range Tomahawk missiles and 1,500–2,000 air-defense interceptors have been fired in the war with Iran, and replacing those stockpiles could take up to six years.
  • Last Rounds? Status of Key Munitions at the Iran War Ceasefire — U.S. forces may have expended more than half of prewar inventory for four of seven heavily used munitions in the 39-day air and missile campaign against Iran, with rebuilding to prewar levels projected to take one to four years. These munitions are also critical for a potential Western Pacific conflict.

Friday, July 10, 2026

AI Summary. Modeling U.S. venture-backed startups, the authors estimate that taxing capital gains as they accrue rather than at sale would cut founders' average ownership at exit by about 25% while raising the share of entrepreneurs with positive payoffs from roughly 16% to nearly 47%. Less risk-averse founders prefer taxation at sale.

Eduardo Azevedo, Florian Scheuer, Kent Smetters and Min Yang National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
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~84% of venture backed founders end with zero exit value, while the top 2% capture ~80% of total exit value. Accrual-based taxation would reduce mean founder ownership stakes at exit by ~25%, but with fully refundable tax credits, raise the share of founders with >0 payoffs to ~47%.

How does taxing unrealized capital gains affect startup founders?

Core argument: The authors estimate that average founder shares at exit fall about 25% under accrual-based capital gains taxation relative to realization-based taxation, as advance taxation forces additional share sales before exit.

This paper examines how taxing unrealized capital gains affects entrepreneurship, combining a dynamic career-choice model with new evidence on all U.S. venture capital backed startups. Figure 1a plots a histogram of the positive company exit values. The distribution spans several orders of magnitude and is relatively similar to a lognormal, but with a right skew and fatter right tail. A stylized model highlights a key trade-off: accrual-based capital gains taxes dilute successful founders by forcing additional share sales before exit, a well known concern, yet they also provide insurance through tax credits to founders whose ventures fail, an aspect often overlooked. Quantitatively, advance taxation substantially reduces founders' ownership at exit: average founder shares fall about 25% under accrual-based taxation relative to realization based taxation. At the same time, accrual taxation increases the fraction of entrepreneurs with positive payoffs from around 16% to nearly 47%. Embedding these outcomes in a career-choice framework shows that the insurance value of accrual taxation partly offsets dilution costs: less risk-averse founders favor realization-based taxes, while more risk averse ones prefer accrual-based taxes. The strength of this insurance channel depends on the highly skewed distribution of entrepreneurial payoffs and the design of loss provisions under accrual-based taxation.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that average founder shares at exit fall about 25% under accrual-based capital gains taxation relative to realization-based taxation, as advance taxation forces additional share sales before exit.
  2. Accrual-based taxation raises the fraction of entrepreneurs with positive payoffs from around 16% to nearly 47%, providing insurance through tax credits to founders whose ventures fail.
  3. In the authors' career-choice framework, less risk-averse founders favor realization-based taxes while more risk-averse founders prefer accrual-based taxes, with the insurance channel's strength depending on the skewed payoff distribution and loss-provision design.

Related Articles:

  • Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II — Analysis of over 5,000 German World War II fighter pilots finds that public peer recognition was associated with higher victory scores among skilled pilots without higher mortality, while average pilots gained little in victories but died at higher rates. The authors conclude status-based awards can have uneven effects in high-risk settings.
  • One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets — Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.
  • Never Enough: Dynamic Status Incentives in Organizations — Data on over 5,000 German fighter pilots show performance rose markedly as pilots approached the eligibility threshold for each medal in a tiered awards ladder and slumped immediately after receiving it, with the effect repeating at each successive rung. The authors estimate the ladder added 3,000–5,000 aerial victories, 5–10% of the total.

AI Summary. The cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio, which compares stock prices to a ten-year average of earnings, stands at a high level because rapid earnings growth at companies exposed to the artificial intelligence boom has lifted prices faster than the slow-moving earnings average. The measure was designed to smooth volatile earnings distorted by temporary booms and busts.

Jesper Rangvid Rangvid's Blog
Date Posted:

Rapid earnings growth has left Shiller’s CAPE at its second highest level ever – above its 1929 level. CAPE’s all-time high was in spring 2000, after which US equities lost ~ half their value.

Does rapid earnings growth make the cyclically adjusted P/E look expensive?

Core argument: A common critique of CAPE is that it can send misleading signals when earnings grow rapidly and stock prices rise alongside them, because the ten-year earnings average increases only gradually and pushes CAPE up.

When it comes to valuing the stock market, one critique of CAPE is that it can send misleading signals during periods when earnings are growing rapidly and stock prices are rising alongside them. The reason is that the ten-year average of earnings increases only gradually because rapidly rising current earnings are averaged together with older earnings that may have grown much more slowly. This causes CAPE to rise. This is essentially the situation today. Companies exposed to the AI boom have experienced extraordinary earnings growth, and their stock prices have followed suit. But the ten-year average of earnings has not increased nearly as quickly, leaving CAPE at a high level. It is important to note that Shiller was fully aware of this discrepancy between a slowly moving average and rapidly rising current earnings. In fact, he designed CAPE with exactly this in mind. His argument was that earnings are highly volatile, so a smoothed measure of earnings provides a better estimate of the ‘fair’ value of stocks than current earnings, which can be distorted by temporary booms and busts.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A common critique of CAPE is that it can send misleading signals when earnings grow rapidly and stock prices rise alongside them, because the ten-year earnings average increases only gradually and pushes CAPE up.
  2. Companies exposed to the AI boom have experienced extraordinary earnings growth and rising stock prices, while the ten-year average of earnings has not increased nearly as quickly, leaving CAPE high.
  3. Shiller designed CAPE aware that a slowly moving earnings average would diverge from rapidly rising current earnings, arguing that smoothed earnings better estimate stocks' fair value than current earnings distorted by temporary booms and busts.

Related Articles:

  • Competitive Advantage Period: The Neglected Value Driver — Data indicate persistence in returns on invested capital has increased since 2000, with large companies the main beneficiaries; the information technology sector's aggregate return was 19% versus a 10.8% median from 1970 to 2024. Of about 13,800 U.S. public firms listing from 1976 to 2019, 18% survived.
  • A Slower AI Payoff Would Be Everyone’s Problem — If artificial intelligence profits arrive later than expected, committed capital spending and depreciation would still hit on schedule, squeezing margins, stretching balance sheets toward more debt and possible ratings downgrades, and repricing equities. Because a handful of large technology firms dominate the indices, the author argues the damage would spread to chips, power, data centers and the broader market.
  • One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets — Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.

AI Summary. 33% of U.S. adults live in households with at least two generations of adults, and 49% of adults under 30 live with a parent — up 6 percentage points since 2022 and 12 points since 2019. Overall 13% of adults live alone, rising to 20% among those 60 and older.

Alicia Lloro, Ellen Merry, Anna Tranfaglia, Mike Zabek, et al. Federal Reserve Board
Date Posted:

Federal Reserve survey data finds that in 2025, 49% of American adults under the age of 30 lived with a parent, up 12pp from 37% in 2019 prior to the pandemic.

Are more young adults living with their parents?

Core argument: Among U.S. adults under age 30, 49% lived with a parent in 2025, up 6 percentage points since 2022 and 12 percentage points since 2019, just before the pandemic.

Most frequently, people lived with a spouse, partner, or children under age 18. Yet, 33% of adults lived in households with at least two generations of adults. Specifically, 19% of adults lived with their adult children (age 18 or older), and 15% lived with a parent. Two percent of adults simultaneously lived with a parent and an adult child. The share of young adults who live with their parents has increased in recent years. In 2025, 49% of adults under age 30 lived with a parent. This share was up by 6 percentage points since 2022, and up 12 percentage points since 2019, just before the pandemic. Conversely, adults aged 60 and older were more likely to live alone than were younger adults. Overall, 13% of people lived alone in 2025. Among those ages 60 and older, a higher 20% were living alone.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Among U.S. adults under age 30, 49% lived with a parent in 2025, up 6 percentage points since 2022 and 12 percentage points since 2019, just before the pandemic.
  2. In 2025, 33% of U.S. adults lived in households with at least two generations of adults, with 19% living with adult children age 18 or older, 15% with a parent, and 2% with both.
  3. In 2025, 13% of people in the U.S. lived alone, with the share reaching 20% among those ages 60 and older.

Related Articles:

  • Changes in Milestones of Adulthood — Among US young adults aged 25–34, the share completing a high school or college degree rose 9 percentage points to 83%, while the share ever married fell 18 points to 44% and the share living with a child fell 16 points to 39%. Economic milestones became more common as family formation milestones became less common.
  • The Happiness Crash of 2020 — Survey data show that after 2020 self-reported happiness fell across groups, compressing pre-existing differences — the black-white gap narrowed from 14 points to 6 — while the marital happiness premium of more than 30 points survived intact. Confidence in major public and private institutions declined nearly across the board, with double-digit drops common and losses spanning all parties and ideologies.
  • Rising Young Worker Despair in the United States — In the United States, mental despair once peaked in middle age but now declines steadily with age, a shift the authors attribute to rising despair among workers under 40. The hump-shaped age pattern persists among those unemployed or unable to work, while it remains flat for homemakers, students, and retirees.

AI Summary. Mentions of billionaires in Democratic fundraising emails quadrupled to a peak above 20% of all emails sent and have held near 15%, making anti-billionaire messaging a mainstay. Anti-AI populism remains far smaller and is entering Democratic rhetoric not as a jobs or safety issue but as something billionaires are building.

Andy Hall Free Systems
Date Posted:

An analysis of Democratic party fundraising emails finds mentions of billionaires spiked in 2025 and remained elevated. Hall argues, “AI is currently entering Democratic rhetoric through the anti-billionaire frame—the oligarchy story makes AI legible as a villain.”

How is artificial intelligence entering Democratic fundraising rhetoric?

Core argument: Billionaire mentions in Democratic fundraising emails quadrupled in the weeks after the January 2025 inauguration, peaking above 20% of all emails sent and holding near 15% since.

For most of the past decade, anti-billionaire language was a niche product. Then came January 2025. In the weeks after an inauguration billionaire mentions in Democratic emails quadrupled, peaking above 20% of all emails sent and holding around 15% ever since. Anti-billionaire fundraising tactics are now a mainstay of Democratic messaging. Economic populism is widespread, particularly in the form of billionaire bashing; anti-AI populism is much, much smaller, but just starting to show signs of growth. And the way it’s growing matters. AI is not currently entering Democratic rhetoric as a jobs issue or a safety issue—it’s entering as the newest thing the billionaires are building, pushed first by the same progressive members who pioneered billionaire bashing before it conquered the rest of the party. Today, AI sits in Democratic fundraising rhetoric almost exactly where the billionaire sat in 2019—a message popular mostly with the party’s left flank, and not commonplace in the party as a whole.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Billionaire mentions in Democratic fundraising emails quadrupled in the weeks after the January 2025 inauguration, peaking above 20% of all emails sent and holding near 15% since.
  2. Anti-AI populism in Democratic messaging remains far smaller than billionaire bashing, entering party rhetoric not as a jobs or safety issue but as the newest thing billionaires are building.
  3. AI messaging is pushed first by the same progressive members who pioneered billionaire bashing, and sits roughly where anti-billionaire rhetoric sat in 2019: popular with the party's left flank, not commonplace across the party.

Related Articles:

  • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of gross domestic income fell to 51%, the lowest since records began in 1947, while profits' share rose to 12.1%, the highest since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages are up 3% since the end of 2019, compared with a 50% rise in profits.
  • This Doommaxxing Has Got to Stop — The author argues that negative narratives, including pessimism about new technology, played an underappreciated role in the economic climate of the Great Depression, alongside more widely studied causes such as sweeping bank failures, a weak initial Federal Reserve response, and a tariff regime that reduced global trade.
  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.

AI Summary. About 10,000 new firms have entered the US defense market in two years, and nontraditional companies received over $120bn in contract obligations in fiscal 2025, while munitions contract obligations have risen 330% since fiscal 2010. The Defense Department is signing large-scale multiyear munitions agreements and backing a rare earth supply chain outside Chinese control.

Jerry McGinn and A.J. Dilts Center for Strategic and International Studies
Date Posted:

The Pentagon is expanding the defense industrial base. The share of spending going to new entrants has risen; these firms were awarded ~$120B in contracts last year. CSIS argues the US “has made meaningful progress” toward wartime readiness.

Is the US defense industrial base scaling up for wartime production?

Core argument: Munitions contract obligations have risen 330% since FY 2010, and the Pentagon is signing multiyear agreements with munitions producers and suppliers on a historic scale in response to increased demand and depleted inventories.

Roughly 10,000 new firms have entered the market in the past two years and nontraditional companies received over $120 billion in contract obligations in FY 2025, adding competition and innovation to the sector. Munitions contract obligations have risen 330% since FY 2010. Spurred by this increased demand and depleted inventories, the Pentagon is signing multiyear agreements with munitions producers and suppliers on a historic scale. In addition to developing magazine depth, the DOD is prioritizing magazine breadth, placing an increased emphasis on equipping the Joint Force with a “high-low mix” of both exquisite and affordable missiles and interceptors. Stockpiles require resilient supplies of subcomponents, and new firms and forms of government-industry collaboration are reshaping the solid rocket motor (SRM) sub-sector. At the bedrock of defense supply chains, unprecedented commitments of public and private capital are focused on establishing a secure mine-to-magnet rare earth supply chain outside Chinese control.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Munitions contract obligations have risen 330% since FY 2010, and the Pentagon is signing multiyear agreements with munitions producers and suppliers on a historic scale in response to increased demand and depleted inventories.
  2. Roughly 10,000 new firms entered the market over the past two years, and nontraditional companies received over $120 billion in contract obligations in FY 2025, adding competition and innovation to the sector.
  3. Alongside magazine depth, the Defense Department is prioritizing magazine breadth through a "high-low mix" of exquisite and affordable missiles and interceptors, while commitments of public and private capital target a mine-to-magnet rare earth supply chain outside Chinese control.

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