Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Monday, June 15, 2026

AI Summary. JPMorgan projects that share sales will add roughly $1.5tn of stock to the US equity market over the next two years even after buybacks, which would be the strongest net equity issuance since at least the late 1990s. Equity has grown cheaper relative to debt as a funding source.

Lu Wang and Carmen Reinicke Bloomberg
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JPM estimates that between 2006 and 2025, net US equity issuance was ~ negative $430B. This de-equitization trend may be over, as JPM forecasts that ~$1.5T of stock will be added to US equity markets over the next two years.

Is the long era of shrinking stock supply reversing?

Core argument: JPMorgan projects that IPOs, secondary offerings, and other share sales will add roughly $1.5 trillion of stock to the US equity market over the next two years, even after accounting for buybacks.

For the better part of two decades, a defining feature of the US stock market has been scarcity. Year after year, shares disappeared from public hands, with buybacks by S&P 500 companies alone erasing nearly $12 trillion worth. According to JPMorgan, IPOs, secondary offerings, and other share sales are poised to add roughly $1.5 trillion of stock to the US equity market over the next two years, even after accounting for buybacks. If realized, it would mark the strongest period of net equity issuance since at least the late 1990s. The shift toward selling more equity is being driven not only by a need for capital but by the opportunity to raise it on attractive terms. The cost of equity has been getting cheaper vis-à-vis debt since the Federal Reserve raised rates to a two-decade high in 2023, ending a prolonged era of cheap borrowing. Thanks to a $30 trillion share rally since, the advantage has persisted even as the Fed started cutting rates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. JPMorgan projects that IPOs, secondary offerings, and other share sales will add roughly $1.5 trillion of stock to the US equity market over the next two years, even after accounting for buybacks.
  2. Such issuance would mark the strongest period of net US equity issuance since at least the late 1990s, following two decades in which S&P 500 buybacks alone erased nearly $12 trillion worth of shares.
  3. The cost of equity has fallen relative to debt since the Federal Reserve raised rates to a two-decade high in 2023, and a $30 trillion share rally has sustained that advantage even as the Fed began cutting rates.

Related Articles:

  • Post-IPO Liquidity Stress Syndrome — Net equity issuance by US domestic non-financial companies has turned positive for the first time since 2021, and a pipeline of initial public offerings and secondary offerings points toward further increases. Net shareholder payouts remain positive on strong earnings and dividends, but the author argues that falling earnings or rising issuance would worsen the outlook for US equities.
  • US Stock Market To Stop Shrinking For First Time In 23 Years — Goldman Sachs estimates that net supply of US equity — new shares issued less shares removed by buybacks and take-privates — will be roughly flat in 2026 after being negative since 2003, with a larger influx expected in 2027 as lock-up periods on this year's initial public offerings expire.
  • Capital Allocation — Internal financing has been the main source of capital for U.S. corporations, with steady new debt issuance except in recession years, consistent with a stable capital structure. Companies have retired equity on average, and net equity issuance remains negative even after accounting for stock-based compensation.

AI Summary. Across a 28-country sample, accumulated trade balances are only weakly correlated with changes in countries' net foreign asset positions, with trade deficits accounting for about one-third of the deterioration in the US position and financial effects entirely explaining Canada's 73 percentage-point improvement relative to its economy.

Stefan Avdjiev, Kristin Forbes, Tsvetelina Nenova and Marjorie Santos Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Avdjiev, et al decompose the changes in countries’ net international investment positions into the effect of accumulated trade flows, net investment income, and asset revaluation. For the US, only ⅓ of the NIIP deterioration was due to trade flows.

Do trade balances explain changes in countries' net foreign asset positions?

Core argument: Accumulated trade deficits over 2010–24 contributed only about one-third of the deterioration in the U.S. net international investment position, in a sample of 28 countries plus the euro area.

Figure 8 shows accumulated trade flows over 2010-24 (as a share of 2024 GDP) for each of the 28 countries in our sample (plus the euro area as one entity) in blue bars, with the corresponding changes in NIIPs (from Figure 5) in black squares. For a few countries (such as Germany and France), changes in NIIPs largely correspond to accumulated trade surpluses or deficits. However, in most cases, trade flows are only weakly correlated with these changes in imbalances. In the United States, trade deficits contributed to only about one-third of the deterioration in its NIIP, and in Canada, the striking improvement of 73pp in its NIIP (relative to 2024 GDP) entirely reflected financial effects, as accumulated trade balances alone would have generated an NIIP deficit. In other countries, accumulated trade flows would have generated much larger changes in imbalances than actually occurred if they were not offset by financial channels working in the opposite direction. For example, in China, accumulated trade surpluses would have improved the NIIP by 24% of 2024 GDP, rather than the reported 10% (with the difference primarily explained by financial losses and unexplained errors and omissions).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Accumulated trade deficits over 2010–24 contributed only about one-third of the deterioration in the U.S. net international investment position, in a sample of 28 countries plus the euro area.
  2. Canada's 73pp improvement in its NIIP relative to 2024 GDP entirely reflected financial effects, since accumulated trade balances alone would have generated an NIIP deficit.
  3. China's accumulated trade surpluses over 2010–24 would have improved its NIIP by 24% of 2024 GDP rather than the reported 10%, with the difference primarily explained by financial losses and unexplained errors and omissions.

Related Articles:

  • Honey, Who Shrunk the U.S. Income Surplus? — Foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets are valued at $69tn versus $41tn of U.S. holdings abroad, a gap that has been mounting for decades. With the net liability position in interest-bearing assets at -$15tn, a 1 percentage point rise in interest rates would subtract $150bn from the U.S. net investment income balance.
  • Understanding Global Imbalances — The US, China, Germany, and Japan account for roughly two-thirds of global current account imbalances, with the US deficit at 4% of GDP financed by capital inflows into dollar assets. The average duration of a surplus or deficit spell roughly doubled since the 1980s, building large net foreign asset and liability positions.
  • Debt, Deficits & Global Imbalances — Taxes or restrictions on short-term capital inflows were argued to be a more direct and potentially superior tool than tariffs for shrinking the trade deficit, since tariffs risk retaliation and supply-chain distortions. Proponents said such measures could reduce reliance on household and government borrowing to sustain employment, if paired with efforts to strengthen domestic demand and tradables capacity.

AI Summary. Asia's $1.5tn trade surplus is larger as a share of world output than at any point since 1945 and is the only large surplus in the global economy. Exchange rates have a meaningful impact on trade balances: China's surplus reached about 10% of its output amid renminbi depreciation, then fell below 2% after a 40% real appreciation.

Brad Setser and Shahin Vallée Foreign Affairs
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Noting the strong connection between Asian countries’ currency depreciation and their trade surpluses since the early 2000s, Setser and Vallée argue “exchange rates still matter,” and urge G-7 “currency diplomacy” to fight chronic undervaluation.

Do exchange rates drive the size of trade surpluses?

Core argument: Asia's trade surplus of $1.5 trillion is larger as a share of world GDP than at any point since 1945, and it is the only large surplus in the global economy.

At $1.5 trillion, Asia’s trade surplus is far larger as a share of world GDP than at any point since 1945. It is also the only large surplus in the global economy. Currency moves were central to the development of the trade imbalances that preceded the 2008 global financial crisis. From 2002 to 2005, for instance, the renminbi was tightly linked to a depreciating dollar even as Beijing’s entry to the World Trade Organization turbocharged Chinese exports. The resulting depreciation is a key reason why China’s surplus reached ten percent or so of its GDP—the first China shock. Conversely, the 40 percent real appreciation in the renminbi from 2005 to 2014 was a big reason why China’s surplus fell back to under two percent of its GDP. Exchange rates still matter, and they have a meaningful impact on the balance of trade.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Asia's trade surplus of $1.5 trillion is larger as a share of world GDP than at any point since 1945, and it is the only large surplus in the global economy.
  2. The renminbi's tight link to a depreciating dollar from 2002 to 2005, alongside China's WTO entry turbocharging exports, is a key reason China's surplus reached roughly 10 percent of its GDP in the first China shock.
  3. The renminbi's 40 percent real appreciation from 2005 to 2014 was a big reason China's surplus fell back to under 2 percent of its GDP, indicating that exchange rates have a meaningful impact on the trade balance.

Related Articles:

  • Understanding Global Imbalances — The US, China, Germany, and Japan account for roughly two-thirds of global current account imbalances, with the US deficit at 4% of GDP financed by capital inflows into dollar assets. The average duration of a surplus or deficit spell roughly doubled since the 1980s, building large net foreign asset and liability positions.
  • Why Global Imbalances Matter — Countries running persistent trade surpluses, such as China, Germany and Japan, have built their economies around an excess supply of tradeable goods and services, leaving them dependent on deficit countries to absorb it. That dependence gives deficit countries bargaining power and exposes surplus countries to pressure to expand domestic demand.
  • The U.S. Trade Deficit: Myths and Realities — Taxing capital inflows would weaken the dollar but could raise domestic interest rates and depress investment, harming long-term growth, while an interest rate cut absent recession would be inflationary and erode any real depreciation needed to durably improve the trade balance. Fiscal restraint could weaken the dollar and reduce the trade deficit.

AI Summary. The US government ordered an AI startup to disable access to its most advanced AI models for all foreign nationals after discovering that the guardrails on a newly released model could be bypassed. The company called the response "disproportionate" and warned such an approach could halt all new model deployments by frontier AI developers.

Maggie Eastland, Joshua Green, and Nancy Cook Bloomberg
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The USG ordered Anthropic to disable all foreign nationals from accessing its Mythos AI models following a report that a team was able to “jailbreak” Fable 5, a commercial version of Mythos. In response, Anthropic pulled Fable 5 from all commercial use.

Does blocking foreign access to advanced AI models risk halting new deployments?

Core argument: The US government ordered Anthropic to disable access to its most advanced AI platforms for all foreign nationals, an unprecedented step.

Washington has taken the unprecedented step of ordering the AI startup to disable access to its most advanced AI platforms for all foreign nationals. The US government issued the order after discovering it was possible to “jailbreak,” or bypass the guardrails, of the Fable 5 AI model Anthropic released just days prior. The swiftness of the move triggered widespread concern over what the startup called a “disproportionate” response — and a warning that such an approach could “halt all new model deployments for all frontier model providers.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US government ordered Anthropic to disable access to its most advanced AI platforms for all foreign nationals, an unprecedented step.
  2. Washington issued the order after discovering that the guardrails of Anthropic's Fable 5 model, released days earlier, could be bypassed through "jailbreaking.".
  3. Anthropic called the response "disproportionate" and warned that such an approach could "halt all new model deployments for all frontier model providers.".

Related Articles:

  • Misanthropic: On Mythos, Bad Human Behaviors and Systems Vulnerabilities — Anthropic reports that its Mythos model has detected thousands of high-severity cyber vulnerabilities, including ones found by chaining multiple obscure software weaknesses, and that these hacking skills are emergent rather than a designed capability. Mythos completed a corporate network attack simulation estimated to take an expert over 10 hours, which no other frontier model had solved.
  • US National Security Agency Using Anthropic’s Mythos For Cyber Attacks — Artificial intelligence company Anthropic is helping the US National Security Agency deploy its Mythos model for offensive cyber operations, with roughly half a dozen engineers embedded inside the agency to guide use of the technology and customize models, according to people familiar with the arrangement.
  • China’s Own Mythos Is Coming — America Must Prepare — The authors argue the US can extend its estimated seven-month lead in artificial intelligence by closing gaps in export controls: halting all AI chip exports to China including less advanced models, curbing smuggling networks, blocking cloud and remote access to controlled chips and US models, and restricting chipmaking equipment.

AI Summary. China's nuclear generation capacity rose 76% (24 GW) between 2016 and 2024, and it has 36 reactors under construction, accounting for more than 49% of all nuclear construction worldwide. Its nuclear fleet is concentrated near eastern population centers along the Pacific coastline and consists mostly of pressurized water reactors.

Slade Johnson and Jonathan Russo Energy Information Administration
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Btw 2016 and 2024, China’s nuclear generation capacity increased 76%. China currently has 36 reactors under construction, 49% of global nuclear construction.

How rapidly is China expanding its nuclear power capacity?

Core argument: China's nuclear generation capacity rose 76%, or 24 GW, from 2016 to 2024, according to International Energy Statistics data.

From 2016 to 2024, China’s nuclear generation capacity increased 76% (24 GW), based on our International Energy Statistics (IES) data. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Power Reactor Information System (PRIS), China added an additional 1.1 GW of nuclear power capacity in 2025 and 2.2 GW in 2026 (through May). China is continuing to build out its nuclear generating capacity and has 36 reactors under construction, accounting for more than 49% of total world nuclear construction, according to PRIS. China’s nuclear fleet is concentrated near population centers in the eastern part of the country, along the Pacific Ocean coastline from the Liaoning province in the north to the Hainan province in the south. According to IAEA’s PRIS, China’s existing nuclear fleet mostly consists of pressurized water reactors.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's nuclear generation capacity rose 76%, or 24 GW, from 2016 to 2024, according to International Energy Statistics data.
  2. China has 36 reactors under construction, more than 49% of total world nuclear construction, according to the IAEA's Power Reactor Information System.
  3. China added 1.1 GW of nuclear capacity in 2025 and 2.2 GW in 2026 through May, according to the IAEA's Power Reactor Information System, with its fleet concentrated near eastern population centers from Liaoning to Hainan and consisting mostly of pressurized water reactors.

Related Articles:

  • Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026 — Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
  • Power Politics: Energy Self-Sufficiency in a Modern Mercantilist World — China leads in adding power to the grid, with more than 30,000 miles of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines versus zero in the US and lead times for large transformers of 48 weeks against a US average of 143 weeks. This positions China to accommodate new demand sources such as artificial intelligence.
  • How China Raced Ahead Of The U.S. On Nuclear Power — Data published in Nature show U.S. nuclear construction costs rose steeply after the 1960s while China's fell by half during the 2000s and have since stabilized. China's nuclear companies repeatedly build only a handful of reactor designs, which analysts say streamlines licensing, simplifies supply chains, and is essential for scaling efficiently.

Tuesday, June 16, 2026

AI Summary. A macro model estimates that each 1 percentage point change in S&P 500 return on equity is associated with roughly a 1x change in the index's price-to-earnings ratio. Consensus estimates put hyperscaler capital spending at $770bn, equal to 100% of their operating cash flows, funded increasingly by debt and equity issuance rather than buybacks.

Ben Snider, Ryan Hammond, Jenny Ma, Daniel Chavez, et al. Goldman Sachs
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GS finds that historically, a 1pp move in the S&P 500’s ROE is associated with about a one‑turn move in its P/E multiple. Whether the S&P’s current P/E is sustainable therefore hinges on whether today’s elevated ROE proves persistent.

How does the AI capital spending boom affect S&P 500 profitability?

Core argument: Consensus estimates put hyperscaler capex at $770 billion in 2026, equivalent to 100% of their cash flows from operations.

Whether S&P 500 valuations revert toward their long-term average or prove structurally higher going forward will depend in large part on the trajectory of corporate profitability. Based on our macro model, every 1 percentage point change in S&P 500 ROE is associated with a change of roughly 1x in S&P 500 P/E. Consensus estimates suggest the hyperscalers will spend $770 billion on capex in 2026, equivalent to 100% of cash flows from operations. In order to fund continued capex growth, the companies have increasingly turned to debt and equity issuance and pulled back on buybacks. Net debt for the hyperscalers has increased by $170 billion since the start of 2025, and share counts have begun to rise. While further increases in corporate leverage would support ROE expansion going forward, all else equal, higher leverage would also likely result in increased interest expenses, weighing on ROE.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Consensus estimates put hyperscaler capex at $770 billion in 2026, equivalent to 100% of their cash flows from operations.
  2. A macro model associates every 1 percentage point change in S&P 500 return on equity with a change of roughly 1x in the S&P 500 P/E ratio.
  3. Hyperscaler net debt has risen by $170 billion since the start of 2025 and share counts have begun to rise as the companies fund capex growth through debt and equity issuance while pulling back on buybacks.

Related Articles:

  • Have We Entered an Era of High Productivity Growth? — Labor productivity has grown solidly while the San Francisco Federal Reserve's total factor productivity index, which adjusts for the equipment and technology workers use, has grown modestly, suggesting gains so far reflect better tools rather than broader advances. A regime-switching model puts the probability of a high-productivity regime at 57% using labor productivity and 21% using total factor productivity.
  • Writing Code vs. Shipping Code: Productivity Effects Across Generations of AI Coding Tools — The authors estimate that AI coding tools raise developers' task-level productivity by about 40% with autocomplete, 140% including synchronous agents, and 180% with asynchronous agents, with larger effects for less active developers. Gains attenuate up the production chain: synchronous agents raise lines of code 741% and pull requests 65% but releases only 20%.
  • Measurements Matter: The Return of SLOC Slop — Measuring developer productivity by software lines of code captures output rather than value, and AI inflates the metric by generating boilerplate, wrappers, tests, and speculative code at near-zero cost. More code also creates liabilities through added maintenance, complexity, attack surface, and debugging load.

AI Summary. China's construction boom is estimated at roughly RMB100trn ($14tn) over a five-year span, moving some 800mn people into modern housing, and the AI data center spending boom is estimated at about half that size — but roughly 7x the $930bn inflation-adjusted US internet and broadband buildout.

Louis-Vincent Gave Gavekal
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The US AI buildout is now ~ half the size of China’s 2014–2018 construction boom. Gave notes the global demand for capital is rising, while supply is constrained relative to recent years, pointing to the disappearance of debt with a negative real yield.

How does AI data center spending compare with past building booms?

Core argument: China is estimated to have spent roughly RMB100trn (US$14trn) on construction of all kinds between 2014 and 2018, a boom that allowed roughly 800mn people to move out of insalubrious housing.

Between 2014 and 2018, when China’s construction boom was really going gangbusters, it is estimated that China spent roughly RMB100trn (US$14trn) on construction of all kinds. This construction boom allowed roughly 800mn people to move out of insalubrious housing and into the modern world The AI data center spending boom is thus estimated to be roughly half the size of the Chinese construction boom over a similar period. And this for assets that have a far faster depreciation cycle and are more prone to obsolescence than apartment buildings. The buildings that China built 10 years ago are still there and mostly still occupied. Meanwhile, will the data centers built in 2026 still be useful in 2036? Perhaps a more apt comparison is that between 1996 and 2000, US telecom companies spent roughly US$500bn on internet and broadband infrastructure, or US$930bn in inflation-adjusted terms. Today’s AI capex boom is thus roughly equal to 7x the internet capex boom.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China is estimated to have spent roughly RMB100trn (US$14trn) on construction of all kinds between 2014 and 2018, a boom that allowed roughly 800mn people to move out of insalubrious housing.
  2. The AI data center spending boom is estimated at roughly half the size of China's construction boom over a similar period, for assets with a far faster depreciation cycle and more prone to obsolescence than apartment buildings.
  3. US telecom companies spent roughly US$500bn on internet and broadband infrastructure between 1996 and 2000, or US$930bn in inflation-adjusted terms, roughly one-seventh of today's AI capex boom.

Related Articles:

  • SpaceX and OpenAI Are Ending Wall Street’s Era of Stock Scarcity — JPMorgan projects that share sales will add roughly $1.5tn of stock to the US equity market over the next two years even after buybacks, which would be the strongest net equity issuance since at least the late 1990s. Equity has grown cheaper relative to debt as a funding source.
  • A Tale of Two Countries: The Real Estate Crises in 1990s Japan and Contemporary China — The authors argue Japan's prolonged recession reflected the interplay of slowing returns to investment, weak consumption, and negative sentiment, and that China is in the middle stages of a multi-year real estate correction under more difficult macroeconomic and demographic conditions. They note China retains advantages, including a state-dominated financial system with implicit government guarantees capable of large-scale intervention.
  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.

AI Summary. The authors argue that American men's lifetime experiences of the male labor market shape their beliefs about the returns to working, contributing to the long-run decline in male labor force participation, with recent cohorts participating less than earlier ones at every age. The effects are stronger for same-race labor markets and for conditions experienced in childhood.

Remy Levin and Daniela Vidart National Bureau of Economic Research
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Btw 1986 and 2019, prime-age males who grew up observing a one–SD lower male earnings history had a 7pp lower LFP rate in adulthood, holding current labor‑market conditions fixed.

How do lifetime labor market experiences shape male labor force participation?

Core argument: The authors propose that American men's lifetime experiences of the aggregate male labor market shape their beliefs about the returns to participation, influencing labor supply decisions in ways that persist even in the face of current market conditions.

We propose a new channel contributing to the long-run decline in [male labor force participation] (MLFP) in the United States: changes in American men’s lifetime experiences of the aggregate male labor market have shaped their beliefs about the returns to participation, influencing labor supply decisions in ways that persist even in the face of current market conditions. MLFP and national lifetime male labor market experiences, holding contemporaneous conditions fixed, are highly correlated over time (Figure 1, Panel A). Second, the decline in MLFP is largely driven by cohort-level differences: recent cohorts participate at lower rates than previous generations at every age (Figure 1, Panel B). These patterns suggest that men’s labor market participation is the history, embedded in each cohort’s memory, of the labor markets experienced by the men around them. The effects on MLFP are stronger for experiences of same-race male labor markets, demonstrating the central role of reference-group identity, and are driven by conditions experienced during men’s formative childhood years not explained by educational attainment of subjects or their fathers. Finally, we show that lifetime male labor market experiences are correlated with direct measures of men’s personal wage and employment expectations, but not their expectations for the macroeconomy as a whole.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors propose that American men's lifetime experiences of the aggregate male labor market shape their beliefs about the returns to participation, influencing labor supply decisions in ways that persist even in the face of current market conditions.
  2. The decline in U.S. male labor force participation is largely driven by cohort-level differences, with recent cohorts participating at lower rates than previous generations at every age.
  3. Effects on male labor force participation are stronger for experiences of same-race male labor markets and are driven by conditions experienced during men's formative childhood years, not explained by the educational attainment of subjects or their fathers.

Related Articles:

  • How Labor Force Participation Has Diverged Across Genders — Between 1976 and 2024 the trend labor force participation rate fell 10.1 percentage points for men and rose 8.2 points for women. Population aging lowered participation by about 4 points for each gender and rising education raised it (+6 for women, +3 for men), but the divergence is dominated by participation trends within age-gender groups.
  • Bachelors Without Bachelor’s: Gender Gaps in Education and Declining Marriage Rates — Marriage rates for college-educated women have remained stable over the past fifty years even as the relative supply of college-educated men declined, with the overall decline in marriage driven almost entirely by fewer marriages between non-college women and non-college men. The education gap in women's marriage rates is larger in areas where non-college men face the highest joblessness and incarceration.
  • Post-Pandemic Recovery for America’s Prime Age Labor Force: A Tale of Two Sexes — Prime-age women's labor force participation climbed about 5 points above its pre-pandemic level over a decade, while prime-age men's rose barely a point, only just regaining pre-pandemic levels. Despite economic expansion and labor shortages, work rates for prime-age American men are barely as high as at the trough of the severe Reagan-era recession.

AI Summary. US consumer sentiment rose for the first time in four months as lower gasoline prices offered some relief from a surge in inflation, with the University of Michigan's preliminary sentiment index increasing to 48.9 from a record low of 44.8. The reading beat most economists' expectations but remains the second lowest in data going back to the 1970s.

María Paula Mijares Torres Bloomberg
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The Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index rose in early June from its record low in May. Respondents expect inflation of 4.6% over the next year, down from 4.8% in May. The survey was taken prior to the US Iran deal.

Do lower gasoline prices lift consumer sentiment from record lows?

Core argument: The University of Michigan's preliminary consumer sentiment index rose to 48.9 in June from a record low of 44.8 in May, its first increase in four months.

US consumer sentiment rose in early June for the first time in four months as lower gasoline prices provided some relief for Americans grappling with a surge in inflation. The University of Michigan’s preliminary sentiment index increased to 48.9 in June from a record low 44.8 in May, according to the survey released Friday. That was higher than most economists in a Bloomberg survey expected, but it’s still the second lowest reading in data back to the 1970s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The University of Michigan's preliminary consumer sentiment index rose to 48.9 in June from a record low of 44.8 in May, its first increase in four months.
  2. The June sentiment reading exceeded the expectations of most economists surveyed by Bloomberg, yet remains the second lowest in data going back to the 1970s.
  3. Lower gasoline prices provided some relief for Americans grappling with a surge in inflation, contributing to the rise in US consumer sentiment.

Related Articles:

  • Gas Prices Wipe Out More Than a Year of Wage Gains — Rising gasoline prices have pushed average hourly earnings 0.7% below their year-earlier level after adjusting for inflation, erasing more than a year of wage gains. Inflation eroding wage increases is one reason consumer sentiment sits near record lows despite relatively low unemployment and a strong stock market.
  • Do Voters Punish Inflation or Pay Cuts? Inflation and Real Wages in U.S. Elections — An analysis of U.S. counties estimates that where wages grew faster than prices, voters supported the incumbent party more, while counties with larger real wage losses than average shifted more toward the opposition. A one-standard-deviation larger real wage loss is associated with shifts of roughly 0.10 and 0.19 percentage points in vote share and margin.
  • US Producer Prices Rise at Fastest Pace Since November 2022 — The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that US producer prices rose 6.5% from a year earlier, the fastest annual pace in more than two years, and 1.1% from the prior month. A core measure excluding food and energy rose 4.9% year over year.

AI Summary. SpaceX's market capitalization reached $2.65tn, about $8bn above Amazon's, making it the fifth-largest stock in the world, and at its intraday high it briefly passed Microsoft to rank fourth.

Carmen Reinicke and Subrat Patnaik Bloomberg
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SpaceX overtook Amazon in value. The firm is acquiring Cursor in an all-stock deal that values the coding startup at $60B.

Has a newly public rocket company become the world's fifth-largest stock?

Core argument: SpaceX shares closed 4.8% higher, lifting its market capitalization to $2.65 trillion, roughly $8 billion above Amazon.com's, and making it the fifth-largest stock in the world.

SpaceX jumped for a third straight day on Tuesday, overtaking Amazon.com in value to become the fifth-largest stock in the world. Shares closed 4.8% higher, pushing its market capitalization to $2.65 trillion, roughly $8 billion higher than Amazon’s. At the stock’s intraday high, the market value of Elon Musk’s rocket and AI company topped Microsoft to briefly become the world’s fourth-largest stock.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. SpaceX shares closed 4.8% higher, lifting its market capitalization to $2.65 trillion, roughly $8 billion above Amazon.com's, and making it the fifth-largest stock in the world.
  2. SpaceX has rallied 49% since its IPO, with Tuesday's gain marking a third consecutive day of advances.
  3. At its intraday high, SpaceX's market value topped Microsoft's, briefly making Elon Musk's rocket and AI company the world's fourth-largest stock.

Related Articles:

  • SpaceX — To Boldly Raise Money Where No IPO Has Gone Before — Goldman Sachs research finds that large companies floating 7% or less of their shares at initial public offering have 54% of shares in circulation two years later, while across its full sample of listings a 24% float at debut became 69% within 24 months.
  • SpaceX and OpenAI Are Ending Wall Street’s Era of Stock Scarcity — JPMorgan projects that share sales will add roughly $1.5tn of stock to the US equity market over the next two years even after buybacks, which would be the strongest net equity issuance since at least the late 1990s. Equity has grown cheaper relative to debt as a funding source.
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AI Summary. Swiss voters rejected a proposal that would have capped the country's population at 10mn, up from about 9.1mn, requiring government measures to curb growth past 9.5mn and potentially ending free movement of people with the European Union. Opponents including the government, business groups and trade unions argued it threatened economic growth and access to foreign labour.

Mercedes Ruehl Financial Times
Date Posted:

Swiss voters rejected by 54–46% a proposal to cap the country’s population at 10mm. The proposal would have required the government to take measures to curb population growth once its level hits 9.5mm. The Swiss population is ~ 9.1mm today.

Will voters approve a national population cap that limits immigration?

Core argument: Swiss voters rejected a Swiss People's Party initiative to cap the population at 10mn, from about 9.1mn today, which would have made Switzerland the first country to impose a formal population cap.

The proposal, backed by the rightwing Swiss People’s Party (SVP), would have made Switzerland the first country to impose a formal cap on its population. It sought to limit the number of residents to 10mn, from about 9.1mn today, and would have required the government to take measures to curb population growth once the population reached 9.5mn. If the population subsequently exceeded 10mn, the government would have been obliged to adopt more far-reaching measures, potentially including ending free movement of people with the EU, a cornerstone of Switzerland’s bilateral relationship with the bloc. The result represents a victory for the Swiss government, business groups and trade unions, which had argued the initiative threatened economic growth and risked undermining Switzerland’s access to foreign labour at a time of acute demographic pressures.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Swiss voters rejected a Swiss People's Party initiative to cap the population at 10mn, from about 9.1mn today, which would have made Switzerland the first country to impose a formal population cap.
  2. The rejected proposal would have required the Swiss government to curb population growth once residents reached 9.5mn, and to adopt more far-reaching measures beyond 10mn, potentially including ending free movement of people with the EU.
  3. The Swiss government, business groups and trade unions opposed the initiative, arguing it threatened economic growth and risked undermining Switzerland's access to foreign labour amid acute demographic pressures.

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