Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, May 21, 2026

AI Summary. U.S. inflation has remained above the Federal Reserve's 2% target since 2022 while government borrowing runs high and companies borrow heavily to fund AI build-out. Even so, the 30-year Treasury yield reached a 19-year high of 5.18% while the 10-year yield, at 4.67%, sat below its October 2023 level.

Greg Ip Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

With US deficits averaging 6.2% of GDP over 2023–2026 (vs. 4.8% over 2010–2019), political populism hindering fiscal restraint, AI Capex, and persistent inflation, 30-year Treasury yields hit a 19-year high of 5.18% Tuesday.

Are long-term Treasury yields lower than high borrowing and inflation suggest?

Core argument: The 30-year Treasury yield reached a 19-year high of 5.18% Tuesday before retreating several basis points, while the 10-year yield at 4.67% remained below its October 2023 level.

Government borrowing—everywhere, and especially in the U.S.—has been out of control for years. Inflation in the U.S. has been stuck above the Federal Reserve’s 2% target since 2022. Add in heavy corporate borrowing to fund the AI build-out, and you wonder why long-term interest rates aren’t higher. To be sure, the selloff has been mild in the scheme of things. The 30-year Treasury yield hit a 19-year high of 5.18% Tuesday [before retreating several bps]. Yet the more closely watched 10-year yield, at 4.67%, was lower than in October 2023. Both dropped back Wednesday on hopes oil will resume flowing through the Strait of Hormuz.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The 30-year Treasury yield reached a 19-year high of 5.18% Tuesday before retreating several basis points, while the 10-year yield at 4.67% remained below its October 2023 level.
  2. Government borrowing worldwide, and especially in the U.S., has been out of control for years, with U.S. inflation stuck above the Federal Reserve's 2% target since 2022.
  3. Heavy corporate borrowing to fund the AI build-out adds to the pressures on long-term interest rates, though both the 30-year and 10-year Treasury yields dropped back Wednesday on hopes oil will resume flowing through the Strait of Hormuz.

Related Articles:

  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • Global Debt Report 2026 — Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.

AI Summary. Business investment outside artificial intelligence has been weak, contributing just 1.54% to total capital expenditure growth. The author argues AI investment is not crowding out other projects, since the spread between return on capital and cost of capital has stayed positive and US nonfinancial corporations' capital spending is below their gross savings.

Tan Kai Xian Gavekal
Date Posted:

US non-residential fixed investment grew +5.8% Y/Y in Q1 2026, driven by AI-related spending, while non-AI capex was minimal. Gavekal does not see crowding out from AI or deficits. Returns on capital > borrowing costs by several pp, and firms sit on trillions in cash.

Is AI investment crowding out other business capital spending?

Core argument: Non-AI business capex contributed just 1.54% to total US capex growth, a share that has barely been exceeded over the last two years.

Outside AI, business capex was anemic, contributing just 1.54% to total capex growth—a share that has barely been exceeded for the last two years. While investment is clearly attracting a lot of financial and real resources, the crowding-out thesis does not stand up well to scrutiny. If the demand for capital generated by AI investment were really pricing other projects out of the market, then the real cost of borrowed capital would have increased materially. That is what happened in the tech boom of the late 1990s. But this time around, the “Wicksellian spread” between return on capital and cost of capital has remained positive. The US corporate sector has abundant internally generated funds for capex. The US nonfinancial corporate financing gap—the difference between capex and gross savings—is negative. This suggests that businesses are not investing beyond their means, and therefore are not forced to pick and choose between investment opportunities. US businesses have enough financial capacity to invest both in AI and non-AI projects. The tightening of immigration policy under Donald Trump has brought US labor force growth (and population growth) almost to a standstill. This implies slower consumer demand growth and less incentive for business capex.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Non-AI business capex contributed just 1.54% to total US capex growth, a share that has barely been exceeded over the last two years.
  2. The crowding-out thesis does not hold up well, as the Wicksellian spread between return on capital and cost of capital has remained positive, unlike the late-1990s tech boom when real borrowing costs rose materially.
  3. The US nonfinancial corporate financing gap—capex minus gross savings—is negative, suggesting businesses have sufficient internally generated funds to invest in both AI and non-AI projects rather than choosing between them.

Related Articles:

  • Competitive Advantage Period: The Neglected Value Driver — Data indicate persistence in returns on invested capital has increased since 2000, with large companies the main beneficiaries; the information technology sector's aggregate return was 19% versus a 10.8% median from 1970 to 2024. Of about 13,800 U.S. public firms listing from 1976 to 2019, 18% survived.
  • Corporate America Is Minting Money—and Not Just in Tech and Finance — Earnings per share for S&P 500 companies are estimated to grow more than 13% year over year for a sixth straight quarter, with sales growth and improving margins accompanying the gains. Share buybacks are contributing less to earnings growth than in many quarters, with the gap between earnings-per-share and net income growth just under 1 percentage point.
  • End of an Era: The Coming Long-Run Slowdown in Corporate Profit Growth and Stock Returns — The authors estimate that declining interest and corporate tax rates accounted for over 40% of real corporate profit growth from 1989 to 2019, while falling risk-free rates explain the entire expansion in price-to-earnings multiples. Real earnings before interest and taxes grew slightly more slowly than in 1962–1989, at 2.2% versus 2.4% per year.

AI Summary. Artificial intelligence company Anthropic generated $4.8bn in quarterly sales and is set to post a $559m quarterly operating profit, with revenue growth outpacing Zoom during the pandemic and Google and Facebook before their stock listings. Its accounting methods are unclear, as it isn't yet subject to public-company reporting rules.

Berber Jin Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Anthropic’s revenue is set to more than double to $10.9B in Q2, delivering its first operating profit ($559M) — versus guidance last summer that pointed to no full-year profit before 2028.

Is a leading AI company about to turn its first profit?

Core argument: Anthropic generated $4.8 billion in first-quarter sales, with quarterly revenue growing faster than Zoom did during the pandemic and faster than Google and Facebook in the run-up to their IPOs.

Anthropic generated $4.8 billion in sales in the first quarter. Its quarterly revenue is now growing faster than Zoom did during the pandemic, and Google and Facebook in the run-up to their initial public offerings. It is set to turn an operating profit of $559 million in the June quarter. It is unclear what accounting methods Anthropic has used to book revenue and costs, as the company isn’t yet required to follow the financial-reporting requirements of a public company. Anthropic and OpenAI both account for revenue differently in ways that can make comparisons between the two companies difficult. Anthropic counts sales of its technology through cloud partners as revenue, while OpenAI doesn’t. An Anthropic spokeswoman has said this is consistent with standard accounting practices because the company is the principal in the transaction.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Anthropic generated $4.8 billion in first-quarter sales, with quarterly revenue growing faster than Zoom did during the pandemic and faster than Google and Facebook in the run-up to their IPOs.
  2. Anthropic is set to post an operating profit of $559 million in the June quarter, its first profitable quarter.
  3. Anthropic's accounting methods for booking revenue and costs are unclear because the company is not yet subject to public-company financial-reporting requirements, and it counts sales through cloud partners as revenue while OpenAI does not.

Related Articles:

  • Bayes and Base Rates 2.0: How History Can Guide Our Assessment of the Future — Applying historical base rates to OpenAI's published sales forecasts, the authors find that no U.S. public company in roughly 18,900 firm-period observations from 1950 to 2024 achieved five-year sales growth as fast as the company projects. Reported forecasts imply compound annual growth rates ranging from 85% to 118%.
  • One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets — Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.
  • An AI IPO Impact Update: The AnthroPix Effect May Be $5-Trillion+ — A closed-end fund holding small private stakes in OpenAI, SpaceX, and Anthropic has more than doubled in under two weeks and trades at nearly triple its last reported net asset value. The author argues this reflects investor appetite for any exposure to pre-IPO artificial intelligence companies, which will pull money out of other assets.

AI Summary. Excluding artificial-intelligence-related categories, US non-residential fixed investment has contracted at roughly a 3% annual rate over the past year, versus average growth above 5% in the prior decade, running about $130bn below trend and cutting GDP growth by roughly 0.4 percentage points. Credit remains plentiful, with tight corporate bond spreads.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
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The AI buildout drove ~ half of US GDP growth in 2025, according to an Economist analysis. Non-residential non-AI related fixed investment contracted ~3% over the past year.

Is business investment outside artificial intelligence shrinking?

Core argument: Excluding AI-related information-processing equipment and software, U.S. non-residential fixed investment has contracted at an annualised rate of roughly 3% over the past four quarters, against average growth above 5% in the previous decade.

Strip out the splurge on information-processing equipment and software—the categories most closely tied to AI—and the picture looks grim. Over the past four quarters non-residential fixed investment excluding ai-related categories has contracted at an annualised rate of roughly 3%, compared with average growth of more than 5% in the previous decade. Investment in industrial and transport equipment has fallen by more than 2% over the past year. Manufacturing construction is down by 20%. In total, non-AI investment is running about $130bn below its trend from the last decade. This capex recession is reducing gdp growth by roughly 0.4 percentage points. [A] potential explanation, in which strong demand or heavy government borrowing pushes up interest rates and crowds out other private investment, also looks unpersuasive. Credit remains plentiful. The spreads between investment-grade corporate bond and Treasuries have seldom been this tight since the 1990s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Excluding AI-related information-processing equipment and software, U.S. non-residential fixed investment has contracted at an annualised rate of roughly 3% over the past four quarters, against average growth above 5% in the previous decade.
  2. Non-AI investment is running about $130bn below its trend from the last decade, with industrial and transport equipment investment down more than 2% over the past year and manufacturing construction down 20%.
  3. The capex recession in non-AI investment is reducing U.S. GDP growth by roughly 0.4 percentage points, and crowding out by higher interest rates looks unpersuasive as an explanation, since credit remains plentiful and investment-grade corporate spreads over Treasuries have seldom been this tight since the 1990s.

Related Articles:

  • $14 Trillion in IG Supply Coming to the Market — About $14tn of investment-grade fixed income supply is coming to market, combining roughly $10tn of US government debt to be refinanced over the next 12 months, a budget deficit near $2tn, and about $2tn of gross corporate bond issuance boosted by data-center builders. The author argues this growing supply is putting upward pressure on interest rates and credit spreads.
  • Let Them Eat Compute: Data Centers’ Implications for Mortgage Finance — The author argues the housing affordability crisis stems from the sharp decline in 30-year fixed mortgage rates rather than their subsequent rise, since fixed rates let rate dips boost purchasing power, lifting existing-home sales 25% and prices 32% relative to rents. A costly data center buildout is crowding out for-sale housing.
  • Larry Summers and Bob Rubin Join Our CIOs to Discuss the Surprising Economic Cycle — Adopting the Simpson-Bowles fiscal consolidation when interest rates were at zero would have risked excessive disinflation, since long rates had no room to fall to provide an offsetting expansionary impulse. After the large run-up in debt and rise in real interest rates, the developing fiscal situation risks inflationary pressure, Treasury market disruption, or crowding out of private investment.

AI Summary. An analysis published by Bloomberg attributes roughly 40% of Germany's shortfall in economic output to lost export markets, another 40% to higher energy prices, and the remaining 20% to weak domestic demand, bureaucracy and other factors. The author argues German politics overemphasizes bureaucracy while China's pressure on the country's industrial base erodes export demand.

Sander Tordoir and Brad Setser Centre for European Reform
Date Posted:

Germany’s economy is 6% below its pre-pandemic path; its exports to China are down more than 40% as a share of GDP since 2021, while China’s trade surplus with the EU is growing around 30% a year on heavy subsidies.

Is Germany's economic shortfall driven by lost exports rather than bureaucracy?

Core argument: A Bloomberg analysis published in late 2024 traces roughly 40% of Germany's GDP shortfall to lost export markets, another 40% to higher energy prices, and the remaining 20% to weak domestic demand, bureaucracy and other factors.

Germany's difficulty in diagnosing the drivers of its malaise resembles a Phantomschmerz – a pain felt where something vital has already been lost. That missing limb is export demand, chopped off by China's profound pressure on Germany's industrial base. According to an analysis published by Bloomberg in late 2024, roughly 40 per cent of Germany's GDP shortfall can be traced to lost export markets, another 40 per cent to higher energy prices, and the remaining 20 per cent to weak domestic demand, bureaucracy and other factors. By focusing overly on bureaucracy, German politics has got the 80-20 rule the wrong way around.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A Bloomberg analysis published in late 2024 traces roughly 40% of Germany's GDP shortfall to lost export markets, another 40% to higher energy prices, and the remaining 20% to weak domestic demand, bureaucracy and other factors.
  2. Germany's lost export demand is attributed to China's pressure on the German industrial base, a loss likened to a Phantomschmerz, or pain felt where something vital has already been gone.
  3. German politics has inverted the 80-20 rule by concentrating on bureaucracy, which sits in the 20% category alongside weak domestic demand, rather than on the export and energy losses making up 80% of the GDP shortfall.

Related Articles:

  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
  • China’s Next-Generation Industrial Policy — China's export growth is concentrated in upstream, higher-tech goods: exports of intermediate inputs rose 26% and capital goods 32% between 2021 and 2024, while consumption goods exports were broadly flat. This shift embeds China deeper in global production systems and aligns with its long-running import substitution strategy of localizing entire value chains.
  • China Is Making Trade Impossible — Interviews with Chinese economists, technologists and business leaders yielded no clear answer to what products China would want to buy from the rest of the world in future, beyond commodities, luxury goods and higher education. The author argues China sees nothing it cannot eventually make better and cheaper itself, undermining trade as a two-way exchange.

AI Summary. SpaceX reported revenue of $18.7bn, up from $14bn a year earlier, while swinging from a $791m profit to a loss of $4.94bn, according to its filing. Its Starlink satellite internet business supplies about two-thirds of sales, with subscribers rising from 2.3m to 8.9m over two years.

Loren Grush, Bailey Lipschultz, and Sana Pashankar Bloomberg
Date Posted:

SpaceX’s 2025 capex hit $20.74B, with more than half flowing to AI. The AI segment lost $6.36B. Starlink’s $4.42B in operating income only partly offset this loss.

Is rapid revenue and subscriber growth accompanied by widening losses?

Core argument: SpaceX reported $18.7 billion in 2025 revenue, up from $14 billion in 2024, while swinging from a $791 million profit in 2024 to a $4.94 billion loss last year, according to its filing.

SpaceX's filing depicts a conglomerate with a maturity practically unheard of in a pre-IPO company. Overall, SpaceX had $18.7 billion in revenue in 2025, up from $14 billion the previous year. During that period, the company swung from a profit of $791 million in 2024 to a loss of $4.94 billion last year, according to the filing. So far, it derives the majority of its revenue from its Starlink satellite internet business, which accounted for about two-thirds of sales in the first quarter of 2026. Subscribers to SpaceX's Starlink internet service have roughly doubled over the past couple of years from 2.3 million in 2023 to 4.4 million in 2024 and up to 8.9 million in 2025. Income from those operations reached $4.42 billion last year, compared with $2 billion a year earlier.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. SpaceX reported $18.7 billion in 2025 revenue, up from $14 billion in 2024, while swinging from a $791 million profit in 2024 to a $4.94 billion loss last year, according to its filing.
  2. Starlink accounted for about two-thirds of SpaceX's sales in the first quarter of 2026, with income from those operations reaching $4.42 billion last year versus $2 billion a year earlier.
  3. Starlink subscribers rose from 2.3 million in 2023 to 4.4 million in 2024 and 8.9 million in 2025.

Related Articles:

  • Old Space, New Space: A Commercial Revolution in Innovation? — Patent data show the largest surge in space-related patenting occurred in the 1990s, alongside spectrum allocation, licensing regimes, and telecommunications and GPS demand, with incumbent aerospace firms accounting for most space patenting and entrants a growing minority share. The authors argue government's most consequential role lies in constructing appropriable markets rather than funding technology directly.
  • An AI IPO Impact Update: The AnthroPix Effect May Be $5-Trillion+ — A closed-end fund holding small private stakes in OpenAI, SpaceX, and Anthropic has more than doubled in under two weeks and trades at nearly triple its last reported net asset value. The author argues this reflects investor appetite for any exposure to pre-IPO artificial intelligence companies, which will pull money out of other assets.
  • Elon Musk’s Starship Heavy Could Revolutionize Warfare — The Starship heavy-lift rocket would make it possible to pre-position conventional munitions in low Earth orbit, with heat shields and inertial guidance, that could be deorbited with little warning to strike anywhere on Earth within minutes. Such a system would allow thousands of simultaneous precise strikes without aircraft or personnel at risk, removing the need to first establish air superiority.

Friday, May 22, 2026

AI Summary. A dataset of technologies by country of origin shows roughly 60–70% attributed to U.S. origin in recent periods, even though the U.S. accounts for only 20–30% of global GDP. The authors argue GDP is a poor proxy for who drives future growth, since innovation appears more concentrated in America than economic activity.

Hemanth Asirvatham, Elliott Mokski, and Andrei Shleifer National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

Asirvatham, Mokski and Shleifer use GPT to assemble a 37,000-technology dataset. The lag from invention to wide adoption has collapsed tenfold — from ~50 years in the 19th century to ~5 today. Implication: AI may diffuse far faster than the computer did.

Is innovation more concentrated in America than economic output?

Core argument: The share of technologies attributed to U.S. origin rises to roughly 60–70% in recent periods, even though the United States accounts for only 20–30% of global GDP.

We observe the rising dominance of American innovation in the late 19th century, coinciding with the US becoming the leading economic power. However, unlike the GDP statistics, while America reached its peak percentage of global GDP in the early 20th century, its total dominance in innovation is a more recent phenomenon. In our dataset, the share of technologies attributed to U.S. origin rises to roughly 60-70% in recent periods, even though only 20 to 30% of global GDP has been American. This highlights how GDP today may be a poor proxy for who is driving GDP growth tomorrow: innovation appears much more concentrated in America than economic activity.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of technologies attributed to U.S. origin rises to roughly 60–70% in recent periods, even though the United States accounts for only 20–30% of global GDP.
  2. American innovation dominance is a more recent phenomenon than American economic dominance, since the U.S. share of global GDP peaked in the early 20th century while its total innovation dominance came later.
  3. GDP today may be a poor proxy for who drives GDP growth tomorrow, because innovation appears much more concentrated in America than economic activity.

Related Articles:

  • American Productivity Still Leads The World — US labor productivity per hour has grown 73% since 1990, versus 39% in the euro area and 55% in both Britain and Japan. America also invests more, with non-residential investment near 17% of GDP and R&D around 3.5%, and sees company churn of nearly 20% annually versus roughly 15% in Europe.
  • The American Economy Has Left Other Rich Countries In The Dust — The United States' share of combined G7 output has risen from about two-fifths in 1990 to roughly half, with output per person now about 40% above Western Europe and Canada and 60% above Japan — roughly double the 1990 gaps. Average wages in Mississippi exceed national averages in Britain, Canada, and Germany.
  • What Makes The US Truly Exceptional — Real GDP per head in other large high-income countries sits below the US level and has fallen further behind this century, with Germany at 84% of the US level (down from 92%) and the UK at 73% (down from 82%). Whether US pathologies such as higher inequality and lower life expectancy are a necessary price of that dynamism is unclear.

AI Summary. The U.S. government will award about $2bn to quantum-computing firms under the 2022 Chips and Science Act, taking a minority equity stake in each company. D-Wave said its entire $100m award would be an equity investment, with Rigetti and Infleqtion describing similar structures.

Amrith Ramkumar and Heather Somerville The Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Lutnick’s Commerce Department is awarding $2B in Chips Act grants to nine quantum firms and taking government equity in each. IBM gets $1B (plus $1B of its own); GlobalFoundries $375M for ~1%. D-Wave, Rigetti, and Infleqtion surged 30%+.

Is the government taking equity stakes in quantum-computing companies?

Core argument: The U.S. will award quantum-computing firms $2 billion funded by the 2022 Chips and Science Act, taking a minority equity stake in each company receiving money.

The funding for the quantum deals comes from the 2022 Chips and Science Act, which includes money for earlier-stage technology projects. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has overhauled the office, asking semiconductor companies to increase their domestic investments and taking a nearly 10% stake in Intel, which has seen shares surge since the unusual deal. The government will receive a minority equity stake in each quantum company, adding to similar deals including the rare-earths magnet maker Vulcan Elements and the mining company MP Materials. D-Wave said that all of its $100 million award would be an equity investment. It recently had a market value of more than $7 billion. Rigetti and Infleqtion said their deals would have a similar structure.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. will award quantum-computing firms $2 billion funded by the 2022 Chips and Science Act, taking a minority equity stake in each company receiving money.
  2. D-Wave, recently valued at more than $7 billion, said its entire $100 million award would be an equity investment, and Rigetti and Infleqtion said their deals would have a similar structure.
  3. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has overhauled the office, asking semiconductor companies to increase their domestic investments and taking a nearly 10% stake in Intel, whose shares have surged since the deal.

Related Articles:

  • New Advances Bring the Era of Quantum Computers Closer Than Ever — Estimates of the quantum computing power needed to run Shor's algorithm and break encryption have fallen from billions of qubits to a million, while existing machines have hundreds. Researchers have announced a design requiring only tens of thousands of qubits and an implementation of the algorithm 10x as efficient as the prior best.
  • An Old Problem Could Stop The U.S. From Leading On Quantum Computers — Many quantum computers depend on dilution refrigerators, produced by a few small firms in the US, Britain and Finland, and on critical minerals such as niobium, concentrated in Brazil, and tantalum, mined in Africa and mostly processed in China. China has announced mass production of a domestic dilution refrigerator and has been buying niobium mines.
  • Google Unveils Quantum Computing Breakthrough on Willow Chip — Google says its "Quantum Echoes" algorithm, run on its Willow quantum chip and detailed in a paper in Nature, is verifiable on other quantum computers and ran 13,000x faster than the world's best classical supercomputer. Google says the advance points to useful quantum applications in medicine and materials science within five years.

AI Summary. Long-term yields in the $50tn-plus market for Group of Seven government bonds reached a two-decade high, as investors demand compensation for the risk that higher inflation persists and central banks must raise interest rates to contain it. Pandemic-era inflation has not fully faded and government debts keep increasing.

Enda Curran, Mark Schroers, Ye Xie, and Jorgelina Do Rosario Bloomberg
Date Posted:

G7 long-term sovereign yields hit a two-decade high this week as the $50T developed-market sovereign bond complex prices in a second inflation regime. Investors expect central banks to hike to contain it; markets reckon the first move by a Warsh Fed will be up.

Are long-term government bond yields rising on persistent inflation fears?

Core argument: Long-term yields in the $50 trillion-plus market for Group of Seven sovereign bonds reached a two-decade high, unsettling the safest haven in world finance.

As all this damage mounts, it's starting to rattle the safest haven in world finance: the $50 trillion-plus market for Group of Seven sovereign bonds, where long-term yields hit a two-decade high this week. Put simply, investors are starting to worry, like they never quite did even at the post-Covid peak, that higher inflation is here to stay. They want compensation for that risk and expect central banks will have to raise interest rates to contain it. That's a conclusion based not just on the blow from the Mideast conflict but the environment it's landing in. Economies still haven't wrung all the pandemic inflation out of their system. Governments owe ever-increasing debts as they struggle to rein in spending that adds fuel to the fire.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Long-term yields in the $50 trillion-plus market for Group of Seven sovereign bonds reached a two-decade high, unsettling the safest haven in world finance.
  2. Investors are demanding compensation for the risk that higher inflation persists, worrying as they never quite did even at the post-Covid peak, and expect central banks will have to raise interest rates to contain it.
  3. The shift reflects not only the Mideast conflict but the environment it lands in, with economies yet to wring out all pandemic inflation and governments owing ever-increasing debts amid spending they struggle to rein in.

Related Articles:

  • What’s Moving Long-Term Interest Rates? — Increases in long-term US government bond yields have been driven almost entirely by real interest rates, as measured by inflation-protected yields, rather than by long-term inflation expectations. One explanation is a rising term premium, with investors demanding extra yield on long bonds if they expect greater inflation volatility or weaker diversification against stocks.
  • Global Economics Comment: Global Economic Impacts of the War in Iran — The main economic risk to major economies from the war in Iran is that higher energy prices lift inflation and slow growth, with oil near $80/bbl, up 14% since late February. Analysts project oil moderating to $76/bbl and then $65/bbl as the risk premium fades in a structurally oversupplied market.
  • War Cost Sinks Long-Term Government Bonds on Deficit Worries — Investor concern that the Iran war will raise government spending and widen budget deficits has triggered a selloff in long-term government bonds, pushing the 30-year US Treasury yield near 4.90% and lifting yields from the UK and Germany to Australia and Japan. A global borrowing wave could further pressure the $31tn US Treasury market.

AI Summary. Returns from new technologies flow to organizations able to implement them and redesign workflows, not to the technology itself; the $27bn US effort to digitize hospital records left physicians spending roughly half their day on records and about a quarter with patients. The Stanford AI Index 2026 finds single-digit AI agent deployment across nearly all business functions.

Luis Garicano and Jesús Saa-Requejo Silicon Continent
Date Posted:

Chinese model MiniMax M2.5 prices at $1.15/m output tokens vs. $25 for Claude Opus 4.6, as intense competition and lack of switching costs in AI models drive price compression, forcing labs to reinvest profits to maintain competitive positions.

Does AI value accrue to chipmakers rather than model developers?

Core argument: The U.S. spent $27 billion under the HITECH Act starting in 2009 to digitize hospital records, yet more than a decade later physicians spend roughly half their day completing those records and about a quarter with patients.

This has long been true in the adoption of new technologies. The path is difficult and slow, and the returns flow to those able to implement the technology. The United States spent twenty-seven billion dollars under the HITECH Act starting in 2009 to digitize hospital records. More than a decade later, physicians spend roughly half their day on completing those records and about a quarter with patients. The technology was available; the knowledge of how to use it was not. The Stanford AI Index 2026 finds AI agent deployment in the single digits as a share of activity across nearly all business functions, even after two years of saturation coverage. No frontier model fixes that. The result is that the implementation layer captures value through its organizational ability to take advantage of the new technology and redesign the workflows effectively.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. spent $27 billion under the HITECH Act starting in 2009 to digitize hospital records, yet more than a decade later physicians spend roughly half their day completing those records and about a quarter with patients.
  2. The Stanford AI Index 2026 finds AI agent deployment in the single digits as a share of activity across nearly all business functions, even after two years of saturation coverage.
  3. Value from new technology accrues to the implementation layer through organizational ability to exploit the technology and redesign workflows, and no frontier model substitutes for that knowledge.

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AI Summary. Chinese state-owned enterprises are advertising party-building and propaganda posts requiring Communist Party membership and political and theoretical grounding, with average pay of about Rmb110,000 ($16,200) a year, below the Rmb124,000 average for non-private employers. Such roles offer job security and benefits exceeding those in the private sector, appealing to graduates facing youth unemployment.

Joe Leahy and Daniel Gage-Brown Financial Times
Date Posted:

Elite Chinese universities (Peking, Renmin, Tsinghua) now offer “party building” courses (Mao through Xi) to give graduates a job edge as youth unemployment climbs. Party loyalty is a hireable credential. CCP cells number 5.25mn, with 30% inside state/private firms.

Are ideological credentials becoming a career advantage for Chinese graduates?

Core argument: Party-building roles in China pay an average Rmb110,000 ($16,200) a year according to job site Zhiyouji, below the Rmb124,000 average for non-private entities, but offer job security and generous benefits relative to the private sector.

Still for China's young graduates, who are grappling with rising youth unemployment, party building could lead to a stable, if not especially lucrative, income. A job posting on recruitment site Yingjiesheng for a "Party building and propaganda officer" at a Tianjin-based engineering state-owned enterprise demanded that applicants be CCP members with "good political literacy and theoretical grounding." According to job site Zhiyouji, the average annual salary for such a role is Rmb110,000 ($16,200), trending below the national average of Rmb124,000 for non-private entities. However, such roles offer job security and generous benefits compared with the private sector.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Party-building roles in China pay an average Rmb110,000 ($16,200) a year according to job site Zhiyouji, below the Rmb124,000 average for non-private entities, but offer job security and generous benefits relative to the private sector.
  2. A Tianjin-based state-owned engineering enterprise advertised a "Party building and propaganda officer" post on recruitment site Yingjiesheng requiring applicants to be CCP members with "good political literacy and theoretical grounding.".
  3. China's young graduates, contending with rising youth unemployment, are turning to party-building work for a stable if not especially lucrative income.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Youth Unemployment Hits New High As Fresh Graduates Flood Market — China's National Bureau of Statistics reported the jobless rate for 16-to-24-year-olds, excluding students, rose to 16.9% from 16.1%, while the rate for those aged 25 to 29 rose to 7.7% from 7.2%, and overall urban unemployment edged up to 5.4%. A record 12.7m students, about 4% more than the prior year, are expected to graduate.
  • China Says Hostile Foreign Forces Are Driving Its Youth to Slack Off — China's Ministry of State Security attributes youth disillusionment to ideological infiltration by foreign anti-China hostile forces, calling young people the primary targets of such efforts. Millions of young Chinese have embraced a "lying flat" mindset, rejecting pressure to overwork or leaving work entirely in an economy with limited well-paying jobs.
  • China Punishes ‘Excessively Pessimistic’ Social Media Users — China's internet regulator has launched a campaign to remove online content that incites "excessively pessimistic sentiment," panic, or defeatist ideas such as "hard work is useless." Authorities have punished bloggers who advocated working less, an influencer who said forgoing marriage and children made financial sense, and a commentator who said China's quality of life lags Western countries.