Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Friday, May 15, 2026

AI Summary. California's healthcare sector drives its job growth despite the state having the sixth-youngest population by share aged 65 or older and residents reporting fewer chronic conditions than almost anywhere else. State policy is one plausible partial explanation: expanded Medicaid coverage, including for undocumented residents, cut the uninsured share to 5.9%, while spending per enrollee is rising faster than enrollment.

Kenan Fikri and Thomas Cronin Agglomerations
Date Posted:

California is trading high wage private sector jobs for lower wage jobs in the healthcare sector, which now account for 17.4% of all jobs in CA, up 3pp in four years – twice the national growth rate.

Is healthcare job growth in a young, healthy state driven by policy?

Core argument: Only 5.9% of Californians lacked health insurance in 2024, a record low, after a decade of Medi-Cal expansion that extended coverage to groups including undocumented populations.

California’s population is not especially old or feeble. Only 16.5% of its population is 65 or older, making it the sixth-youngest state on this measure. Californians also report fewer chronic health conditions than almost anywhere else. So why is its healthcare sector so mighty? One plausible partial explanation is that state policies are driving the outcome — in other words, that government subsidies are allowing more people to access more healthcare and social support, stoking demand. Enrollment in Medi-Cal, the state’s medicaid program, has increased significantly over the past decade as the state has continuously expanded coverage, including in recent years to undocumented populations. As a result, only 5.9% of Californians went without health insurance in 2024, a record low. The extensive margin (new enrollment) isn’t the only one at work; the intensive margin (use of healthcare services) is too. The state legislature has noted that Medi-Cal spending per enrollee is increasing even faster than the number of enrolled. Both greater utilization and greater coverage are driving demand and creating jobs in the process.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Only 5.9% of Californians lacked health insurance in 2024, a record low, after a decade of Medi-Cal expansion that extended coverage to groups including undocumented populations.
  2. California's healthcare sector strength is unlikely to stem from an aged or unwell population, since 16.5% of residents are 65 or older — the sixth-youngest state on that measure — and Californians report fewer chronic conditions than almost anywhere else.
  3. The California legislature has noted that Medi-Cal spending per enrollee is rising faster than enrollment, indicating that greater utilization as well as broader coverage is driving healthcare demand and job creation.

Related Articles:

  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • Has the United States Bent the Health Care Cost Curve? — The authors estimate that a slowdown in US health care spending reflects technology-associated changes in health and site of care (21% of the slowdown, double that in Medicare), more elastic long-run supply (6%), market changes reducing and making demand more elastic (11–27%), improved population health (7%), and slower price growth net of upcoding (24%).
  • Saved by Medicaid: New Evidence on Health Insurance and Mortality from the Universe of Low-Income Adults — Using linked Census and tax records for 37m low-income adults, the authors estimate that state Medicaid expansions raised enrollment by 12 percentage points and cut mortality among low-income adults by 2.5%, implying a 21% reduction in the mortality hazard of new enrollees. They estimate direct budgetary costs of $5.4m per life saved and $179,000 per life-year saved.

AI Summary. Miami has added investment banking and portfolio management jobs but has grown less than New York City, trailing Salt Lake City in banking growth and Atlanta in portfolio management growth. Measured by employment levels in both segments combined, South Florida ranks fifth among counties, behind Manhattan, Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles.

Aziz Sunderji Financial Times
Date Posted:

NYC’s billionaires moved south: $5B in taxable income left for Miami in 2020–21, 10x the return flow. But most of the firms stayed, as Miami added only 3K finance jobs since 2019.

Is Miami becoming a major hub for institutional finance jobs?

Core argument: South Florida (Miami and Palm Beach) ranks only fifth among US counties by combined employment in investment banking and portfolio management, behind Manhattan, Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles.

For the two crucial segments of institutional finance — banking (what the Bureau of Labor Statistics calls “Investment Banking & Securities Intermediation”) and fund management (“Portfolio Management & Investment Advice”)—Miami has indeed grown, but far less than New York City. Miami isn’t even growing the second fastest. For banking, Salt Lake City grew faster (Goldman Sachs has steadily expanded its Salt Lake City campus into the firm’s third-largest US hub), and for portfolio management, Atlanta grew more rapidly (anchored by Invesco, the $2tn asset manager headquartered there since 2008). Looking at levels rather than rates of growth, and for banking and portfolio management combined, South Florida (Miami and Palm Beach) ranks only fifth among counties by number of employees, behind Manhattan, Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. South Florida (Miami and Palm Beach) ranks only fifth among US counties by combined employment in investment banking and portfolio management, behind Manhattan, Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles.
  2. Miami's employment in investment banking and securities intermediation and in portfolio management and investment advice has grown, but far less than New York City's.
  3. Salt Lake City outgrew Miami in banking, where Goldman Sachs expanded its campus into the firm's third-largest US hub, and Atlanta outgrew Miami in portfolio management, anchored by $2tn asset manager Invesco.

Related Articles:

  • Florida’s Population Boom Fizzles as High Costs Drive Away Middle Class — Florida's net domestic migration has slowed to a trickle as prime-working-age residents leave citing affordability and arrivals from other states decline. An influx of wealthy newcomers has helped drive up home prices, inflation in parts of the state outpaced the national average, home-insurance rates soared, and deaths began outnumbering births.
  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — New York state's share of US taxpayers reporting over $1m in income fell from 12.7% in 2010 to 8.7% in 2022, and the Citizens Budget Commission estimates state and city income tax receipts from that group would have been $13bn higher had the share held. Job growth has concentrated in lower-paid health care and social assistance.
  • The Limits of New York’s “Tax the Rich” Policy — Between 2010 and 2022, taxpayers earning $1m or more in California, New York, Texas, and Florida accounted for about 50% of US capital gains realizations on average. Over that period Florida rose from 8% to 16.7% of millionaire capital gains income while New York fell from 14% to 8.9%.

AI Summary. People moving to Miami-Dade County from other states had average adjusted gross income of $178,000, more than double that of those leaving for other states, according to an analysis of Internal Revenue Service data. A residence-planning firm counts 38,800 millionaires in Miami, up 94% over a decade.

Arian Campo-Flores The Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Miami illustrates wealth-driven bifurcation: new arrivals report ~$178K average AGI, among the highest in the US, even as the metro leads major cities in net out-migration. Luxury spending and tax revenue are rising; the middle class is being priced out.

Are wealthier newcomers replacing lower-income residents leaving Miami?

Core argument: People moving to Miami-Dade County from other states had average adjusted gross income of $178,000, more than double that of people leaving the county for other states, according to Maria Ilcheva's analysis of 2022–23 IRS data.

People moving to Miami-Dade County from other states had on average $178,000 in adjusted gross income, more than double that of people who left the county for other states, according to an analysis of 2022-23 Internal Revenue Service data by Maria Ilcheva, associate director of the Jorge M. Pérez Metropolitan Center at Florida International University. Those coming from Manhattan earned on average $358,000, and those from Chicago earned on average $711,000. The number of millionaires in Miami soared 94% to 38,800 between 2014 and 2024, according to Henley & Partners, a residence and citizenship planning firm. That was the second-largest percentage increase among the U.S. cities it studied, behind the San Francisco Bay Area.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. People moving to Miami-Dade County from other states had average adjusted gross income of $178,000, more than double that of people leaving the county for other states, according to Maria Ilcheva's analysis of 2022–23 IRS data.
  2. Arrivals to Miami-Dade from Manhattan earned an average of $358,000 and those from Chicago an average of $711,000, according to the Florida International University analysis of IRS data.
  3. Miami's millionaire count rose 94% to 38,800 between 2014 and 2024, the second-largest percentage increase among U.S. cities studied by Henley & Partners, behind the San Francisco Bay Area.

Related Articles:

  • Florida’s Population Boom Fizzles as High Costs Drive Away Middle Class — Florida's net domestic migration has slowed to a trickle as prime-working-age residents leave citing affordability and arrivals from other states decline. An influx of wealthy newcomers has helped drive up home prices, inflation in parts of the state outpaced the national average, home-insurance rates soared, and deaths began outnumbering births.
  • With Less Immigration, Urban Growth Slowed in 2025 — Census population estimates show urban counties growing more slowly than suburbs, smaller metropolitan areas, and rural areas, with all county types slowing as immigration fell and the slowdown especially sharp in urban counties. Domestic migration is driven more by affordability, with people leaving expensive urban counties for cheaper suburbs and smaller communities.
  • Where Americans Choose to Move and Where They Leave — County-level mapping of net domestic migration within the United States shows some counties gained net movers equal to 10% or more of their 2020 population while others lost an equivalent share, excluding international moves.

AI Summary. US Census Bureau survey data show artificial intelligence adoption among US establishments rose 0.9 percentage points to 19.8%, with firms expecting 23.0% within six months, led by information, professional, education, and finance/insurance services. Equity analysts expect global semiconductor revenue to grow 50% from current levels by the end of 2026.

Sarah Dong and Joseph Briggs Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:

AI’s net employment impact remains limited so far. Job losses in AI-exposed fields like marketing, graphic design, customer service, and parts of tech have been offset by hiring tied to data center buildouts, especially in construction-linked categories.

Is AI adoption by US firms still rising?

Core argument: AI adoption among US establishments rose 0.9pp to 19.8% in the Census Bureau's Business Trends and Outlook Survey, with adoption expected to reach 23.0% within six months.

AI-related investment growth remains strong, particularly for semiconductors, where equity analysts expect global revenue growth of 50% from current levels by the end of 2026. AI adoption by firms rose by 0.9pp to 19.8% among US establishments (with adoption expected to rise to 23.0% in the next 6 months) according to the Census Bureau’s Business Trends and Outlook Survey (BTOS). Information services, professional services, education services, and finance/insurance firms continue to lead adoption. The tech share of total employment continues to decline relative to the pre-2022 trend. That said, the correlation between AI adoption and other labor market slack measures remains limited, and only 15.3k employees were affected by corporate layoffs attributed to AI in March.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. AI adoption among US establishments rose 0.9pp to 19.8% in the Census Bureau's Business Trends and Outlook Survey, with adoption expected to reach 23.0% within six months.
  2. Equity analysts expect global semiconductor revenue to grow 50% from current levels by the end of 2026, amid strong AI-related investment growth.
  3. Corporate layoffs attributed to AI affected 15.3k employees in March, and the correlation between AI adoption and other labor market slack measures remains limited, though the tech share of total employment continues to decline relative to the pre-2022 trend.

Related Articles:

  • Firm Data On AI — Survey data show around 70% of businesses use some artificial intelligence technology, with larger, more productive, and higher-paying firms more likely to adopt it. Firms report little employment effect and a modest productivity boost so far, but predict adoption will raise productivity by about 1.4% and cut employment by about 0.7% over three years.
  • Not Quite mAInstream: A Consumer AI Adoption Profile — Bank of America payments data show about 3% of its households paid for artificial intelligence services, with median spending of $20 per household, up 10.4% from a year earlier, an adoption rate that remains low relative to subscriptions such as music or on-demand video. Bank of America Global Research projects the US addressable market could scale to $75bn annually.
  • Geopolitics And The Geometry Of Global Trade: 2026 Update — Shipments of AI hardware rose almost 40%, accounting for about a third of global trade growth, drawing on supply chains running through Taiwan, South Korea, and parts of Southeast Asia. The US added roughly half of the world's new data center capacity, and its AI-related goods trade rose about 66%.

AI Summary. A multi-country, multi-sector trade model simulation estimates that U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods shifted U.S. demand toward Mexican producers, raising Mexico's GDP by 0.35% in the medium run and 1.08% once its capital stock adjusts. The authors argue structural constraints in Mexico have limited the gains.

Ricardo Reyes-Heroles, Luis Torres and Diego Morales-Burnett Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Date Posted:

Between 2017 and 2024, Mexico’s share of total US expenditure rose from ~.8% to ~1.06%, increasing Mexican GDP by an estimated 1.08%, as China’s share fell from ~1.25% to ~.95% in the face of the US-China trade war.

How much do US tariffs on China raise Mexico's GDP?

Core argument: A multi-country, multi-sector general equilibrium trade model indicates U.S.-China trade war tariffs raised Mexico's GDP by 0.35 percent in the medium run, driven by higher exports to the United States and expansion of sectors integrated into North American value chains.

We examine the effects of the tariffs implemented during the U.S.-China trade war on Mexico’s GDP, using a multi-country, multi-sector general equilibrium trade model. Higher U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods reduce the competitiveness of Chinese exports in the U.S. market, thereby shifting U.S. demand toward alternative suppliers, including Mexico. Model simulation indicates the U.S. - China tariff shock generated a positive effect on Mexico’s GDP, shifting U.S. demand from goods produced in China toward those produced in Mexico. There was a clear increase in U.S. demand for goods produced in Mexico during 2017–24, suggesting that output in Mexico expanded to meet this increased demand in response to the China trade tension. [Chart 2]. In the medium run—a period when aggregate capital does not change through investment—Mexico experiences a modest increase in GDP of 0.35 percent, driven primarily by higher exports to the United States and expansion of sectors integrated into North American value chains. Once Mexico’s capital stock adjusts, GDP expands by an additional 0.73 percentage points (total of 1.08 percent), reflecting increased investment in expanding industries (Chart 3). Although trade reallocation has contributed to economic growth in Mexico, structural constraints led to underperformance.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A multi-country, multi-sector general equilibrium trade model indicates U.S.-China trade war tariffs raised Mexico's GDP by 0.35 percent in the medium run, driven by higher exports to the United States and expansion of sectors integrated into North American value chains.
  2. Once Mexico's capital stock adjusts, the model shows GDP expanding by an additional 0.73 percentage points, for a total of 1.08 percent, reflecting increased investment in expanding industries.
  3. U.S. demand for goods produced in Mexico increased during 2017–24, suggesting Mexican output expanded to meet that demand, though structural constraints led to underperformance.

Related Articles:

  • Mexico Is Not Just the Top Supplier to the U.S. Now It Is the Top Buyer — Mexico is now both the largest buyer of U.S. exports and the largest source of U.S. imports, with U.S. goods exports to Mexico at $226.4bn versus $225.6bn to Canada and imports from Mexico totaling $354.9bn. Mexico's growth, including its middle class, has increased demand for U.S. goods among its more than 130 million people.
  • Mexico’s Growth Stagnation — Mexico's growth has fallen to near zero as an investment boom from recent years faded into a drag on growth and private consumption returned to the weakness seen in the five years before the pandemic. Despite strong exports to the US, the gains from trade are not reaching enough of the population, making the stagnation a structural problem.
  • The U.S. Wants to Ban China’s High-Tech Cars, but They’re Already Here in El Paso — Chinese automakers BYD, Geely, and Great Wall Motor rank among the world's largest and have gained market share in Europe and Asia, with Chinese vehicles making up a quarter of sales in Mexico. US federal rules let Mexican residents and dual citizens drive noncompliant Chinese cars across the border, and Canada will allow imports of inexpensive Chinese electric vehicles.

Monday, May 18, 2026

AI Summary. China's export growth is concentrated in upstream, higher-tech goods: exports of intermediate inputs rose 26% and capital goods 32% between 2021 and 2024, while consumption goods exports were broadly flat. This shift embeds China deeper in global production systems and aligns with its long-running import substitution strategy of localizing entire value chains.

Camille Boullenois, Malcolm Black and Alessia Caruso Rhodium Group
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

China’s exports of intermediate inputs rose 26% and of capital goods 32% from 2021 to 2024, while its exports of consumption goods were mostly flat, deepening China’s integration into global production systems by shifting to high-tech, upstream exports.

Is China shifting its exports toward upstream, higher-tech goods?

Core argument: China's exports of capital goods rose 32% and intermediate inputs 26% between 2021 and 2024, while exports of consumption goods remained broadly flat.

The aggregate growth in Chinese exports masks two important shifts: They are increasingly concentrated upstream in global value chains, and they are increasingly high-tech. China’s exports of intermediate inputs was up 26% between 2021 and 2024, while its exports of capital goods were up 32%. Meanwhile, exports of consumption goods have remained broadly flat. China is becoming further embedded in global production systems by shifting its exports away from final consumption goods and toward manufactured products that are used by firms in the manufacturing of other goods, such as chips or machines. This evolution is consistent with its long-running import substitution strategy, which has progressively localized entire value chains after initially relying on imported components for assembly.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's exports of capital goods rose 32% and intermediate inputs 26% between 2021 and 2024, while exports of consumption goods remained broadly flat.
  2. China's aggregate export growth masks a shift upstream in global value chains and toward high-tech products such as chips and machines used by firms to manufacture other goods.
  3. China's shift toward upstream, high-tech exports is consistent with its long-running import substitution strategy, which has progressively localized entire value chains after initially relying on imported components for assembly.

Related Articles:

  • China Is Making Trade Impossible — Interviews with Chinese economists, technologists and business leaders yielded no clear answer to what products China would want to buy from the rest of the world in future, beyond commodities, luxury goods and higher education. The author argues China sees nothing it cannot eventually make better and cheaper itself, undermining trade as a two-way exchange.
  • China Is Reflating… — Chinese industries with the largest declines in fixed asset investment are also those with the largest increases in factory-gate producer prices, which the authors read as evidence that China's "anti-involution" campaign is curbing excess capacity and reflating manufacturing prices. If durable, this reflation would affect global prices through Chinese export prices.
  • The Real China Model — China generates more electricity annually than the United States and European Union combined, having added capacity equivalent to the United Kingdom's total supply each year. Electricity makes up nearly 30% of China's energy use, versus 22% in the US and 21% globally, and its share is growing about 6% a year.

AI Summary. Birth rates among teens and young adults in countries across the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia began falling at different times, and each inflection point coincided with mass smartphone adoption in that market as measured by Google searches for mobile apps. The declines were most pronounced in the youngest age groups, mirroring smartphone usage patterns.

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

The most striking finding in the global birth-rate collapse is that if one re-centers each country’s data by the year smartphones took off, every decline looks identical (US/UK 2007, France 2009, Mexico/Indonesia 2012, Nigeria/Senegal 2013–2015).

Do falling birth rates worldwide coincide with mass smartphone adoption?

Core argument: Birth rates for teens and young adults in the US, Britain and Australia were broadly flat in the early 2000s but fell markedly from 2007, with the same slide starting in France and Poland around 2009 and in Mexico, Morocco and Indonesia around 2012.

US, British and Australian birth rates for teens and young adults were broadly flat during the early 2000s but began to fall markedly from 2007. The same slide began in France and Poland around 2009, and in Mexico, Morocco and Indonesia around 2012. What had been steady declines in fertility in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal became precipitous drops between 2013 and 2015. All of these inflection points coincided with the mass adoption of smartphones in local markets — as measured by Google searches for mobile apps. In country after country the birth rate plunged after the introduction of smartphones, no matter what the previous trend was. The younger the age group, the more pronounced the downturn — a mirror image of smartphone usage patterns.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Birth rates for teens and young adults in the US, Britain and Australia were broadly flat in the early 2000s but fell markedly from 2007, with the same slide starting in France and Poland around 2009 and in Mexico, Morocco and Indonesia around 2012.
  2. Steady fertility declines in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal turned into precipitous drops between 2013 and 2015, and these inflection points coincided with mass smartphone adoption as measured by Google searches for mobile apps.
  3. Birth rates fell after smartphones were introduced regardless of the prior trend, with the downturn more pronounced in younger age groups, mirroring smartphone usage patterns.

Related Articles:

  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
  • The Collapse of Teen Fertility in the Digital Era — Teen fertility fell in countries with very different healthcare systems, welfare regimes, abortion laws, and religious traditions within roughly the same window, pointing to a global cause. Between 2007 and 2024 the US birth rate fell 71% among women 15–19 and 43% among those 20–24, while rising 9% among those 35–39.

AI Summary. Teen fertility fell in countries with very different healthcare systems, welfare regimes, abortion laws, and religious traditions within roughly the same window, pointing to a global cause. Between 2007 and 2024 the US birth rate fell 71% among women 15–19 and 43% among those 20–24, while rising 9% among those 35–39.

Nathan Hudson and Hernan Moscoso Boedo University of Cincinnati
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

US birth rates over 2007–2024 were down 71% for women 15–19, 43% for those 20–24, and 23% for those 25–29, but up 9% for women 35–39. Hudson and Moscoso-Boedo argue that this monotone age gradient is the signature of a smartphone shock.

Does the worldwide drop in teen fertility share one cause?

Core argument: Between 2007 and 2024, the birth rate among women 15–19 fell 71 percent, 20–24 fell 43 percent, and 25–29 fell 23 percent, while the rate among women 35–39 rose 9 percent.

Teen fertility collapsed almost everywhere in the world starting around 2007. This is a striking fact. Countries with very different healthcare systems, welfare regimes, abortion laws, religious traditions, recessions, and demographic trends all saw similar breaks in the same window. Whatever caused it was something global—something that arrived in roughly the same form in all of these places at roughly the same time… between 2007 and 2024, the birth rate among women 15–19 fell by 71 percent, 20–24 by 43 percent, 25–29 by 23 percent, 30–34 by 1 percent, and 35–39 rose by 9 percent… U.S. teens reduced in-person socializing from 68 minutes per day in 2003 to 38 in 2019 while computer-leisure rose from 22 to 96 minutes… Under-18 conception rates accelerated from −1.3 percent per year pre-2007 to −8.9 percent post-2007, a 6.8x acceleration that nearly matches the U.S. 5.6x acceleration.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Between 2007 and 2024, the birth rate among women 15–19 fell 71 percent, 20–24 fell 43 percent, and 25–29 fell 23 percent, while the rate among women 35–39 rose 9 percent.
  2. Teen fertility broke downward around 2007 in countries with very different healthcare systems, welfare regimes, abortion laws, religious traditions, recessions, and demographic trends, indicating a cause that arrived globally in roughly the same form at roughly the same time.
  3. U.S. teens cut in-person socializing from 68 minutes per day in 2003 to 38 in 2019 while computer leisure rose from 22 to 96 minutes, and under-18 conception rates moved from −1.3 percent per year before 2007 to −8.9 percent after.

Related Articles:

  • The Happiness Crash of 2020 — Survey data show that after 2020 self-reported happiness fell across groups, compressing pre-existing differences — the black-white gap narrowed from 14 points to 6 — while the marital happiness premium of more than 30 points survived intact. Confidence in major public and private institutions declined nearly across the board, with double-digit drops common and losses spanning all parties and ideologies.
  • Why U.S. Test Scores Are in a ‘Generation-Long Decline’ — District-level test score data from the Educational Opportunity Project at Stanford show reading scores down over the past decade in 83% of districts with available data and math scores down in 70%, with declines spanning rich and poor districts and racial and geographic lines. Education experts attribute the declines to no single cause.
  • US College Students’ Well-Being — A study of US college students finds moderate-to-severe depression reported by 26% of students at one elite institution, 22% reporting moderate-to-severe anxiety and 10% contemplating suicide. Poorer mental health is associated with being female, little exercise, low grades, and financial aid; financial stress is associated with higher suicidal thoughts.

AI Summary. China's industrial policy is costly and wasteful, and China runs larger budget deficits relative to economic output than the U.S., with an economy outside advanced manufacturing weighed down by debt, deflation and aging demographics. Critics expect this approach to eventually collapse under its own contradictions, but it could persist longer than foreign competitors can remain solvent.

Greg Ip The Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

In 2016, China controlled more than 50% of global export volumes in 163 industries. By 2024, 315 of ~ 2,000 categories tracked. Rhodium Group calls it the “industrial policy of everything.” Beijing’s latest five-year plan covers 24 priority sectors.

Can China sustain costly industrial policy longer than foreign competitors can survive?

Core argument: China runs larger budget deficits relative to economic output than the U.S., and cost and waste are the Achilles' heel of its industrial policy.

The Achilles’ heel of Chinese industrial policy is its cost and waste. China runs bigger budget deficits relative to economic output than the U.S. Outside advanced manufacturing, the economy is moribund, weighed down by debt, deflation and aging demographics. Many critics thus expect, even hope, that Chinese industrial policy will eventually implode under the weight of its own contradictions. But there is no guarantee that will happen soon. To paraphrase an adage about markets, China can stay irrational longer than foreign competitors can stay solvent.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China runs larger budget deficits relative to economic output than the U.S., and cost and waste are the Achilles' heel of its industrial policy.
  2. Outside advanced manufacturing, China's economy is moribund, weighed down by debt, deflation and aging demographics.

Related Articles:

  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
  • Why Global Imbalances Matter — Countries running persistent trade surpluses, such as China, Germany and Japan, have built their economies around an excess supply of tradeable goods and services, leaving them dependent on deficit countries to absorb it. That dependence gives deficit countries bargaining power and exposes surplus countries to pressure to expand domestic demand.
  • China’s Next-Generation Industrial Policy — China's export growth is concentrated in upstream, higher-tech goods: exports of intermediate inputs rose 26% and capital goods 32% between 2021 and 2024, while consumption goods exports were broadly flat. This shift embeds China deeper in global production systems and aligns with its long-running import substitution strategy of localizing entire value chains.

AI Summary. The authors argue profits measure economic power because they show a firm can do what others can't, and by that metric U.S. firms dominate globally—with Japan and Europe significant and China second-tier—implying greater U.S. power than GDP or industrial output comparisons suggest. The gap favoring the U.S. is most pronounced in high-tech products.

Chris Miller Chris Miller's Newsletter
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Citing Brooks and Vagle, Miller argues profits are a better measure of economic power than output, and the US and its allies are ahead, especially in high tech. But, Miller asks, “Is perhaps profitability the right metric in peace but not in war?”

Do corporate profits measure national economic power better than GDP?

Core argument: Brooks and Vagle argue profit is evidence that a firm can do something others cannot, and their measurement of profits finds U.S. firms dominate, with Japan and Europe significant players and China a second-tier player.

Profit, [Brooks and Vagle] argue, is evidence that one company can do something others can’t. Monopolists have the highest profit. Oligopolists make good money. Manufacturers of toys and textiles have razor thin margins. When Brooks and Vagle measure profits, they find that U.S. firms dominate, while Japan and Europe remain significant players. China is a second-tier player. The U.S. and allies lead in profits across the board. When it comes to high tech products, the imbalance in America’s favor is particularly pronounced. If profitability is the result of power dynamics, then the U.S. is far more powerful than comparing GDP or industrial output implies. There are a couple of potential counterarguments. Is China pursuing a loss-leading strategy, accepting low profits in the short run to win market share in the long run? In solar power, China has commoditized the sector and produced overcapacity that has led to losses, not profits. There’s no moat in solar the way there is around tech. Is perhaps profitability the right metric in peace but not in war? China is betting that its production advantage will create more durable CATL-style moats that eventually enable both profit and power.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Brooks and Vagle argue profit is evidence that a firm can do something others cannot, and their measurement of profits finds U.S. firms dominate, with Japan and Europe significant players and China a second-tier player.
  2. The imbalance in America's favor is particularly pronounced in high-tech products, suggesting that, if profitability reflects power dynamics, the U.S. is far more powerful than comparisons of GDP or industrial output imply.
  3. China has commoditized solar power and produced overcapacity that has led to losses rather than profits, without the moat that surrounds tech, while betting its production advantage will create more durable CATL-style moats enabling both profit and power.

Related Articles:

  • The Real China Trump Card — Among the world's 2,000 largest companies, U.S. firms generated 38% of global profits and firms based in allied countries 35%, while Chinese firms including Hong Kong generated 16%. The U.S. leads in 20 of 27 industries and China in three, with profits used as a measure of economic chokepoints.
  • Underestimating China — China's productive capacity is three times that of the United States and exceeds the next nine countries combined, with its share of global manufacturing quintupling to 30% while the U.S. share halved to about 15%. The authors argue Washington must convert its alliances into a platform for pooled capacity building.
  • China’s Next-Generation Industrial Policy — China's export growth is concentrated in upstream, higher-tech goods: exports of intermediate inputs rose 26% and capital goods 32% between 2021 and 2024, while consumption goods exports were broadly flat. This shift embeds China deeper in global production systems and aligns with its long-running import substitution strategy of localizing entire value chains.