Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Friday, May 8, 2026

AI Summary. The International Monetary Fund projects Eastern European economies will close much of the gap with US per capita GDP — Poland from 34% to 67%, Romania 27% to 60%, Lithuania 29% to 69% — while Western Europe slips, with France falling from 86% to 71% and Italy from 93% to 68%.

Luis Garicano Silicon Continent
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Western Europe is losing ground to the US as measured by PPP-adjusted GDP per capita; e.g. France is projected to retreat from 86% of the US’s 2000 level to 71% in 2030. Eastern Europe is converging, with Poland approaching 67% of the US level, versus 34% in 2000.

Is Eastern Europe converging with the US while Western Europe falls behind?

Core argument: Western Europe moved the opposite way, with Italy falling from 93% of the US per capita GDP level to 68%, France from 86% to 71%, Spain from 72% to 61%, and Portugal from 64% to 57%.

While we have spent a decade complaining about Europe’s stagnation, a real positive convergence story has been unfolding at the eastern edge of the continent. Poland entered the millennium at 34% of US per capita GDP; by 2030, the IMF projects it will reach 67%. Romania rises from 27% to 60%. Lithuania moves from 29% to 69%. Bulgaria goes from 23% to 53%. These countries’ citizens are still significantly poorer than Americans. But they have closed a large part of the gap with the global frontier. Meanwhile, at the other end of the continent, the picture is almost the mirror image. Portugal slipped from 64% to 57%. Spain fell from 72% to 61%. The richer laggards are more striking: France dropped from 86% of the US level to 71%, and Italy fell from 93% to 68%. The hope in Europe after the Draghi report was that the Russian threat to the east would supply the political urgency the reform agendas in the “stuck” [Western] part of Europe lack. The correlation created by the crisis is the wrong one. The Russian shock is mobilising the countries where the Draghi problem is not most severe, and leaving the countries where it is most severe largely untouched. War is reforming Europe’s frontier. It is not reforming Europe’s rear, and on present evidence, it will not.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Western Europe moved the opposite way, with Italy falling from 93% of the US per capita GDP level to 68%, France from 86% to 71%, Spain from 72% to 61%, and Portugal from 64% to 57%.
  2. The author argues the Russian shock is mobilising Europe's eastern frontier, where the Draghi reform problem is not most severe, while leaving largely untouched the Western countries where it is most severe.

Related Articles:

  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
  • The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
  • Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.

AI Summary. Record $725bn in AI investment by Amazon, Alphabet, Microsoft and Meta is projected to cut their combined quarterly free cash flow to about $4bn, down from an average of $45bn per quarter since the pandemic. Analyst estimates put their full-year free cash flow at the lowest level since 2014.

Ryan McMorrow, Rafe Rosner-Uddin, Stephen Morris and Hannah Murphy Financial Times
Date Posted:

The hyperscalers’ combined free cash flow is expected to fall to ~$4B in Q3. Their free cash flow this year will likely be at its lowest level since 2014, when revenues were about a seventh of their current size.

Is AI spending pushing Big Tech free cash flow to decade lows?

Core argument: Wall Street forecasts combined third-quarter free cash flow for Amazon, Alphabet, Microsoft and Meta of roughly $4bn, down from an average of $45bn per quarter since the Covid-19 pandemic six years ago.

Big Tech’s record $725bn AI investment strategy is beginning to strain the resources of America’s largest companies, leaving them with less cash left over this year than at any point in the past decade. The combined free cash flow of the four “hyperscalers” — Amazon, Alphabet, Microsoft and Meta — is expected to fall to roughly $4bn in the third quarter, according to Wall Street’s forecasts, down from an average of $45bn in each quarter since the Covid-19 pandemic six years ago. Their full-year free cash flow is set to hit the lowest level since 2014, when their revenues were about a seventh of their current size, according to analysts’ estimates compiled by Visible Alpha.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Wall Street forecasts combined third-quarter free cash flow for Amazon, Alphabet, Microsoft and Meta of roughly $4bn, down from an average of $45bn per quarter since the Covid-19 pandemic six years ago.
  2. The four hyperscalers' full-year free cash flow is set to hit its lowest level since 2014, when their revenues were about a seventh of their current size, according to analysts' estimates compiled by Visible Alpha.
  3. Big Tech's record $725bn AI investment strategy is beginning to strain the resources of America's largest companies, leaving them with less cash left over this year than at any point in the past decade.

Related Articles:

  • The Macro Implications of the AI Capex Boom — Artificial intelligence capital spending is estimated to add roughly 1.4 percentage points to US growth in one year and about 1.5 points the next, comparable to business investment's contribution during the tech bubble. A material part of that estimate reflects profits at Nvidia and a few other chipmakers that are unlikely to be recycled back into the economy.
  • Abandon Ship! — 42 AI-related stocks have accounted for 75%-85% of S&P 500 returns, earnings and capital spending since generative AI chatbots launched, and 80%-100% over the more recent period. Unlike the dot-com era, rising tech capital spending has not been accompanied by increased debt financing in aggregate.
  • Commoditization, Orchestration, and the New AI Stack — The author argues that as incremental gains from larger AI training runs shrink, the return on additional computing power falls, weakening the case for the training spending that dominates data center demand. Survivors of model commoditization will be those owning the orchestration layer or the applications where outcomes are priced.

AI Summary. Undergraduate enrollment in degrees tied to the most AI-exposed jobs has risen 8%, indicating students are moving toward rather than away from fields exposed to artificial intelligence. A decline in computer science degrees is more than offset by growth in other exposed fields such as engineering.

Sarah Eckhardt and Nathan Goldschlag Agglomerations
Date Posted:

Far from shying away from AI, American undergraduates “are flocking towards the most-AI-exposed degrees,” with enrollment in these majors up 8% last year compared to 2017.

Are students moving toward or away from degrees exposed to AI?

Core argument: Undergraduate enrollment in the most-AI-exposed degrees rose 8% last year compared with 2017, indicating students are moving toward fields whose likely jobs have greater AI exposure.

Are students shying away from fields that have more exposure to AI, perhaps worried that AI will shrink the number of jobs available to them? Or are students shifting towards those fields, preparing for a future in which they will have to be comfortable using AI? To find out, we can check enrollment for groups of degrees based on the AI exposure of the jobs that students with those degrees are likely to take, as shown in Figure 1. As is clear, undergraduates are flocking towards the most-AI-exposed degrees, with enrollment in those degrees up 8% last year compared to 2017. This trend holds despite a notable decline in Computer Science degrees, one of the most-AI-exposed degrees, but whose decline is more than offset by increases in other exposed degrees like Engineering.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Undergraduate enrollment in the most-AI-exposed degrees rose 8% last year compared with 2017, indicating students are moving toward fields whose likely jobs have greater AI exposure.
  2. Computer Science, one of the most-AI-exposed degrees, saw a notable enrollment decline that was more than offset by increases in other exposed fields such as Engineering.
  3. Grouping degrees by the AI exposure of the jobs their graduates are likely to take offers a way to test whether students are avoiding or embracing AI-exposed fields.

Related Articles:

  • Attention (And Money) Is All You Need: Why Universities Are Struggling to Keep AI Talent — The annual compensation gap between top industry and academic artificial intelligence researchers widened from roughly $294,000 to $1.5m, coinciding with accelerating academic out-migration toward large incumbent technology firms. Researchers who move to industry cut paper production by about 63% while increasing patent filings nearly sixfold, consistent with a shift from open science toward proprietary innovation.
  • AI and Young-adult Jobs: The Real Mystery — Employment rates have declined for young adults both with and without college degrees, with non-degree holders faring marginally worse, and employment growth for young workers of all education levels has lagged that of other workers. Artificial intelligence can replace some lower-skilled jobs, but those jobs are too few to drive youth labor market weakness.
  • Tracking the Impact of AI on the Labor Market — US labor force survey data show occupational stability rather than economy-wide disruption from generative artificial intelligence, with the dissimilarity in occupational mix between older and more recent college graduates rarely deviating outside a 30–33% range. The authors note this limited early impact resembles the pace of change in previous periods of technological disruption.

AI Summary. Chinese state-owned oil companies have been reselling cargoes to European and Asian buyers, a sign of surplus that has capped benchmark crude prices and collapsed the premiums paid for physical barrels from about $30 above benchmarks to as little as $1. Satellite data show Chinese commercial stockpiles still rising.

Javier Blas Bloomberg
Date Posted:

Since the start of the war, China has reduced oil imports by ~25% without drawing down reserves or stockpiles, signaling that underlying demand may be structurally weaker than import volumes previously implied.

Are Chinese oil resales signaling surplus and capping crude prices?

Core argument: Physical crude premia over benchmark prices have collapsed from $30 in early April to as little as $1, with talk of discounts emerging, as Chinese state-owned oil companies resell cargoes to European and Asian rivals.

Over recent weeks, industry executives have noticed something odd: Chinese state-owned oil companies have been reselling some of their oil cargoes to European and Asian rivals. The behavior suggests surpluses — odd during a supply shortage. The shift has not only capped benchmark oil prices, but also helped to trigger a collapse in the premia that traders pay above them to secure physical crude. Barrels that in early April went for $30 above benchmark prices are now changing hands at premiums as low as $1. Talk of discounts has even started to emerge. The import drop might make sense if Chinese commercial inventories were falling sharply, or if Beijing had tapped its strategic petroleum reserves. But neither is happening. Instead, commercial stockpiles have continued to increase in recent weeks, according to satellite data. What Beijing did was ban exports of refined products, effectively allowing refineries to process less crude to meet domestic demand. But the policy has now been reversed, suggesting the country sees enough fuel availability. Make no mistake, China is rebalancing the oil market today. The bigger question is for tomorrow: If the country can reduce imports so drastically without, apparently, having to take extreme measures, what does that say about the future of oil consumption there? Nothing positive for the bulls, certainly.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Physical crude premia over benchmark prices have collapsed from $30 in early April to as little as $1, with talk of discounts emerging, as Chinese state-owned oil companies resell cargoes to European and Asian rivals.
  2. China's commercial oil stockpiles have continued to increase in recent weeks, according to satellite data, undercutting falling inventories or strategic petroleum reserve draws as explanations for the country's drop in crude imports.
  3. Beijing's ban on refined product exports effectively allowed refineries to process less crude to meet domestic demand, and the reversal of that policy suggests the country sees enough fuel availability.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Energy Security Doesn’t Run Through Hormuz but Through the Electrification of Everything — China's energy security rests on coal rather than imported oil and gas: the country consumes more than half the world's coal, and coal powers its industry and electricity system. Coal consumption has risen since 2022, with roughly 95GW of new coal capacity added in one year, exceeding Vietnam's entire installed electricity capacity.
  • Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026 — Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
  • Power Politics: Energy Self-Sufficiency in a Modern Mercantilist World — China leads in adding power to the grid, with more than 30,000 miles of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines versus zero in the US and lead times for large transformers of 48 weeks against a US average of 143 weeks. This positions China to accommodate new demand sources such as artificial intelligence.

AI Summary. Global sea temperatures reached their second highest level on record for the month of April, with the European Union's Copernicus Climate Change Service reporting record sea-surface temperatures across much of the tropical Pacific. Scientists say this raises concerns that an El Niño warming cycle is forming, which would temporarily accelerate global air temperature rise and intensify fires, floods and droughts.

Attracta Mooney Financial Times
Date Posted:

April’s global ocean temperatures rose to their second-highest level on record, suggesting a brewing El Niño warming cycle. April temperatures were just shy of their level in 2024, which was also an El Niño year.

Are record ocean temperatures signaling more extreme weather ahead?

Core argument: Global average sea-surface temperatures for non-polar oceans reached 21°C (69.8°F) in April, just below the record 21.04°C (69.9°F) set in April 2024 during the last El Niño event.

Sea temperatures around the world were the second highest on record for the month of April, stoking concerns among scientists that an El Niño warming cycle is brewing that would intensify extreme weather. The naturally occurring El Niño weather phenomenon, where water temperatures in the central and eastern tropical Pacific Ocean become significantly warmer, temporarily accelerates the rise in global air temperature, resulting in the spread of fires, floods and droughts. The EU’s Copernicus Climate Change Service reported record sea-surface temperatures across much of the tropical Pacific in April, while the global average for non-polar oceans reached 21°C [69.8°F]— just shy of the 21.04°C [69.9°F] record set in April 2024 during the last El Niño event.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Global average sea-surface temperatures for non-polar oceans reached 21°C (69.8°F) in April, just below the record 21.04°C (69.9°F) set in April 2024 during the last El Niño event.
  2. The EU's Copernicus Climate Change Service reported record sea-surface temperatures across much of the tropical Pacific in April, stoking scientists' concerns that an El Niño warming cycle is brewing.
  3. El Niño, in which central and eastern tropical Pacific waters become significantly warmer, temporarily accelerates the rise in global air temperature and results in the spread of fires, floods and droughts.

Related Articles:

  • Three Tough Truths About Climate — The International Energy Agency's projection for annual carbon dioxide emissions in 2040 has fallen from 50bn tons to 30bn tons, though the world is expected to fall far short of the 1.5°C Paris goal, with warming likely between 2°C and 3°C by 2100. Global energy demand is projected to more than double by 2050.
  • The Most Amazing Climate Policy Figure — U.S. carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels moved closely with GDP from 1992 to about 2005, after which the two decoupled, with GDP continuing to rise while emissions fell.
  • Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026 — Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.

Monday, May 11, 2026

AI Summary. French gross domestic product per person, adjusted for purchasing power, was 74% of the US level in 2001 and 73% in 2024, while Germany closed some of the gap, indicating European living standards have not fallen behind. Higher measured US growth is attributed to rapid productivity growth in information technology, a sector the US dominates.

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

US outperformance in GDP growth relative to Europe is almost entirely due to the tech sector. Krugman argues the gains are passed on to Europe in the form of lower prices. In PPP terms, the ratio of Europe’s GDP to that of the US hasn’t fallen since 2002.

Have European living standards fallen behind the US over recent decades?

Core argument: French GDP per capita at PPP was 74% of the U.S. level in 2001 and 73% in 2024, while German GDP per capita closed some of the gap with the U.S.

European economies do produce less per person than the U.S. does. In 2001 French GDP per capita, measured at PPP was 74% of the US level. In 2024 the ratio was basically the same: 73%. German GDP per capita actually closed some of the gap with the US. By this measure, a comparison between European and US living standards look about the same today as it did 25 years ago: Europe is not falling behind. The key to understanding US-Europe comparisons is to realize that higher measured US growth is overwhelmingly driven by a small part of the American economy: “tech.” As the Draghi report acknowledges, essentially all of America’s productivity growth has been generated by rapid productivity growth in information technology, which the US currently dominates. Do the gains stay in America or are they shared with the tech sector’s customers, wherever they are? The answer to this question crucially depends upon whether there is competition among technology companies. If there is, then the answer to the question is no: rising productivity will be passed on to consumers in both countries through low prices.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. French GDP per capita at PPP was 74% of the U.S. level in 2001 and 73% in 2024, while German GDP per capita closed some of the gap with the U.S.
  2. Higher measured U.S. growth is overwhelmingly driven by "tech," and the Draghi report acknowledges that essentially all of America's productivity growth comes from rapid productivity growth in information technology, which the U.S. currently dominates.
  3. Whether U.S. tech productivity gains stay in America or reach customers abroad depends on competition among technology companies: with competition, rising productivity would be passed to consumers in both countries through low prices.

Related Articles:

  • The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
  • Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans? — About half of the 1990s gap between American and European hours worked had reversed by the end of the 2010s. The authors estimate US hours per person declined after the 2000s because of rising benefits for the non-employed—especially health benefits like Medicaid—while non-US hours rose with higher wages and lower work costs.

AI Summary. Using an AI model to estimate how much earlier each of 190 major inventions could plausibly have appeared, the author finds most gaps are small: 64% had an "earliest plausible" date within 50 years of the actual date, and 90% had an "earliest straightforward" date within 50 years.

Brian Potter Construction Physics
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

An analysis using Claude finds that for more than half of 190 inventions, the delay between the earliest date at which the invention became possible and the invention’s realization was 10 years or less. Since 1900, the fraction rose from ~50 to 75%.

How much earlier could major inventions plausibly have appeared?

Core argument: Of 166 major inventions for which Claude Opus 4.7 estimated a date, 107 (64%) had an "earliest plausible" invention date within 50 years of the actual date, and 150 (90%) had an "earliest straightforward" date within that window.

I used a list of 190 major inventions. For each invention, I asked Claude Opus 4.7 how much earlier it could have been invented. The graph shows how much earlier, on average, each invention could have appeared for both the “earliest plausible” and “earliest straightforward” date ranges. We can clearly see a few trends on this graph. One is that for most inventions, the gap between when they could have been invented and when they were actually invented is not particularly large. Of the 166 inventions Claude estimated a date for, 107 of them (64%) had an “earliest plausible” date 50 years or less from the actual date, and 150 of them (90%) had an “earliest straightforward” date 50 years or less from the actual date. For more than half the inventions, the average earliest straightforward date of invention was 10 years or less from the actual date.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Of 166 major inventions for which Claude Opus 4.7 estimated a date, 107 (64%) had an "earliest plausible" invention date within 50 years of the actual date, and 150 (90%) had an "earliest straightforward" date within that window.
  2. For more than half of the inventions assessed, the average "earliest straightforward" date of invention was 10 years or less from the actual date of invention.
  3. Asking Claude Opus 4.7 how much earlier each of 190 major inventions could have been invented suggests that for most inventions the gap between the earliest possible and actual date is not particularly large.

Related Articles:

  • Attention (And Money) Is All You Need: Why Universities Are Struggling to Keep AI Talent — The annual compensation gap between top industry and academic artificial intelligence researchers widened from roughly $294,000 to $1.5m, coinciding with accelerating academic out-migration toward large incumbent technology firms. Researchers who move to industry cut paper production by about 63% while increasing patent filings nearly sixfold, consistent with a shift from open science toward proprietary innovation.
  • Never Enough: Dynamic Status Incentives in Organizations — Data on over 5,000 German fighter pilots show performance rose markedly as pilots approached the eligibility threshold for each medal in a tiered awards ladder and slumped immediately after receiving it, with the effect repeating at each successive rung. The authors estimate the ladder added 3,000–5,000 aerial victories, 5–10% of the total.
  • Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find? — The authors estimate U.S. research productivity has fallen by a factor of 41 since the 1930s, averaging declines above 5% per year across sectors. Sustaining constant growth in output per person requires doubling research effort every 13 years, challenging growth models that assume constant research productivity.

AI Summary. The share of men aged 16 and over who are employed has fallen from a 1990s average of 70.9% to 64.1%, partly reflecting an aging population, while women's employment share has held up better at 54.5%. Healthcare and social assistance, where women outnumber men three to one, drove recent private-sector job gains.

Justin Lahart Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Since December 2024, male employment, as measured by US payrolls, has declined by ~1,000 workers, while the number of jobs held by women increased by ~421,000. This measure doesn’t capture the self-employed, who are disproportionately men.

Is men's employment falling faster than women's as healthcare drives hiring?

Core argument: The employment-to-population ratio for men aged 16 and over was 64.1% in April, down from a 2019 average of 66.6% and a 1990s average of 70.9%, a decline largely explained by an aging population with more male retirees.

Among men aged 16 and over, the employment-to-population ratio was 64.1% in April. That compared with an average of 66.6% in 2019, and 70.9% in the 1990s. A lot of that decline can be explained by an aging population: There are a lot more male retirees than there used to be. The share of women working has always been lower than men’s, but it has held up much better despite an aging population. Women’s employment-to-population ratio came to 54.5% in April, a bit below its 2019 and 1990s averages. More recently healthcare and social assistance, where women outnumber men three to one, has been the main bright spot in a dimming job market. The sector added 656,500 jobs over the year that ended in April, the Labor Department reported Friday. Absent that gain, the private sector would have shed 145,500 private-sector jobs. Among the sectors where employment has fallen over the past year: manufacturing, which has resumed its long decline after a brief, postpandemic pop, and which employs more than two men for every woman.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The employment-to-population ratio for men aged 16 and over was 64.1% in April, down from a 2019 average of 66.6% and a 1990s average of 70.9%, a decline largely explained by an aging population with more male retirees.
  2. Women's employment-to-population ratio came to 54.5% in April, a bit below its 2019 and 1990s averages, holding up better than men's despite an aging population.
  3. Healthcare and social assistance, where women outnumber men three to one, added 656,500 jobs in the year ended April, without which the private sector would have shed 145,500 jobs, the Labor Department reported.

Related Articles:

  • What Sweeping Revisions and a Blowout Month Tell Us About the U.S. Job Market — Labor Department revisions lowered previously estimated job gains for the past two calendar years, cutting the combined net change in construction, manufacturing, and retail by 115,000 jobs. Healthcare added about 437,000 jobs and social assistance about 321,000 over 12 months, while all other private-sector jobs combined shrank.
  • Post-Pandemic Recovery for America’s Prime Age Labor Force: A Tale of Two Sexes — Prime-age women's labor force participation climbed about 5 points above its pre-pandemic level over a decade, while prime-age men's rose barely a point, only just regaining pre-pandemic levels. Despite economic expansion and labor shortages, work rates for prime-age American men are barely as high as at the trough of the severe Reagan-era recession.
  • Bachelors Without Bachelor’s: Gender Gaps in Education and Declining Marriage Rates — Marriage rates for college-educated women have remained stable over the past fifty years even as the relative supply of college-educated men declined, with the overall decline in marriage driven almost entirely by fewer marriages between non-college women and non-college men. The education gap in women's marriage rates is larger in areas where non-college men face the highest joblessness and incarceration.

AI Summary. The number of 18-year-olds in the US is peaking at a record high and is projected to fall 14% over the next decade.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

The number of American 18-year-olds will peak this year and fall 14% over the next decade.

Is the number of 18-year-olds in the US peaking?

Core argument: The number of 18-year-olds in the United States is projected to peak this year at a record high and then fall 14% over the coming decade.

America is at peak 18, and the number of 18-year-olds will fall 14% over the coming decade.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The number of 18-year-olds in the United States is projected to peak this year at a record high and then fall 14% over the coming decade.

Related Articles:

  • Can A Depopulating America Still Flourish? — US labor force participation among women aged 25-54 has reached all-time highs, exceeding its previous 1999 peak, yet remains over 4 points below Europe's level and nearly 6 points below Japan's. About 3.5m prime-age American women are neither working nor looking for work, without children at home or husbands, compared with roughly 7m such men.
  • The Happiness Crash of 2020 — Survey data show that after 2020 self-reported happiness fell across groups, compressing pre-existing differences — the black-white gap narrowed from 14 points to 6 — while the marital happiness premium of more than 30 points survived intact. Confidence in major public and private institutions declined nearly across the board, with double-digit drops common and losses spanning all parties and ideologies.
  • The Demographic Outlook: 2026 to 2056 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the US population rises from 349m to 364m between 2026 and 2056, with annual growth slowing from 0.3% over the next decade to 0.1% thereafter before reaching zero and then shrinking. Declining fertility is projected to push deaths above births starting in 2030, increasingly offsetting net immigration.

AI Summary. China's economy is smaller than many Western economists predicted, with per capita gross domestic product adjusted for purchasing power differences less than one-third of the U.S. level. Total social expenditures, estimated at around 9% of gross domestic product, are roughly in line with countries such as Mexico and Turkey and less than half the levels of many rich countries.

Brian Spegele Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Rhodium finds that property and residential construction represented 11% of China’s GDP in 2025, down from 16% in 2023. Output in strategic sectors rose 1pp to 6.3% of GDP over that period, and as of 2024, defense spending has risen to 7% of GDP.

Is China's economy smaller and less generous than Western economists expected?

Core argument: China's per capita GDP was less than one-third of the U.S. level in 2024 even after adjusting for purchasing power differences, and its economy is smaller than many Western economists predicted when Xi Jinping took over.

Since the death of Mao Zedong, China’s leaders have largely focused on growth, which has fueled the nation’s economic rise. These days, political messaging often conflicts with economic reality. Farmers living off a few dollars a day are urged to make China a great power in agriculture. Students memorize Xi quotes about restoring China’s greatness, though millions are likely to end up unemployed and relying on their parents. China’s economy is smaller than many Western economists predicted it would be when Xi took over. Even when adjusting for purchasing power differences between the two countries, China’s per capita gross domestic product was less than one-third the size of the U.S.’s in 2024. While China has boosted its pension system and some other social programs during Xi’s time in office, total social expenditures—estimated at around 9% of GDP as of 2023—are roughly in line with countries such as Mexico and Turkey. They are less than half the levels of many rich countries.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's per capita GDP was less than one-third of the U.S. level in 2024 even after adjusting for purchasing power differences, and its economy is smaller than many Western economists predicted when Xi Jinping took over.
  2. China's total social expenditures, estimated at around 9% of GDP as of 2023, are roughly in line with Mexico and Turkey and less than half the levels of many rich countries, despite Xi-era expansions to pensions and some social programs.
  3. Political messaging in Xi's China often conflicts with economic reality: farmers living on a few dollars a day are urged to make China a great power in agriculture, and students memorize Xi quotes though millions are likely to end up unemployed and relying on their parents.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Economy: Rightsizing 2025, Looking Ahead to 2026 — The authors argue China's official growth figures are inconsistent with ten consecutive quarters of deflation, estimating that real GDP is around 11% below official levels, with most of the adjustment in investment. That would imply a drop of roughly 9 percentage points in China's share of global investment, helping explain its export surge.
  • Imbalances Are Back On The Global Agenda — China's current account surplus remains about the same size relative to the world economy as it was in 2008, while net US liabilities reached 24% of global output in 2024 versus 6% in 2008, with government borrowing now the domestic counterpart of US external deficits. Such imbalances drive protectionist sentiment and have preceded financial crises.
  • How China Is Outperforming the United States in Critical Technologies — The Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Critical Technology Tracker finds China leads in 57 of 64 critical technology categories while the United States leads in 7, and that China surpasses the United States in top-tier scientific publications across all 8 technology domains. In energy and environment China accounts for 46% of top-tier publications versus 10% for the United States.

AI Summary. China's first-quarter marriage registrations fell 6.24% from a year earlier to 1.697m couples, the lowest first-quarter total since 2020, while divorces edged down 1.27% to 622,000. The decline comes as China contends with a falling birth rate and a shrinking population.

Sylvia Ma South China Morning Post
Date Posted:

~1.7mm marriages in China took place in Q1, down ~6% y/y, falling to their lowest level since the pandemic period. Q1 is typically the peak season for marriages due to the Chinese New Year holiday.

Are China's marriages still falling as its population shrinks?

Core argument: China recorded 1.697 million marriage registrations in the first quarter, down 6.24% from a year earlier and the lowest first-quarter total since 2020, when 1.557 million couples registered during the first wave of Covid-19 lockdowns, according to Wind.

China’s first-quarter marriage registrations fell to their lowest level for the same period since 2020, as the country continued to grapple with persistent demographic challenges amid a declining birth rate and a shrinking population. In the first three months of this year, 1.697 million couples in China tied the knot, down 6.24% from the same period last year. The figure marked the lowest first-quarter total since 2020, when 1.557 million couples registered to marry amid the country’s first wave of Covid-19 pandemic lockdowns, according to financial data provider Wind. The first quarter is typically a peak season for marriages in China due to the Chinese New Year holiday. The number of divorces in the first quarter also edged down 1.27% from a year earlier to 622,000.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China recorded 1.697 million marriage registrations in the first quarter, down 6.24% from a year earlier and the lowest first-quarter total since 2020, when 1.557 million couples registered during the first wave of Covid-19 lockdowns, according to Wind.
  2. The first quarter is typically a peak season for marriages in China because of the Chinese New Year holiday.
  3. Chinese divorces in the first quarter fell 1.27% from a year earlier to 622,000, as the country continued to grapple with a declining birth rate and a shrinking population.

Related Articles:

  • The Power of Demography and the Fate of East Asia — East Asia's total population has peaked and is projected to decline for at least a generation, with the pace of decline likely accelerating each decade, while US population is projected to keep growing for decades. The author argues such sustained divergence can shift the global balance of power.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
  • China Says Hostile Foreign Forces Are Driving Its Youth to Slack Off — China's Ministry of State Security attributes youth disillusionment to ideological infiltration by foreign anti-China hostile forces, calling young people the primary targets of such efforts. Millions of young Chinese have embraced a "lying flat" mindset, rejecting pressure to overwork or leaving work entirely in an economy with limited well-paying jobs.