Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, May 6, 2026

AI Summary. China's current account surplus remains about the same size relative to the world economy as it was in 2008, while net US liabilities reached 24% of global output in 2024 versus 6% in 2008, with government borrowing now the domestic counterpart of US external deficits. Such imbalances drive protectionist sentiment and have preceded financial crises.

Martin Wolf Financial Times
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US net liabilities were ~24% of global output in 2024, relative to 6% going into the crisis in 2008. Because the private sector, now driven by high household savings, is in surplus, the government deficit absorbs more than 100% of capital inflows.

How large are global imbalances today compared with before the financial crisis?

Core argument: Net US liabilities reached 24% of global output in 2024, against 6% in 2008, while the US private sector has moved into balance, leaving US government borrowing as the domestic counterpart of external deficits.

China’s reported surplus is much the same size now relative to the world economy as it was in 2008, though it is a far smaller share of its own GDP because the relative size of its economy has more than doubled. One difference is that former deficit European countries are now running a small surplus. More important differences are that net US liabilities reached 24% of global output in 2024 against a mere 6% in 2008, and that the US private sector has moved into balance. So, the domestic counterpart of its external deficits today is borrowing by the US government. Once roughly every 20 years, it appears, [the issue of global imbalances] comes to the fore. This is so for two good reasons. One is that current account imbalances drive protectionist sentiment. The other is that they are harbingers of financial crisis. In the 1980s, protectionist sentiment rose against Japan, which is also where the financial crisis struck. In the 2000s, the era of “the China shock”, protectionism began to rise against China and a financial crisis hit the western world. In the 2020s, protectionism is already here, in the US above all. But the financial crisis is not — or at least not yet.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Net US liabilities reached 24% of global output in 2024, against 6% in 2008, while the US private sector has moved into balance, leaving US government borrowing as the domestic counterpart of external deficits.
  2. China's reported surplus is about the same size relative to the world economy as in 2008, but a far smaller share of its own GDP because the relative size of its economy has more than doubled.
  3. Global imbalances return to prominence roughly every 20 years because current account imbalances drive protectionist sentiment and herald financial crises; protectionism has already arrived, above all in the US, but the financial crisis has not.

Related Articles:

  • Why Global Imbalances Do Matter — From 2008 to 2023 the US household and corporate sectors ran average savings surpluses of 3.5% and 1.6% of GDP respectively, leaving the federal government as the dominant net borrower in the US economy. This suggests the benefit of persistent net capital inflows is the ability to run larger fiscal deficits and grow public debt.
  • Debt, Deficits & Global Imbalances — Taxes or restrictions on short-term capital inflows were argued to be a more direct and potentially superior tool than tariffs for shrinking the trade deficit, since tariffs risk retaliation and supply-chain distortions. Proponents said such measures could reduce reliance on household and government borrowing to sustain employment, if paired with efforts to strengthen domestic demand and tradables capacity.
  • Europe Has No Choice But To Intervene On Trade — Manufacturing competitiveness is argued to stem largely from lower labor costs relative to productivity, so policies that raise the household share of income weaken competitiveness while countries that suppress wages gain at trade partners' expense. The author argues Europe must therefore intervene in its external accounts to offset foreign trade intervention rather than cut wages and welfare.

AI Summary. Economists argue that large current account deficits and surpluses reflect unbalanced growth: chronically low household consumption in China, persistently weak productive investment in the European Union, and enduring fiscal deficits in the United States. They recommend China shift fiscal resources toward healthcare and safety nets, and the European Union raise its growth potential.

Chong-En Bai, Gita Gopinath, Hélène Rey and Axel Weber G7
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Deep structural problems underlie global imbalances. China maintains low domestic consumption, the EU suffers from weak productive investment levels, and the US runs excessively large fiscal deficits. All three need to be addressed.

How can global imbalances be addressed through rebalancing growth?

Core argument: The G7 economists attribute excessive current account deficits and surpluses to unbalanced growth dynamics: China's chronically low domestic consumption, the EU's persistently weak productive investment, and enduring US fiscal deficits.

The rise of excessive current account deficits and surpluses reflects increasingly unbalanced growth dynamics in China, the EU, and the US. China has chronically low domestic consumption, the EU suffers from persistently weak levels of productive investment, and the US has enduring fiscal deficits. Addressing global imbalances requires rebalancing growth, which is in the individual and collective interest of China, the EU, and the US. China’s growth can be rebalanced by increasing ‘investment in people’ as prioritized in its 15th Five-Year Plan. This calls for public support for healthcare, safety nets, repairing balance-sheets damaged by the property market crisis, changing incentives of regional administrators, and scaling down unwarranted industrial policies to free up fiscal resources for investing in people. The European Union should raise its growth potential by implementing key recommendations of the Draghi report.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The G7 economists attribute excessive current account deficits and surpluses to unbalanced growth dynamics: China's chronically low domestic consumption, the EU's persistently weak productive investment, and enduring US fiscal deficits.
  2. The memo argues China can rebalance growth through "investment in people" as prioritized in its 15th Five-Year Plan, including public support for healthcare, safety nets, repair of balance sheets damaged by the property market crisis, and changed incentives for regional administrators.
  3. The G7 economists call on China to scale down unwarranted industrial policies to free fiscal resources for investing in people, and on the European Union to raise its growth potential by implementing key recommendations of the Draghi report.

Related Articles:

  • The U.S. Trade Deficit: Myths and Realities — Taxing capital inflows would weaken the dollar but could raise domestic interest rates and depress investment, harming long-term growth, while an interest rate cut absent recession would be inflationary and erode any real depreciation needed to durably improve the trade balance. Fiscal restraint could weaken the dollar and reduce the trade deficit.
  • The Chinese Current Account Imbalances: Puzzles, Patterns, and Possible Causes — Households in China with a son save more where local male-female ratios are skewed, while savings by households with a daughter show no such relationship; the authors estimate this competition in the marriage market accounts for more than half the rise in China's household saving rate from 1990 to 2007, contributing to excess saving and a larger current account surplus.
  • China’s Trade Surplus, Part I — China's very high investment rates, combined with a shrinking workforce and slowing productivity, produce sharply diminishing returns, making its decades-old high-savings, high-investment growth model unsustainable. The author argues China's leaders resist a pivot toward consumption because of ideology and geopolitical ambition, with the leadership rejecting welfare spending as breeding dependency.

AI Summary. Adjusted for inflation, SpaceX alone would rank as the second-largest initial public offering ever, behind Saudi Aramco, and three such listings together would exceed the entire 1995–2000 dot-com wave. Funding that equity supply requires selling existing holdings, and index rule changes make passive funds forced buyers, pressuring large-cap technology stocks.

Paul Kedrosky Notes on Complexity
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At hoped-for valuations, the sum of SpaceX’s, OpenAI’s and Anthropic’s gross valuations at IPO would exceed the valuation of the entire dot-com IPO wave of 1995–2000 in real terms.

Will a wave of giant IPOs pressure large-cap technology stocks?

Core argument: SpaceX alone would rank as the second-largest IPO in history in inflation-adjusted terms, behind only Saudi Aramco, and the three mega-IPOs together would exceed the entire dot-com IPO wave of 1995–2000.

In inflation-adjusted terms, SpaceX alone would rank as the second-largest IPO in history, just behind Saudi Aramco. All three together would exceed the entire dot-com IPO wave of 1995–2000. They will be at least half the value, inflation-adjusted, of all US IPOs since WWII. That much new equity supply hitting in a few months creates a math problem: the money has to come from somewhere. Most of it will come from existing holdings. Passive funds will be forced buyers once these names join the indexes, which will happen much faster than usual, given recent index rule changes. That means mechanical selling pressure on whatever many funds currently own, which is mostly the same large-cap tech stocks that everyone else owns.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. SpaceX alone would rank as the second-largest IPO in history in inflation-adjusted terms, behind only Saudi Aramco, and the three mega-IPOs together would exceed the entire dot-com IPO wave of 1995–2000.
  2. The three mega-IPOs would total at least half the inflation-adjusted value of all US IPOs since World War II, and that much equity supply arriving within a few months would have to be funded largely from existing holdings.
  3. Passive funds will be forced buyers once the new listings join indexes, which recent index rule changes will accelerate, creating mechanical selling pressure on their current holdings, mostly the same widely held large-cap tech stocks.

Related Articles:

  • Trampled Underfoot by a Stampede of Unicorns — A database trawl counts 1,727 private companies valued above $1bn globally, and if private market valuations are accurate, the largest of them have outperformed public markets since the pandemic. Several, led by SpaceX and OpenAI, plan initial public offerings, which can signal trouble ahead since insiders are choosing to sell.
  • One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets — Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.
  • The Deep End: 2025 Alternative Investments Review — In venture capital, only consistently investing with top-quartile managers outperformed the S&P 500, while the median manager at best matched public equity markets and fourth-quartile managers destroyed value relative to equities. Fees are part of the issue: an 11.7% annualized NASDAQ 100 return falls to 7.4% under a 2%/20% fee structure.

AI Summary. In a survey of generative AI users, a plurality across most occupations reported that the tools assist with tasks requiring intermediate expertise, with high-expertise assistance reported by over 30% in computer and math, architecture and engineering, and management roles but under 10% in some manual occupations.

Alexander Bick, Adam Blandin, David Deming and Tyler Schumacher National Bureau of Economic Research
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In a real-time survey, >30% of workers in tech and professional occupations reported that genAI assists with high-expertise tasks, compared to <10% in manual jobs. The modal response saw AI assisting in medium-expertise tasks.

What level of expertise does generative AI assist workers with?

Core argument: In the Real Time Population Survey, more than 30% of workers in Computer and Math, Architecture and Engineering, and Management occupations report that generative AI assists with high-expertise parts of their job.

The RPS [Real Time Population Survey] asked genAI users whether genAI primarily assisted them with low-, moderate-, or high-expertise parts of their job (workers could select multiple options). Figure 7 displays the average responses by broad occupation. In most occupations, a plurality of workers indicate that genAI assists with work that require intermediate expertise. In most technical and professional occupations, a relatively large share of workers report that genAI assists with high-expertise work. Computer and Math, Architecture and Engineering, and Management Occupations all exhibit high-expertise shares above 30%. By contrast, many occupations involving manual work exhibit small shares of workers who report high-expertise assistance - e.g. Protective Service and Buildings and Grounds Maintenance occupations exhibit high-expertise shares below 10%. However, we also observe a few interesting counterexamples to these patterns. Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Occupations, which involve substantial manual work and average education rates, exhibit large high-expertise shares. In the other direction, Legal Occupations, which exhibit high adoption rates, high education levels, and minimal manual work, exhibit small high-expertise shares. Overall, these patterns suggest that genAI does not map cleanly into a uniform “low-expertise” or “high-expertise” case.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In the Real Time Population Survey, more than 30% of workers in Computer and Math, Architecture and Engineering, and Management occupations report that generative AI assists with high-expertise parts of their job.
  2. Protective Service and Buildings and Grounds Maintenance occupations show high-expertise generative AI assistance shares below 10%, while in most occupations a plurality of users report that generative AI assists with work requiring intermediate expertise.
  3. Installation, Maintenance, and Repair occupations show large high-expertise shares despite substantial manual work and average education rates, while Legal occupations show small high-expertise shares despite high adoption rates, high education levels, and minimal manual work.

Related Articles:

  • Expertise — The authors' model of automation predicts that occupations with rising expertise requirements see higher wages but falling employment, while those with declining requirements see lower wages alongside rising employment. Analyzing employment and earnings data by occupation across four decades, they find changes in occupational expertise strongly predict changes in occupational wages.
  • Generative AI and Entrepreneurship — The authors find that startups with a larger share of tasks doable by generative AI cut employment beginning immediately after ChatGPT's release, with technically proficient founders restructuring teams toward higher-skill roles. Venture investors made smaller but more numerous deals, and new firm entry offset the decline in total startup employment.
  • The Labor Market Effects of Generative AI: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis of AI Exposure — U.S. sectors with greater exposure to large language models are estimated to have seen statistically significant gains in total wages paid, employment, and hourly wages, with larger hourly wage gains for younger and more educated workers in exposed occupations. Sectors intensive in human–AI collaboration tasks gained employment and wages, while those with more directly automatable tasks saw declines.

AI Summary. Statistics Canada reports 16.3% of millennials aged 25 to 39 lived with their parents in 2021, compared with 8.2% of baby boomers at the same age in 1991, with the pattern most pronounced in expensive cities. Homeownership among 25-to-39-year-olds was 49.9%, down from about 56% for baby boomers and Gen Xers at that age.

Nojoud Al Mallees Bloomberg
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16.3% of Canadians aged 25–39 were living with their parents in 2021, up from 8.2% of baby boomers at the same age in 1991.

Are more young adults living with parents and owning fewer homes?

Core argument: A Statistics Canada study based on the most recent census data found 16.3% of millennials aged 25 to 39 lived with their parents in 2021, up from 8.2% of baby boomers at the same age in 1991.

Millennials were twice as likely to live with their parents in 2021 than baby boomers were at the same age, a trend that was particularly acute in expensive cities but not fully attributed to affordability challenges. A new Statistics Canada study based on the most recent census data found 16.3% of millennials aged 25 to 39 were living with parents, up from 8.2% of baby boomers of the same age in 1991. After taking into account the share of millennials living with parents, the study found a lower rate of homeownership among young adults in 2021. While 55.9% of baby boomers in 1991 and 56.2% of Gen Xers in 2006 owned a home when they were aged 25 and 39, that proportion was only 49.9% for millennials.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A Statistics Canada study based on the most recent census data found 16.3% of millennials aged 25 to 39 lived with their parents in 2021, up from 8.2% of baby boomers at the same age in 1991.
  2. After accounting for the share of millennials living with parents, Statistics Canada found homeownership among those aged 25 to 39 was 49.9% for millennials in 2021, compared with 55.9% for baby boomers in 1991 and 56.2% for Gen Xers in 2006.
  3. The trend of young Canadians living with parents was particularly acute in expensive cities, though Statistics Canada did not fully attribute it to affordability challenges.

Related Articles:

  • A “Heat Dome” of Immigration — Canada has adopted some of the most aggressive immigration policies in the OECD, adding 1.273m residents in a year to reach a population of 41m — proportionally equivalent to the US admitting more than 10m immigrants annually. Canadians are increasingly angry as housing prices soar, sprawl expands, and traffic worsens.
  • Canada’s Population Dips for Second Straight Quarter, Leading to First Annual Fall On Record — Statistics Canada estimates the country's population fell by about 102,436 people, or 0.2%, over the course of a year to 41.47 million, its first annual decline on record, driven by a steep reduction in temporary residents. Deaths exceeded births in the latest quarter, the second consecutive quarterly population drop.
  • How Canada Is Responding to American Mercantilism — US tariffs as high as 35% on certain goods not compliant with the US-Mexico-Canada trade agreement have coincided with falling Canadian exports, weaker business confidence and investment, a softening labor market, and a contraction in Canadian output. Canada has responded by aiming to double non-US exports within 10 years, expanding fiscal spending and deregulation, and keeping monetary policy loose.

Thursday, May 7, 2026

AI Summary. U.S. and Chinese data agree the bilateral U.S.-China trade imbalance decreased, while the U.S. deficit with Southeast Asian nations increased, with Vietnam the largest driver. The U.S. deficit with China in high-tech computer and networking goods fell about $70bn as it rose roughly $80bn with Southeast Asia, pointing to a redirection of final assembly.

Hunter Clark and Gregory Simitian Federal Reserve Bank of New York
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In 2025, the US deficit with China in machinery and electrical goods fell ~$70B, while the US deficit with ASEAN in similar goods rose ~$80B, and China’s surplus with ASEAN increased ~$70B—reshuffling, not shrinking, trade imbalances.

Has the falling U.S.-China trade deficit shifted to Southeast Asia?

Core argument: The U.S. deficit with China in high-tech computer- and networking-related goods fell by about $70 billion, while the comparable deficit with ASEAN rose by about $80 billion.

The charts plot several views of the trade balances between the U.S., China, and countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). [The top panel in the Gallery] shows the U.S.’s reported trade deficit with China and China’s reported trade surplus with the U.S. Both measures broadly agree that the bilateral trade imbalance decreased. [The first image] shows a similar set of plots for the trade imbalances between the U.S. and ASEAN. Both agree that the U.S. trade deficit with ASEAN increased significantly, with Vietnam the single largest driver of the deficit increase. Finally, the bottom panel shows the bilateral balances vis-à-vis China and ASEAN. The U.S.'s deficit with China in high-tech computer- and networking-related goods [in particular] declined by about $70 billion, and increased by a rather similar amount, $80 billion, for ASEAN. China’s own balance with ASEAN shows a nearly $70 billion increase in its surplus in Electrical machinery and equipment. These changes point to a redirection of final assembly from China to ASEAN nations, reducing direct U.S. exposure to Chinese exports. This rerouting doesn’t require a complete overhaul of supply chains, thanks to their inherent flexibility. Companies can relocate final assembly stages (like putting together laptops in Vietnam or Thailand) while continuing to source upstream components from established Chinese suppliers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. deficit with China in high-tech computer- and networking-related goods fell by about $70 billion, while the comparable deficit with ASEAN rose by about $80 billion.
  2. U.S. and Chinese data broadly agree that the bilateral U.S.–China trade imbalance decreased, while the U.S. trade deficit with ASEAN increased significantly, with Vietnam the single largest driver of that increase.
  3. China's surplus with ASEAN in electrical machinery and equipment rose by nearly $70 billion, a pattern pointing to a redirection of final assembly from China to ASEAN nations while upstream components are still sourced from established Chinese suppliers.

Related Articles:

  • US Notches One of Its Biggest Annual Trade Gaps Since 1960 — The US goods and services trade deficit reached $901.5bn for the year, one of the largest in data going back to 1960. US companies increased imports of computers and accessories by nearly $145bn from the prior year, an acceleration in demand that reflects large-scale artificial intelligence investment.
  • China Blames US For Trade Imbalances As Surplus Hits Record $1.2tn — China reported a record annual goods trade surplus of $1.2tn, with monthly exports growing 6.6% year over year in dollar terms, more than double analysts' average forecast of 3.1%. Chinese customs officials argue that other countries' restrictions on high-tech exports to China are holding down China's imports.
  • The Dangerous Triumph Of Neo-Mercantilism — Neo-mercantilism is thriving in both China, which pairs infant-industry promotion with large trade surpluses, and in a United States focused on external deficits and protecting domestic markets. The author argues this will likely fracture the world economy, and that a new multilateral treaty could include a mechanism to combat large structural trade surpluses.

AI Summary. A US stock market rebound has been driven by the smallest number of stocks on record, pushing market concentration to an all-time high and prompting warnings about the rally's fragility. The S&P 500, dominated by megacap technology companies, has far outperformed its equal-weight counterpart, with semiconductor stocks posting especially large gains.

Emily Herbert, Ray Douglas and Jonathan Vincent Financial Times
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The S&P 500 has risen ~12% since the start of April. The rally has been highly concentrated, with only five firms driving ~ half the S&P 500’s growth.

Is the stock market rebound driven by a record-small number of stocks?

Core argument: Wall Street's rebound since late March has been driven by the smallest number of stocks on record, pushing US market concentration to an all-time high and prompting warnings about the rally's "fragility.".

Wall Street’s rebound since late March has been driven by the smallest number of stocks on record, pushing US market concentration to an all-time high and prompting warnings about the “fragility” of the rally. Before the conflict began, the equal-weight version of the S&P powered ahead of the more commonly used index, in which bigger companies are weighted more heavily. But that pattern has reversed during the market rebound, with the S&P, which is dominated by Silicon Valley’s megacap tech companies, performing far better than its equal-weight counterpart. The Philadelphia Semiconductor index has surged more than 40% since the war started, with chipmaker Intel up more than 130% and memory giant Sandisk up 100%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Wall Street's rebound since late March has been driven by the smallest number of stocks on record, pushing US market concentration to an all-time high and prompting warnings about the rally's "fragility.".
  2. The S&P, dominated by Silicon Valley's megacap tech companies, has far outperformed its equal-weight counterpart during the rebound, reversing the pattern that prevailed before the conflict began.
  3. The Philadelphia Semiconductor index has surged more than 40% since the war started, with Intel up more than 130% and memory maker Sandisk up 100%.

Related Articles:

  • The Coming Mega-IPO Flow & Funding Problem of 2026 — Adjusted for inflation, SpaceX alone would rank as the second-largest initial public offering ever, behind Saudi Aramco, and three such listings together would exceed the entire 1995–2000 dot-com wave. Funding that equity supply requires selling existing holdings, and index rule changes make passive funds forced buyers, pressuring large-cap technology stocks.
  • Abandon Ship! — 42 AI-related stocks have accounted for 75%-85% of S&P 500 returns, earnings and capital spending since generative AI chatbots launched, and 80%-100% over the more recent period. Unlike the dot-com era, rising tech capital spending has not been accompanied by increased debt financing in aggregate.
  • One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets — Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.

AI Summary. SpaceX's capital spending is growing by billions of dollars as it builds space-related infrastructure, including launchpads in Florida and a solar-cell factory in Texas, ahead of a planned public offering. The company also plans to spend more to potentially send up to 1m artificial-intelligence satellites into low-Earth orbit.

Micah Maidenberg Wall Street Journal
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SpaceX’s planned capex is surging ahead of its IPO, ranging from a $55B chip complex in Texas to new launch facilities in Florida. Last year, the firm’s space-related businesses generated $8B in adjusted earnings on $16B in revenue.

Is a rocket maker ramping up capital spending before going public?

Core argument: SpaceX plans to spend more to potentially send up to one million AI satellites into low-Earth orbit in the years ahead, part of capital investments growing by billions of dollars as the company prepares a public offering.

SpaceX’s bill for capital investments is growing by the billions as the Elon Musk-led company prepares for a huge public offering. The rockets, satellites and AI company is investing in building space-related infrastructure, including launchpads in Florida and a new solar-cell factory in Texas. There are also plans to spend even more to potentially send up to one million AI satellites to low-Earth-orbit in the years ahead. The planned outlays reflect the appetite that Musk, SpaceX’s chief executive, has for pursuing projects at huge scales. Documents filed in connection with the company’s planned IPO are expected to give investors a clearer sense of how SpaceX expects to allocate spending.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. SpaceX plans to spend more to potentially send up to one million AI satellites into low-Earth orbit in the years ahead, part of capital investments growing by billions of dollars as the company prepares a public offering.
  2. SpaceX is investing in space-related infrastructure including launchpads in Florida and a new solar-cell factory in Texas, outlays that reflect Chief Executive Elon Musk's appetite for pursuing projects at huge scales.
  3. Documents filed in connection with SpaceX's planned IPO are expected to give investors a clearer sense of how the rockets, satellites and AI company expects to allocate spending.

Related Articles:

  • It’s Not a Space Race, It’s the Space Olympics — The US operates 81% of commercial satellites in orbit and 86% of global effective launch capacity, with NATO allies second in satellites at 11% and China second in launch capacity at 9%. China is pursuing mega satellite constellations and reusable rockets, in many cases copying approaches already proven by US companies.
  • The Coming Mega-IPO Flow & Funding Problem of 2026 — Adjusted for inflation, SpaceX alone would rank as the second-largest initial public offering ever, behind Saudi Aramco, and three such listings together would exceed the entire 1995–2000 dot-com wave. Funding that equity supply requires selling existing holdings, and index rule changes make passive funds forced buyers, pressuring large-cap technology stocks.
  • Elon Musk’s Starship Heavy Could Revolutionize Warfare — The Starship heavy-lift rocket would make it possible to pre-position conventional munitions in low Earth orbit, with heat shields and inertial guidance, that could be deorbited with little warning to strike anywhere on Earth within minutes. Such a system would allow thousands of simultaneous precise strikes without aircraft or personnel at risk, removing the need to first establish air superiority.

AI Summary. Census data show the under-18 population fell 22% in Chicago, 23% in Los Angeles and 12% in New York between 2010 and 2024, while wealthier white families defy the trend in central neighborhoods of the densest, richest cities. Brooklyn's white child population grew 13% over that period, rising from a third to more than two-fifths of the total.

Economist Staff The Economist
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Btw 2010 and 2024, the under-18 population in New York City declined by 12%. This decline was concentrated in the non-white population, which fell 15.4%, compared to a 1.7% drop for white children.

Are wealthy white families the only ones raising children downtown?

Core argument: Census-bureau data show the under-18 population fell 22% in Chicago, 23% in Los Angeles and 12% in New York between 2010 and 2024.

Cities across America are losing children fast. Across Chicago, between 2010 and 2024, according to census-bureau data, the total population aged under 18 declined by 22%. In Los Angeles the figure was 23% and in New York, 12%. And yet in the country’s richest, densest cities, there is one group noticeably defying the trend: wealthier white families. The change is most concentrated in central neighbourhoods in what Ness Sandoval, a sociologist at St Louis University, calls “winner takes all” cities, like New York, Chicago or San Francisco. Good examples include Park Slope in Brooklyn, Mar Vista in Los Angeles and Bernal Heights in San Francisco. Across Brooklyn the population of white children grew by 13% from 2010 to 2024. They now make up more than two-fifths of the total, up from a third in 2010. In Wicker Park’s two zip codes, the number of white children increased by 39% and 94%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Census-bureau data show the under-18 population fell 22% in Chicago, 23% in Los Angeles and 12% in New York between 2010 and 2024.
  2. Wealthier white families defy the decline, with Brooklyn's white child population growing 13% from 2010 to 2024 and now exceeding two-fifths of the total, up from a third; in Wicker Park's two zip codes it rose 39% and 94%.
  3. Ness Sandoval, a sociologist at St Louis University, places the shift in central neighbourhoods of "winner takes all" cities such as New York, Chicago and San Francisco, including Park Slope, Mar Vista and Bernal Heights.

Related Articles:

  • Young Families Have Stopped Leaving Big Cities, For Now — New data show the population of children under five in large U.S. urban counties fell 0.2%, matching the national rate of decline and ending a stretch in which big cities lost young children faster than the country as a whole. Every large urban county with under-five growth since 2020 is in Texas, North Carolina, or Florida.
  • Supply and The Mam — New York City has the highest combined city-state personal tax rate in the US and the highest all-in corporate income tax rate at 17.4%, and the highest industrial, retail and multifamily property taxes per square foot among ten major cities. New York State ranks first in tax collections per capita.
  • Where is Standard of Living the Highest? Local Prices and the Geography of Consumption — The authors estimate that geographical differences in cost of living are especially large for low-income US households, and that expensive cities offer college graduates a standard of living similar to affordable cities while offering less-educated households a lower one. A high school dropout household moving from the most affordable to the most expensive commuting zone would see consumption fall 18.5%.

AI Summary. Spain has been the world's fastest-growing large advanced economy and, by Financial Times analysis, accounted for one in four of the 11.1mn jobs added across the European Union, with roughly 70% going to immigrants according to the think-tank Funcas. Spain's fertility rate of 1.1 births per woman is the EU's lowest after Malta.

Barney Jopson, Alan Smith and Irene de la Torre Arenas Financial Times
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Is Database:
Database

Spain’s foreign-born population grew from ~5% to ~20% in less than 25 years. Since 2020, ~25% of the 1.1mm new jobs created in the EU were Spanish, and ~70% were filled by immigrants. At 1.1 births/woman, Spain has the second-lowest birth rate in the EU.

How has immigration driven Spain's economic and job growth?

Core argument: Spain accounted for one in four of the 11.1mn jobs added across the EU since 2020, according to FT analysis, and has been the world's fastest-growing large advanced economy over the past two years.

Over the past two years, Spain has been the world’s fastest-growing large advanced economy and an engine of EU job creation. Since 2020, it has been responsible for one in four of the 11.1mn new jobs added across the bloc, according to FT analysis. Roughly 70% of those have gone to immigrants, according to Funcas, a think-tank, which has examined the period since 2019. Spain’s unemployment rate remained the second highest in the EU at 10.3% in March. Juan Félix Huarte, chair of Uriel Investments, whose businesses range from waste management to renewables, says immigrants have become vital for the country’s economy for two underlying reasons. One is Spain’s fertility rate of 1.1 births per woman, the lowest in the EU after Malta and little more than half the rate of 2.1 needed to maintain demographic stability. “The Spanish, unfortunately, don’t have children. We have pets, but we don’t have children,” Huarte says. The other reason, he says, is that many young Spaniards are disinclined to take arduous jobs: “We’re getting society far too used to government assistance, to grants, to support from the state.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Spain accounted for one in four of the 11.1mn jobs added across the EU since 2020, according to FT analysis, and has been the world's fastest-growing large advanced economy over the past two years.
  2. Roughly 70% of Spain's job gains since 2019 have gone to immigrants, according to the think-tank Funcas, while Spain's unemployment rate stood at 10.3% in March, the second highest in the EU.
  3. Spain's fertility rate of 1.1 births per woman is the lowest in the EU after Malta and little more than half the 2.1 needed for demographic stability, which Uriel Investments chair Juan Félix Huarte cites as one reason immigrants are vital to the economy.

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