Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, April 22, 2026

AI Summary. The authors estimate that the rate at which employed U.S. workers receive better-paying outside job offers fell by 51% between 1982–1991 and 2012–2021, a decline that is broad-based across demographic groups and especially pronounced among younger workers. They attribute part of the weakness in real wage growth since the early 1980s to this weakening job ladder.

Niklas Engbom, Aniket Baksy, and Daniele Caratelli National Bureau of Economic Research
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The arrival rate for outside offers of better-paying employment fell 51% btw 1982–1991 and 2012–2021. The decade-by-decade narrowing of the distance between initial offers and the equilibrium wage distribution suggests declining advancement opportunities.

How much of the U.S. wage slowdown reflects fewer outside job offers?

Core argument: Using CPS microdata from 1982–2023 and a canonical job-ladder model, the authors estimate that the arrival rate of better-paying outside offers to employed U.S. workers fell by 51% between 1982–1991 and 2012–2021.

Real wage growth in the United States has been markedly weaker since the early 1980s relative to the earlier postwar period. This paper quantifies the contribution of changes in labor-market structure—manifested as a weakening of the U.S. job ladder—to this wage stagnation. Using CPS microdata from 1982–2023 and a canonical job-ladder model, we estimate that the arrival rate of better-paying outside offers to employed workers has fallen by roughly one-half since the 1980s. The decline is broad-based across demographic groups, is especially pronounced among younger workers, and is not offset by greater mobility along non-wage dimensions. We measure the strength of the job ladder using the gap between the wage distribution of all employed workers and that of workers newly hired from nonemployment (our proxy for the offer distribution). A larger gap reflects more frequent offers from higher-paying employers, which accelerates movement up the wage ladder. [Figure 3 shows that] in every decade, the distance [between the wage distribution and the offer distribution] has narrowed over time. Through the lens of a textbook job-ladder model, this narrowing indicates declining net upward job mobility. We estimate that the arrival rate of better-paying outside offers to employed workers fell by 51% between 1982–1991 and 2012–2021.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using CPS microdata from 1982–2023 and a canonical job-ladder model, the authors estimate that the arrival rate of better-paying outside offers to employed U.S. workers fell by 51% between 1982–1991 and 2012–2021.
  2. The estimated decline in the job ladder is broad-based across demographic groups, is especially pronounced among younger workers, and is not offset by greater mobility along non-wage dimensions.
  3. The authors measure job-ladder strength as the gap between the wage distribution of all employed workers and that of workers newly hired from nonemployment, and find the gap narrowed in every decade, indicating declining net upward job mobility.

Related Articles:

  • Countries for Old Men: An Analysis of the Age Pay Gap — Administrative data on 38mm Italian and German workers show wages of older workers grew much faster than those of younger workers, a widening age pay gap the authors also find in fourteen other high-income countries. The authors argue workforce aging leaves fewer top hierarchy slots for younger workers, slowing promotions.
  • The Age Divide in the American Workplace — American workers over 50 earned roughly 35% more per week than workers under 30 in the late 1970s, a gap that widened to about 55% at its early-2010s peak before narrowing to 47%. Their advantage in access to top-quarter-paying management jobs also widened, from about 5 to 8.3 percentage points.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.

AI Summary. A closure of the Strait of Hormuz has removed 550m barrels of Gulf crude, nearly 2% of annual global output, plus 7m tonnes of liquefied natural gas each month, equal to 2% of yearly supply. Western fuel prices have risen only modestly as 16 European Union governments subsidise consumers or cut fuel taxes.

Economist Staff The Economist
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50 days into the Iran war, the world is short ~550mm barrels of Gulf crude – almost 2% of 2025’s global production. Pre-war cargoes are being consumed, suggesting prices will soon rise to bring demand in line with the reduced supply.

Are stable fuel prices hiding a worsening global energy supply shortage?

Core argument: Fifty days into the Iran war, the world has lost 550m barrels of Gulf crude, nearly 2% of last year's global output, while each month the Strait of Hormuz stays closed costs 7m tonnes of LNG, or 2% of annual supply.

Fifty days into the Iran war, the world has lost 550m barrels of Gulf crude—nearly 2% of last year’s global output. Every month Hormuz stays closed, the world misses out on 7m tonnes of liquefied natural gas (lng), worth 2% of its annual supply. Yet in Western countries, which host the largest futures markets, pain remains limited. Petrol is a bit pricier, but most households can still afford to drive. Trucks keep trucking. Planes continue to fly. Fuel stocks remain close to pre-war levels. This comforting picture is deeply misleading. Three factors are pushing the world towards the cliff edge. Oil cargoes available to buy are drying up. Refineries are slashing output of fuel. And demand remains artificially high [for example] Europe has so far avoided demand destruction. Governments are working hard to preserve people’s purchasing power. Of the 27 European Union countries, 16 are using taxpayer money or cutting fuel taxes to shield consumers from higher prices. European refiners have thus barely slashed production.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Fifty days into the Iran war, the world has lost 550m barrels of Gulf crude, nearly 2% of last year's global output, while each month the Strait of Hormuz stays closed costs 7m tonnes of LNG, or 2% of annual supply.
  2. Pain in Western countries remains limited, with petrol only slightly pricier, trucks and planes still operating, and fuel stocks close to pre-war levels, a picture that is deeply misleading.
  3. Three factors push global energy markets toward the cliff edge: oil cargoes available to buy are drying up, refineries are slashing fuel output, and demand stays artificially high as 16 of 27 EU countries use taxpayer money or fuel-tax cuts to shield consumers.

Related Articles:

  • Are We Running Out Of Oil — An analysis of country- and product-specific oil markets identifies pockets of potential extreme tightness if the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed, with critically low supplies of the petrochemical feedstocks naphtha and liquefied petroleum gas in Asia and cross-product scarcity in multiple Asian countries.
  • Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026 — Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
  • Power Politics: Energy Self-Sufficiency in a Modern Mercantilist World — China leads in adding power to the grid, with more than 30,000 miles of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines versus zero in the US and lead times for large transformers of 48 weeks against a US average of 143 weeks. This positions China to accommodate new demand sources such as artificial intelligence.

AI Summary. China earned about $3.4bn from exporting rare-earth elements and magnets in a year, while the U.S. Geological Survey estimates a 30% disruption to U.S. supply of the rare-earth element neodymium alone would cut U.S. GDP by 2.2%, over $600bn. This asymmetry gives Chinese export controls their leverage.

Edward Fishman Foreign Affairs
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Edward Fishman makes the case for deeper integration of Western economies in order to manage chokepoints; integration “can preserve the scale modern economies require while neutralizing the coercive power of rivals.”

What makes export controls on critical minerals so powerful?

Core argument: U.S. Geological Survey researchers estimate that a 30% disruption to U.S. supply of the rare-earth element neodymium alone would cut U.S. GDP by 2.2%, more than $600 billion.

Chinese rare earths offer a clear-cut case. In 2024, China earned approximately $3.4 billion from exporting rare-earth elements and magnets. Meanwhile, researchers at the U.S. Geological Survey estimate that a 30% disruption to the United States’ supply of the rare-earth element neodymium alone would reduce the country’s GDP by 2.2 percent—more than $600 billion. In other words, China would have to forgo no more than a couple of billion dollars in export revenue to inflict over half a trillion dollars of damage on the U.S. economy. This asymmetry is what gives Chinese export controls their power. It also highlights a broader reality about economic warfare. When they have a choice, states don’t weaponize interdependence—they weaponize dependence.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. Geological Survey researchers estimate that a 30% disruption to U.S. supply of the rare-earth element neodymium alone would cut U.S. GDP by 2.2%, more than $600 billion.
  2. China earned roughly $3.4 billion from exporting rare-earth elements and magnets in 2024, meaning it would forgo no more than a couple of billion dollars in export revenue to inflict over half a trillion dollars of damage on the U.S. economy.
  3. The asymmetry between small Chinese export revenues and large U.S. losses gives Chinese export controls their power, and states with a choice weaponize dependence rather than interdependence.

Related Articles:

  • Underestimating China — China's productive capacity is three times that of the United States and exceeds the next nine countries combined, with its share of global manufacturing quintupling to 30% while the U.S. share halved to about 15%. The authors argue Washington must convert its alliances into a platform for pooled capacity building.
  • China Hatches Plan to Keep U.S. Military From Getting Its Rare-Earth Magnets — China is designing a "validated end-user" system that would fast-track rare-earth and other restricted material export approvals for U.S. firms while excluding companies tied to the U.S. military. The arrangement would let China ease export flows while keeping the materials away from U.S. military suppliers.
  • How Japan Built a Rare-Earth Supply Chain Without China — Japan has reduced its reliance on Chinese rare earths, with industry estimates putting China's share of Japanese rare-earth imports at roughly 60% to 70%, down from 90% or more. Japan's alternative chain runs from an Australian open-pit mine through a separation plant in Malaysia to Japanese magnet makers supplying automakers.

AI Summary. U.S. forces may have expended more than half of prewar inventory for four of seven heavily used munitions in the 39-day air and missile campaign against Iran, with rebuilding to prewar levels projected to take one to four years. These munitions are also critical for a potential Western Pacific conflict.

Mark Cancian and Chris Park Center For Strategic and International Studies
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A CSIS analysis finds restoring magazine depth to pre-war levels under current production pipelines will take ~ 1 to 4 years. New orders have a longer lead. They calculate that the US may have expended ~50% of its stock of 4 of 7 key munitions.

How long will rebuilding depleted U.S. munitions stockpiles take?

Core argument: In the 39-day air and missile campaign against Iran before the ceasefire, U.S. forces may have expended more than half of the prewar inventory for four of seven heavily used munitions.

In the 39 days of the air and missile campaign before the ceasefire, U.S. forces heavily used the seven munitions in Table 1. For four of them, the United States may have expended more than half of the prewar inventory. Rebuilding to prewar levels for the seven munitions will take from one to four years as missiles in the pipeline are delivered. These missiles will also be critical for a potential Western Pacific conflict. Even before the Iran war, stockpiles were deemed insufficient for a peer competitor fight. That shortfall is now even more acute, and building stockpiles to levels adequate for a war with China will take additional time.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In the 39-day air and missile campaign against Iran before the ceasefire, U.S. forces may have expended more than half of the prewar inventory for four of seven heavily used munitions.
  2. Rebuilding U.S. stockpiles of the seven munitions to prewar levels will take one to four years as missiles already in the production pipeline are delivered.
  3. The same munitions would be critical in a potential Western Pacific conflict, and U.S. stockpiles deemed insufficient for a peer competitor fight before the Iran war now face an even more acute shortfall.

Related Articles:

  • The First 36 Hours of War Consumed Over 3,000 U.S.-Israeli Munitions — The authors estimate replacing two destroyed U.S. radars would take five to eight years and $1.1bn for one and 12–24 months and $50m–$75m for the other, making supply-chain fragility and replacement timelines a greater constraint than materials cost. Both systems require gallium, of which China controls 98% of global supply.
  • Pentagon Approaches Automakers, Manufacturers to Boost Weapons Production — The Pentagon has approached U.S. automakers and other manufacturers about using their workers and factory capacity to boost production of munitions and other equipment as wars deplete stocks, asking whether they could rapidly shift to defense work. Most large non-defense manufacturers already hold Pentagon contracts, but these are typically limited in scope and value.
  • The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers — The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.

AI Summary. A Taipei-based think tank estimates Taiwan shipped 136,010 drones to Europe in a single quarter, more than its full-year total of 107,433 units, which itself was over 40x the 2,574 units shipped the prior year. The figures illustrate the momentum of Taiwan's emerging drone industry.

Thompson Chau Nikkei Asia
Date Posted:

Taiwanese drone exports to Europe in Q1 exceeded 2025’s total. The exports have been concentrated in Poland and the Czech Republic, which are gateways to Ukraine.

Are Taiwan's drone exports to Europe surging on wartime demand?

Core argument: Taiwan shipped an estimated 136,010 drones to Europe in the first quarter of 2026, exceeding the 107,433 completed drones it sent to Europe in all of the prior year, according to calculations by the Taipei-based think tank DSET.

Taiwan's drone exports to Europe in the first quarter exceeded the total for all of last year, a think tank estimates, illustrating the emerging industry's momentum. The Taipei-based Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology (DSET) told Nikkei Asia that drone exports to Europe in the first quarter of 2026 reached 136,010. That surpasses the 107,433 completed drones Taiwan shipped to Europe last year, according to DSET calculations included in a new report released Wednesday. The 2025 figure itself already marked significant growth, more than 40-fold, from just 2,574 units the year before.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Taiwan shipped an estimated 136,010 drones to Europe in the first quarter of 2026, exceeding the 107,433 completed drones it sent to Europe in all of the prior year, according to calculations by the Taipei-based think tank DSET.
  2. Taiwan's drone exports to Europe rose more than 40-fold in 2025, to 107,433 units from 2,574 the year before, according to DSET estimates provided to Nikkei Asia.

Related Articles:

  • Taiwan’s Bid To Export Drones Free Of Chinese Parts Is Taking Off — Taiwan is marketing drones built without Chinese parts to the US and allies concerned about Chinese espionage and supply-chain control, with production rising from about 10,000 units to more than 12x that level and exports climbing more than 35-fold to roughly 123,000 units. The Czech Republic and Poland were the largest buyers.
  • Can Drones Be Stockpiled? Europe Wrestles With Weapons Dilemma — European defense officials argue that small, cheap drones have proven as effective as heavy armour in Ukraine, but stockpiling millions of them risks holding weapons made obsolete within months by new software, radio frequencies, and autonomous navigation. Drones that dominate one week can be jammed or outclassed the next.
  • Why Every Country Needs To Master The Electric Tech Stack — Drones are the foundation of hard power in the early 21st century, so a country unable to produce them domestically is at a disadvantage. As electric motors overtake combustion engines as the core technology that makes machines move, the same supply chains and production processes used for electronics can also produce cars, drones, robots, and appliances.

Thursday, April 23, 2026

AI Summary. Comparing Americans in their late 30s across generations, median household market income growth has slowed since the Baby Boomers while remaining positive: Baby Boomers earned 31% more than the Silent Generation, Generation X 10% more than Baby Boomers, and Millennials 15% more than Generation X. Accounting for taxes and transfers softens the slowdown.

Kevin Corinth and Jeff Larrimore Demography
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As measured by the 36–40 cohort across generations, Americans’ real market income has continued to rise but at a slower pace. Accounting for taxes and transfers partially offsets the slowdown in the growth of market income.

Has income growth across successive generations of Americans slowed?

Core argument: Household market income for Baby Boomers in their late 30s was 31% above that of similarly aged Silent Generation adults, while Generation X gained 10% over Baby Boomers and Millennials gained 15% over Generation X.

We zoom in on a focal age range in peo­ple’s late 30s—an age at which we observe the five gen­er­a­tions from the Greatest Generation (born 1901–1927) through the Millennial Generation (born 1981–1996)—and assess both whether gen­er­a­tional prog­ress is positive and the extent to which the rate of growth is speeding up or slowing down. Focusing first on median market income, there are two notable takeaways that apply for both the individual/couple and the household sharing units.The first is that generational progress has clearly slowed since the Baby Boom Generation, although it remains positive. Second, despite the perception that slowing generational progress is a recent phenomenon, the substantial slowdown did not start with Millennials but began a generation earlier with Generation X. Looking at the patterns formed in household market income by generation, the income of Baby Boomers in their late 30s was 31% above that for similarly aged adults in the Silent Generation. Progress slowed substantially for Generation X—their incomes increased by 10% relative to Baby Boomers—and then ticked up for Millennials, whose incomes rose by 15% relative to Generation X. Although market income is an important indicator of progress, it does not reflect the full set of resources that individuals have available for consumption. The slowdown in generational progress is softened when accounting for taxes and transfers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Household market income for Baby Boomers in their late 30s was 31% above that of similarly aged Silent Generation adults, while Generation X gained 10% over Baby Boomers and Millennials gained 15% over Generation X.
  2. Generational progress in median market income has slowed since the Baby Boom Generation but remains positive for both the individual/couple and household sharing units.
  3. The substantial slowdown in generational income progress began with Generation X rather than Millennials, and is softened when taxes and transfers are taken into account.

Related Articles:

  • The American Dream Is Not a Coin Flip, and Wages Have Not Stagnated — Using an alternative cost-of-living adjustment, the typical 40-year-old's pre-tax family income rose 52% between 1979 and 2019, or 73% adjusting for family size, versus 15% under the methods behind widely cited mobility estimates. Absolute mobility is down 20 percentage points since 1979 but stood at 72% in 2023.
  • Changing Opportunity: Sociological Mechanisms Underlying Growing Class Gaps and Shrinking Race Gaps in Economic Mobility — Across the 1978 to 1992 birth cohorts, adult household incomes fell for white children raised in low-income families and rose for those raised in high-income families, increasing the intergenerational persistence of income ranks among white children by 28%. Over the same cohorts, adult incomes rose for Black children at all parental income levels.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.

AI Summary. An analysis of industries that rely most heavily on noncitizen workers with a high-school degree or less—including construction, restaurants, food manufacturing and hotels—found hourly earnings in those 41 industries rose 3.5% from a year earlier, below the 3.8% increase for all workers. Employment in those industries fell by 90,400 over the same period, while overall employment grew by 298,000.

Paul Kiernan and Drew An-Pham Wall Street Journal
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Industries most dependent on low-skilled immigrant workers saw wages rise 3.5% and employment fall by 90,400 Y/Y in Feb, underperforming the broader economy, where wages grew 3.8% and total employment rose by 298,000.

Have immigration-dependent industries seen wages rise faster than the broader economy?

Core argument: Hourly earnings across the 41 industries most reliant on low-skilled immigrants rose a weighted average of 3.5% in February from a year earlier, below the 3.8% gain for all workers and a slowdown from before Trump took office.

The analysis used 2024 census data to identify fields—including construction, restaurants, food manufacturing and hotels—that rely heavily on noncitizens with a high-school degree or less, a common proxy for people who entered the country illegally. The Journal excluded industries such as agriculture and the gig economy, for which the Labor Department doesn’t publish hourly earnings. The result: Across 41 industries that rely most heavily on low-skilled immigrants, hourly earnings rose by a weighted average of 3.5% in February from a year earlier, according to the latest figures. That was less than the 3.8% increase in average hourly earnings for all workers and marked a slowdown from before Trump took office. Employment in those 41 immigrant-dependent industries fell by 90,400 in February from a year earlier, while overall employment grew by 298,000 jobs in the same stretch. Preliminary March figures available for 23 of the sectors show a year-over-year gain of 39,400 jobs, boosted by hiring in construction and food service.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Hourly earnings across the 41 industries most reliant on low-skilled immigrants rose a weighted average of 3.5% in February from a year earlier, below the 3.8% gain for all workers and a slowdown from before Trump took office.
  2. Employment in the 41 immigrant-dependent industries fell by 90,400 in February from a year earlier, while overall employment grew by 298,000 jobs over the same stretch.
  3. Preliminary March figures available for 23 of the immigrant-dependent sectors show a year-over-year gain of 39,400 jobs, boosted by hiring in construction and food service.

Related Articles:

  • Macroeconomic Implications Of Immigration Flows In 2025 And 2026: January 2026 Update — The authors estimate that job growth consistent with full employment was 20,000–50,000 a month in the second half of 2025, while reported nonfarm payroll growth averaged about 14,500 and unemployment rose 0.3 percentage points. They project immigration policy changes will keep potential employment growth low, reducing GDP growth by roughly 0.2 percentage points in 2025 and 0.1 in 2026.
  • Labor Force Growth, Breakeven Employment, and Potential GDP Growth — Slowing net immigration could cut US labor force growth so much that the breakeven pace of job creation falls to nearly zero — under 10,000 jobs a month — far below any point in the past 65 years. Monthly payroll declines as large as 100,000 would then not be unusual even with output at potential.
  • Break-Even Employment Declines As Unauthorized Immigration Outflows Continue — Net outflows of unauthorized immigrants have lowered the break-even rate of U.S. payroll growth needed to hold the unemployment rate steady, so smaller job gains that once signalled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced labor market. Recent payroll growth has slightly exceeded that break-even rate on average.

AI Summary. The U.S. government has invested $20.9bn across sixteen deals taking direct ownership stakes, expanding beyond its traditional toolkit of grants, loans, and tax incentives. The Department of Defense leads with seven deals, the Department of Commerce has six including a 10% stake in Intel, and partners have mobilized an additional $4.75bn.

Jonathan Hillman Council On Foreign Relations
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Since January 2025, the USG has taken equity stakes totaling $20.9B in 16 American businesses. $8.6B, ~41% of the total, was invested in critical mineral miners and processors, while $8.9B, ~43% of the total, funded the government’s 10% stake in Intel.

Is the U.S. government taking direct equity stakes in companies?

Core argument: Since January 2025, the U.S. government has invested $20.9 billion across sixteen deals involving direct ownership, broadening a toolkit traditionally focused on grants, loans, and tax incentives.

Since January 2025, the U.S. government has invested $20.9 billion across sixteen deals involving direct ownership, broadening a toolkit that has traditionally focused on grants, loans, and tax incentives. The Department of Commerce has participated in six such deals, including taking a 10% stake in Intel. The Development Finance Corporation, the United States’ development bank, has executed three equity transactions in critical minerals, healthcare, and infrastructure. The Department of Defense leads the way with seven such deals. The U.S. government is also working with a range of partners and has mobilized an additional $4.75 billion in investment. Private co-investors include J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs, and others.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Since January 2025, the U.S. government has invested $20.9 billion across sixteen deals involving direct ownership, broadening a toolkit traditionally focused on grants, loans, and tax incentives.
  2. The Department of Defense leads with seven direct-ownership deals, followed by the Department of Commerce with six, including a 10% stake in Intel, while the Development Finance Corporation has executed three equity transactions in critical minerals, healthcare, and infrastructure.
  3. The U.S. government has mobilized an additional $4.75 billion in investment alongside private co-investors including J.P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs.

Related Articles:

  • Industrial Policy and Economic Security — Industrial policy justified on national security grounds requires weighing how much economic inefficiency is worth tolerating, since costs incurred today make a country poorer and therefore less able to project power later. The calculation is difficult because security gains are probabilistic and long-term economic costs are speculative.
  • The Cold War and the U.S. Labor Market — The authors estimate that declining U.S. military procurement spending from the 1950s to the 1990s explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing employment and just under 10% of the rise in top-decile income inequality. They argue Cold War procurement raised demand for manufacturing workers and helped sustain tight labor markets for low-skill workers.
  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.

AI Summary. A database trawl counts 1,727 private companies valued above $1bn globally, and if private market valuations are accurate, the largest of them have outperformed public markets since the pandemic. Several, led by SpaceX and OpenAI, plan initial public offerings, which can signal trouble ahead since insiders are choosing to sell.

John Authers Bloomberg
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“Brace for a thundering herd of unicorns.” John Authers notes that in recent years, large IPOs have marked the peak for multiple asset classes, citing Blackstone’s June 2007 IPO and the 2011 Glencore deal, which saw the peak of the metals market.

Do large private company listings signal market peaks?

Core argument: BestBrokers' trawl of databases counts 1,727 unicorns globally, with 70 added in the first quarter of this year.

A trawl of databases by BestBrokers finds that there are now 1,727 globally, with their numbers swelling by 70 in the first quarter of this year. If private market valuations are right, the biggest unicorns have far outperformed public markets since the pandemic. Several unicorns, led by SpaceX and OpenAI, are planning initial public offerings this year. That’s not necessarily good news. As ever when insiders at a company decide to sell, IPOs can signal trouble ahead. Two of this century’s biggest IPOs marked the top for entire markets and asset classes.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. BestBrokers' trawl of databases counts 1,727 unicorns globally, with 70 added in the first quarter of this year.
  2. If private market valuations are accurate, the biggest unicorns have far outperformed public markets since the pandemic.
  3. Several unicorns, led by SpaceX and OpenAI, plan initial public offerings this year, and two of this century's biggest IPOs marked the top for entire markets and asset classes.

Related Articles:

  • One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets — Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.
  • Public Markets Are a Shrinking Part of the US Economy — S&P 500 companies account for 18% of total US employment, 21% of total US capital expenditure, roughly half of economy-wide corporate profits, and less than half of outstanding corporate debt. Privately owned firms account for almost 80% of job openings, and 81% of firms with revenues above $100m are private.
  • The Deep End: 2025 Alternative Investments Review — In venture capital, only consistently investing with top-quartile managers outperformed the S&P 500, while the median manager at best matched public equity markets and fourth-quartile managers destroyed value relative to equities. Fees are part of the issue: an 11.7% annualized NASDAQ 100 return falls to 7.4% under a 2%/20% fee structure.

AI Summary. Higher oil and gas prices are projected to lower Euro Area industrial production by almost 2% by end-2027, compared with an estimated 4% drag during the 2022/23 energy crisis. The current shock is primarily an oil supply shock affecting industry broadly and is more global, leaving European energy-intensive industries less exposed to competitiveness pressures.

Niklas Garnadt Goldman Sachs
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Per GS, the current energy shock will lower Europe’s industrial production by ~2%, ½ the ~4% decline that occurred during the 2022 shock. As the current shock is global, also hitting Asia, Europe does not face the competitive disadvantage it did in 2022.

Why does the new energy price shock hurt European manufacturing less?

Core argument: Higher oil and gas prices are projected to lower Euro Area industrial production by almost 2% by end-2027 relative to a pre-conflict baseline, versus an estimated 4% drag during the 2022/23 energy crisis.

[We] project that higher oil and gas prices [will] lower Euro Area industrial production by almost 2% by end-2027 relative to our pre-conflict baseline, with negative IP growth later this year but a return to positive growth in 2027. This compares to an estimated drag of 4% during the energy crisis of 2022/23. The current price shock is expected to be smaller and less persistent, while the decoupling from Russian pipeline gas that began in 2022/23 has been sustained. The 2022/23 crisis was fundamentally driven by a sharp reduction in Russian pipeline gas supply to Europe and impacted a narrow set of highly gas-intensive industries particularly hard. The current shock is primarily an oil supply one that tends to reduce industrial production more broadly. However, in 2022/23, energy market shifts were largely focused on Europe, leading to major cost disadvantages for energy-intensive industries, particularly relative to China, and a surge in import competition. This time, energy price pressures are more global, with Asia appearing to be affected to a similar (or even greater) extent. European energy-intensive industries therefore look less exposed to competitiveness pressures.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Higher oil and gas prices are projected to lower Euro Area industrial production by almost 2% by end-2027 relative to a pre-conflict baseline, versus an estimated 4% drag during the 2022/23 energy crisis.
  2. The 2022/23 crisis stemmed from a sharp reduction in Russian pipeline gas supply and hit a narrow set of highly gas-intensive industries, while the present shock is primarily an oil supply shock that tends to reduce industrial production more broadly.
  3. Energy price pressures are now more global, with Asia appearing affected to a similar or greater extent, leaving European energy-intensive industries less exposed to competitiveness pressures than in 2022/23, when cost disadvantages relative to China accompanied a surge in import competition.

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AI Summary. Boeing delivered 143 commercial aircraft in a quarter, up 10% year over year and 29 more than Airbus, its widest delivery lead since 2018, as Airbus contended with supply-chain bottlenecks including engine shortages. Revenue at Boeing's defense, space and security division rose 21%, aided by rising global defense spending.

Christian Davies and Sylvia Pfeifer Financial Times
Date Posted:

In Q1, Boeing delivered more planes than Airbus for the first time since 2023. Defense and space revenue rose 21%, as global defense spending surged.

Has Boeing retaken the commercial aircraft delivery lead from its rival?

Core argument: Boeing delivered 143 commercial aircraft in the first three months of this year, up 10% on 2025, and 29 more jets than Airbus, its widest delivery lead since 2018.

Boeing delivered 143 commercial aircraft to customers in the first three months of this year, up 10% on 2025. It shipped 29 more jets than Airbus, its widest lead since 2018, as its rival struggled with supply-chain bottlenecks, particularly engine shortages. Revenue at Boeing’s defence, space and security division rose 21%, buoyed by a surge in global defence spending.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Boeing delivered 143 commercial aircraft in the first three months of this year, up 10% on 2025, and 29 more jets than Airbus, its widest delivery lead since 2018.
  2. Airbus trailed Boeing on deliveries as it struggled with supply-chain bottlenecks, particularly engine shortages.
  3. Revenue at Boeing's defence, space and security division rose 21%, buoyed by a surge in global defence spending.

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