Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Monday, April 20, 2026

AI Summary. Research on "transformative entrepreneurs" argues that turning inventions into long-run growth depends on tycoons who control and popularize new technologies. An analysis of 11 American technological waves over 150 years, scoring leaders by company revenue, employment, market value, corporate control, and personal wealth, ranks Henry Ford as the most powerful.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
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An Economist analysis concludes that history suggests “prosperity requires tycoons,” as transformational entrepreneurs have played a decisive role in diffusing new technologies and are “a necessary condition of innovation.”

How powerful are today's AI tycoons compared with past industrial titans?

Core argument: John D. Rockefeller's peak wealth equalled roughly 1.5% of American GDP, and Elon Musk may be richer still depending on how his wealth is calculated, though The Economist's ranking places Henry Ford as the most powerful mogul America has seen.

A paper by Ufuk Akcigit points to the crucial role of so-called “transformative entrepreneurs” in turning inventions into long-run economic growth. In short, prosperity requires tycoons. To understand how the AI magnates compare with business titans through history, The Economist examined 11 technological waves in America over the past 150 years, from railways to the internet. For each, we picked the top five people responsible for the control, distribution and popularisation of that technology. We quantified the power of each by looking at the revenue, employment and market value of their companies at their peak, as well as a subjective assessment of the degree of corporate control held by the tycoon, along with their personal wealth. Riches alone would not capture the full extent of a tycoon’s power. At his peak the wealth of John D. Rockefeller, founder of Standard Oil, was equivalent to around 1.5% of American GDP. Mr. Musk may be richer still, depending on how his wealth is calculated. By our ranking, however, Henry Ford is the most powerful mogul America has seen so far.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. John D. Rockefeller's peak wealth equalled roughly 1.5% of American GDP, and Elon Musk may be richer still depending on how his wealth is calculated, though The Economist's ranking places Henry Ford as the most powerful mogul America has seen.
  2. The Economist examined 11 American technological waves over the past 150 years, from railways to the internet, picking the top five people responsible for each technology's control, distribution and popularisation.
  3. The Economist quantified each tycoon's power using the revenue, employment and market value of their companies at their peak, plus a subjective assessment of corporate control and personal wealth, since riches alone would not capture a tycoon's full power.

Related Articles:

  • Transformative and Subsistence Entrepreneurs: Origins and Impacts on Economic Growth — Only 17% of firms are "transformative" entrepreneurs, defined as those hiring a research-and-development worker at some point; higher IQ and educational attainment strongly predict transformative entrepreneurship, though the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur overall declines with IQ. The authors argue education subsidies address financial constraints more effectively than uniform startup or research subsidies.
  • Which Entrepreneurs Boost Productivity? — The authors find that a minority of entrepreneurs are "transformative" — generating disproportionate productivity gains, scoring high on IQ tests, being well-educated, and hiring research and development workers. They argue that economies with more such entrepreneurs and R&D workers sustain higher long-run productivity growth.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.

AI Summary. US labor force survey data show occupational stability rather than economy-wide disruption from generative artificial intelligence, with the dissimilarity in occupational mix between older and more recent college graduates rarely deviating outside a 30–33% range. The authors note this limited early impact resembles the pace of change in previous periods of technological disruption.

Martha Gimbel, Molly Kinder, Joshua Kendall, and Maddie Lee Yale University
Date Posted:

An index of dissimilarity of occupational mix between college grads aged 20–24 and those 25–34 showed a modest uptick in March relative to November 2022, but remains within its historical range, suggesting at most a modest labor market effect from AI.

Is artificial intelligence reshaping the labor market for recent graduates?

Core argument: The dissimilarity in occupational mix between older and more recent college graduates has rarely moved outside the 30–33% range since January 2021, which the authors argue is inconsistent with generative AI substantially changing the labor market for recent graduates.

Overall, the March 2026 CPS releases do not indicate a meaningful shift from December in most categories. If generative AI were in fact substantially changing the labor market for recent college graduates, we would expect to see a growing dissimilarity in the occupational mix between these two groups [Figure 8]. Taking a closer look at the trend since January 2021, the dissimilarity between older and more recent college graduates rarely deviates outside of the 30-33% range [Figure 9]. The picture of AI’s impact on the labor market that emerges from our data is one that largely reflects stability, not major disruption at an economy-wide level. The lack of widespread impacts at this early stage is not unlike the pace of change with previous periods of technological disruption. [As a prospective research strategy], preregistering areas where we would expect to see the impact and continuing to monitor monthly impacts will help us distinguish rumor from fact.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The dissimilarity in occupational mix between older and more recent college graduates has rarely moved outside the 30–33% range since January 2021, which the authors argue is inconsistent with generative AI substantially changing the labor market for recent graduates.
  2. The March 2026 Current Population Survey releases show no meaningful shift from December in most categories, a picture the authors characterize as stability rather than major economy-wide disruption from AI.
  3. The authors note that the absence of widespread AI impacts at this early stage resembles the pace of change in previous periods of technological disruption, and propose preregistering expected impact areas and monitoring monthly data to distinguish rumor from fact.

Related Articles:

  • Looking for the Ladder — The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
  • AI and Young-adult Jobs: The Real Mystery — Employment rates have declined for young adults both with and without college degrees, with non-degree holders faring marginally worse, and employment growth for young workers of all education levels has lagged that of other workers. Artificial intelligence can replace some lower-skilled jobs, but those jobs are too few to drive youth labor market weakness.
  • AI and the Fable of the ATMs — Bank tellers per branch fell steadily as automated teller machines spread, and total teller employment held up only because banking deregulation drove a rise in branch numbers; teller jobs are down nearly 40% from their peak. The author argues invoking this case for AI requires identifying an equivalent offsetting source of labor demand.

AI Summary. U.S. manufacturing growth is attributed to demand rather than tariffs, with McKinsey analysis finding that sectors with strong domestic production also had strong imports rather than the lower imports that reshoring would imply. Computer and electronic products output rose 7.7% while imports in the sector rose 40.5%, and aerospace and transportation equipment output rose 28%.

Greg Ip Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

US manufacturing output has increased 2.3% since January 2025. In the sectors where output rose, so did imports, suggesting the increase is due to changes in underlying demand, not tariffs.

Is demand rather than tariffs driving U.S. manufacturing growth?

Core argument: U.S. domestic production of computer and electronic products rose 7.7% in the fourth quarter from a year earlier while imports in the sector rose 40.5%, part of a pattern McKinsey found in several sectors where strong production coincided with strong imports.

This stealth recovery, though, isn’t because of tariffs. Instead, credit goes to the most basic economic force of all: demand. The U.S. is good at making things that happen to be in big demand right now. McKinsey looked at production, imports and investment, reasoning that reshoring would be associated with lower imports and more investment. While no uniform pattern emerged, they did find in several sectors that where domestic production was strong, so were imports. Where production was down, so were imports. For example, domestic production of computer and electronic products last year was up 7.7%. (All its figures are from the fourth quarter compared with a year earlier.) But imports in this sector were up even more, by 40.5%. Aerospace and transportation equipment (which excludes trucks and cars) also boomed last year, with domestic output up 28%. No mystery here. Boeing’s jetliner deliveries soared 72% last year to 600 as production, curtailed over safety scrutiny, recovered. A new global arms race is lifting orders for jet fighters, missiles and helicopters. Meanwhile, aerospace imports rose 3%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. domestic production of computer and electronic products rose 7.7% in the fourth quarter from a year earlier while imports in the sector rose 40.5%, part of a pattern McKinsey found in several sectors where strong production coincided with strong imports.
  2. Aerospace and transportation equipment output, excluding trucks and cars, rose 28% from a year earlier while aerospace imports rose 3%, as Boeing's jetliner deliveries climbed 72% to 600 after production curtailed by safety scrutiny recovered.
  3. The U.S. manufacturing recovery is credited to demand rather than tariffs, with a global arms race lifting orders for jet fighters, missiles and helicopters.

Related Articles:

  • Crises at Boeing and Intel Are a National Emergency — Intel and Boeing, once benchmarks for high-quality, demanding manufacturing, declined because of their own mistakes rather than cheap foreign competition. Because leading U.S. tech firms' software and devices depend on advanced semiconductors fabricated under contract, especially by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., Chinese subjugation of Taiwan could leave the U.S. tech sector at Beijing's mercy.
  • What Would It Take to Bring Back US Manufacturing? Part 2: Making American Manufacturing More Productive — The authors argue the United States is a decade away from the scale of automated "lights-out" manufacturing needed to meet its own end-to-end demand at comparable cost. With 98% of US manufacturers being small or medium enterprises, low deployment of mature productivity technologies reflects limited commercial adoption and investment rather than technical readiness.
  • Geopolitics And The Geometry Of Global Trade: 2026 Update — Shipments of AI hardware rose almost 40%, accounting for about a third of global trade growth, drawing on supply chains running through Taiwan, South Korea, and parts of Southeast Asia. The US added roughly half of the world's new data center capacity, and its AI-related goods trade rose about 66%.

AI Summary. America's three largest legacy defense contractors—Lockheed Martin, RTX and Northrop Grumman—together generated roughly 8x the combined sales of newcomers Anduril, Palantir and SpaceX, yet the three upstarts are worth more than 3x the legacy trio. Their valuations reflect investor optimism that they can shake up the arms industry.

The Economist Economist Staff
Date Posted:

Palantir has a market value greater than RTX, Lockheed and Northrop individually. Going into its public offering, SpaceX has a market value of $1.25T. Collectively, the 3 “neo-primes” have a market value 3x that of the traditional “prime” defense contractors.

Are defense newcomers worth more than legacy contractors despite lower sales?

Core argument: Lockheed Martin, RTX and Northrop Grumman together generated roughly eight times the combined sales of Anduril, Palantir and SpaceX last year, with SpaceX and Palantir earning much of their revenue from customers other than the Pentagon.

Last year America’s three biggest legacy primes—Lockheed Martin, RTX and Northrop Grumman—between them generated around eight times the combined sales of the three newcomers (and SpaceX and Palantir make much of their money from customers other than the Pentagon). Even so, investors are bullish. The upstart trio are worth more than three times the three biggest legacy contractors, reflecting among other things optimism over their ability to shake up the arms industry. The price tag on the company partly reflects the record amounts of venture-capital money pouring into defence startups in America. The buzz is helped by President Donald Trump’s quixotic quest to have Congress boost the next fiscal year’s defence budget by more than two-fifths from its current level, to $1.5trn.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Lockheed Martin, RTX and Northrop Grumman together generated roughly eight times the combined sales of Anduril, Palantir and SpaceX last year, with SpaceX and Palantir earning much of their revenue from customers other than the Pentagon.
  2. Anduril, Palantir and SpaceX are worth more than three times the three biggest legacy defence contractors, reflecting among other things investor optimism about their ability to shake up the arms industry.
  3. Record amounts of venture-capital money are flowing into American defence startups, with the buzz helped by President Donald Trump's quest to have Congress raise the next fiscal year's defence budget by more than two-fifths, to $1.5trn.

Related Articles:

  • The Cold War and the U.S. Labor Market — The authors estimate that declining U.S. military procurement spending from the 1950s to the 1990s explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing employment and just under 10% of the rise in top-decile income inequality. They argue Cold War procurement raised demand for manufacturing workers and helped sustain tight labor markets for low-skill workers.
  • The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers — The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.

AI Summary. As university attendance has expanded, the average graduate has shifted from economic elite to norm, placing graduates lower in the socio-economic pecking order than graduates of the past. In both the UK and US, only 10% of graduates are in the lowest earnings quartile, but one in three ranks in the bottom bracket for earnings relative to expectations.

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
Date Posted:
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John Burn-Murdoch argues that the expansion of higher education has worsened the relative economic status of both graduates and non-graduates. “The average graduate shifts from being the elite to the norm,” and the non-graduate is “ever more disadvantaged.”

Does expanding university attendance leave graduates falling short of expectations?

Core argument: In both the UK and US, only 10% of graduates fall in the lowest earnings quartile, yet one in three ranks in the bottom bracket for earnings relative to reasonable expectations.

The expansion of higher education, while well intentioned and clearly beneficial in many aspects, has upset the balance between expectations and outcomes. The dynamic I’m talking about here is a much broader phenomenon [than the erosion of the graduate wage premium]. As more and more people go to university, the average graduate shifts from being among the economic elite to being the norm, placing them much further down the socio-economic pecking order than graduates of yesteryear. The result is that even though today’s young adults, and graduates in particular, are over-represented in the top quartile of the earnings distribution, they are also far more likely to be at the bottom than the top for earnings relative to reasonable expectations. In both the UK and US, even though only 10% of graduates are in the lowest earnings quartile, one in three is in the bottom bracket for earnings relative to expectations. As a larger share of youngsters go to university, those who don’t are an ever more disadvantaged slice of their generation.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In both the UK and US, only 10% of graduates fall in the lowest earnings quartile, yet one in three ranks in the bottom bracket for earnings relative to reasonable expectations.
  2. The expansion of higher education has shifted the average graduate from the economic elite to the norm, placing them further down the socio-economic pecking order than graduates of earlier generations.
  3. As a larger share of young people attend university, those who do not are an ever more disadvantaged slice of their generation.

Related Articles:

  • The Middle Class Is Shrinking Because of a Booming Upper-Middle Class — Analyses showing a shrinking middle class typically use relative income thresholds that rise with median income, so they can register decline even when living standards rise across the distribution. Using an absolute definition, the authors find the core middle class shrank because the upper-middle class grew from 10% of families to 31%, doubling its income share.
  • Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
  • Military Officer Quality in the All-Volunteer Force — The authors find a steady decline in U.S. Marine Corps officers' General Classification Test scores, which is statistically associated with the expansion of college attendance and explains 96% of the measured change. They also find a positive association between African American officers and mean test scores, arguing affirmative action has not lowered officer quality.

AI Summary. Florida's net domestic migration has slowed to a trickle as prime-working-age residents leave citing affordability and arrivals from other states decline. An influx of wealthy newcomers has helped drive up home prices, inflation in parts of the state outpaced the national average, home-insurance rates soared, and deaths began outnumbering births.

Arian Campo-Flores and Paul Overberg Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Florida’s migration patterns have changed. Outflows of workers aged less than 44 drove domestic out-migration in cities like Orlando, Naples and Panama City in 2024 as affordability declined. Deaths have outnumbered births in Florida since 2020.

Are rising living costs slowing a fast-growing state's population gains?

Core argument: Florida's net domestic migration has slowed to a trickle, as residents in their prime working years leave for other states citing affordability while arrivals from other states shrink.

Florida’s migration patterns are changing dramatically. Residents in their prime working years are heading to other states, often citing affordability concerns. At the same time, the stream of people arriving from other states is shrinking. Meanwhile, an influx of wealthy people from other states—turbocharged during the pandemic—has helped drive up home prices. Inflation in parts of Florida outpaced the national average over the past decade and home-insurance rates soared. Florida lost one driver of population growth when deaths began to outnumber births in the state in 2020. Large flows of immigration fueled gains for years, but have waned under the Trump administration’s hard-line policies. Despite the influx of wealth, net domestic migration—people arriving from other states minus those leaving to other states—has overall slowed to a trickle in the past few years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Florida's net domestic migration has slowed to a trickle, as residents in their prime working years leave for other states citing affordability while arrivals from other states shrink.
  2. Florida lost a driver of population growth in 2020 when deaths began to outnumber births, while large immigration flows that fueled gains for years have waned under the Trump administration's hard-line policies.
  3. An influx of wealthy arrivals from other states, turbocharged during the pandemic, has helped drive up Florida home prices, and inflation in parts of Florida outpaced the national average over the past decade as home-insurance rates soared.

Related Articles:

  • With Less Immigration, Urban Growth Slowed in 2025 — Census population estimates show urban counties growing more slowly than suburbs, smaller metropolitan areas, and rural areas, with all county types slowing as immigration fell and the slowdown especially sharp in urban counties. Domestic migration is driven more by affordability, with people leaving expensive urban counties for cheaper suburbs and smaller communities.
  • Where Americans Choose to Move and Where They Leave — County-level mapping of net domestic migration within the United States shows some counties gained net movers equal to 10% or more of their 2020 population while others lost an equivalent share, excluding international moves.
  • The Economic Geography Of The 2024 Elections — Counties where government transfer programs such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and unemployment insurance make up at least a quarter of personal income gave Trump 63% of the vote, while counties where transfers account for less than 15% gave Harris 56%. Transfers supplied 18% of total US personal income.

Tuesday, April 21, 2026

AI Summary. Employment among workers aged 22–24 in the most artificial-intelligence-exposed quintile of industry-state employers fell 15.2%, while other exposure quintiles were flat or posted modest gains. The decline is not generally observed among older workers; the 25-34 group's drop was less than one-third as large in percentage terms.

Lee Tucker U.S. Census Bureau
Date Posted:
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Using matched employer-employee data, Tucker finds a sharp 15.2% drop in employment of workers aged 22–24 (and a ~6% decline for workers aged 25–34) in the industry-state quintile most exposed to AI btw the rollout of ChatGPT in 2022q4 and 2025q2.

Is AI exposure reducing employment for the youngest workers?

Core argument: Employment of early career workers aged 22–24 in the most AI-exposed quintile of industry-state employers fell 15.2% from 2022q4 to 2025q2, while all other exposure quintiles were flat or posted modest gains.

Figure 3 provides a comparison of total employment among early career workers [those aged 22-24] across quintiles of industry-state AI exposure. It shows that early career employment in the most AI-exposed quintile of employers declined by 15.2% from the reference period of 2022q4 to 2025q2. All other quintiles either had flat employment or exhibited modest gains over the same period. This result is considerably larger than the 6% decline in employment among the most exposed workers as reported by Brynjolfsson, Chandar and Chen (2025). However, since I also find weaker employment growth among less-exposed quintiles, the unadjusted gap in employment growth is similar in magnitude. For example, although the result of Figure 3 is not regression adjusted, it is highly consistent with the 16% regression-adjusted relative decline in employment that Brynjolfsson et al. observe among the most exposed occupations in ages 22-24. Figure 4 [] compares most exposed quintile employment changes for early career workers against those of workers in four age bins of older workers. This figure demonstrates that the decline in employment of early career workers in AI-exposed industries is not generally observed among older workers. The 25-34 age group saw a substantial decline in employment over this period, but in percentage terms it was less than one third as large as that observed among ages 22-24.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Employment of early career workers aged 22–24 in the most AI-exposed quintile of industry-state employers fell 15.2% from 2022q4 to 2025q2, while all other exposure quintiles were flat or posted modest gains.
  2. The unadjusted 15.2% decline is consistent with the 16% regression-adjusted relative employment decline that Brynjolfsson, Chandar and Chen (2025) report among the most exposed occupations for ages 22–24.
  3. The employment decline in AI-exposed industries is not generally observed among older workers, and the 25–34 age group's percentage decline was less than one third as large as that for ages 22–24.

Related Articles:

  • AI and Jobs: The Final Word (Until the Next One) — Unemployment has risen by 0.30 percentage points for the fifth of workers most exposed to artificial intelligence, compared with 0.94 percentage points for the least exposed fifth, leaving no visible AI effect on jobs. The share of workers leaving the labor force within a year is lowest among the most AI-exposed workers and roughly flat.
  • Jobless Growth — Labor demand growth may be too weak to keep pace with even modest labor supply growth: the labor market is somewhat weaker than before the pandemic, job growth has turned negative outside healthcare, and firms are focused on using AI to cut labor costs. Economists estimate most employment losses in routine manual occupations since the 1970s occurred during recessions.
  • Looking for the Ladder — The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.

AI Summary. US travel agency employment tripled to about 340,000 by 2000, then fell roughly 60% from that peak after airlines cut ticket commissions and online booking platforms emerged. Remaining agents shifted toward high-end clients, and the travel agent labor force shrank as workers changed careers, leaving a 2.8% unemployment rate.

Ernie Tedeschi Stripe Economics
Date Posted:

A structural decline in demand for travel agents due to online platforms manifested as sharp upticks in sector unemployment in 2001 and 2008. As agents exited, unemployment fell to new lows; overall employment has fallen by 60% from its 2000 peak.

How did travel agents adjust to online booking platforms?

Core argument: Airlines cutting agent commissions on ticket sales in the early 1990s and the emergence of Expedia, Travelocity, and Priceline preceded a structural decline in travel agency employment that accelerated after the 2001 recession.

Between 1980 and 2000, travel agent jobs tripled, peaking at about 340,000. But then a prolonged structural decline set in: airlines began cutting agent commissions on ticket sales in the early 1990s; and internet platforms like Expedia, Travelocity, and Priceline emerged. In the wake of the 2001 recession, employment in the travel agency industry fell precipitously. By the eve of the Great Recession in 2007, there were already nearly 40% fewer workers in travel agencies than at their dot-com peak. Four years later, employment was at less than half of its peak, and today travel agency jobs are 60% lower. The remaining human travel agents pivoted sharply upmarket, offering high end clients services no algorithm could replicate - a shift that is reflected in wages. While travel agent employment has declined steadily, so has the travel agent labor force, indicating that many agents have changed careers since 2000. As a result, the unemployment rate of travel agents was just 2.8% in 2025, lower than typical even before the dot-com boom, though travel agent unemployment has become far more sensitive to economic downturns.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Airlines cutting agent commissions on ticket sales in the early 1990s and the emergence of Expedia, Travelocity, and Priceline preceded a structural decline in travel agency employment that accelerated after the 2001 recession.
  2. Travel agent unemployment was 2.8% in 2025, lower than typical even before the dot-com boom, as the travel agent labor force shrank alongside employment and remaining agents moved upmarket, a shift reflected in wages.

Related Articles:

  • Looking for the Ladder — The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
  • AI and the Fable of the ATMs — Bank tellers per branch fell steadily as automated teller machines spread, and total teller employment held up only because banking deregulation drove a rise in branch numbers; teller jobs are down nearly 40% from their peak. The author argues invoking this case for AI requires identifying an equivalent offsetting source of labor demand.
  • AI and Young-adult Jobs: The Real Mystery — Employment rates have declined for young adults both with and without college degrees, with non-degree holders faring marginally worse, and employment growth for young workers of all education levels has lagged that of other workers. Artificial intelligence can replace some lower-skilled jobs, but those jobs are too few to drive youth labor market weakness.

AI Summary. Chinese industries with the largest declines in fixed asset investment are also those with the largest increases in factory-gate producer prices, which the authors read as evidence that China's "anti-involution" campaign is curbing excess capacity and reflating manufacturing prices. If durable, this reflation would affect global prices through Chinese export prices.

Martin Lynge Rasmussen Money: Inside and Out
Date Posted:

Pointing at stable Chinese industrial production while fixed asset investment has declined, Martin Lynge Rasmussen argues that Xi’s anti-involution campaign launched in July 2025 may be driving reflation in the industrial sector.

Is China's campaign against excess capacity reflating manufacturing prices?

Core argument: Industry-level Chinese data show an R² of 0.43 between 2025 declines in fixed asset investment and Jan–Feb 2026 increases in producer prices, with a few outliers, according to the authors' analysis.

To gain confidence in the idea that the anti-involution campaign has contributed to a) the decline in fixed asset investment and, thereby, b) the increase in manufacturing PPI, we examined the correlation between industry-level investment trends in 2025 and PPI in Jan-Feb 2026. Except for a few outliers, there is a respectable relationship (R2 = 0.43) between investment and PPI: the industries that saw the largest declines in investment in 2025 are also those that have seen the largest increases in PPI in Jan-Feb 2026. This makes us rather confident in the hypothesized mechanism: the anti-involution campaign -> decline in fixed asset investment -> decline in excess capacity -> increase in manufacturing PPI. If durable, China’s reflation will have global repercussions, most directly via export prices, even if the precise impact is difficult to quantify. This contrasts with the common view outside China that US tariffs will lead to excess supply being dumped into other markets, putting downward pressure on global prices.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Industry-level Chinese data show an R² of 0.43 between 2025 declines in fixed asset investment and Jan–Feb 2026 increases in producer prices, with a few outliers, according to the authors' analysis.
  2. The authors argue the correlation supports a mechanism running from China's anti-involution campaign to lower fixed asset investment, reduced excess capacity, and higher manufacturing PPI.
  3. If durable, China's reflation would carry global repercussions, most directly via export prices though difficult to quantify, contrasting with the common view outside China that US tariffs will push excess supply into other markets and depress global prices.

Related Articles:

  • China Shock 2.0: The Flood Of High-Tech Goods That Will Change The World — China's record goods trade surplus surpassed $1tn, driven by fierce domestic competition among manufacturers that investors describe as malignant but that yields high-quality products at prices rivals struggle to match. European leaders have called the surge of high-tech Chinese goods an existential threat to their continent's manufacturing.
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
  • China’s Economy: Rightsizing 2025, Looking Ahead to 2026 — The authors argue China's official growth figures are inconsistent with ten consecutive quarters of deflation, estimating that real GDP is around 11% below official levels, with most of the adjustment in investment. That would imply a drop of roughly 9 percentage points in China's share of global investment, helping explain its export surge.

AI Summary. China's National Bureau of Statistics reported the jobless rate for 16-to-24-year-olds, excluding students, rose to 16.9% from 16.1%, while the rate for those aged 25 to 29 rose to 7.7% from 7.2%, and overall urban unemployment edged up to 5.4%. A record 12.7m students, about 4% more than the prior year, are expected to graduate.

Sylvia Ma South China Morning Post
Date Posted:

China’s youth unemployment (16–24) rose ~80pp to 16.9% in March as 12.7mm new graduates prepare to enter the labor force. The measure’s recent peaks were in August 2024 and August 2025 at just under ~19%.

Is China's youth unemployment rising as record graduate numbers enter the workforce?

Core argument: China's jobless rate for 16-to-24-year-olds excluding students rose to 16.9% in March from 16.1% in February, according to National Bureau of Statistics data.

The jobless rate for the 16-to-24 age group, excluding students, edged up to 16.9% in March from 16.1% in February, according to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics. And with a record 12.7 million students expected to graduate this summer – around 4% more than last year – market conditions are expected to tighten further in the coming months. The unemployment rate for those aged 25 to 29, also excluding students, stood at 7.7% in March, up from 7.2% in February and the highest figure for the age group since the metric’s introduction in December 2023. China’s overall urban-unemployment rate inched up to 5.4% in March, from 5.3% in February, official data showed.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's jobless rate for 16-to-24-year-olds excluding students rose to 16.9% in March from 16.1% in February, according to National Bureau of Statistics data.
  2. Unemployment among Chinese 25-to-29-year-olds excluding students climbed to 7.7% in March from 7.2% in February, the highest for the age group since the metric's introduction in December 2023.
  3. A record 12.7 million Chinese students are expected to graduate this summer, around 4% more than last year, with market conditions expected to tighten further.

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AI Summary. Japan removed most restrictions on weapons exports, allowing overseas arms sales for the first time since World War II in a move aimed at strengthening its defense industrial base. Previously, exports were limited to equipment for rescue, transport, warning, surveillance and minesweeping.

Alastair Gale Bloomberg
Date Posted:

Japan is scrapping export controls that restricted overseas arms sales. The change came just days after a new contract was signed between the Australian Navy and Mitsubishi Heavy for 11 frigates.

Is Japan lifting most weapons export restrictions to strengthen its defense industry?

Core argument: Japan removed most restrictions on weapons exports, allowing arms sales overseas for the first time since World War II, in a move aimed at strengthening its defense industrial base.

Japan removed most of its restrictions on weapons exports, allowing the nation to sell arms overseas for the first time since World War II in a move aimed at strengthening its defense industrial base. The cabinet of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi approved changes to defense export rules that will create a larger market for companies in the arms business. Previously, businesses could only export military equipment for use in operations related to rescue, transport, warning, surveillance and minesweeping. Unlike large defense-focused contractors in countries such as the UK and the US, Japan’s defense sector consists of a handful of manufacturing and technology conglomerates primarily focused on other businesses. For most, defense has long accounted for less than 20% of companywide revenue.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Japan removed most restrictions on weapons exports, allowing arms sales overseas for the first time since World War II, in a move aimed at strengthening its defense industrial base.
  2. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's cabinet approved defense export rule changes that will create a larger market for Japanese arms companies, which previously could only export equipment for rescue, transport, warning, surveillance and minesweeping operations.
  3. Japan's defense sector consists of a handful of manufacturing and technology conglomerates focused primarily on other businesses, with defense accounting for less than 20% of companywide revenue for most, unlike large defense-focused contractors in the UK and US.

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  • Japan PM Takaichi Vows To Boost Defense Spending To 2% of GDP by March — Japan plans to raise defense-related spending to 2% of gross domestic product in the fiscal year ending March 2026, two years ahead of the existing target date of March 2028. The government also set economic goals it says require no tax increases and prioritized domestic energy sources including nuclear power and Japanese-developed perovskite solar cells.
  • Japan Builds Up ‘Missile Archipelago’ Near Taiwan to Counter China — Japan is installing missile batteries, radar towers, ammunition storage and other combat facilities across the 160-island Ryukyu chain, whose southern end lies about 110km east of Taiwan. It is also deploying F-35 fighter jets and long-range missiles on Kyushu and expanding its amphibious rapid deployment force.
  • U.S. Seeks To ‘Integrate’ Japan Into Defense Industrial Base — The U.S. and Japan are formalizing arrangements for U.S. Navy warships to undergo maintenance, repair, and overhaul at Japanese private shipyards, initially limited to the roughly two dozen ships forward-deployed to Japan. Expanding the work to U.S.-based ships, which could ease American maintenance bottlenecks, may require congressional action.