Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, April 9, 2026

AI Summary. Estimates of the quantum computing power needed to run Shor's algorithm and break encryption have fallen from billions of qubits to a million, while existing machines have hundreds. Researchers have announced a design requiring only tens of thousands of qubits and an implementation of the algorithm 10x as efficient as the prior best.

Charlie Wood Quanta Magazine
Date Posted:

Two separate breakthroughs at Google and CalTech suggest the ability to run Shor’s algorithm, which would break the vast majority of current encryption, is a few years away. Google is planning on migrating to post-quantum cryptography by 2029.

Are quantum computers moving closer to breaking modern encryption?

Core argument: Caltech quantum physicists unveiled a design for a quantum computer that could break encryption with only tens of thousands of qubits, down from earlier estimates of billions and a more recent estimate of a million, and formed a company to build it.

For 30 years, Shor’s algorithm has been a security threat in theory only. Physicists initially estimated that they would need a colossal quantum machine with billions of qubits — the elements used in quantum calculations — to run it. That estimate has come down drastically over the years, falling recently to a million qubits. But it has still always sat comfortably beyond the modest capabilities of existing quantum computers, which typically have just hundreds of qubits. However, two different groups of researchers have just announced advances that notably reduce the gap between theoretical estimates and real machines. A star-studded team of quantum physicists at the California Institute of Technology went public with a design for a quantum computer that could break encryption with only tens of thousands of qubits and said that it had formed a company to build the machine. And researchers at Google announced that they had developed an implementation of Shor’s algorithm that is ten times as efficient as the best previous method.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Caltech quantum physicists unveiled a design for a quantum computer that could break encryption with only tens of thousands of qubits, down from earlier estimates of billions and a more recent estimate of a million, and formed a company to build it.
  2. Google researchers announced an implementation of Shor's algorithm that is ten times as efficient as the best previous method.
  3. Existing quantum computers typically have just hundreds of qubits, short of the estimates for running Shor's algorithm against encryption.

Related Articles:

  • An Old Problem Could Stop The U.S. From Leading On Quantum Computers — Many quantum computers depend on dilution refrigerators, produced by a few small firms in the US, Britain and Finland, and on critical minerals such as niobium, concentrated in Brazil, and tantalum, mined in Africa and mostly processed in China. China has announced mass production of a domestic dilution refrigerator and has been buying niobium mines.
  • Google Unveils Quantum Computing Breakthrough on Willow Chip — Google says its "Quantum Echoes" algorithm, run on its Willow quantum chip and detailed in a paper in Nature, is verifiable on other quantum computers and ran 13,000x faster than the world's best classical supercomputer. Google says the advance points to useful quantum applications in medicine and materials science within five years.
  • Google and IBM Believe First Workable Quantum Computer Is In Sight — IBM and Google each say they are on course to build an industrial-scale quantum computer by the end of the decade, with IBM publishing a blueprint filling in missing pieces from its earlier designs. The Pentagon's advanced research agency has begun studying quantum companies to identify which could reach practical size fastest.

AI Summary. Provisional data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention put the U.S. general fertility rate at a record low of 53.1 births per 1,000 women ages 15 to 44, with childbearing shifting toward older women. The total number of births held at roughly 3.6m for a sixth straight year.

Anthony DeBarros, Paul Overberg and Andrea Petersen Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

The US’s total fertility rate likely hit a record low of 1.57 in 2025, according to provisional CDC data. Childbearing continued to shift toward older women with the birthrate for American women 35–39 exceeding that of women 20–24 for the first time.

Why has the U.S. fertility rate fallen to a record low?

Core argument: The U.S. general fertility rate fell to a record low of 53.1 births per 1,000 women ages 15–44 in 2025, according to provisional CDC data, with childbearing continuing to shift toward older women.

The nation’s fertility rates hit record lows in 2025 as childbearing continued to shift toward older women, according to new federal data released Thursday. For the sixth straight year, the number of children born in the U.S. remained at roughly 3.6 million. The number of births per 1,000 women ages 15 to 44—the general fertility rate—reached a record low of 53.1 in 2025, according to provisional data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The rate has mostly headed down since 2007, a prerecession peak when millennial women started to enter their prime childbearing years. While non-Hispanic white women saw a small increase in births last year, births by women of other racial and ethnic groups declined slightly.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. general fertility rate fell to a record low of 53.1 births per 1,000 women ages 15–44 in 2025, according to provisional CDC data, with childbearing continuing to shift toward older women.
  2. The number of U.S. births held at roughly 3.6 million for the sixth consecutive year, even as the fertility rate has mostly declined since its 2007 prerecession peak, when millennial women began entering their prime childbearing years.
  3. Non-Hispanic white women saw a small increase in births in 2025, while births by women of other racial and ethnic groups declined slightly, according to the CDC data.

Related Articles:

  • The US Has One of the Highest Fertility Rates Among Peer Countries — The tempo-adjusted fertility rate, which accounts for shifts in the timing of births, shows the US rate falling since roughly 2009-10 and dropping below the 2.1 births-per-woman replacement level around 2017, reaching 1.82 in 2022. The US decline is less severe than in many peer countries.
  • The Eldest Millennials Had the Same Fertility as the Youngest Baby Boomers — Completed fertility for US women aged 41–44 has been stable for more than two decades, with the large decline having occurred earlier; among those with at least one native-born parent it averaged 1.88 children versus 1.87. What changed is timing: 30-year-old women averaged 1.34 children versus 0.98.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.

AI Summary. US labor force participation among women aged 25-54 has reached all-time highs, exceeding its previous 1999 peak, yet remains over 4 points below Europe's level and nearly 6 points below Japan's. About 3.5m prime-age American women are neither working nor looking for work, without children at home or husbands, compared with roughly 7m such men.

Nicholas Eberstadt American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Eberstadt finds as of the summer of 2025 ~7mm American men 25–54 were not in the labor force. Despite record high prime age female LFP, ~3.5mm prime age women are not working or looking for work, nor married or caring for children.

Does record female labor participation still leave room for improvement?

Core argument: US labor force participation for prime age women aged 25–54 reached all-time highs in 2023, exceeding its previous 1999 peak and inching slightly higher since.

Arguably the best performance of any major population group in the US workforce would be for prime age women, since the 25-54 female contingent has recently registered all-time highs, exceeding in 2023 its previous 1999 apex and inching slightly higher in the years since then. Even so: prime age female LFPRs in America in 2024 were distinctly below the corresponding levels in Europe (where they were over 4 points higher) and Japan (nearly 6 points higher). For even as workforce participation for American women 25-54 increases, we also see an ominous rise of the “prime age female dropout” women neither working nor looking for work, but also without children at home or husbands in the picture. This “prime age dropout” contingent accounts for about three and a half million women today—as against roughly seven million NILF (not in labor force) men—but it is growing exponentially, and the women in its ranks exhibit many of the same troubling proclivities of inactivity and pain medication consumption, according to self-reported BLS time use surveys.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US labor force participation for prime age women aged 25–54 reached all-time highs in 2023, exceeding its previous 1999 peak and inching slightly higher since.
  2. Prime age female labor force participation in the US in 2024 remained more than 4 points below Europe's level and nearly 6 points below Japan's, despite the American record highs.
  3. About 3.5 million American "prime age female dropouts" are neither working nor looking for work and have no children at home or husbands, against roughly 7 million men not in the labor force, with the female group growing exponentially.

Related Articles:

  • Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
  • Military Officer Quality in the All-Volunteer Force — The authors find a steady decline in U.S. Marine Corps officers' General Classification Test scores, which is statistically associated with the expansion of college attendance and explains 96% of the measured change. They also find a positive association between African American officers and mean test scores, arguing affirmative action has not lowered officer quality.
  • Post-Pandemic Recovery for America’s Prime Age Labor Force: A Tale of Two Sexes — Prime-age women's labor force participation climbed about 5 points above its pre-pandemic level over a decade, while prime-age men's rose barely a point, only just regaining pre-pandemic levels. Despite economic expansion and labor shortages, work rates for prime-age American men are barely as high as at the trough of the severe Reagan-era recession.

AI Summary. Bank of America deposit data show after-tax wage and salary growth for higher-income households rose to 5.6% year-over-year, widening the gap with middle- and lower-income households to the largest since the series began in 2015. The bank points to bonus growth as a likely driver, with higher-income households posting positive bonus growth while other cohorts' was negative.

David Michael Tinsley Bank of America
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Bank of America customer deposit data showed American “K-shaped” wage growth was extended in March with higher income households’ wage growth growing 5.6% y/y, while lower income households grew 1% y/y, the largest gap since 2015.

How unequal is after-tax wage growth across income groups?

Core argument: Bank of America deposit data shows higher-income households' after-tax wage and salary growth rose to 5.6% YoY in March from 4.2% in February, the highest for this cohort since August 2021.

Bank of America deposit data shows higher-income households’ after-tax wage and salary growth rose to 5.6% YoY in March, up from 4.2% YoY in February. This is the highest after-tax wage growth for this cohort since August 2021. There was also a rebound in middle- and lower-income households’ after-tax wage growth in March, to 2% and 1% YoY, respectively. But the gap between these cohorts’ and higher-income households’ wage growth still widened and is now the largest gap we’ve seen since the data series began in 2015. In our view, one driver of the current widening in after-tax wage growth between higher-income households and the other cohorts is likely bonus growth. An estimate of bonus growth based on Bank of America deposit data showed higher-income households saw solid positive growth over the first three months of 2026, while for middle- and lower-income households, bonus growth was negative. This divergence in bonus growth may fade as we move through the year (many higher-income households receive their bonuses in the early part of the year). But, even so, the persistence in the “K” shape between higher-income wage growth and other cohorts suggests underlying wage dynamics may continue to favor the higher-income group.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bank of America deposit data shows higher-income households' after-tax wage and salary growth rose to 5.6% YoY in March from 4.2% in February, the highest for this cohort since August 2021.
  2. Middle- and lower-income households' after-tax wage growth rebounded to 2% and 1% YoY in March, but the gap versus higher-income households widened to the largest since the data series began in 2015.
  3. Bank of America views bonus growth as a likely driver of the widening gap, with deposit data estimates showing solid positive bonus growth for higher-income households over the first three months of 2026 and negative growth for middle- and lower-income households.

Related Articles:

  • K-Shaped Economy? — Available spending data does not support the narrative of a bifurcated "K-shaped" consumer economy: surveys show households earning under $50,000 reported spending growth of 5%, versus 4.6% for those earning over $100,000. Government data show the top income decile's share of aggregate spending at 22.8%, down from 23.4% a year earlier.
  • Unprecedented ‘Jobless Boom’ Tests Limits of US Economic Expansion — Forecasters expect US gross domestic product to have expanded 2.7% over the year while employment barely grew, a divergence drawing comparisons to the "jobless recovery" that followed the early-2000s technology stock collapse. Unlike that episode, which began with a recession, this "jobless boom" is occurring without one — a first in the postwar era.
  • Is U.S. Wage Growth Slowing Or Not? — A slowdown in U.S. wage growth stems entirely from a sharp deceleration in the "private education and health services" sector, which employs one in four private-payroll workers and has historically tracked economy-wide wage trends. The slowdown would imply wage growth is no longer running faster than the pre-pandemic norm, a benign signal for inflation.

AI Summary. China's energy security rests on coal rather than imported oil and gas: the country consumes more than half the world's coal, and coal powers its industry and electricity system. Coal consumption has risen since 2022, with roughly 95GW of new coal capacity added in one year, exceeding Vietnam's entire installed electricity capacity.

Damien Ma Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Due to electrification, China’s energy security is not contingent on Hormuz. China is increasing its absolute coal generation capacity while coal’s share of domestic generation falls overall.

Does China's energy security depend on coal rather than oil imports?

Core argument: China added roughly 95GW of coal capacity in 2024, a decade high exceeding Vietnam's entire installed electricity capacity, with total coal consumption rising markedly since 2022 after Beijing's pivot to energy security following its domestic energy crisis.

[China's] energy security isn’t really tied to oil or gas, for which the country does depend on imports. It has always been inextricably linked to coal. China consumes more than half of the world’s coal, and it is the main commodity that powers Chinese industry and the electricity system. Total coal consumption has risen markedly since 2022, which aligns with the rebound in commissioned capacity resulting from Beijing’s hard pivot to energy security after the domestic energy crisis noted above. In 2024 alone, China added a staggering decade-high of ~95GW of coal capacity, which is larger than the entire installed electricity capacity of Vietnam. [While Chinese] solar power [has] achieved cost parity with coal, the country has a deep industrial base and a comprehensive electro-tech ecosystem that is intent on manufacturing a new energy landscape, or an “electro-state,” as some have come to call it. Peak coal is not only congruent with but is also a necessary condition for realizing this strategy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China added roughly 95GW of coal capacity in 2024, a decade high exceeding Vietnam's entire installed electricity capacity, with total coal consumption rising markedly since 2022 after Beijing's pivot to energy security following its domestic energy crisis.
  2. China consumes more than half of the world's coal, the main commodity powering its industry and electricity system, and its energy security is linked to coal rather than to imported oil and gas.
  3. Chinese solar power has reached cost parity with coal, and the country's industrial base and electro-tech ecosystem aim to build an "electro-state," a strategy for which peak coal is a necessary condition.

Related Articles:

  • The Real China Model — China generates more electricity annually than the United States and European Union combined, having added capacity equivalent to the United Kingdom's total supply each year. Electricity makes up nearly 30% of China's energy use, versus 22% in the US and 21% globally, and its share is growing about 6% a year.
  • Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026 — Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
  • Power Politics: Energy Self-Sufficiency in a Modern Mercantilist World — China leads in adding power to the grid, with more than 30,000 miles of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines versus zero in the US and lead times for large transformers of 48 weeks against a US average of 143 weeks. This positions China to accommodate new demand sources such as artificial intelligence.

Friday, April 10, 2026

AI Summary. Survey data show that after 2020 self-reported happiness fell across groups, compressing pre-existing differences — the black-white gap narrowed from 14 points to 6 — while the marital happiness premium of more than 30 points survived intact. Confidence in major public and private institutions declined nearly across the board, with double-digit drops common and losses spanning all parties and ideologies.

Sam Peltzman University of Chicago
Date Posted:

Peltzman documents a dramatic drop in US self-reported happiness in 2020, much of which persisted through 2024. Only those who are married maintain positive net happiness. A correlate is loss of faith in institutions, which “spared no party or ideology.”

How did happiness gaps and institutional confidence shift after 2020?

Core argument: The black-white happiness gap narrowed from 14 points before 2020 to 6 points after, part of a common pattern of post-Covid compression in pre-existing group differences.

Before 2020 there was a large black-white happiness differential, which had been narrowing gradually. This process accelerates after 2020 – from a 14-point difference before (light blue) to 6 points after 2020 (light red). Compression of pre-Covid differences [not limited to race] is a common pattern. Marital status is a glaring exception. There is no post-Covid compression at all. This large marital premium – upwards of 30 points – is a durable feature of all pre-2020 data, not just the 2010s. And this premium survives the post-Covid shock wholly intact (Figure 3 in gallery). Many aspects of family, social and political life were disrupted by the Covid pandemic. Perhaps the happiness crash is just one part, or a summary for, this wider disruption. I ask if other broad attitudinal measures also suffered Covid shocks. Table 5 focuses on institutions. It shows a striking, nearly across the board, post-Covid decline in confidence in significant public and private institutions. Here double-digit declines are common. The happiness crash spared no ideology or party (black bars).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The black-white happiness gap narrowed from 14 points before 2020 to 6 points after, part of a common pattern of post-Covid compression in pre-existing group differences.
  2. Marital status is the exception to post-Covid compression, with a marital happiness premium upwards of 30 points that is a durable feature of all pre-2020 data and survives the post-Covid shock intact.
  3. Confidence in significant public and private institutions fell nearly across the board after Covid, with double-digit declines common, and the happiness crash spared no ideology or party.

Related Articles:

  • Rising Young Worker Despair in the United States — In the United States, mental despair once peaked in middle age but now declines steadily with age, a shift the authors attribute to rising despair among workers under 40. The hump-shaped age pattern persists among those unemployed or unable to work, while it remains flat for homemakers, students, and retirees.
  • US College Students’ Well-Being — A study of US college students finds moderate-to-severe depression reported by 26% of students at one elite institution, 22% reporting moderate-to-severe anxiety and 10% contemplating suicide. Poorer mental health is associated with being female, little exercise, low grades, and financial aid; financial stress is associated with higher suicidal thoughts.
  • Teens Used To Be Happier. What Changed? — The share of US high school seniors describing themselves as "very happy" peaked at 24.8% and remained around 24.4% before falling to 11.4% at its low, recovering only to 12.7%, well below the 17.9% recorded before the pandemic. The decline coincided with smartphones and social media becoming pervasive.

AI Summary. 49% of 30-year-old US women had given birth to at least one child in 2024, down from 63% a decade earlier and 69% two decades earlier, while 88% of 45-year-old women were mothers, up from 84%. Demographers say fertility is unlikely to fully catch up to earlier decades' levels because conceiving becomes harder at older ages.

Claire Cain Miller New York Times
Date Posted:

Btw 1980 and 2000, US completed fertility fell from > 3 children per woman to < 2. As of 2024, 88% of 45-year-old women were mothers – up from 84% in 2004. Birth timing is delayed relative to 2000, but completed fertility has been ~ stable since 1995.

Does delayed childbearing still lead most women to become mothers?

Core argument: In 2024, 49% of women aged 30 had given birth to at least one child, down from 63% a decade earlier and 69% two decades earlier.

In 2024, the most recent year for which there is this data, 49% of women who were 30 had given birth to at least one child. By comparison, 63% of women who were 30 just a decade ago had had a child, and 69% of those who were 30 two decades ago. Yet today’s 45-year-olds, who are nearing the end of their childbearing years, are more likely to be mothers than women who were that age two decades ago. As of 2024, 88% of 45-year-old women were mothers, up from 84% in 2004. The question is whether the young women who aren’t having children now will eventually have them. If they follow the pattern of today’s 45-year-olds, the vast majority of them will. And surveys indicate that most of them want to. Still, demographers say it’s unlikely that fertility will fully catch up to the level of earlier decades. Women who plan to have children at older ages may not be able to, or may have fewer children than they planned, because it becomes harder to get pregnant.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In 2024, 49% of women aged 30 had given birth to at least one child, down from 63% a decade earlier and 69% two decades earlier.
  2. As of 2024, 88% of 45-year-old women were mothers, up from 84% in 2004.
  3. Demographers say fertility is unlikely to fully catch up to earlier decades' levels, because women who plan to have children at older ages may not be able to or may have fewer than planned.

Related Articles:

  • Why the U.S. Fertility Rate Has Hit a Record Low — Provisional data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention put the U.S. general fertility rate at a record low of 53.1 births per 1,000 women ages 15 to 44, with childbearing shifting toward older women. The total number of births held at roughly 3.6m for a sixth straight year.
  • The US Has One of the Highest Fertility Rates Among Peer Countries — The tempo-adjusted fertility rate, which accounts for shifts in the timing of births, shows the US rate falling since roughly 2009-10 and dropping below the 2.1 births-per-woman replacement level around 2017, reaching 1.82 in 2022. The US decline is less severe than in many peer countries.
  • The Eldest Millennials Had the Same Fertility as the Youngest Baby Boomers — Completed fertility for US women aged 41–44 has been stable for more than two decades, with the large decline having occurred earlier; among those with at least one native-born parent it averaged 1.88 children versus 1.87. What changed is timing: 30-year-old women averaged 1.34 children versus 0.98.

AI Summary. Slowing net immigration could cut US labor force growth so much that the breakeven pace of job creation falls to nearly zero — under 10,000 jobs a month — far below any point in the past 65 years. Monthly payroll declines as large as 100,000 would then not be unusual even with output at potential.

Seth Murray and Ivan Vidangos Federal Reserve Board
Date Posted:

Slow population growth due to the decline in net immigration and an aging workforce suggest breakeven employment growth is now likely “near-zero,” which implies negative job growth will be almost as likely as positive job growth in any given month.

Does lower immigration push breakeven job growth to near zero?

Core argument: The rapid slowing of net immigration may cut labor force growth enough that the breakeven pace of job creation falls to nearly zero, requiring fewer than 10,000 new jobs per month in 2026.

The rapid slowing of net immigration may translate into such a large drop in labor force growth that the breakeven pace could fall to nearly zero, requiring less than 10,000 new jobs per month in 2026. This near-zero pace of breakeven job growth is substantially lower than at any point in the past 65 years. One important implication of a near-zero breakeven pace is that, even if the output of the U.S. economy (GDP) is growing at the same pace as potential output (potential GDP), employment growth in any given month is almost as likely to be negative as it is to be positive. Furthermore, these negative prints of job growth could be large in any given month. The gray shaded area in Figure 2 shows the 90-percent confidence interval of total employment growth based on the BLS's estimate of the standard error of monthly payroll employment growth from their establishment survey. This 90-percent confidence interval implies that it would not be unusual for there to be one or more months in 2026 with declines in total payroll employment as large as -100,000 jobs, even if economic output was growing at the rate of potential output growth.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The rapid slowing of net immigration may cut labor force growth enough that the breakeven pace of job creation falls to nearly zero, requiring fewer than 10,000 new jobs per month in 2026.
  2. A near-zero breakeven pace would be substantially lower than at any point in the past 65 years, and it implies that monthly employment growth is almost as likely to be negative as positive even when GDP grows at the rate of potential output.
  3. The 90-percent confidence interval derived from the BLS establishment survey's estimated standard error implies that monthly payroll declines as large as 100,000 jobs in 2026 would not be unusual even with output growing at the rate of potential output.

Related Articles:

  • Break-Even Employment Declines As Unauthorized Immigration Outflows Continue — Net outflows of unauthorized immigrants have lowered the break-even rate of U.S. payroll growth needed to hold the unemployment rate steady, so smaller job gains that once signalled economic slack are now consistent with a balanced labor market. Recent payroll growth has slightly exceeded that break-even rate on average.
  • Macroeconomic Implications Of Immigration Flows In 2025 And 2026: January 2026 Update — The authors estimate that job growth consistent with full employment was 20,000–50,000 a month in the second half of 2025, while reported nonfarm payroll growth averaged about 14,500 and unemployment rose 0.3 percentage points. They project immigration policy changes will keep potential employment growth low, reducing GDP growth by roughly 0.2 percentage points in 2025 and 0.1 in 2026.
  • What Sweeping Revisions and a Blowout Month Tell Us About the U.S. Job Market — Labor Department revisions lowered previously estimated job gains for the past two calendar years, cutting the combined net change in construction, manufacturing, and retail by 115,000 jobs. Healthcare added about 437,000 jobs and social assistance about 321,000 over 12 months, while all other private-sector jobs combined shrank.

AI Summary. The US Treasury and Federal Reserve convened Wall Street leaders over concerns that Anthropic's Mythos artificial intelligence model and similar systems could usher in an era of greater cyber risk. The meeting aimed to ensure banks are aware of the possible risks and are taking precautions to defend their systems.

Todd Gillespie, Katanga Johnson, Hannah Levitt, and Sridhar Natarajan Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The CEOs of the major American banks met with Scott Bessent and Jerome Powell this week to discuss managing the cybersecurity threat posed by Anthropic’s new Mythos model.

Do advanced AI models raise cybersecurity risks for banks?

Core argument: Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell summoned Wall Street leaders to an urgent meeting at Treasury headquarters in Washington over concerns that Anthropic's latest artificial intelligence model will usher in an era of greater cyber risk.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell summoned Wall Street leaders to an urgent meeting on concerns that the latest artificial intelligence model from Anthropic will usher in an era of greater cyber risk. Bessent and Powell assembled the group at Treasury’s headquarters in Washington on Tuesday to make sure banks are aware of possible future risks raised by Anthropic’s Mythos and potential similar models, and are taking precautions to defend their systems, according to people familiar with the matter who asked not to be identified citing the private discussions.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell summoned Wall Street leaders to an urgent meeting at Treasury headquarters in Washington over concerns that Anthropic's latest artificial intelligence model will usher in an era of greater cyber risk.
  2. Bessent and Powell convened the bank leaders to ensure they are aware of possible future risks raised by Anthropic's Mythos and potential similar models, and are taking precautions to defend their systems.

Related Articles:

  • Anthropic Claims Its New A.I. Model, Mythos, Is a Cybersecurity ‘Reckoning’ — Anthropic says its Claude Mythos Preview model can autonomously conduct security research, including finding and exploiting previously unknown software flaws, often prompted by amateurs. The company claims the model has identified thousands of bugs across major operating systems and browsers, including a 27-year-old flaw in the OpenBSD operating system.
  • Anthropic and Alignment — Designating an AI company a supply-chain risk would be devastating because it depends on cloud hosting from Amazon, Microsoft, and Google, all of which hold US defense contracts, though such authority appears limited to work covered by US government contracts. The author argues governments have incentive to destroy any private firm that dictates terms to their military.
  • Clawed — The US Department of War threatened to designate the artificial intelligence company Anthropic as a supply-chain risk after it refused to accept the government's terms on how its technology may be deployed. The author argues this treats a domestic company like a foreign adversary for expressing different views and making its own decisions about the use of its property.

AI Summary. Elite artificial intelligence researchers have left US firms including Google DeepMind and OpenAI for Chinese companies such as ByteDance, Tencent, and Alibaba. Three China- and San Francisco-based headhunters say they relocated more than 30 US-based researchers to China over 12 months, up from low single digits the prior year.

Zijing Wu Financial Times
Date Posted:

Several high-profile AI researchers have left Google and OpenAI for Chinese firms in recent months. A Tsinghua University official said ~20% of engineering graduates apply to PhDs in the US, down from ~50% prior to the pandemic.

Is China drawing top AI researchers home from the US?

Core argument: Three AI-focused headhunters based in China and San Francisco say they helped hire and relocate more than 30 US-based researchers to China over the past 12 months, up from a low single-digit figure a year earlier.

Over the past 12 months, a wave of elite engineering and scientific talent has returned from the US to Chinese shores. Wu Yonghui, who gave up a senior role at Google DeepMind to lead ByteDance’s push into next-generation large language models, and Yao Shunyu, who left OpenAI to anchor Tencent’s AI development, have returned in the past year. Other returnees include Roger Jiang, a senior scientist who left OpenAI to found his own robotics start-up in Shenzhen, and Zhou Hao, a researcher Alibaba poached from Google DeepMind to refine models. Three AI-focused headhunters based in China and San Francisco say they helped hire and relocate more than 30 US-based researchers to China in the past 12 months, versus a low single-digit a year earlier.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Three AI-focused headhunters based in China and San Francisco say they helped hire and relocate more than 30 US-based researchers to China over the past 12 months, up from a low single-digit figure a year earlier.
  2. Wu Yonghui gave up a senior role at Google DeepMind to lead ByteDance's push into next-generation large language models, and Yao Shunyu left OpenAI to anchor Tencent's AI development.
  3. Roger Jiang, a senior scientist, left OpenAI to found a robotics start-up in Shenzhen, and Alibaba poached researcher Zhou Hao from Google DeepMind to refine models.

Related Articles:

  • China and the Future Of Science — China graduates about 5x as many medical and biomedical students as the US each year, 7x as many engineers, and nearly double the number of science and engineering PhDs, while one-sixth to one-fifth of US science and engineering graduates are themselves Chinese. One study found returning Chinese scientists lead-author 2.5x more papers than peers who stay in the US.
  • Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire — Regrouping US college majors to match Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science and engineering to humanities and social sciences, the same ratio as in China. The author argues America's building slowdown reflects structural economic shifts—urbanization reached 70% by 1960 and 85% by 2020, shifting needs toward maintenance—rather than a lawyerly culture.
  • The Global AI Talent Tracker 2.0 — The United States remains the leading destination for the world's most elite AI talent and hosts 60% of top AI institutions. China's share of top AI researchers working domestically rose from 29% in 2019 to 47% in 2022, and India retained one-fifth of its top AI researchers in 2022 versus nearly none in 2019.