Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, March 25, 2026

AI Summary. A study of a large public urban university system finds that high school grade point average is a far stronger predictor of student academic success than SAT scores, contrasting with analyses of highly selective colleges that found the SAT superior. Under-represented minority students were less likely to graduate within six years at every grade point average level.

Theodore Joyce, Mina Afrouzi Khosroshahi, Sarah Truelsch, Kerstin Gentsch, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
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SAT scores are known to be better predictors of college and post-college success in Ivy+ universities. By contrast, this study of a public urban university system with 11 colleges shows that for the 2010–2019 cohort, high school GPA strongly dominates SAT scores.

Do high school grades predict college success better than test scores?

Core argument: In a study of 2010–2019 cohorts at a large public urban university system, high school GPA predicts student academic success far better than the SAT, contrary to analyses of Ivy-plus colleges that found the SAT superior.

Many of the country’s most selective colleges have returned to requiring the SAT, based on evidence that the test not only predicts student success, but facilitates the identification of qualified applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds. The results from our study of a large public urban university system find the opposite: high school grades are a vastly superior predictor of student academic success than is the SAT. We undertake an exercise with binned scatter plots of six year graduation rates against HSGPA [High School Grade Point Average] stratified by URM [under-represented minority] and whether the student received the maximum Pell grant (Figures 1a and 1b). [Note that SAT is included in the regression so the monotonic linear effect of GDP remains after controlling for SAT score]. We find that URM are less likely to graduate in six years at every level of HSGPA than are non-URM. In contrast, we find no similar difference when we stratify the plot by whether the student received the max Pell grant or not, a strong proxy for a low-income household (Figure 1b). The clear takeaway from the analysis of the 2010-2019 cohorts is the dominance of HSGPA in predicting student academic success. The results are in direct contrast to recent high-profile analyses of students from Ivy-plus colleges that demonstrated the superiority of SAT over HSGPA in predicting not only first-year academic outcomes, but post-college success as well.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In a study of 2010–2019 cohorts at a large public urban university system, high school GPA predicts student academic success far better than the SAT, contrary to analyses of Ivy-plus colleges that found the SAT superior.
  2. Binned scatter plots of six-year graduation rates against high school GPA, controlling for SAT score, show under-represented minority students are less likely to graduate in six years at every level of high school GPA than non-URM students.
  3. Stratifying six-year graduation rates by receipt of the maximum Pell grant, a proxy for a low-income household, shows no similar gap to the one found between under-represented minority and non-URM students.

Related Articles:

  • Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges — Children from top-1% families are more than 2x as likely as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores to attend an Ivy-Plus college, with two-thirds of the gap attributable to higher admissions rates. The authors attribute this advantage to legacy preferences, weight on non-academic credentials, and athlete recruitment.
  • Military Officer Quality in the All-Volunteer Force — The authors find a steady decline in U.S. Marine Corps officers' General Classification Test scores, which is statistically associated with the expansion of college attendance and explains 96% of the measured change. They also find a positive association between African American officers and mean test scores, arguing affirmative action has not lowered officer quality.
  • Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.

AI Summary. An analysis of Federal Reserve data estimates about 430,000 U.S. households are worth $30m or more, including roughly 74,000 worth at least $100m, with growth in the number of very rich households outpacing overall population growth over recent decades. Nearly 72% of the top 0.1%'s wealth consists of corporate equities, mutual fund shares, and private businesses.

Rachel Louise Ensign Wall Street Journal
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At the end of 2022, ~430,000 American households had a net worth of at least $30mm, of which ~74,000 were worth $100mm or more. As of Q3 2025, ~72% of the top .1 percent’s wealth consisted of equities, mutual fund shares and private businesses.

How many U.S. households are worth $30 million or more?

Core argument: About 430,000 U.S. households are worth $30 million or more, including roughly 74,000 worth $100 million or more, according to Princeton economist Owen Zidar's analysis of Federal Reserve data.

There are about 430,000 U.S. households worth $30 million or more, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by Owen Zidar, a Princeton economics professor. Within that, there are about 74,000 worth $100 million or more. Over the past few decades, the growth in the number of very rich households has surpassed general population growth. Wealth measures a household’s assets, like stocks, bank accounts and home equity, minus liabilities like mortgages, car loans and credit-card debt. For the top 0.1%, nearly 72% of their wealth is made up of corporate equities, mutual fund shares and private businesses, according to the Fed. The S&P 500 has more than tripled in the past decade. And many private businesses have seen valuations rise, too.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. About 430,000 U.S. households are worth $30 million or more, including roughly 74,000 worth $100 million or more, according to Princeton economist Owen Zidar's analysis of Federal Reserve data.
  2. Nearly 72% of the wealth of the top 0.1% consists of corporate equities, mutual fund shares and private businesses, according to the Federal Reserve, and the S&P 500 has more than tripled in the past decade.
  3. The number of very rich U.S. households has grown faster than the general population over the past few decades, with wealth measured as assets such as stocks, bank accounts and home equity minus liabilities including mortgages, car loans and credit-card debt.

Related Articles:

  • Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century — Most income at the top of the US distribution is non-wage income, primarily profits from closely-held, mid-market firms in skill-intensive industries owned by working-age individuals. The authors find private business profit falls by three-quarters after an owner retires or dies prematurely, indicating most top earners are "working rich" deriving income from human capital.
  • Meet the ‘Stealthy Wealthy’ Who Make Their Money the Boring Way — Owning a medium-size regional business — auto dealerships, beverage distributors, grocery stores, dental practices, law firms — is the largest source of income for the top 1% of US earners. Analysis of anonymized tax data finds such business ownership generated 34.9% of top 1% income in 2022, up from 30.3% in 2014, and 43.1% for the top 0.1%.
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.

AI Summary. Oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz are projected to stay at just 5% of normal levels for six weeks before a gradual one-month recovery. The authors expect the resulting supply shock to prompt policymakers to rebuild strategic reserves and markets to price a security premium into long-dated oil.

Daan Struyven, Yulia Zhestkova Grigsby and Alexandra Paulus Goldman Sachs
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Goldman’s base case forecast now has Brent averaging $110 across March/April and $115 in April, with Hormuz flows at 5% of normal levels through April 10th.

Will a prolonged shipping disruption keep oil prices elevated longer?

Core argument: The analysts now expect Strait of Hormuz flows to stay at 5% of normal levels for 6 weeks, through April 11, before a gradual 1-month recovery, versus their prior assumption of 10% for 3 weeks.

We now expect Hormuz flows to remain at only 5% of normal levels for a longer period totaling 6 weeks (vs. 10% for 3 weeks prior) before a gradual 1-month recovery. We previously laid out three theoretical paths for a pick-up in Hormuz flows: 1) Iran allowing safe passage of tankers with certain origins/destinations (e.g. China, India, Japan), 2) conflict de-escalation, and 3) military protection for tankers. While the uncertainty about the duration of disruptions remains high, the 6-weeks assumption for peak Hormuz disruptions sits between a) the 4 to 6 weeks range for the military operation cited by US policymakers and b) the median length of the conflict currently reflected in prediction markets. Because our 6-weeks (i.e. 5% of normal flows till April 11) assumption corresponds to SoH flows edging up above 5% and because Iran already allows some selective passage, SoH flows are likely to exceed 5% before the conflict ends. The largest oil supply shock ever will likely lead policymakers and markets to recognize the structural risks from the high concentration of production and spare capacity in the Middle East and from the vulnerability of energy infrastructure. Specifically, we now expect policymakers to rebuild higher strategic reserve levels after reopening of the Strait and markets to build a security premium in long-dated prices.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The analysts now expect Strait of Hormuz flows to stay at 5% of normal levels for 6 weeks, through April 11, before a gradual 1-month recovery, versus their prior assumption of 10% for 3 weeks.
  2. The 6-week peak-disruption assumption sits between the 4–6 week range for the military operation cited by US policymakers and the median conflict length reflected in prediction markets.
  3. The analysts expect the oil supply shock to prompt policymakers to rebuild higher strategic reserve levels after the Strait reopens and markets to build a security premium into long-dated prices.

Related Articles:

  • Pandora’s Bog: The Global Energy Shock of 2026 — Gulf liquefied natural gas is only 3% of global gas consumption, but because commodity prices are set at the margin, its loss pushes gas import prices higher in Europe and Asia as China, Korea, India and Pakistan seek replacement supplies on the spot market. Undamaged Qatari facilities would need 3-4 months to reach full loading.
  • You Can’t Print Molecules — Rebuilding after a disruption to a key shipping strait would require governments to finance defense, strategic reserves, domestic energy production, and infrastructure at the same time that inflation expectations are raising funding costs. The author argues capital will rotate out of asset-light sectors that thrived on open sea lanes and cheap energy into asset-heavy physical ones.
  • Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026 — Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.

AI Summary. Increases in long-term US government bond yields have been driven almost entirely by real interest rates, as measured by inflation-protected yields, rather than by long-term inflation expectations. One explanation is a rising term premium, with investors demanding extra yield on long bonds if they expect greater inflation volatility or weaker diversification against stocks.

Robert Armstong Financial Times
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Since the start of the War, real yields on 30-year TIPS have risen; breakeven inflation has not. This real rate premium at the long end is likely to be compensation for long-term inflation risk and/or increased correlation of bond and equity returns.

Are real rates, not inflation expectations, driving long-term yields?

Core argument: The rise in long-term US yields is almost entirely attributable to real interest rates, as proxied by inflation-protected yields, rather than to long-term inflation expectations.

Short-term sovereign bond yields have risen a lot since the start of the war as traders anticipate fewer central bank interest rate cuts or even rate increases. That financial logic is pretty clear. The long end of the yield curve has risen meaningfully too, however, and that logic is trickier. What is driving up the long end is not long-term inflation expectations; it’s almost entirely real interest rates, as proxied by inflation-protected yields. Here are 30-year US real rates and break-even inflation. Why should the war in Iran and the attendant energy crisis have this effect (if the war is in fact what is at work here)? One natural explanation is that the term premium — the extra yield investors earn for owning long-duration bonds — is rising over and above the expected path of short-term interest rates. There are several ways of thinking about this. It could be that investors are demanding more yield for owning long bonds because they think inflation volatility will be higher in the future. The higher real rates are a margin of safety. Or it could be that in a world with more inflationary incidents, bonds become a worse diversifier of equities; that is, they are more likely to fall at the same time stocks do. So investors require a higher return to own them.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The rise in long-term US yields is almost entirely attributable to real interest rates, as proxied by inflation-protected yields, rather than to long-term inflation expectations.
  2. Short-term sovereign bond yields have risen substantially since the war began as traders anticipate fewer central bank rate cuts or even rate increases.
  3. One explanation offered for the higher long end is a rising term premium, with investors demanding more yield either because they expect greater future inflation volatility or because bonds become a worse diversifier of equities.

Related Articles:

  • War Cost Sinks Long-Term Government Bonds on Deficit Worries — Investor concern that the Iran war will raise government spending and widen budget deficits has triggered a selloff in long-term government bonds, pushing the 30-year US Treasury yield near 4.90% and lifting yields from the UK and Germany to Australia and Japan. A global borrowing wave could further pressure the $31tn US Treasury market.
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • $14 Trillion in IG Supply Coming to the Market — About $14tn of investment-grade fixed income supply is coming to market, combining roughly $10tn of US government debt to be refinanced over the next 12 months, a budget deficit near $2tn, and about $2tn of gross corporate bond issuance boosted by data-center builders. The author argues this growing supply is putting upward pressure on interest rates and credit spreads.

AI Summary. Volkswagen is in talks with Israel's Rafael Advanced Defence Systems to convert its Osnabrück car plant to make Iron Dome air-defence components, including missile-carrying trucks, launchers and generators, but not the missiles themselves. Rafael plans a separate German site for missiles and hopes to sell Iron Dome to European governments.

Laura Pitel, Anne-Sylvaine Chassany and Sebastien Ash Financial Times
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Volkswagen may convert some production lines from cars to heavy-duty trucks for Israel’s Rafael, the primary contractor behind the Iron Dome system. Rafael is planning on setting up a separate production facility for missile production in Germany.

Are carmakers converting idle auto plants into air-defence production sites?

Core argument: Volkswagen is in talks with Israel's Rafael Advanced Defence Systems to convert its Osnabrück plant from car production to making Iron Dome components, including heavy-duty missile-carrying trucks, launchers and electricity generators.

Volkswagen is in talks with Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defence Systems over a deal that would switch production at one of the German group’s factories from cars to missile defence. The two companies plan to convert the embattled Osnabrück plant to make components for the Israeli state-owned group’s Iron Dome air defence system, according to people familiar with the plan. Under the plans, the Osnabrück factory would make various Iron Dome parts, including the heavy-duty trucks that carry the system’s missiles as well as launchers and electricity generators. But it would not produce the projectiles themselves. Rafael plans to set up a separate production facility in Germany for the system’s missiles, which must be handled on a specialist site. The company hopes to sell the Iron Dome system to governments across Europe including Germany, as countries strengthen their air defences as part of a large-scale rearmament in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Germany last year took delivery of the first of three batteries of the Israeli Arrow 3 air defence system, made by another Israeli company, Israel Aerospace Industries.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Volkswagen is in talks with Israel's Rafael Advanced Defence Systems to convert its Osnabrück plant from car production to making Iron Dome components, including heavy-duty missile-carrying trucks, launchers and electricity generators.
  2. The Osnabrück factory would not produce Iron Dome projectiles, and Rafael plans a separate German facility for the system's missiles, which must be handled on a specialist site.
  3. Rafael hopes to sell the Iron Dome system to European governments including Germany, which has taken delivery of the first of three batteries of the Arrow 3 air defence system made by Israel Aerospace Industries.

Related Articles:

  • European Manufacturing Misery? Some Sectors Have Never Had It So Good — Eurozone industrial production fell 1.2% year on year, with chemical output down 6.6%, while production of weapons and ammunition rose 31% to a record high and aerospace output rose 15%, indicating a split between energy-intensive sectors and defense-linked manufacturing.
  • The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers — The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.
  • Waking the Sleeping European Giant — Europe, at roughly 500m people and a $26tn economy with world-class aerospace, shipbuilding, pharmaceutical, vehicle and weapons manufacturers, has the material basis to be a military superpower. National militaries' preference for home-country suppliers has left subscale defense firms, and common procurement could raise output and lower unit costs.

Thursday, March 26, 2026

AI Summary. The authors argue Japan's prolonged recession reflected the interplay of slowing returns to investment, weak consumption, and negative sentiment, and that China is in the middle stages of a multi-year real estate correction under more difficult macroeconomic and demographic conditions. They note China retains advantages, including a state-dominated financial system with implicit government guarantees capable of large-scale intervention.

Kenneth Rogoff and Yuanchen Yang Brookings Papers On Economic Activity
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The deep recession after Japan’s 1990–1991 real estate crash saw low returns on investment, soft consumption and weak sentiment. After its property bust, China shows many parallels, but strong productivity and state-backed finance are potential cushions.

Is China's property correction following Japan's post-bubble path?

Core argument: China appears to be in the middle stages of a multi-year real estate correction, with structural and cyclical features resembling Japan's pre- and post-bubble conditions, though China's adjustment is unfolding in a more difficult macroeconomic and demographic context.

Japan’s prolonged recession was likely driven by the interplay of slowing returns to investment, soft consumption, and negative sentiment that reinforced these weaknesses. With some structural and cyclical characteristics closely resembling Japan’s pre- and post-bubble conditions, China appears to be in the middle stages of a multi-year correction. China’s post-boom adjustment is unfolding in a more difficult macroeconomic and demographic context than Japan’s. That said, China still possesses several economic and institutional advantages that could help cushion the blow of a prolonged real estate downturn. In Japan’s post-bubble era, the country’s productivity growth was considered a binding constraint, a factor that does not appear to limit China in the same way. Most crucially, China possesses a state-dominated financial system backed by implicit government guarantees and a highly proactive policymaking apparatus capable of large-scale interventions, which have thus far prevented the crisis from precipitating a financial sector breakdown.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China appears to be in the middle stages of a multi-year real estate correction, with structural and cyclical features resembling Japan's pre- and post-bubble conditions, though China's adjustment is unfolding in a more difficult macroeconomic and demographic context.
  2. China's state-dominated financial system, backed by implicit government guarantees and a proactive policymaking apparatus capable of large-scale interventions, has thus far prevented its real estate crisis from precipitating a financial sector breakdown.
  3. Japan's prolonged recession was likely driven by the interplay of slowing returns to investment, soft consumption, and negative sentiment, with productivity growth considered a binding constraint that does not appear to limit China in the same way.

Related Articles:

  • Peak China Housing — Real estate and related industries account for roughly 29% of China's GDP, a level of dependence the authors estimate exceeds that of Ireland and Spain before their financial crises. A 20% decline in housing activity could reduce economic output by 5-10%.
  • China Debt Overhang Leads To Rising Share Of ‘Zombie’ Firms — Firm-level data indicate the share of Chinese non-financial firms' assets held by "zombie" companies — those whose operating earnings fall short of their interest expenses — rose from 5% to 16% between 2018 and 2024, with real estate highest at 40%, services at 17% and manufacturing at 11%.
  • China’s Economy: Rightsizing 2025, Looking Ahead to 2026 — The authors argue China's official growth figures are inconsistent with ten consecutive quarters of deflation, estimating that real GDP is around 11% below official levels, with most of the adjustment in investment. That would imply a drop of roughly 9 percentage points in China's share of global investment, helping explain its export surge.

AI Summary. Inflation across the G20 is projected to run 1.2 percentage points higher than previously expected at 4% before easing to 2.7% the following year, while core inflation in G20 advanced economies is anticipated to weaken from 2.6% to 2.3%. These projections assume energy market disruption moderates, with oil, gas and fertiliser prices declining gradually.

OECD Staff Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
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The OECD projects US headline inflation of 4.2% this year, up 1.2pp from their December projection and 1.6pp above 2025’s 2.6%, due to the energy shock from the Iran War. Their core inflation projection is unchanged at 3%, up from 2.8% last year.

Will global inflation ease as energy price pressures fade?

Core argument: G20 inflation is projected at 4% in 2026, 1.2 percentage points higher than previously expected, before easing to 2.7% in 2027 as energy price pressures are assumed to fade.

G20 inflation is projected to be 1.2 percentage points higher than previously expected in 2026 at 4%, before easing to 2.7% in 2027 with an assumed fading of energy price pressures. Core inflation in the G20 advanced economies is anticipated to weaken from 2.6% in 2026 to 2.3% in 2027. These projections are conditional on a technical assumption that the current extent of energy market disruption moderates over time, with oil, gas and fertiliser prices declining gradually from mid-2026 onwards.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. G20 inflation is projected at 4% in 2026, 1.2 percentage points higher than previously expected, before easing to 2.7% in 2027 as energy price pressures are assumed to fade.
  2. Core inflation in the G20 advanced economies is anticipated to weaken from 2.6% in 2026 to 2.3% in 2027.
  3. The inflation projections are conditional on a technical assumption that energy market disruption moderates, with oil, gas and fertiliser prices declining gradually from mid-2026 onwards.

Related Articles:

  • High Prices and Upside Risks for Longer — Oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz are projected to stay at just 5% of normal levels for six weeks before a gradual one-month recovery. The authors expect the resulting supply shock to prompt policymakers to rebuild strategic reserves and markets to price a security premium into long-dated oil.
  • You Can’t Print Molecules — Rebuilding after a disruption to a key shipping strait would require governments to finance defense, strategic reserves, domestic energy production, and infrastructure at the same time that inflation expectations are raising funding costs. The author argues capital will rotate out of asset-light sectors that thrived on open sea lanes and cheap energy into asset-heavy physical ones.
  • Pandora’s Bog: The Global Energy Shock of 2026 — Gulf liquefied natural gas is only 3% of global gas consumption, but because commodity prices are set at the margin, its loss pushes gas import prices higher in Europe and Asia as China, Korea, India and Pakistan seek replacement supplies on the spot market. Undamaged Qatari facilities would need 3-4 months to reach full loading.

AI Summary. Disruption to fertilizer supplies could raise grain prices mainly by cutting grain output, through yield losses from delayed or sub-optimal nitrogen application and shifts toward less fertilizer-intensive crops; fertilizer accounts for about 20% of grain costs. Regions with later crop calendars, such as Europe and the Southern Hemisphere, are more exposed than the US.

Lina Thomas and Daan Struyven Goldman Sachs
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More than 25% of the global nitrogen fertilizer trade, which accounts for 60% of global fertilizer use, passed through the Strait of Hormuz. GS projects grain supply will decline as farmers shift to less fertilizer-intensive crops like soybeans.

How do fertilizer supply disruptions raise global grain prices?

Core argument: Fertilizer accounts for roughly 20% of grain costs, so higher fertilizer prices may feed into grain prices, though the larger potential boost to grain prices is more likely to come from reduced grain supply.

While higher fertilizer prices may eventually feed into grain prices -- given fertilizer accounts for ~20% of grain costs -- the largest potential boost to grain prices is more likely to come from reduced grain supply. Fertilizer disruptions may reduce grain production both through yield losses from delayed/sub-optimal nitrogen application, and potential acreage shifts toward less fertilizer-intensive crops. While the US is currently relatively insulated--because the conflict began just ahead of the planting season, by which point most farmers likely already secured fertilizers--more exposed regions such as Europe, Australia and the Southern Hemisphere, where crop calendars are later, could increase demand for US grain exports if fertilizer disruptions persist, raising US grain prices too.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Fertilizer accounts for roughly 20% of grain costs, so higher fertilizer prices may feed into grain prices, though the larger potential boost to grain prices is more likely to come from reduced grain supply.
  2. Fertilizer disruptions may reduce grain production through yield losses from delayed or sub-optimal nitrogen application and through potential acreage shifts toward less fertilizer-intensive crops.
  3. The US is relatively insulated because the conflict began just ahead of planting season, by which point most farmers had likely already secured fertilizer, while Europe, Australia and the Southern Hemisphere have later crop calendars and greater exposure.

Related Articles:

  • Why is Xi Jinping Building Secret Commodity Stockpiles? — China's commodity imports rose 16% in volume terms with record imports of many basic resources, while state statisticians have stopped publishing stock data for many commodities. The US Department of Agriculture projects China will hold 51% of world wheat stocks and 67% of maize stocks, and the country's crude-oil storage capacity has grown from 1.7bn to 2bn barrels.
  • China Expands Farmland In Bid To Cut Foreign Food Reliance — China has set a target of maintaining 120mn hectares of cultivated land, a level Beijing views as necessary for food self-sufficiency, and has reclaimed more than 170,000 hectares of farmland in a drive to cut reliance on imported food. Analysts say the effort reflects preparation for a scenario in which confrontation with the US disrupts global food supply chains.

AI Summary. Census population estimates show urban counties growing more slowly than suburbs, smaller metropolitan areas, and rural areas, with all county types slowing as immigration fell and the slowdown especially sharp in urban counties. Domestic migration is driven more by affordability, with people leaving expensive urban counties for cheaper suburbs and smaller communities.

Jed Kolko Jed Kolko Substack
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As immigration slowed in 2025, large urban counties’ growth continued to slow relative to that of suburban, rural and smaller urban counties. Domestic migration continued to consist of moves from expensive counties to more affordable suburban areas.

Does lower immigration slow urban county growth more than elsewhere?

Core argument: Urban counties grew more slowly in 2025 than suburban counties, smaller metropolitan areas, and rural areas, according to vintage 2025 Census population estimates.

Urban counties grew more slowly than suburban counties, smaller metropolitan areas, and rural areas in 2025. All types of counties grew more slowly in 2025 than in 2023 and 2024 because immigration fell. However, the slowdown was especially sharp for urban counties. The only other years this century when urban counties lagged all other types of places were in 2020-2022, when people moved out of cities during the pandemic, and in 2003-2006, when the housing bubble boosted housing construction in outlying suburban areas and drew new residents from cities. (This is based on vintage 2025 Census population estimates, released this morning.) Domestic migration is driven more by affordability, with people leaving expensive urban counties for more affordable suburban areas and smaller communities.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Urban counties grew more slowly in 2025 than suburban counties, smaller metropolitan areas, and rural areas, according to vintage 2025 Census population estimates.
  2. All county types grew more slowly in 2025 than in 2023 and 2024 because immigration fell, with the slowdown especially sharp for urban counties.
  3. The only other years this century when urban counties lagged all other place types were 2020–2022, amid pandemic moves out of cities, and 2003–2006, when housing-bubble construction in outlying suburbs drew residents from cities.

Related Articles:

  • Where Americans Choose to Move and Where They Leave — County-level mapping of net domestic migration within the United States shows some counties gained net movers equal to 10% or more of their 2020 population while others lost an equivalent share, excluding international moves.
  • The Demographic Outlook: 2026 to 2056 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the US population rises from 349m to 364m between 2026 and 2056, with annual growth slowing from 0.3% over the next decade to 0.1% thereafter before reaching zero and then shrinking. Declining fertility is projected to push deaths above births starting in 2030, increasingly offsetting net immigration.
  • New Population Estimates Show Historic Decline in Net International Migration — The U.S. Census Bureau estimates net international migration peaked at 2.7m in 2024 and fell to 1.3m in 2025, with a projected decline to roughly 321,000 in 2026 if current trends continue. The Bureau notes that continued trends would produce the first net negative migration in more than 50 years.

AI Summary. The average monthly new-car payment reached $774, up from $588 four years earlier, and more than 20% of new-car borrowers agreed to pay over $1,000 a month, a record, according to auto research firm Edmunds. Including insurance, gas, repairs and maintenance, total vehicle ownership costs have risen more than 40%.

Kailyn Rhone New York Times
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The mean payment on a new car was $774 in January, up from $588 in January 2021 – an ~32% increase, outpacing the overall 24% increase in the price level. Americans with household incomes above $150,000 make up 43% of new car sales.

How much have car payments and ownership costs risen?

Core argument: The average monthly new-car payment reached $774 in January, up from $588 in January 2021, according to Edmunds, with more than 20% of new-car borrowers agreeing to pay over $1,000 a month at the end of last year, a record.

The average monthly new-car payment reached $774 in January, up from $588 in January 2021, according to Edmunds, an auto research firm. A growing share of buyers are taking on even larger loans: More than 20% of new-car borrowers agreed to pay over $1,000 a month at the end of last year, which was a record, Edmunds reported. But loan payments are only part of the strain. When insurance, gas, repairs and maintenance are included, the total cost of owning a vehicle has risen more than 40% since January 2020, according to an index from Navy Federal Credit Union. Part of the reason insurance costs are [rising is] steady growth in uninsured drivers. The number of people driving without coverage jumped to more than 15% in 2023 from about 11% in 2019, according to Insurance Research Council, a firm that calculates data based on the relative frequencies of auto-insurance claims. JD Power, which surveys consumers about insurance trends, reported a similar increase in uninsured drivers in the second half of 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The average monthly new-car payment reached $774 in January, up from $588 in January 2021, according to Edmunds, with more than 20% of new-car borrowers agreeing to pay over $1,000 a month at the end of last year, a record.
  2. The total cost of vehicle ownership, including insurance, gas, repairs and maintenance, has risen more than 40% since January 2020, according to an index from Navy Federal Credit Union.
  3. The share of uninsured drivers rose to more than 15% in 2023 from about 11% in 2019, according to the Insurance Research Council, and JD Power reported a similar increase in the second half of 2025.

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