Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Monday, March 23, 2026

AI Summary. The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.

Sahil Chinoy, Nathan Nunn, Sandra Sequeira and Stefanie Stantcheva American Economic Review
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense. Democrats in the top quartile of the index had an elevated propensity to vote for Trump in 2016.

How does zero-sum thinking shape voting behavior among Democrats?

Core argument: Democrats in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking, both moderate and strong, voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.

Our baseline measure of zero-sum thinking is based on four questions about the extent to which respondents believe that relationships in different domains are zero-sum: 1. 'If one ethnic group becomes richer, this generally comes at the expense of other groups in the country.' 2. 'If those without American citizenship do better economically, this will generally come at the expense of American citizens.' 3. 'In international trade, if one country makes more money, then it is generally the case that the other country makes less money.' 4. 'If one group becomes wealthier, it is usually the case that this comes at the expense of other groups.' We create an index ranging from 0 to 1, summarizing the degree to which respondents perceive the world in zero-sum terms, using the estimated factor loadings from the first principal component of these four questions, which are positive and of similar magnitude across all four domains. Figure 9 shows that those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking among both moderate and strong Democrats voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate. In general, Donald Trump’s rhetoric was very zero-sum: emphasizing situations in which individuals or groups are pitted against each other in a (supposedly) zero-sum setting, such as immigrants versus domestic-born people, Muslims versus Christians, China versus the United States, and the anti-establishment versus the Washington elite.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Democrats in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking, both moderate and strong, voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  2. The zero-sum index, scaled 0 to 1, combines four questions on whether gains for ethnic groups, non-citizens, trading partners, or any group come at others' expense, with positive factor loadings of similar magnitude across all four domains.
  3. Donald Trump's rhetoric is characterized as very zero-sum, pitting immigrants against the domestic-born, Muslims against Christians, China against the United States, and the anti-establishment against the Washington elite.

Related Articles:

  • Welcome To The Age Of Zero-Sum Politics — Polling across the US, UK, France and Germany finds that zero-sum beliefs on the left and right are expressions of a shared worldview holding that gains for some must come at others' expense. Per capita growth across the West has averaged under 1% a year since the financial crisis.
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.

AI Summary. Gulf liquefied natural gas is only 3% of global gas consumption, but because commodity prices are set at the margin, its loss pushes gas import prices higher in Europe and Asia as China, Korea, India and Pakistan seek replacement supplies on the spot market. Undamaged Qatari facilities would need 3-4 months to reach full loading.

Michael Cembalest J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:

Futures markets are expecting oil prices to fall to ~$82 per barrel by this summer. European natural gas futures prices, pipeline and LNG, are expected to reach ~$15 per MMBtu by January, 25% lower than the current level.

How does losing 3% of global gas supply spike prices worldwide?

Core argument: Gulf LNG exports account for only 3% of global natural gas consumption, but because commodity prices are often set on the margin, their loss pushes LNG and pipeline import prices higher in Europe and Asia as China, Korea, India and Pakistan seek spot replacements.

Gulf LNG exports only represent 3% of global natural gas consumption. The problem is that commodity prices are often set on the margin, and the loss of this supply is enough to drive LNG and pipeline import prices higher in Europe and Asia as the largest recipients of Gulf LNG (China, Korea, India and Pakistan) seek replacement supplies on the spot market. There’s a limit to energy efficiency benefits when a large global energy shock occurs, one which is worsening by the day with attacks on energy infrastructure. Infrastructure takes a long time to build and a short time to destroy. Even undamaged parts of Qatar’s LNG facilities will take 3-4 months to reach full loading once the war ends; Qatar was also planning to expand production by ~30 MT per year, which is now delayed/halted. Asian economies are already seeing an oil shock comparable to the 1970’s with fuel and product rationing starting to spread across many countries. Inventories of oil, oil products, natural gas and manufactured products are typically only a few weeks or months. If the Strait of Hormuz remains mostly closed for another 3 to 4 weeks, physical shortages may intensify and start curtailing economic activity and global trade, starting in Asia first. [Nevertheless], futures markets are expecting a large decline in oil prices this year, [albeit] a slower decline in European natural gas futures prices (both pipeline and LNG).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Gulf LNG exports account for only 3% of global natural gas consumption, but because commodity prices are often set on the margin, their loss pushes LNG and pipeline import prices higher in Europe and Asia as China, Korea, India and Pakistan seek spot replacements.
  2. Undamaged parts of Qatar's LNG facilities will take 3–4 months to reach full loading once the war ends, and Qatar's planned expansion of roughly 30 MT per year is delayed or halted.
  3. Asian economies face an oil shock comparable to the 1970s with fuel and product rationing spreading, and if the Strait of Hormuz stays mostly closed another 3–4 weeks, physical shortages may intensify and curtail economic activity and global trade.

Related Articles:

  • Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026 — Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
  • You Can’t Print Molecules — Rebuilding after a disruption to a key shipping strait would require governments to finance defense, strategic reserves, domestic energy production, and infrastructure at the same time that inflation expectations are raising funding costs. The author argues capital will rotate out of asset-light sectors that thrived on open sea lanes and cheap energy into asset-heavy physical ones.
  • Global Economics Comment: Supply Shocks from the War in Iran Are Mostly Limited to Energy — Analysts forecast 2.6% global growth on an annual average basis, down from 2.9% before the war in Iran, with headline inflation of 2.9% versus 2.3% prior. They argue the supply risk is mostly confined to energy, limiting the chance of a repeat of the severe shipping disruptions and second-round inflation effects seen in 2021-2022.

AI Summary. China graduates about 5x as many medical and biomedical students as the US each year, 7x as many engineers, and nearly double the number of science and engineering PhDs, while one-sixth to one-fifth of US science and engineering graduates are themselves Chinese. One study found returning Chinese scientists lead-author 2.5x more papers than peers who stay in the US.

Tanner Greer Scholar's Stage
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Greer argues that the scale and intensity of investment in science in China suggests that “even if you believe that political instability or economic uncertainty might arrest China’s upward climb, that might not change the trajectory of Chinese science.”

Is China outpacing the US in producing scientists and engineers?

Core argument: China graduates five times as many medical and biomedical students, seven times as many engineers, and two-and-a-half times as many undergraduates with artificial intelligence research experience as the United States each year.

The scale of Chinese scientific production is in part a story about people. China graduates five times the number of medical and biomedical students than we do every year, seven times the number of engineers, and two-and-a-half times the number of undergraduates with research experience in artificial intelligence. Last year China graduated almost double the number of STEM PhD students than we did—and that number is actually worse than it sounds because—depending on the exact year you do the counting—between one sixth and one fifth of our STEM graduates are themselves Chinese. Many of these researchers go back. They go back partially because they are well compensated for doing so. They also go back because of the research opportunities afforded to them. A recent study found that returning Chinese scientists go on to become the lead author on 2.5 times more papers than their colleagues who stay in the United States. Many Chinese research labs have 30 or 40 people attached to them—the equivalent to a commercial research lab in the United States.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China graduates five times as many medical and biomedical students, seven times as many engineers, and two-and-a-half times as many undergraduates with artificial intelligence research experience as the United States each year.
  2. China graduated almost double the number of STEM PhD students as the United States, while between one sixth and one fifth of U.S. STEM graduates are themselves Chinese.
  3. A recent study found that Chinese scientists who return home go on to become lead author on 2.5 times more papers than colleagues who stay in the United States, and many Chinese research labs have 30 or 40 people attached to them.

Related Articles:

  • How China Is Outperforming the United States in Critical Technologies — The Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Critical Technology Tracker finds China leads in 57 of 64 critical technology categories while the United States leads in 7, and that China surpasses the United States in top-tier scientific publications across all 8 technology domains. In energy and environment China accounts for 46% of top-tier publications versus 10% for the United States.
  • Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire — Regrouping US college majors to match Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science and engineering to humanities and social sciences, the same ratio as in China. The author argues America's building slowdown reflects structural economic shifts—urbanization reached 70% by 1960 and 85% by 2020, shifting needs toward maintenance—rather than a lawyerly culture.
  • The US Is The World’s Science Superpower — But For How Long? — International students on temporary visas received more than a third of US science and engineering doctorates, including 59% in computer science, with most coming from China and India, and 77% of Chinese doctoral recipients said they intended to stay in the US. The US hosts 15% of the world's international students, down from 23%.

AI Summary. South Korean marriages rose 8.1% to 240,000, a third consecutive annual increase following more than a decade of decline. Officials attribute the recovery to demographic factors including a larger cohort in their early 30s, delayed pandemic weddings, and shifting attitudes toward marriage, and caution the demographic boost could fade.

Kim Jaewon Nikkei Asia
Date Posted:

The number of marriages in South Korea rose 8.1% y/y to 240,000, ~25% above the 2022 trough; 2025 was the third straight year of gains after a decade of decline between 2012–2022.

Are marriages rebounding after more than a decade of decline?

Core argument: South Korean marriages rose 8.1% to 240,000 in 2025, the third straight annual increase and above pre-COVID-19 levels, following more than a decade of decline through 2022, according to government figures.

A shift in social attitudes toward favoring marriage is helping lift wedding numbers in South Korea, as more young adults say tying the knot is necessary despite persistent economic and demographic pressures. The number of marriages in the country jumped 8.1%, to 240,000, in 2025 from a year earlier, marking the third straight annual increase, according to government figures. It comes after more than a decade of decline through 2022, with officials attributing the recovery to a mix of demographic factors, delayed pandemic weddings and shifting attitudes toward matrimony. The data also confirmed that South Koreans are continuing to marry later in life. The average age at first marriage stood at 33.9 for men and 31.6 for women, with the gender gap narrowing slightly. Officials said the marriage rebound partly reflects a normalization after pandemic disruptions, with 2025 figures surpassing pre-COVID-19 levels. However, they cautioned that the boost from demographics -- particularly a larger cohort in their early 30s -- could fade in coming years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. South Korean marriages rose 8.1% to 240,000 in 2025, the third straight annual increase and above pre-COVID-19 levels, following more than a decade of decline through 2022, according to government figures.
  2. Officials attribute South Korea's marriage recovery to a mix of demographic factors, delayed pandemic weddings and shifting attitudes, with more young adults saying marriage is necessary.
  3. South Koreans continue to marry later, with the average age at first marriage at 33.9 for men and 31.6 for women, and officials caution that the boost from a larger cohort in their early 30s could fade.

Related Articles:

  • South Korea Baby Bump Grows — South Korea's total fertility rate rose to 0.8, up from 0.75 and an all-time low of 0.72, which the national statistics agency attributes to a post-pandemic rebound in marriages and more favorable attitudes toward childbearing. The government's mid-range projection still implies a population decline of 10mn by 2067.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
  • The Case for Gradual Population Decline — South Korea's fertility rate fell below 1.7 in 1985 and its share of population aged 20-40 has fallen 20% since 2000, yet it ranked first in Bloomberg's Innovation Index and twelfth in a global soft power ranking. The author argues low fertility does not inevitably cause technological and cultural stagnation.

AI Summary. Ukraine's unmanned forces, which make up 2% of the army's headcount, claim responsibility for more than a third of Russian losses, with one drone brigade claiming a sixth. Its commander says drone units are ordered to target personnel rather than armour or equipment at least 30% of the time.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:

Ukraine claims December 2025 may have been a turning point, as verified Russian losses to Ukrainian drones exceeded Russian recruitment. “Ukrainian drones have killed or incapacitated at least 8,776 more soldiers than Russia has replaced.”

How large a share of enemy losses do drone units cause?

Core argument: Ukraine's unmanned forces, comprising just 2% of the army's headcount, claim more than a third of Russian losses, with commander Brovdi's "Madyar's birds" brigade alone claiming responsibility for a sixth.

Mr Brovdi’s [commander of Ukraine’s unmanned forces] drone brigade, codenamed “Madyar’s birds”, claims it has been responsible for a sixth of the Russian losses. The wider unmanned-forces grouping he now controls accounts for more than a third. Those forces make up just 2% of the Ukrainian army’s headcount. At the December peak, enemy losses reached 388 a day, equivalent to the assault component of an entire battalion. “If a battalion has no infantry left, the Russians don’t disband it but throw desk officers to the front,” Mr Brovdi says. “They are the easiest targets, because they can’t fight.” His soldiers are ordered to target personnel, rather than armour or other equipment, at least 30% of the time. Russia can only train and equip so many recruits; Mr Brovdi likens it to a cow, and his units to farmers. “We need to keep milking this cow, the Russian army, for everything it’s worth, exhausting it beyond its maximum capacity.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Ukraine's unmanned forces, comprising just 2% of the army's headcount, claim more than a third of Russian losses, with commander Brovdi's "Madyar's birds" brigade alone claiming responsibility for a sixth.
  2. Russian losses reached 388 a day at their December peak, equivalent to the assault component of an entire battalion, and Brovdi says depleted Russian battalions are refilled with desk officers he calls the easiest targets because they cannot fight.
  3. Brovdi orders his drone units to target personnel rather than armour or other equipment at least 30% of the time, describing the aim as exhausting the Russian army beyond its maximum capacity.

Related Articles:

  • Ukraine Reaches a Milestone: Making ‘China-Free’ Drones — Ukraine has produced drones built without Chinese components, though mass production remains unlikely because Chinese parts are much cheaper and China's manufacturing dominance makes any drone hard to classify as truly "China-free." Two Ukrainian companies making such drones were selected among 11 firms to compete for US Defense Department contracts for low-cost attack drones.
  • Can Drones Be Stockpiled? Europe Wrestles With Weapons Dilemma — European defense officials argue that small, cheap drones have proven as effective as heavy armour in Ukraine, but stockpiling millions of them risks holding weapons made obsolete within months by new software, radio frequencies, and autonomous navigation. Drones that dominate one week can be jammed or outclassed the next.
  • Why Every Country Needs To Master The Electric Tech Stack — Drones are the foundation of hard power in the early 21st century, so a country unable to produce them domestically is at a disadvantage. As electric motors overtake combustion engines as the core technology that makes machines move, the same supply chains and production processes used for electronics can also produce cars, drones, robots, and appliances.

Tuesday, March 24, 2026

AI Summary. The authors estimate that students assigned teachers who inflate average grades have lower future test scores, high school graduation, college enrollment, and earnings, with a one standard deviation increase in a teacher's average grade inflation reducing the present value of students' lifetime earnings by $213,872. Inflating passing grades instead raises graduation with limited long-run effects.

Jeffrey Denning, Rachel Nesbit, Nolan Pope and Merrill Warnick National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Data from Los Angeles and Maryland linking high school, postsecondary, and earnings records suggest that one class-year with a teacher with 1 SD higher mean grade inflation reduces the PDV of their students’ lifetime earnings by ~$213,872.

How does teacher grade inflation affect students' long-term outcomes and earnings?

Core argument: The authors estimate that assignment to a teacher with one standard deviation higher average grade inflation reduces the present discounted value of students' lifetime earnings by $213,872 per year.

We develop two teacher-level measures of grade inflation: one measuring average grade inflation (the year-specific teacher fixed effect showing the teacher’s average contribution to grades after controlling for the student's contemporaneous performance in the focal subject as measured by the corresponding subject test score as well as prior test scores, prior grades, and other background characteristics), and another measuring a teacher's propensity to give a passing grade [which affects primarily students near the bottom of the distribution]. A [separate] cognitive value-added measure [included in the regressions] is a teacher fixed effect capturing how much a teacher raises students' standardized test scores relative to what would be predicted from the students' prior test scores and background characteristics. Grade-inflating teachers have moderately lower cognitive value-added and slightly higher noncognitive value-added. The two [grade-inflation] measures differentially impact students' long-term outcomes. Being assigned a higher average grade inflating teacher reduces a student's future test scores, the likelihood of graduating from high school, college enrollment, and ultimately earnings. A teacher with one standard deviation higher average grade inflation reduces the present discounted value [PDV] of lifetime earnings of their students by $213,872 per year.  In contrast, passing grade inflation reduces the likelihood of being held back and increases high school graduation, with limited long-run effects. [Figure 7 in the gallery].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that assignment to a teacher with one standard deviation higher average grade inflation reduces the present discounted value of students' lifetime earnings by $213,872 per year.
  2. Higher average grade inflation by teachers lowers students' future test scores, high school graduation likelihood, college enrollment, and earnings, while passing-grade inflation instead reduces grade retention and raises high school graduation with limited long-run effects.
  3. Grade-inflating teachers have moderately lower cognitive value-added, measured as a teacher's contribution to standardized test scores beyond what students' prior scores and background characteristics predict, and slightly higher noncognitive value-added.

Related Articles:

  • Steeper At The Top: Cognitive Ability and Earnings in Finland and Norway — Administrative data on over 350,000 men each in Finland and Norway show a convex relationship between earnings rank and cognitive ability measured by military conscription tests: top-percentile earners score about 1 standard deviation above median earners, who score about 0.5 above bottom-percentile earners. The lowest scores are almost absent among top earners.
  • Never Enough: Dynamic Status Incentives in Organizations — Data on over 5,000 German fighter pilots show performance rose markedly as pilots approached the eligibility threshold for each medal in a tiered awards ladder and slumped immediately after receiving it, with the effect repeating at each successive rung. The authors estimate the ladder added 3,000–5,000 aerial victories, 5–10% of the total.
  • Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II — Analysis of over 5,000 German World War II fighter pilots finds that public peer recognition was associated with higher victory scores among skilled pilots without higher mortality, while average pilots gained little in victories but died at higher rates. The authors conclude status-based awards can have uneven effects in high-risk settings.

AI Summary. About $14tn of investment-grade fixed income supply is coming to market, combining roughly $10tn of US government debt to be refinanced over the next 12 months, a budget deficit near $2tn, and about $2tn of gross corporate bond issuance boosted by data-center builders. The author argues this growing supply is putting upward pressure on interest rates and credit spreads.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:

The US will refinance ~$10T of debt this year in addition to running a budget deficit of ~$2T. Total IG US corporate bond issuance will be ~$2T, in part due to the AI buildout. Sløk notes debt sales at this scale will put upward pressure on rates.

Is rising investment-grade bond supply pushing up rates and spreads?

Core argument: Total investment grade supply reaching the market this year is around $14 trillion, combining $10 trillion of US government debt to be refinanced over the coming 12 months, a roughly $2 trillion budget deficit, and about $2 trillion of gross corporate bond issuance.

Ten trillion dollars in existing US government debt will need to be refinanced over the coming 12 months. The budget deficit this year is about $2 trillion. Total gross corporate bond issuance in 2026 is likely to be around $2 trillion because of increased supply from hyperscalers. Adding it all up, the total amount of investment grade supply coming to the market this year is around $14 trillion. The bottom line is that the growing supply of investment grade fixed income product is putting upward pressure on rates and credit spreads.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Total investment grade supply reaching the market this year is around $14 trillion, combining $10 trillion of US government debt to be refinanced over the coming 12 months, a roughly $2 trillion budget deficit, and about $2 trillion of gross corporate bond issuance.
  2. Gross corporate bond issuance in 2026 is likely to total around $2 trillion, reflecting increased supply from hyperscalers.
  3. The growing supply of investment grade fixed income product is putting upward pressure on rates and credit spreads.

Related Articles:

  • Global Debt Report 2026 — Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.

AI Summary. An analysis of the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which has tracked 85,000 individuals from 5,000 families since 1968, finds that first-time US home buyers are on average 35 years old — three years older than a decade earlier and eight years older than in the 1970s.

Aziz Sunderji Home Economics
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

The median age of American first-time home buyers was 35 years old in 2025, up from 32 in 2015.

Are Americans buying their first homes at older ages?

Core argument: First-time U.S. home buyers are on average 35 years old, three years older than a decade ago and eight years older than in the 1970s, according to an analysis of the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

At what age do people buy their first home? My analysis of data from the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) shows that, on average, they’re 35—three years older than a decade ago, and eight years older than in the 1970s. The PSID is a remarkable dataset. Like wildlife researchers tagging a pod of whales, the researchers at the University of Michigan have tracked 85,000 individuals from 5,000 families they began studying in 1968. This ‘longitudinal’ data allows us to observe the kids in these families as they leave home, form their own households, rent their first apartments, and eventually become first time buyers (FTBs) of homes. And because specific individuals are tracked over time, we can pinpoint the exact moment someone transitions from renting to owning for the first time, and how old they were when it happened. No other U.S. dataset can do this, and none go as far back as the 1960s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. First-time U.S. home buyers are on average 35 years old, three years older than a decade ago and eight years older than in the 1970s, according to an analysis of the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
  2. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics has tracked 85,000 individuals from 5,000 families first studied in 1968, allowing observation of when specific people leave home, rent, and first buy a home.
  3. No other U.S. dataset can pinpoint the exact moment an individual transitions from renting to owning, and none extends back as far as the 1960s.

Related Articles:

  • What Explains Low Millennial Home Ownership? — At age 30, 31% of Millennials still live with parents or roommates versus 19% of Boomers, and only 61% of Millennial household heads are married versus 77% of Boomers; the analysis attributes most of the 18-percentage-point home ownership gap (25% versus 43%) to these two differences. Among married household heads, the ownership gap narrows to 8 points.
  • Has Intergenerational Progress Stalled? Income Growth Over Five Generations of Americans — Using post-tax, post-transfer income data, the authors find each of the past four US generations was better off than the prior one, with Millennials' real median household income at ages 36–40 18% above the previous generation's, versus 34% for the Silent Generation, 27% for Baby Boomers, and 16% for Generation X.
  • Why Are Young Adults in the English-Speaking World So Unhappy? — The share of young adults regularly experiencing stress and anger has risen sharply in the US, Canada, UK, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand while remaining largely stable elsewhere in the West. Real house prices since 1995 are up 85% in the US and over 200% in the other five countries.

AI Summary. Gold is heading for an extended losing streak as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and damage to Persian Gulf energy infrastructure send crude and natural gas prices surging, raising the prospect of higher interest rates from the Federal Reserve and other central banks.

Yvonne Yue Li, Yihui Xie, and Jack Ryan Bloomberg
Date Posted:

Gold has fallen ~15% since the start of the Iran War but remains positive for the year, having returned to its January level. The decline is being attributed to higher real rates, as the 10-year TIPS yield climbed above 2%.

Are surging energy prices and rate expectations pushing gold lower?

Core argument: Gold is heading for its longest-ever losing streak as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and damage to Persian Gulf energy infrastructure accompany surging crude and natural gas prices.

A key implication of the war for financial markets has been the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, along with damage to energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. With crude and natural gas prices surging, the prospect of higher interest rates from the Federal Reserve and other central banks continues to weigh on gold. A similar pattern followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, when an initial spike in the safe-haven commodity was followed by a months-long decline as an energy price shock rippled through markets and added to inflationary pressures.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Gold is heading for its longest-ever losing streak as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and damage to Persian Gulf energy infrastructure accompany surging crude and natural gas prices.
  2. The prospect of higher interest rates from the Federal Reserve and other central banks continues to weigh on gold as crude and natural gas prices surge.
  3. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, an initial spike in gold was followed by a months-long decline as an energy price shock rippled through markets and added to inflationary pressures.

Related Articles:

  • Global Economics Comment: Supply Shocks from the War in Iran Are Mostly Limited to Energy — Analysts forecast 2.6% global growth on an annual average basis, down from 2.9% before the war in Iran, with headline inflation of 2.9% versus 2.3% prior. They argue the supply risk is mostly confined to energy, limiting the chance of a repeat of the severe shipping disruptions and second-round inflation effects seen in 2021-2022.
  • The Fed is Misreading the Inflation Risks — The author argues the Federal Reserve is wrong to attribute excess inflation mostly to goods prices driven by tariffs, since services make up the bulk of economic activity. Prices of services businesses buy as production inputs have been accelerating, as has consumer services inflation excluding imputed prices, housing, and utilities.
  • Why Did Inflation Rise And Fall In 2021-24? Channels And Evidence From Expectations — Across countries, unexpectedly higher government deficits relative to earlier International Monetary Fund forecasts are associated with unexpectedly higher inflation, measured by each factor's contribution to the increase in public debt, a relationship the author finds statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with a fiscal channel for inflation.

AI Summary. China's urban unemployment rate for 16-to-24-year-olds excluding students edged down to 16.1% from 16.3%, a sixth consecutive monthly decline from a peak of 18.9% reached after a record 12.2m university graduates entered the job market. The rate for those aged 25 to 29 rose to 7.2% from 6.8%.

Xinyi Wu South China Morning Post
Date Posted:

China’s youth unemployment (16–24) continued to decline from its recent peak in August of 18.9%, falling to 16.1% in February.

Is China's youth unemployment rate continuing to decline?

Core argument: China's urban youth unemployment rate for ages 16–24, excluding students, edged down to 16.1% in February from 16.3% in January, a sixth consecutive monthly decline, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.

China’s urban youth unemployment rate fell in February for the sixth consecutive month, though the marginal improvement provides little reprieve for job seekers in a challenging post-holiday labour market. The jobless rate for the 16-to-24 age group, excluding students, edged down to 16.1% in February from 16.3% in January, according to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics on Thursday. The figure has been gradually declining since August, when a record 12.2 million university graduates entered the job market and pushed the jobless rate to 18.9% – the highest level since students were excluded from the data in December 2023. The unemployment rate for those aged 25 to 29, also excluding students, stood at 7.2% in February, up from 6.8% in January.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's urban youth unemployment rate for ages 16–24, excluding students, edged down to 16.1% in February from 16.3% in January, a sixth consecutive monthly decline, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.
  2. The 16-to-24 jobless rate has declined gradually since August, when a record 12.2 million university graduates entered the job market and pushed it to 18.9%, the highest since students were excluded from the data in December 2023.
  3. China's unemployment rate for those aged 25 to 29, excluding students, stood at 7.2% in February, up from 6.8% in January.

Related Articles:

  • Xi’s Export Juggernaut Is Leaving China’s Factory Workers Behind — Chinese exports rose nearly 22% year-over-year in the first two months of 2026, exceeding expectations and producing a record trade surplus for the period. Growth is concentrated in less labor-intensive goods such as batteries, cars and chips, while an alternative wage measure sits near its lowest level outside the pandemic.
  • China’s Future Rests On 200m Precarious Workers — China classifies roughly 200m people as "flexible workers" without formal contracts, a group that makes up a quarter of the national workforce and two-fifths of the urban workforce. Unlike the West's service-focused gig economy, about 40m of these workers are paid by the day or week in factories, and semi-official estimates put 84m at online delivery and ride-hailing firms.
  • Macro Outlook 2026: Sturdy Growth, Stagnant Jobs, Stable Prices — China's growth is forecast at 4.8%, above the 4.5% consensus, with robust manufacturing offset by a housing drag on output estimated at about 1.5 percentage points as property sales run 60% below peak. Strong manufacturing and weak domestic demand are projected to lift China's current account surplus toward 1% of global output.