Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Friday, March 20, 2026

AI Summary. The author argues the Federal Reserve is wrong to attribute excess inflation mostly to goods prices driven by tariffs, since services make up the bulk of economic activity. Prices of services businesses buy as production inputs have been accelerating, as has consumer services inflation excluding imputed prices, housing, and utilities.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
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Countering Powell’s view that current inflation is mostly about goods prices and heavily tariff-driven, Klein points to broad-based increases in services prices, and suggests that even absent the war, the Fed was not headed towards meeting its 2% target.

Is the Fed wrong to blame inflation mainly on tariffs and goods?

Core argument: Consumer goods prices were rising about 2% a year on the eve of the war with Iran and accelerating, against flat prices in 2024 and annual declines of roughly 0.5%–1% in the years immediately preceding the pandemic.

Perhaps the most striking thing about Powell’s Wednesday press conference was the repeated—and wrong—insistence that excessive inflation was mostly about rising goods prices, which in turn were mostly about tariffs. To be fair, goods inflation was getting worse [prior to] the Iran conflict, and in some significant categories was worse than in the 2021H2-2022H1 price spike. In the years immediately preceding the pandemic, consumer goods prices regularly fell about 0.5%-1% each year. In 2024, those prices were flat. As of the eve of the war with Iran, consumer goods prices were rising by about 2% a year—and the pace was accelerating. Services represent the bulk of economic activity, and should be making Fed officials worry that their 2% inflation target is out of reach. Prices of services purchased by businesses as inputs to their production have been accelerating rapidly in the past few months. Stage 2 services inflation would likely be even faster if not for the fact that the official price of “business loans” is falling by 25% a year, the fastest rate on record outside of the pandemic. On the consumer side, the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price index for services excluding imputed prices, housing (which has known issues with measurement lags), and utilities (which can be volatile and mask underlying trends) has actually been accelerating recently.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Consumer goods prices were rising about 2% a year on the eve of the war with Iran and accelerating, against flat prices in 2024 and annual declines of roughly 0.5%–1% in the years immediately preceding the pandemic.
  2. Powell insisted at his press conference that excessive inflation was mostly about rising goods prices driven by tariffs, a characterization the author argues is wrong because services, the bulk of economic activity, put the 2% target out of reach.
  3. Prices of services purchased by businesses as production inputs have accelerated rapidly in recent months, and would likely be rising faster still were the official price of "business loans" not falling 25% a year, the fastest rate on record outside the pandemic.

Related Articles:

  • Why Did Inflation Rise And Fall In 2021-24? Channels And Evidence From Expectations — Across countries, unexpectedly higher government deficits relative to earlier International Monetary Fund forecasts are associated with unexpectedly higher inflation, measured by each factor's contribution to the increase in public debt, a relationship the author finds statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with a fiscal channel for inflation.
  • Why Did Inflation Rise And Fall In 2021-24? Channels And Evidence From Expectations — Across countries, unexpectedly higher government deficits relative to earlier International Monetary Fund forecasts are associated with unexpectedly higher inflation, measured by each factor's contribution to the increase in public debt, a relationship the author finds statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with a fiscal channel for inflation.
  • Inflation is Persistent and Consumers are Flush. Falling Rates Could be Dangerous — U.S. household and nonprofit net worth equals roughly 8.5 years of personal consumption spending, down from a peak of 9 years but above the 7.7-year average of 2018-2019. The author argues that cutting interest rates with inflation persistent risks unleashing this untapped financial firepower as additional consumer spending that would largely show up in higher prices rather than higher output.

AI Summary. Analysts forecast 2.6% global growth on an annual average basis, down from 2.9% before the war in Iran, with headline inflation of 2.9% versus 2.3% prior. They argue the supply risk is mostly confined to energy, limiting the chance of a repeat of the severe shipping disruptions and second-round inflation effects seen in 2021-2022.

Joseph Briggs and Megan Peters Goldman Sachs
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GS estimates that higher oil prices will boost headline inflation by 50–60bps over the next year. The selloff at the front-end – 50bps in the Euro Area and 40bps in the US – suggests markets expect central banks will keep a lid on inflationary pressures.

Is the war's supply shock mostly limited to energy?

Core argument: The global growth forecast was cut to 2.6% on an annual average basis from 2.9% before the war in Iran, while the Q4/Q4 headline inflation forecast was raised to 2.9% from 2.3%.

We now accordingly forecast 2.6% global growth (vs. 2.9% prior to the war) on an annual average basis, and 2.9% headline inflation on a Q4/Q4 basis (vs. 2.3%). The recent selloff in front end rates [Exhibit 1] shows that end-2026 policy rate pricing has increased notably in the UK (+63bp), Euro Area (+50bp), US (+40bp), Canada (+39bp), and Australia (+31bp) since the start of the war [and] signals an expectation that global central banks will be especially sensitive to higher inflation given the recent memory of post-pandemic supply disruptions and associated surge in inflation. In summary, our analysis suggests that the major risk to global supply and inflation is mostly confined to energy, which limits the risk that the severe supply chain disruptions (and associated surge in inflation) and large second-round inflation effects observed in 2021-2022 will re-emerge. The problematic shipping disruptions from 2021-2022 appear less likely to repeat. Gulf economies are not major re-exporters of most products (aside from boats), non-tanker ocean shipping costs have actually ticked down since the start of the war, and the recent rise in airfreight prices (while notable) implies less than 5bp upside to global inflation.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The global growth forecast was cut to 2.6% on an annual average basis from 2.9% before the war in Iran, while the Q4/Q4 headline inflation forecast was raised to 2.9% from 2.3%.
  2. End-2026 policy rate pricing has risen since the start of the war by 63bp in the UK, 50bp in the Euro Area, 40bp in the US, 39bp in Canada, and 31bp in Australia, signaling expected central bank sensitivity to higher inflation.
  3. The analysis suggests supply risk is mostly confined to energy: Gulf economies are not major re-exporters of most products aside from boats, non-tanker ocean shipping costs have ticked down since the war began, and higher airfreight prices imply less than 5bp of global inflation.

Related Articles:

  • The White House Is Using the Wrong Oil Price for the Iran War — Refining margins have jumped to nearly $50 a barrel from $20, approaching record highs, pushing wholesale fuel prices sharply higher: diesel near $185 a barrel, jet fuel near $150, and both fuel oil and gasoline above $100. Diesel is a particular concern because it powers construction, transport and farming.
  • War Cost Sinks Long-Term Government Bonds on Deficit Worries — Investor concern that the Iran war will raise government spending and widen budget deficits has triggered a selloff in long-term government bonds, pushing the 30-year US Treasury yield near 4.90% and lifting yields from the UK and Germany to Australia and Japan. A global borrowing wave could further pressure the $31tn US Treasury market.
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.

AI Summary. Internal Revenue Service data show residents leaving Massachusetts took a net $4.2bn in adjusted gross income with them, an 8% year-over-year increase, in the first year of a 4% surtax on incomes above $1m, though the number of departing taxpayers slowed. Net outflows predate the surtax, and surtax collections have risen every year.

Greg Ryan Bloomberg
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Net outflows of adjusted gross income from Massachusetts increased 8% y/y in 2023 to $4.2B, after a 4% surtax on income over $1mm took effect. Top earners leaving the state were responsible for 70% of the outflow.

Does a millionaire surtax accelerate income leaving the state?

Core argument: Residents leaving Massachusetts took a net $4.2 billion in adjusted gross income with them in 2023, an 8% year-over-year increase and one of the largest totals in the country, according to Internal Revenue Service data.

Residents exiting Massachusetts took a net of $4.2 billion in adjusted gross income with them in 2023, one of the largest totals in the country, after a tax on millionaires took effect. The amount was an 8% year-over-year increase, according to Internal Revenue Service data, even as the total number of taxpayers leaving the state slowed. This was the first year that residents were subject to a 4% surtax on incomes over $1 million after voters approved the levy in 2022 to fund schools and transportation. Despite the tax’s implementation, the number of residents moving out of Massachusetts who reported income of $200,000 or more — the top bracket tracked in the IRS data — fell year-over-year. Net outflows from Massachusetts long predate the millionaires tax, especially to Florida and New Hampshire, its northern neighbor, which has no tax on wages or capital gains. Total lost income was also higher in 2021 than 2023. The state’s millionaires-tax collections have increased every year since 2023 and so far in fiscal 2026 have jumped 19% year-over-year to $1.3 billion.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Residents leaving Massachusetts took a net $4.2 billion in adjusted gross income with them in 2023, an 8% year-over-year increase and one of the largest totals in the country, according to Internal Revenue Service data.
  2. The number of Massachusetts out-migrants reporting income of $200,000 or more, the top bracket tracked in IRS data, fell year-over-year in 2023, the first year of the voter-approved 4% surtax on incomes above $1 million.
  3. Massachusetts millionaires-tax collections have risen every year since 2023 and are up 19% year-over-year to $1.3 billion so far in fiscal 2026, while net outflows to Florida and New Hampshire predate the surtax.

Related Articles:

  • The Net Present Value of the Billionaire Tax Act: An Assessment of the Fiscal Effects of California’s Proposed Wealth Tax — A proposed one-time 5% California tax on the worldwide net worth of individuals above $1bn would have positive net present value only if its revenue exceeds the present value of income taxes lost to departing billionaires. The authors' simulations yield negative net present value in 71% of draws, averaging -$24.7bn.
  • Behavioral Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners: Evidence from California — A California ballot measure raising top marginal income tax rates by up to 3 percentage points prompted an additional 0.8% of the affected tax base to leave the state, with an estimated income elasticity of 2.5–3.2 for high earners who stayed. The authors estimate these responses eroded 45.2% of windfall revenues within one year and 60.9% within two.
  • The Robin Hood State Is Coming For The Rich — In the US, increased redistribution has offset rising pre-tax inequality: Congressional Budget Office data show inequality of taxable income near record highs while inequality after taxes and transfers was lower than in several earlier years and only slightly above 1986. The top 1% of earners paid 40% of income tax in 2022, up from 33% in 2001.

AI Summary. Eurozone industrial production fell 1.2% year on year, with chemical output down 6.6%, while production of weapons and ammunition rose 31% to a record high and aerospace output rose 15%, indicating a split between energy-intensive sectors and defense-linked manufacturing.

Valentina Romei Financial Times
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Eurozone industrial production was down 1.2% y/y, led by energy-intensive sectors such as chemicals (down 6.6%) and metals. On the other side of Europe’s “split screen,” aerospace production rose 15% and production of weapons and ammunition was up 31%.

Is European manufacturing splitting between energy-intensive sectors and defense production?

Core argument: Eurozone production of weapons and ammunition jumped 31% year on year in January to a record high, while overall eurozone industrial production fell 1.2%, according to Eurostat data.

Europe’s industrial base is having a bit of a split-screen moment. On one side: chemicals, metals and other energy-guzzling stalwarts. All are still reeling from high gas prices and now staring down another squeeze as oil and natural gas jump on the back of the war in the Middle East. On the other: weapons, planes and anything with a defence budget attached. These are quietly (or not so quietly) booming. The latest Eurostat data captures the divergence neatly. Eurozone industrial production fell 1.2% year on year in January, with chemical output down a chunky 6.6%. Meanwhile, production of weapons and ammunition jumped 31% to a record high. Aerospace is having a moment, with eurozone output up 15% on the year to January and posting double-digit growth in most recent months.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Eurozone production of weapons and ammunition jumped 31% year on year in January to a record high, while overall eurozone industrial production fell 1.2%, according to Eurostat data.
  2. Eurozone chemical output fell 6.6% year on year in January, with energy-intensive sectors such as chemicals and metals still reeling from high gas prices and facing another squeeze as oil and natural gas prices jump on the war in the Middle East.
  3. Eurozone aerospace output rose 15% in the year to January and posted double-digit growth in most recent months.

Related Articles:

  • You Can’t Print Molecules — Rebuilding after a disruption to a key shipping strait would require governments to finance defense, strategic reserves, domestic energy production, and infrastructure at the same time that inflation expectations are raising funding costs. The author argues capital will rotate out of asset-light sectors that thrived on open sea lanes and cheap energy into asset-heavy physical ones.
  • The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers — The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.

AI Summary. The share of Chinese who believe effort is always rewarded fell from 62% in 2004 to 28% in 2023, according to survey research, with respondents now citing unequal opportunity, connections, and being born rich as the keys to wealth. Those reporting their family situation had improved over the prior five years fell from about 70% to 39%.

Economist Staff The Economist
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Piketty’s data suggest China’s top 10% hold 68% of net personal wealth, on par with the US. As the wealth distribution has shifted, sentiment has declined. In 2004, 62% of Chinese felt “effort is always rewarded;” by 2023, the share had fallen to 28%.

Are Chinese losing faith that hard work brings success?

Core argument: The share of Chinese who believe "effort is always rewarded" fell from 62% in 2004 to 28% in 2023, according to a paper by Michael Alisky, Scott Rozelle and Martin Whyte.

Many Chinese once viewed wealth and success as reflections of hard work or intelligence. The rich were an advertisement for the dream of advancement. In 2004, according to a paper by Michael Alisky, Scott Rozelle and Martin Whyte, 62% of Chinese felt that “effort is always rewarded” and blamed poverty on lack of ability. But in recent years economic growth has slowed sharply and ordinary Chinese have become gloomy about their prospects. The proportion who think hard work pays off fell to 28% in 2023. People now see unequal opportunity as the biggest factor contributing to poverty; connections and being born rich are considered the keys to wealth. They think mobility has slowed. From 2004 to 2014 70% of respondents thought their family situation was better or much better than five years before. In 2023 only 39% thought so.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of Chinese who believe "effort is always rewarded" fell from 62% in 2004 to 28% in 2023, according to a paper by Michael Alisky, Scott Rozelle and Martin Whyte.
  2. Chinese respondents now identify unequal opportunity as the biggest factor contributing to poverty, and view connections and being born rich as the keys to wealth.
  3. The share of Chinese saying their family situation was better than five years earlier fell from 70% between 2004 and 2014 to 39% in 2023.

Related Articles:

  • 2025 Letter — China's economy features intense market competition, with firms continually expanding into each other's core businesses, a dynamic the author argues involves greater capitalist competition and greater capitalist excess than in the United States. The author attributes China's sideways-trending stock market in part to profits being competed away.
  • The Grandchildren of China’s Pre-Revolutionary Elite Have Regained Their Social Advantage, Earning 12% More Than Their Contemporaries and Surpassing Communist Party Members By 2% — A survey of 36,000 Chinese residents found that grandchildren of China's pre-revolutionary elite, born between 1966 and 1990, were 6% more likely to finish high school and earned 12% more than their contemporaries, exceeding Communist Party members by 2%. An earlier generation, the children of the old elite, earned 5% less than other Chinese.
  • The Sinister Disappearance Of China’s Bosses — China's liuzhi detention system operates alongside normal policing, requiring no court approval and denying detainees lawyers, with windowless cells, constant lighting and round-the-clock supervision. Stock-exchange filings show 39 executives at listed companies disappearing into the system by the end of September, exceeding the prior year's record.

Monday, March 23, 2026

AI Summary. The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.

Sahil Chinoy, Nathan Nunn, Sandra Sequeira and Stefanie Stantcheva American Economic Review
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Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense. Democrats in the top quartile of the index had an elevated propensity to vote for Trump in 2016.

How does zero-sum thinking shape voting behavior among Democrats?

Core argument: Democrats in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking, both moderate and strong, voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.

Our baseline measure of zero-sum thinking is based on four questions about the extent to which respondents believe that relationships in different domains are zero-sum: 1. 'If one ethnic group becomes richer, this generally comes at the expense of other groups in the country.' 2. 'If those without American citizenship do better economically, this will generally come at the expense of American citizens.' 3. 'In international trade, if one country makes more money, then it is generally the case that the other country makes less money.' 4. 'If one group becomes wealthier, it is usually the case that this comes at the expense of other groups.' We create an index ranging from 0 to 1, summarizing the degree to which respondents perceive the world in zero-sum terms, using the estimated factor loadings from the first principal component of these four questions, which are positive and of similar magnitude across all four domains. Figure 9 shows that those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking among both moderate and strong Democrats voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate. In general, Donald Trump’s rhetoric was very zero-sum: emphasizing situations in which individuals or groups are pitted against each other in a (supposedly) zero-sum setting, such as immigrants versus domestic-born people, Muslims versus Christians, China versus the United States, and the anti-establishment versus the Washington elite.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Democrats in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking, both moderate and strong, voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  2. The zero-sum index, scaled 0 to 1, combines four questions on whether gains for ethnic groups, non-citizens, trading partners, or any group come at others' expense, with positive factor loadings of similar magnitude across all four domains.
  3. Donald Trump's rhetoric is characterized as very zero-sum, pitting immigrants against the domestic-born, Muslims against Christians, China against the United States, and the anti-establishment against the Washington elite.

Related Articles:

  • Welcome To The Age Of Zero-Sum Politics — Polling across the US, UK, France and Germany finds that zero-sum beliefs on the left and right are expressions of a shared worldview holding that gains for some must come at others' expense. Per capita growth across the West has averaged under 1% a year since the financial crisis.
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.

AI Summary. Gulf liquefied natural gas is only 3% of global gas consumption, but because commodity prices are set at the margin, its loss pushes gas import prices higher in Europe and Asia as China, Korea, India and Pakistan seek replacement supplies on the spot market. Undamaged Qatari facilities would need 3-4 months to reach full loading.

Michael Cembalest J.P. Morgan
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Futures markets are expecting oil prices to fall to ~$82 per barrel by this summer. European natural gas futures prices, pipeline and LNG, are expected to reach ~$15 per MMBtu by January, 25% lower than the current level.

How does losing 3% of global gas supply spike prices worldwide?

Core argument: Gulf LNG exports account for only 3% of global natural gas consumption, but because commodity prices are often set on the margin, their loss pushes LNG and pipeline import prices higher in Europe and Asia as China, Korea, India and Pakistan seek spot replacements.

Gulf LNG exports only represent 3% of global natural gas consumption. The problem is that commodity prices are often set on the margin, and the loss of this supply is enough to drive LNG and pipeline import prices higher in Europe and Asia as the largest recipients of Gulf LNG (China, Korea, India and Pakistan) seek replacement supplies on the spot market. There’s a limit to energy efficiency benefits when a large global energy shock occurs, one which is worsening by the day with attacks on energy infrastructure. Infrastructure takes a long time to build and a short time to destroy. Even undamaged parts of Qatar’s LNG facilities will take 3-4 months to reach full loading once the war ends; Qatar was also planning to expand production by ~30 MT per year, which is now delayed/halted. Asian economies are already seeing an oil shock comparable to the 1970’s with fuel and product rationing starting to spread across many countries. Inventories of oil, oil products, natural gas and manufactured products are typically only a few weeks or months. If the Strait of Hormuz remains mostly closed for another 3 to 4 weeks, physical shortages may intensify and start curtailing economic activity and global trade, starting in Asia first. [Nevertheless], futures markets are expecting a large decline in oil prices this year, [albeit] a slower decline in European natural gas futures prices (both pipeline and LNG).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Gulf LNG exports account for only 3% of global natural gas consumption, but because commodity prices are often set on the margin, their loss pushes LNG and pipeline import prices higher in Europe and Asia as China, Korea, India and Pakistan seek spot replacements.
  2. Undamaged parts of Qatar's LNG facilities will take 3–4 months to reach full loading once the war ends, and Qatar's planned expansion of roughly 30 MT per year is delayed or halted.
  3. Asian economies face an oil shock comparable to the 1970s with fuel and product rationing spreading, and if the Strait of Hormuz stays mostly closed another 3–4 weeks, physical shortages may intensify and curtail economic activity and global trade.

Related Articles:

  • Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026 — Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
  • You Can’t Print Molecules — Rebuilding after a disruption to a key shipping strait would require governments to finance defense, strategic reserves, domestic energy production, and infrastructure at the same time that inflation expectations are raising funding costs. The author argues capital will rotate out of asset-light sectors that thrived on open sea lanes and cheap energy into asset-heavy physical ones.
  • Global Economics Comment: Supply Shocks from the War in Iran Are Mostly Limited to Energy — Analysts forecast 2.6% global growth on an annual average basis, down from 2.9% before the war in Iran, with headline inflation of 2.9% versus 2.3% prior. They argue the supply risk is mostly confined to energy, limiting the chance of a repeat of the severe shipping disruptions and second-round inflation effects seen in 2021-2022.

AI Summary. China graduates about 5x as many medical and biomedical students as the US each year, 7x as many engineers, and nearly double the number of science and engineering PhDs, while one-sixth to one-fifth of US science and engineering graduates are themselves Chinese. One study found returning Chinese scientists lead-author 2.5x more papers than peers who stay in the US.

Tanner Greer Scholar's Stage
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Greer argues that the scale and intensity of investment in science in China suggests that “even if you believe that political instability or economic uncertainty might arrest China’s upward climb, that might not change the trajectory of Chinese science.”

Is China outpacing the US in producing scientists and engineers?

Core argument: China graduates five times as many medical and biomedical students, seven times as many engineers, and two-and-a-half times as many undergraduates with artificial intelligence research experience as the United States each year.

The scale of Chinese scientific production is in part a story about people. China graduates five times the number of medical and biomedical students than we do every year, seven times the number of engineers, and two-and-a-half times the number of undergraduates with research experience in artificial intelligence. Last year China graduated almost double the number of STEM PhD students than we did—and that number is actually worse than it sounds because—depending on the exact year you do the counting—between one sixth and one fifth of our STEM graduates are themselves Chinese. Many of these researchers go back. They go back partially because they are well compensated for doing so. They also go back because of the research opportunities afforded to them. A recent study found that returning Chinese scientists go on to become the lead author on 2.5 times more papers than their colleagues who stay in the United States. Many Chinese research labs have 30 or 40 people attached to them—the equivalent to a commercial research lab in the United States.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China graduates five times as many medical and biomedical students, seven times as many engineers, and two-and-a-half times as many undergraduates with artificial intelligence research experience as the United States each year.
  2. China graduated almost double the number of STEM PhD students as the United States, while between one sixth and one fifth of U.S. STEM graduates are themselves Chinese.
  3. A recent study found that Chinese scientists who return home go on to become lead author on 2.5 times more papers than colleagues who stay in the United States, and many Chinese research labs have 30 or 40 people attached to them.

Related Articles:

  • How China Is Outperforming the United States in Critical Technologies — The Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Critical Technology Tracker finds China leads in 57 of 64 critical technology categories while the United States leads in 7, and that China surpasses the United States in top-tier scientific publications across all 8 technology domains. In energy and environment China accounts for 46% of top-tier publications versus 10% for the United States.
  • Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire — Regrouping US college majors to match Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science and engineering to humanities and social sciences, the same ratio as in China. The author argues America's building slowdown reflects structural economic shifts—urbanization reached 70% by 1960 and 85% by 2020, shifting needs toward maintenance—rather than a lawyerly culture.
  • The US Is The World’s Science Superpower — But For How Long? — International students on temporary visas received more than a third of US science and engineering doctorates, including 59% in computer science, with most coming from China and India, and 77% of Chinese doctoral recipients said they intended to stay in the US. The US hosts 15% of the world's international students, down from 23%.

AI Summary. South Korean marriages rose 8.1% to 240,000, a third consecutive annual increase following more than a decade of decline. Officials attribute the recovery to demographic factors including a larger cohort in their early 30s, delayed pandemic weddings, and shifting attitudes toward marriage, and caution the demographic boost could fade.

Kim Jaewon Nikkei Asia
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The number of marriages in South Korea rose 8.1% y/y to 240,000, ~25% above the 2022 trough; 2025 was the third straight year of gains after a decade of decline between 2012–2022.

Are marriages rebounding after more than a decade of decline?

Core argument: South Korean marriages rose 8.1% to 240,000 in 2025, the third straight annual increase and above pre-COVID-19 levels, following more than a decade of decline through 2022, according to government figures.

A shift in social attitudes toward favoring marriage is helping lift wedding numbers in South Korea, as more young adults say tying the knot is necessary despite persistent economic and demographic pressures. The number of marriages in the country jumped 8.1%, to 240,000, in 2025 from a year earlier, marking the third straight annual increase, according to government figures. It comes after more than a decade of decline through 2022, with officials attributing the recovery to a mix of demographic factors, delayed pandemic weddings and shifting attitudes toward matrimony. The data also confirmed that South Koreans are continuing to marry later in life. The average age at first marriage stood at 33.9 for men and 31.6 for women, with the gender gap narrowing slightly. Officials said the marriage rebound partly reflects a normalization after pandemic disruptions, with 2025 figures surpassing pre-COVID-19 levels. However, they cautioned that the boost from demographics -- particularly a larger cohort in their early 30s -- could fade in coming years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. South Korean marriages rose 8.1% to 240,000 in 2025, the third straight annual increase and above pre-COVID-19 levels, following more than a decade of decline through 2022, according to government figures.
  2. Officials attribute South Korea's marriage recovery to a mix of demographic factors, delayed pandemic weddings and shifting attitudes, with more young adults saying marriage is necessary.
  3. South Koreans continue to marry later, with the average age at first marriage at 33.9 for men and 31.6 for women, and officials caution that the boost from a larger cohort in their early 30s could fade.

Related Articles:

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  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
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AI Summary. Ukraine's unmanned forces, which make up 2% of the army's headcount, claim responsibility for more than a third of Russian losses, with one drone brigade claiming a sixth. Its commander says drone units are ordered to target personnel rather than armour or equipment at least 30% of the time.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:

Ukraine claims December 2025 may have been a turning point, as verified Russian losses to Ukrainian drones exceeded Russian recruitment. “Ukrainian drones have killed or incapacitated at least 8,776 more soldiers than Russia has replaced.”

How large a share of enemy losses do drone units cause?

Core argument: Ukraine's unmanned forces, comprising just 2% of the army's headcount, claim more than a third of Russian losses, with commander Brovdi's "Madyar's birds" brigade alone claiming responsibility for a sixth.

Mr Brovdi’s [commander of Ukraine’s unmanned forces] drone brigade, codenamed “Madyar’s birds”, claims it has been responsible for a sixth of the Russian losses. The wider unmanned-forces grouping he now controls accounts for more than a third. Those forces make up just 2% of the Ukrainian army’s headcount. At the December peak, enemy losses reached 388 a day, equivalent to the assault component of an entire battalion. “If a battalion has no infantry left, the Russians don’t disband it but throw desk officers to the front,” Mr Brovdi says. “They are the easiest targets, because they can’t fight.” His soldiers are ordered to target personnel, rather than armour or other equipment, at least 30% of the time. Russia can only train and equip so many recruits; Mr Brovdi likens it to a cow, and his units to farmers. “We need to keep milking this cow, the Russian army, for everything it’s worth, exhausting it beyond its maximum capacity.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Ukraine's unmanned forces, comprising just 2% of the army's headcount, claim more than a third of Russian losses, with commander Brovdi's "Madyar's birds" brigade alone claiming responsibility for a sixth.
  2. Russian losses reached 388 a day at their December peak, equivalent to the assault component of an entire battalion, and Brovdi says depleted Russian battalions are refilled with desk officers he calls the easiest targets because they cannot fight.
  3. Brovdi orders his drone units to target personnel rather than armour or other equipment at least 30% of the time, describing the aim as exhausting the Russian army beyond its maximum capacity.

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  • Ukraine Reaches a Milestone: Making ‘China-Free’ Drones — Ukraine has produced drones built without Chinese components, though mass production remains unlikely because Chinese parts are much cheaper and China's manufacturing dominance makes any drone hard to classify as truly "China-free." Two Ukrainian companies making such drones were selected among 11 firms to compete for US Defense Department contracts for low-cost attack drones.
  • Can Drones Be Stockpiled? Europe Wrestles With Weapons Dilemma — European defense officials argue that small, cheap drones have proven as effective as heavy armour in Ukraine, but stockpiling millions of them risks holding weapons made obsolete within months by new software, radio frequencies, and autonomous navigation. Drones that dominate one week can be jammed or outclassed the next.
  • Why Every Country Needs To Master The Electric Tech Stack — Drones are the foundation of hard power in the early 21st century, so a country unable to produce them domestically is at a disadvantage. As electric motors overtake combustion engines as the core technology that makes machines move, the same supply chains and production processes used for electronics can also produce cars, drones, robots, and appliances.