Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, March 18, 2026

AI Summary. Bank tellers per branch fell steadily as automated teller machines spread, and total teller employment held up only because banking deregulation drove a rise in branch numbers; teller jobs are down nearly 40% from their peak. The author argues invoking this case for AI requires identifying an equivalent offsetting source of labor demand.

Paul Kedrosky Notes on Complexity
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ATM’s reduced demand for tellers per bank branch, but this was offset by an increased number of branches due to deregulation. Kedrosky notes, “aggregate numbers can hide substitution.” Total teller jobs are down ~40% from their peak.

Does the teller story support optimism about AI and jobs?

Core argument: Bank teller employment is down nearly 40% from its peak, falling once the regulatory tailwind faded and mobile banking added pressure.

While overall employment grew, tellers per branch fell steadily from ~1985 onward. That is the ATM effect, technology working exactly as you'd expect. Teller employment fell, even if it was masked by more branches appearing. What caused all the new branches? Technology? No. It was banking deregulation. The AI tale-tellers who invoke the comforting ATM story are arguing, even if they don't realize it, that some equivalent of Riegle-Neal is coming, some expansion in the demand for human labor that will offset AI's substitution effect at the task level. And that's possible. But it requires identifying what that force actually is, not just assuming it will materialize because it did once before under very different circumstances. The more honest read of the banking employment data is that the ATM case was more like a near-miss than a success story. Employment held up by coincidence, not by the magic of automation economics. Teller jobs eventually did collapse — they're down nearly 40% from peak — once the regulatory tailwind fell away. (And mobile banking provided a push too.)

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bank teller employment is down nearly 40% from its peak, falling once the regulatory tailwind faded and mobile banking added pressure.
  2. Tellers per branch fell steadily from about 1985 onward, the expected ATM substitution effect, while total teller employment was masked by a proliferation of branches driven by banking deregulation rather than technology.
  3. Invoking the ATM story for AI implicitly assumes some equivalent of Riegle-Neal will expand demand for human labor and offset task-level substitution, a force that must be identified rather than assumed.

Related Articles:

  • AI Tracker – The GDP Dividend; A Jobs Dilemma — Unemployment in occupations exposed to artificial intelligence rose to 3.8% from 3%, a larger increase than the 0.3 percentage point rise in the national rate, while unemployment in non-exposed occupations edged lower. The rise is concentrated among workers aged 34 and under, whose jobless rate jumped to 5.3% from 3%.
  • Tech Has Never Caused a Job Apocalypse. Don’t Bet on It Now — Labor Department data analyzed by researchers show the number of software developers up 5% year over year, a pace largely consistent with the past 23 years, while computer programmers declined slightly in line with a decades-long trend. The median young computer science graduate earned 63% more than the typical young graduate in 2024, up from 47% in 2009.
  • Looking for the Ladder — The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.

AI Summary. Rebuilding after a disruption to a key shipping strait would require governments to finance defense, strategic reserves, domestic energy production, and infrastructure at the same time that inflation expectations are raising funding costs. The author argues capital will rotate out of asset-light sectors that thrived on open sea lanes and cheap energy into asset-heavy physical ones.

Jeff Currie and James Gutman Carlyle
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The Red Sea oil trade never recovered from the Houthi strikes. Regardless of its outcome, the Iran war itself will accelerate the rotation towards physical assets as nations move to localize, diversify and create redundancy in their energy supply.

Does a shipping disruption shift capital from asset-light to asset-heavy sectors?

Core argument: Germany's 10-year bund auction technically failed, not for lack of liquidity but because the bond market is already pricing the inflationary impact, according to the author.

When the dust settles and the strait reopens — partially, gradually, and perhaps on Tehran’s terms — the cost of rebuilding will likely be enormous. Governments must simultaneously finance defense, rebuild strategic reserves, restart domestic energy production, and harden infrastructure. All of this comes at a moment when inflation expectations are driving the cost of funding sharply higher — Germany’s 10-year bund auction technically failed this week, not for lack of liquidity, but because the bond market is already pricing the inflationary impact. Where does the capital come from? Capital will flow from the sectors that prospered during the era of open sea lanes and cheap energy, asset light, into the sectors that will build the replacement, asset heavy. The rotation back toward physical assets is not a trade — it is a regime change.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Germany's 10-year bund auction technically failed, not for lack of liquidity but because the bond market is already pricing the inflationary impact, according to the author.
  2. The author argues that governments must simultaneously finance defense, rebuild strategic reserves, restart domestic energy production, and harden infrastructure, at a cost likely to be enormous once the strait reopens partially and gradually.
  3. The author expects capital to flow from the asset-light sectors that prospered under open sea lanes and cheap energy into the asset-heavy sectors that will build the replacement, describing the rotation as a regime change rather than a trade.

Related Articles:

  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.
  • The Old Economy Begins To Take Its Revenge — The author argues that capital rotates between the financial economy's asset-light booms and the physical economy, with commodity capacity constraints and the use of critical materials as geopolitical leverage now making returns on physical investment more attractive. In this view, higher interest rates reflect the better returns and capital spending needed to expand production capacity.
  • Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026 — Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.

AI Summary. Available spending data does not support the narrative of a bifurcated "K-shaped" consumer economy: surveys show households earning under $50,000 reported spending growth of 5%, versus 4.6% for those earning over $100,000. Government data show the top income decile's share of aggregate spending at 22.8%, down from 23.4% a year earlier.

Ernie Tedeschi Stripe Economics
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Using internal Stripe payment data, Tedeschi finds that spending growth of households in low-income zip codes has outpaced that of households in high-income zip codes since 2023, thus showing no evidence of the “K-shaped economy” in the consumer sector.

Does spending data support a bifurcated consumer economy?

Core argument: Households making under $50,000 reported spending growth of 5% over 2025, versus 4.6% for households making over $100,000, which does not support a K-shaped bifurcation narrative.

While consumer spending by income group is not tracked well in real time by any single government source, the available data does not support a bifurcation narrative. Multiple spending surveys show low-income household spending [growth] performing at least on par with high-income households over 2025. Households making under $50,000 reported spending growth of 5% over 2025, versus 4.6% for households making over $100,000. While inflation-adjusted retail spending for lower-income households grew modestly slower than it did for top-income households in 2023 and 2024, the gap converged through 2025—low- and upper-income consumption grew at similar rates. This is consistent with lagged but larger and more-reliable government data, which shows the top income decile’s share of aggregate spending at 22.8% in 2024, down from 23.4% in 2023 and below the recent peak of 23.9% in 2016, Using Stripe data, we can also crudely proxy for consumer spending by income quartile, based on consumer [Merchant Category Codes] transactions and average income in the ZIP code of the spender. This data similarly shows no evidence of a high-income divergence: if high-income ZIP codes were seeing faster spending growth than low-income ZIPs, the ratio of the two would be rising. But in fact, the ratio has been falling since 2023. So at least on Stripe, lower-income ZIP codes have seen more robust spending growth than the top.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Households making under $50,000 reported spending growth of 5% over 2025, versus 4.6% for households making over $100,000, which does not support a K-shaped bifurcation narrative.
  2. The top income decile's share of aggregate spending fell to 22.8% in 2024 from 23.4% in 2023, below the recent peak of 23.9% in 2016, according to lagged government data.
  3. Stripe transaction data proxied by ZIP-code average income shows the ratio of high-income to low-income ZIP spending falling since 2023, with lower-income ZIP codes seeing more robust spending growth.

Related Articles:

  • Unprecedented ‘Jobless Boom’ Tests Limits of US Economic Expansion — Forecasters expect US gross domestic product to have expanded 2.7% over the year while employment barely grew, a divergence drawing comparisons to the "jobless recovery" that followed the early-2000s technology stock collapse. Unlike that episode, which began with a recession, this "jobless boom" is occurring without one — a first in the postwar era.
  • 2026 Outlook: The Year Ahead In 14 Sparks — Slowing US growth — attributed to trade frictions, immigration restrictions and risks from a K-shaped economy — combined with inflation stuck near 3% amounts to a stagflation environment, even as the medium-term outlook looks strong. Real business investment growth is concentrated in information processing equipment such as computers, data centers and software, while non-AI capital spending growth is roughly zero.
  • Inflation Is Down, But Americans Still Feel an Affordability Squeeze — Average US weekly pay has risen 31% over six years, outpacing prices, but inflation erased most of those gains. Grocery prices are up about 30% since early 2020, a young married couple now needs 70% of annual household income for an average down payment versus 58% in 2019.

AI Summary. Consumer sentiment about the economy has worsened even as the economy and affordability continued improving at roughly the same pace, falling below levels seen during the financial crisis and the pandemic. Measures of economic conditions increasingly track how people feel about the party in power, with Democratic and Republican views of the economy flipping after the change in administration.

Jason Furman New York Times
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Despite the AI buildout and changes to tariff and immigration policy, key macro indicators were largely unchanged between 2024 and 2025. Overall consumer sentiment continues to decline despite a sharp increase in Republican sentiment after the election.

Does consumer sentiment reflect the economy or partisan loyalty?

Core argument: Consumer sentiment fell below its levels during the financial crisis and the pandemic even though the economy and affordability improved in 2025 at roughly the same pace as in 2024, and gasoline prices were lower.

Even though the economy and affordability continued to improve at roughly the same pace in 2025 as in 2024, consumer sentiment about the economy worsened. In 2024, analysts were puzzling about the “vibecession,” people feeling badly despite the overall numbers looking good. Since then, we have fallen into something more like avibe depression, with consumer sentiment falling below its levels during the financial crisis and the pandemic. And this was with lower gasoline prices. I expect the data for sentiment this month to set new lows as consumers react to rising gas prices and the news coverage of the Middle East. There are many explanations for negative feelings about the economy, including the legitimate concern that the purchasing power of wages is below the track it was on before Covid; public frustration with high prices even if inflation is moderating; and a failure to consider the ways that wages have risen alongside those prices. Perhaps most important, measures of how the economy is doing are increasingly measures of how people feel about the party in power. Democratic and Republican views of the economy flipped after Mr. Trump returned to office, although Democrats have become even more negative about the economy than Republicans were about Mr. Biden’s. When politics changes, perceptions follow — even if paychecks, prices and jobs do not.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Consumer sentiment fell below its levels during the financial crisis and the pandemic even though the economy and affordability improved in 2025 at roughly the same pace as in 2024, and gasoline prices were lower.
  2. Democratic and Republican views of the economy flipped after Trump returned to office, with Democrats becoming even more negative about the economy than Republicans had been under Biden.
  3. Explanations offered for negative economic sentiment include wage purchasing power sitting below its pre-Covid track, frustration with high prices despite moderating inflation, and a failure to consider that wages have risen alongside those prices.

Related Articles:

  • Asymmetric Amplification and the Consumer Sentiment Gap — Consumer sentiment surveys show Republican respondents' views swing about ±15 index points relative to predicted levels depending on which party holds the presidency, while Democrats' views swing only about ±6 points. The authors estimate that adjusting for this asymmetric amplification shrinks the gap between observed and predicted consumer sentiment by 30%.
  • Bad News Bias in Gasoline Price Coverage — An analysis of over one million television transcripts finds that coverage of gasoline prices shows a negative news bias, ramping up sharply once the nominal price reaches $3.50 a gallon, most steeply at Fox News. Because that threshold is fixed in nominal terms, the inflation-adjusted trigger has fallen by one-third.
  • The Cost of Money is Part of the Cost of Living: New Evidence on the Consumer Sentiment Anomaly — Variation in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index that inflation and unemployment cannot explain is strongly correlated with growth in consumer borrowing costs, such as mortgage and car loan rates. The authors estimate that including interest payments and homeownership costs in the consumer price index would raise measured inflation from 3% to 9%.

AI Summary. Across countries, unexpectedly higher government deficits relative to earlier International Monetary Fund forecasts are associated with unexpectedly higher inflation, measured by each factor's contribution to the increase in public debt, a relationship the author finds statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with a fiscal channel for inflation.

Ricardo Reis London School of Economics and Political Science
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Reis compares the IMF’s 2019 forecasts of increases in the public debt over the next 5 years with the actual increases. In OECD countries where deficits turned out to be higher than the IMF expected, inflation also turned out to be unexpectedly higher.

Do unexpectedly larger government deficits coincide with unexpectedly higher inflation across countries?

Core argument: Across the IMF World Economic Outlook country sample, unexpected increases in public debt from unexpected deficits and from inflation over 2019–25 show a statistically significant positive relation.

To inspect the fiscal mechanism, I compare the IMF’s 2019 forecasts for the increase in the public debt over the next 5 years, with the actual increase that we saw. The IMF also puts out forecasts for each term in the accounting identity linking current to future debt in equation (7). Using these forecasts, I constructed the expected increase in debt due to expected inflation, interest rates, economic growth, and fiscal deficits. Then, using the April 2025 actual values for what each of these variables were, I constructed the actual increase in public debt due to the actual evolution of each of these four variables. Subtracting one from the other gives the unexpected increase in public debt, broken down into four unexpected terms, for each country in the WEO sample. Figure 9 plots two of these terms: the unexpected increase in public debt due to unexpected deficits, and the unexpected increase in the debt due to inflation in 2019-25 per country. The figure shows a clear positive relation, which is statistically significant. This says that for countries where deficits turned out to be higher than the IMF expected, inflation also turned out to be unexpectedly higher, using the common metric of their impact on the public debt. The fiscal mechanism is validated using the expectations data. If fiscal developments lead the IMF to raise its expected deficits, then this past experience should lead it to raise its expected inflation as well.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Across the IMF World Economic Outlook country sample, unexpected increases in public debt from unexpected deficits and from inflation over 2019–25 show a statistically significant positive relation.
  2. Comparing the IMF's 2019 five-year forecasts for debt, inflation, interest rates, growth, and deficits with April 2025 actual values decomposes the unexpected increase in public debt into four unexpected terms.
  3. Countries whose deficits turned out higher than the IMF expected also saw unexpectedly higher inflation, measured by each variable's impact on public debt, which the author reads as validating the fiscal mechanism.

Related Articles:

  • Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020-2022 — Across 21 economies, the authors find that headline and core inflation responded positively to a measure of government spending increases scaled by pre-pandemic debt-to-GDP and average debt duration. Estimated coefficients of 0.4–0.5 suggest 40–50% of the extra spending was financed through inflation, with the rest through conventional public finance.
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • Global Debt Report 2026 — Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.

Thursday, March 19, 2026

AI Summary. Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.

Hendrik Bessembinder Arizona State University
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Btw January 1926 and December 2025, 60% of US firms had negative total returns relative to T-bills. 46 firms accounted for half of the $91T in net wealth creation over the period, and 1,082 firms, 3.7%, accounted for 100% of net wealth creation.

Do a few firms drive a century of stock market wealth?

Core argument: U.S. publicly traded stocks generated some $91 trillion in shareholder wealth enhancement over a 100-year period in the CRSP data, according to the author's calculations.

Two central conclusions emerge from this study of long-term investment outcomes in the CRSP data. First, stocks publicly traded in the U.S. markets were, despite periodic volatility, a tremendous source of wealth enhancement, totaling some $91 trillion by my calculations over the 100-year period. Second, long-term stock market outcomes demonstrate strong positive skewness, and the success of the overall markets is attributable to a substantial extent to very strong outcomes for a relatively few firms. This skewness is of practical importance. Financial planning is often based on expected or mean future returns. The outcome of such an exercise is informative, but it should be recognized that in a skewed distribution most possible future outcomes are less than the expected or mean outcome. While the distribution of possible outcomes to diversified portfolios is less skewed than for individual stocks, positive skewness is present at long time horizons in any case. Analyses focused on the median outcome, or better yet on the entire distribution of potential outcomes, are more informative. The historical U.S. stock return data shows that both buy-and-hold returns and dollar based measures of shareholder wealth enhancement are dominated by relatively few high performing firms.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. publicly traded stocks generated some $91 trillion in shareholder wealth enhancement over a 100-year period in the CRSP data, according to the author's calculations.
  2. Long-term U.S. stock market outcomes display strong positive skewness, with overall market success attributable to a substantial extent to very strong outcomes for a relatively few firms.
  3. Because most possible outcomes in a skewed distribution fall below the mean, the author argues that analyses focused on median outcomes or the entire distribution are more informative, noting positive skewness persists for diversified portfolios at long horizons.

Related Articles:

  • Which U.S. Stocks Generated the Highest Long-Term Returns? — Of the 29,078 U.S. common stocks in a database spanning nearly a century, 51.6% had negative cumulative returns, while 17 stocks returned more than 5m% — led by Altria at 265m%. Those top performers averaged annualized returns of just 13.47%, underscoring the value of time invested.
  • Long-Term Shareholder Returns: Evidence From 64,000 Global Stocks — A study of about 64,000 global stocks estimates net global stock market wealth creation of $75.7tn, with returns highly concentrated: the top 159 firms (0.25%) account for half of net wealth creation and the top 1,526 (2.39%) account for all of it. Fewer than half of stocks beat one-month US Treasury bills, 42.6% of non-US and 44.8% of US stocks.
  • Entire Market Structure Exposed To A Big Move — The share of S&P 500 stocks moving more than 10% in a single day has increased, and high dispersion alongside low implied correlation suggests stocks are trading more on their own fundamentals. Combined with extremely elevated options activity, these larger idiosyncratic moves leave market structure more vulnerable to an abrupt, outsized move.

AI Summary. The annual compensation gap between top industry and academic artificial intelligence researchers widened from roughly $294,000 to $1.5m, coinciding with accelerating academic out-migration toward large incumbent technology firms. Researchers who move to industry cut paper production by about 63% while increasing patent filings nearly sixfold, consistent with a shift from open science toward proprietary innovation.

Ufuk Akcigit, Craig Chikis, Emin Dinlersoz, and Nathan Goldschlag University of Chicago
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In 2001, 48% of AI researchers were in industry; by 2019—two years after the landmark transformer paper—68% were. Over this period, the compensation gap btw industry and academia for top 1% researchers widened markedly, from ~$294k to ~$1.5mm annually.

How does the pay gap shift AI research from publishing to patenting?

Core argument: The annual compensation gap between top industry and academic AI researchers widened from roughly $294,000 to $1.5 million, a fivefold increase since 2001, per a dataset linking publication records to administrative employer–employee data.

Using a novel dataset linking publication records to administrative employer–employee data, we document profound changes in AI talent allocation over two decades. The compensation gap between top industry and academic AI researchers widened from roughly $294,000 to $1.5 million annually—a fivefold increase since 2001. This divergence coincided with accelerating academic out-migration, particularly among early-career researchers, and an increasing concentration of talent flows toward large, incumbent technology firms rather than startups. These patterns reflect a structural reorganization of frontier AI research. Researchers who transition to industry reduce paper production by approximately 63% while increasing patent filings nearly sixfold, consistent with a shift from open science toward proprietary and commercially oriented innovation. Even among those who remain in academia, moonlighting has risen substantially. Frontier AI research has become increasingly capital intensive and concentrated within large firms. Universities may no longer be able to compete at the frontier of computational scale, but they continue to play a central role in preserving open science, training general human capital, and providing outside options in the market for research talent.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The annual compensation gap between top industry and academic AI researchers widened from roughly $294,000 to $1.5 million, a fivefold increase since 2001, per a dataset linking publication records to administrative employer–employee data.
  2. AI researchers who move to industry reduce paper production by approximately 63% while increasing patent filings nearly sixfold, consistent with a shift from open science toward proprietary, commercially oriented innovation.
  3. Academic out-migration of AI researchers accelerated, particularly among early-career researchers, with talent flows concentrating toward large, incumbent technology firms rather than startups, while moonlighting rose among those remaining in academia.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Refining margins have jumped to nearly $50 a barrel from $20, approaching record highs, pushing wholesale fuel prices sharply higher: diesel near $185 a barrel, jet fuel near $150, and both fuel oil and gasoline above $100. Diesel is a particular concern because it powers construction, transport and farming.

Javier Blas Bloomberg
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WTI is up ~70% since January, but still under $100 a barrel. US wholesale gasoline and jet fuel are up ~84%, and worryingly, wholesale diesel is up ~109%. Refinery margins are nearing 2022’s all-time high, ~$50 per barrel, vs. $20 per barrel in January

Do refining margins matter more than crude prices for fuel costs?

Core argument: U.S. refinery margins, measured as two barrels of gasoline and one of distillate per three barrels of WTI crude, have jumped to nearly $50 a barrel from $20 in January, approaching 2022's high, and the cost of everyday fuels has surged.

For every three barrels of WTI crude the refinery processes, it makes two barrels of gasoline and one barrel of distillate fuel such as diesel or jet fuel. Measured by that benchmark, refinery margins are approaching 2022’s all-time high point, having jumped to nearly $50 a barrel from $20 in January. Consequently, the cost of everyday fuels has surged. Look at what Main Street buys. In the most extreme case, wholesale diesel prices have spiked to nearly $185 a barrel. Jet fuel is flirting with $150, and both fuel oil and gasoline are commanding $100-plus prices in the wholesale market. Diesel is a particular concern because it fuels the American economy: construction, transport and farming. Diesel engines are famously reliable and slow, designed for strength not speed. Its price inflation is similar: It is grinding ever higher and will endure a long while.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. refinery margins, measured as two barrels of gasoline and one of distillate per three barrels of WTI crude, have jumped to nearly $50 a barrel from $20 in January, approaching 2022's high, and the cost of everyday fuels has surged.
  2. Wholesale diesel prices have spiked to nearly $185 a barrel, jet fuel is near $150, and both fuel oil and gasoline are commanding $100-plus wholesale prices.
  3. Diesel is a particular concern because it fuels American construction, transport and farming, and its price inflation is grinding ever higher and will endure a long while.

Related Articles:

  • Iran and the US Economy — Commodity strategists project Brent crude to average $98 over two months—40% above the prior year's average—before falling to $71 by late 2026, with a 60-day disruption of oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz pushing prices to $145. On these forecasts, headline inflation is projected at 2.9%, growth at 2.2%, and peak unemployment at 4.6%.
  • Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026 — Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
  • Markets Are Still Sanguine About the Oil Outlook — Crude oil from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE equaled about 20% of global supply and over 40% of crude exports, and much is now unavailable with Strait of Hormuz traffic near zero, yet Brent futures trade near $103/barrel. Past smaller disruptions required larger, slower price adjustments.

AI Summary. Statistics Canada estimates the country's population fell by about 102,436 people, or 0.2%, over the course of a year to 41.47 million, its first annual decline on record, driven by a steep reduction in temporary residents. Deaths exceeded births in the latest quarter, the second consecutive quarterly population drop.

Robb Stewart Wall Street Journal
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Canada’s population fell by .2% or 103,504 people in 2025, as immigration policy changes curtailed inflows. Births fell short of deaths by 781 people in Q4. 83,168 permanent immigrants entered Canada in Q4, down ~ 20% y/y.

Are fewer temporary residents driving Canada's first recorded annual population decline?

Core argument: Canada's population fell by an estimated 102,436 people, or 0.2%, over 2025 to 41.47 million as of January 1, the first annual decline on record, according to preliminary Statistics Canada estimates.

Preliminary demographic estimates [by Statistics Canada] indicate the country’s population stood at 41.47 million as of January 1, after it shrank by 103,504 people, or 0.2%, in the final quarter of last year. That marked a second straight quarter of decline, the first back-to-back drop recorded, and outweighed the increase in the population over the first six months of last year. As a result, the population fell by an estimated 102,436 over the course of 2025, a dip of 0.2%. The contraction was driven by a steep reduction in temporary residents, exacerbating ongoing demographic aging. The change from quarterly population growth highs above 3% as recently as mid-2024 has broad implications for the economy, the labor market and housing demand. Births minus deaths was a negative 781 in the fourth quarter, meaning that there were more deaths than births in Canada in the latest quarter.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Canada's population fell by an estimated 102,436 people, or 0.2%, over 2025 to 41.47 million as of January 1, the first annual decline on record, according to preliminary Statistics Canada estimates.
  2. Canada's population shrank by 103,504, or 0.2%, in the fourth quarter, a second consecutive quarterly decline and the first back-to-back drop recorded, driven by a steep reduction in temporary residents.
  3. Births minus deaths in Canada was negative 781 in the fourth quarter, and the shift from quarterly population growth above 3% as recently as mid-2024 has broad implications for the economy, the labor market and housing demand.

Related Articles:

  • Immigration Surge Fuels Male Population Boom in Canada — Canada's adult male population grew 3.4% over the past year versus 2.9% for women, the widest gap in nearly 50 years of records, as a higher share of male newcomers shifts the gender ratio. Among those aged 25 to 44, men outnumber women by 141,000, against a long-run average of zero.
  • A “Heat Dome” of Immigration — Canada has adopted some of the most aggressive immigration policies in the OECD, adding 1.273m residents in a year to reach a population of 41m — proportionally equivalent to the US admitting more than 10m immigrants annually. Canadians are increasingly angry as housing prices soar, sprawl expands, and traffic worsens.
  • How Canada Is Responding to American Mercantilism — US tariffs as high as 35% on certain goods not compliant with the US-Mexico-Canada trade agreement have coincided with falling Canadian exports, weaker business confidence and investment, a softening labor market, and a contraction in Canadian output. Canada has responded by aiming to double non-US exports within 10 years, expanding fiscal spending and deregulation, and keeping monetary policy loose.

AI Summary. Taiwan is marketing drones built without Chinese parts to the US and allies concerned about Chinese espionage and supply-chain control, with production rising from about 10,000 units to more than 12x that level and exports climbing more than 35-fold to roughly 123,000 units. The Czech Republic and Poland were the largest buyers.

Economist Staff The Economist
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Taiwan’s drone production increased from ~10,000 units in 2024 to ~135,000 last year. The country plans to be able to produce 180,000 “non-red” drones (those excluding any Chinese component) annually by the end of 2028.

Is demand rising for drones built without Chinese parts?

Core argument: Taiwan's UAV production rose from about 10,000 units in 2024 to more than 12 times that in 2025, with exports up more than 35-fold to roughly 123,000 units, nearly all of its output.

Taiwan positions itself as a supplier of “non-red” unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs—ie, without Chinese parts—to America, its allies and other countries worried about China’s espionage and control over industrial supply chains. Taiwan’s production of UAVs has increased from about 10,000 units in 2024 to more than 12 times that in 2025. Its exports rose more than 35-fold to about 123,000 units last year—almost all its output. The Czech Republic was its biggest buyer, followed by Poland (see chart). Industry insiders say their purchases mostly went to Ukraine, where many are used on the battlefield, giving valuable feedback on their performance. Another bumper year for exports is expected in 2026, after reaching 85,500 units in the first two months. Taiwan has pledged to build an entirely non-red UAV industry by the end of 2026, with annual output of 180,000 units by 2028. Last year it also promised to buy more than 200,000 drones for its own armed forces by 2033.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Taiwan's UAV production rose from about 10,000 units in 2024 to more than 12 times that in 2025, with exports up more than 35-fold to roughly 123,000 units, nearly all of its output.
  2. The Czech Republic was the largest buyer of Taiwanese drones, followed by Poland, and industry insiders say those purchases mostly went to Ukraine, where battlefield use generates feedback on performance.
  3. Taiwan has pledged to build an entirely "non-red" UAV industry free of Chinese parts by the end of 2026, with annual output of 180,000 units by 2028 and purchases of more than 200,000 drones for its own armed forces by 2033.

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