Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Monday, March 9, 2026

AI Summary. With crude unable to reach world markets through the Strait of Hormuz, Iraq has cut output by more than two-thirds and producers in Kuwait and Abu Dhabi have slowed production as storage tanks fill. JPMorgan Chase analysts estimate regional daily output could fall by around 9m barrels, close to a tenth of global demand.

Joe Wallace, Summer Said, Rebecca Feng and Georgi Kantchev Wall Street Journal
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US oil prices briefly broke $100/barrel for the 1st time since Russia invaded Ukraine. In real terms, crude prices are ~20% below their 2022 level, ~33% under the level set in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, and only half their level preceding the GFC.

How much oil output falls when Gulf shipping stalls?

Core argument: JPMorgan Chase analyst Natasha Kaneva estimates Persian Gulf daily output could fall by more than 4 million barrels if the strait remains closed through Friday, with the decline reaching around 9 million barrels by the end of March — almost a 10th of global demand.

Unable to ship crude to world markets, much bigger producers in Iraq began to run out of places to put it. The country cut output by more than two-thirds. Tanks in Kuwait were next to fill up. On Saturday, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company signaled it too was slowing production so tanks didn’t overflow. If the strait is still closed this Friday, daily output in the region could fall by more than four million barrels, JPMorgan Chase analyst Natasha Kaneva estimates. The decline could reach around nine million by the end of March, representing almost a 10th of global demand. The strait isn’t officially closed or physically blocked, and a small number of vessels have traversed it, some carrying Iranian crude. Still, on Sunday, more than 1,000 ships were waiting to pass through, their owners and sailors scared of being attacked after strikes on at least nine vessels that left one crew member dead.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. JPMorgan Chase analyst Natasha Kaneva estimates Persian Gulf daily output could fall by more than 4 million barrels if the strait remains closed through Friday, with the decline reaching around 9 million barrels by the end of March — almost a 10th of global demand.
  2. Iraq cut crude output by more than two-thirds as storage filled, tanks in Kuwait filled next, and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company signaled on Saturday it was slowing production so tanks didn't overflow.
  3. The strait is neither officially closed nor physically blocked, and a small number of vessels have traversed it, some carrying Iranian crude, yet more than 1,000 ships were waiting to pass on Sunday after strikes on at least nine vessels left one crew member dead.

Related Articles:

  • Global Economics Comment: Global Economic Impacts of the War in Iran — The main economic risk to major economies from the war in Iran is that higher energy prices lift inflation and slow growth, with oil near $80/bbl, up 14% since late February. Analysts project oil moderating to $76/bbl and then $65/bbl as the risk premium fades in a structurally oversupplied market.
  • Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026 — Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
  • The Risks to Energy Prices From Iran — Tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which normally carries a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas supply, appears significantly disrupted as shippers, producers, and insurers turn cautious. Analysts estimate an $18/bbl risk premium in crude, and project European gas and spot liquefied natural gas could reach about $25/mmBtu if flows halt for a month.

AI Summary. Saudi Arabia's 746-mile East-West pipeline to the Red Sea can bypass the Strait of Hormuz for up to 5m barrels a day, and a UAE pipeline to the Gulf of Oman for 1.5m, against roughly 20m barrels of daily crude and refined product flows through the strait.

Javier Blas Bloomberg
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The Saudis’ East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea and the UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah Pipeline to the Gulf of Oman could divert up to 6.5 to 7mm bpd. Pre-war, ~20mm barrels of crude and refined products flowed through the Strait of Hormuz.

How much oil can pipelines move around a blocked strait?

Core argument: The Strait of Hormuz, closed by Iran, is a choke point for about 20 million barrels a day of crude and refined products, equal to a fifth of global consumption.

The East-West pipeline [is a 746 mile conduit] crisscrossing the Arabian Peninsula from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. Its raison d’être is to meet this historic moment: Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The Saudis built it 45 years ago thinking that, one day, Tehran would manage to do what was then unthinkable and halt shipments through the narrow waterway. The strait is a choke point for about 20 million barrels a day of crude and refined products — equal to a fifth of global consumption. The Saudi pipeline can’t offset all of that, nowhere near. But it can provide a workaround for as much as 5 million daily barrels. Another pipeline, owned by the United Arab Emirates, offers a separate bypass option to the Gulf of Oman for 1.5 million barrels. In an emergency, the UAE can probably push it close to 2 million. Right now about 25 supertankers, each capable of loading about 2 million barrels, have diverted from their original destinations and are headed toward the new pickup points. It remains to be seen how the ports will cope with these armadas.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Strait of Hormuz, closed by Iran, is a choke point for about 20 million barrels a day of crude and refined products, equal to a fifth of global consumption.
  2. Saudi Arabia's 746-mile East-West pipeline, built 45 years ago in anticipation of a Hormuz closure, can bypass the strait for as much as 5 million barrels a day, far short of offsetting the full flow.
  3. A UAE-owned pipeline offers a separate bypass to the Gulf of Oman for 1.5 million barrels a day, and close to 2 million in an emergency, as about 25 supertankers divert toward the new pickup points.

Related Articles:

  • Power Politics: Energy Self-Sufficiency in a Modern Mercantilist World — China leads in adding power to the grid, with more than 30,000 miles of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines versus zero in the US and lead times for large transformers of 48 weeks against a US average of 143 weeks. This positions China to accommodate new demand sources such as artificial intelligence.
  • China’s Secret Stockpiles Have Been A Great Success—So Far — A data firm estimates China's observable oil stocks reached a record 1.2bn barrels, triple the size of America's reserves, with storage capacity of 2bn barrels only 58% full and traders expecting stockpiling to continue. Analysts also note metal imports have soared even as China's metal-consuming industries have slumped.
  • The Rise Of The Security Premium — Energy security concerns, not environmentalism, are argued to drive the buildout of solar, wind, and nuclear power, since domestic generation avoids chokepoints like Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Panama Canal. China and India are expected to demand higher strategic stockpiles of energy and other critical commodities, repricing security above efficiency.

AI Summary. American workers over 50 earned roughly 35% more per week than workers under 30 in the late 1970s, a gap that widened to about 55% at its early-2010s peak before narrowing to 47%. Their advantage in access to top-quarter-paying management jobs also widened, from about 5 to 8.3 percentage points.

Nicola Bianchi and Matteo Paradisi Aspen Economic Strategy Group
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In the late 1970s, US workers over 50 earned ~35% more per week than those under 30. By 2024, older workers earned ~47% more. Longer working lives and entrenchment in managerial positions decreased opportunities for younger workers.

How has the pay gap between older and younger workers changed?

Core argument: U.S. workers over 50 earned 47% more per week than workers under 30 in 2024, down from a peak of about 55% in the early 2010s but up from roughly 35% in the late 1970s.

In the late 1970s, workers over 50 earned roughly 35% more per week than workers under 30. Over the following four decades, this gap widened steadily, reaching a peak in the early 2010s, when older workers earned about 55% more. It has narrowed somewhat in the last decade, as the oldest baby boomers have begun to retire and leave the very top of the wage distribution, but even in 2024, older workers still earned 47% more per week than younger workers on average. And because working lives are now longer, with many employees remaining in senior roles well into their late sixties, there is little reason to expect this pay gap to return to the more modest levels observed in the 1970s without intervention from firms or policymakers. Older workers have pulled further ahead of younger workers in access to desirable, higher-paying managerial jobs, as displayed in figure 4. In the mid-1970s, workers over 50 were about 5 percentage points more likely than workers under 30 to be employed in management occupations in the top quarter of the wage distribution. By 2024, this gap had widened to almost 8.3 percentage points. Over the same period, these higher-paying managerial roles grew from just over 5% to a little more than 7% of full-time private-sector jobs. 

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. workers over 50 earned 47% more per week than workers under 30 in 2024, down from a peak of about 55% in the early 2010s but up from roughly 35% in the late 1970s.
  2. The gap between workers over 50 and workers under 30 in holding management jobs in the top quarter of the wage distribution widened from about 5 percentage points in the mid-1970s to almost 8.3 percentage points by 2024.
  3. Higher-paying managerial roles grew from just over 5% to a little more than 7% of full-time private-sector jobs between the mid-1970s and 2024, while longer working lives leave little reason to expect the age pay gap to return to 1970s levels without action by firms or policymakers.

Related Articles:

  • Countries for Old Men: An Analysis of the Age Pay Gap — Administrative data on 38mm Italian and German workers show wages of older workers grew much faster than those of younger workers, a widening age pay gap the authors also find in fourteen other high-income countries. The authors argue workforce aging leaves fewer top hierarchy slots for younger workers, slowing promotions.
  • Changes in Milestones of Adulthood — Among US young adults aged 25–34, the share completing a high school or college degree rose 9 percentage points to 83%, while the share ever married fell 18 points to 44% and the share living with a child fell 16 points to 39%. Economic milestones became more common as family formation milestones became less common.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.

AI Summary. A proposed one-time 5% California tax on the worldwide net worth of individuals above $1bn would have positive net present value only if its revenue exceeds the present value of income taxes lost to departing billionaires. The authors' simulations yield negative net present value in 71% of draws, averaging -$24.7bn.

Benjamin Jaros, Joshua Rauh, Greg Kearney, John Doran, et al. Stanford University
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A simulation study of the proposed CA wealth tax on billionaires, finds a 71% chance that it will have a negative NPV, with a mean of −$24.7 billion. The PV of permanently lost income tax revenue more than offsets the one-time wealth tax collection.

Does a one-time wealth tax on billionaires raise net revenue?

Core argument: Simulations drawing from plausible ranges for discount rates, wealth-tax revenue, and lost income tax collections yield a negative net present value for California's proposed Billionaire Tax Act in 71% of draws, with a mean of −$24.7 billion, a median of −$19.1 billion, and a standard deviation of $38.4 billion.

The California Billionaire Tax Act of 2026 proposes a one-time 5% tax on the worldwide net worth of individuals exceeding $1 billion. This measure applies to tangible and intangible assets, including those held through trusts and certain recent transfers. Our proxy for these taxable assets in this dataset is the “Net Worth” of each California-based billionaire listed in the 2025 Forbes Billionaires listing. Our preferred revenue estimate implies that approximately 55% of the billionaire income tax base has or will avoid the tax, nearly double the 30.7% break-even threshold under even [proponent’s optimistic] assumption of six confirmed departures at a 1.5% real discount rate, and approaching the 61.4% threshold at 3%. The wealth tax has positive net present value only if the one-time revenue exceeds the present value of foregone income taxes from departing billionaires. We simulate draws from uniform distributions over the plausible ranges for discount rates, revenue from the wealth tax, and lost income tax collections; 71% of draws yield a negative net present value, with a mean of [-]$24.7 billion, with a median of −$19.1 billion, and standard deviation of $38.4 billion. [See Figure 3 in gallery]. These estimates are conservative in that we exclude all non-income-tax fiscal spillovers, including lost sales tax, property tax, and business activity, such as employing other income taxpayers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Simulations drawing from plausible ranges for discount rates, wealth-tax revenue, and lost income tax collections yield a negative net present value for California's proposed Billionaire Tax Act in 71% of draws, with a mean of −$24.7 billion, a median of −$19.1 billion, and a standard deviation of $38.4 billion.
  2. The authors' preferred revenue estimate implies roughly 55% of the billionaire income tax base has avoided or will avoid the proposed one-time 5% tax on worldwide net worth above $1 billion, nearly double the 30.7% break-even threshold at a 1.5% real discount rate and approaching the 61.4% threshold at 3%.
  3. The authors describe their estimates as conservative because they exclude all non-income-tax fiscal spillovers, including lost sales tax, property tax, and business activity such as employing other income taxpayers.

Related Articles:

  • Behavioral Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners: Evidence from California — A California ballot measure raising top marginal income tax rates by up to 3 percentage points prompted an additional 0.8% of the affected tax base to leave the state, with an estimated income elasticity of 2.5–3.2 for high earners who stayed. The authors estimate these responses eroded 45.2% of windfall revenues within one year and 60.9% within two.
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
  • The Robin Hood State Is Coming For The Rich — In the US, increased redistribution has offset rising pre-tax inequality: Congressional Budget Office data show inequality of taxable income near record highs while inequality after taxes and transfers was lower than in several earlier years and only slightly above 1986. The top 1% of earners paid 40% of income tax in 2022, up from 33% in 2001.

AI Summary. Between 2010 and 2022, taxpayers earning $1m or more in California, New York, Texas, and Florida accounted for about 50% of US capital gains realizations on average. Over that period Florida rose from 8% to 16.7% of millionaire capital gains income while New York fell from 14% to 8.9%.

E. J. McMahon Manhattan Institute
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Btw 2010 and 2022, New York State’s share of realized capital gains among income millionaires declined 5.1pp to 8.9%, while Florida’s increased 8.7pp to 16.7% – above California’s 14.9%.

Are millionaire capital gains shifting from high-tax to low-tax states?

Core argument: New York's share of capital gains realized by U.S. income millionaires fell from 14% in 2010, second among states, to 8.9% in 2022, dropping it to fourth place.

As the nation emerged from the Great Recession in 2010, the capital gains of income millionaires were disproportionately concentrated in the four most populous states: California, New York, Texas, and Florida. Between 2010 and 2022, taxpayers earning $1 million or more in these states accounted, on average, for 50% of the nation’s total capital gains realizations. At the start of the period, California led all states, with 16% of capital gains among all U.S. income millionaires. New York ranked second, at 14%, while Texas and Florida trailed at 8.7% and 8%, respectively. The next 12 years saw a significant shift in the rankings. By 2022, Florida had topped the list, with 16.7% of capital gains income among millionaire earners, followed by California at 14.9% and Texas at 9.7%. New York had dropped to fourth place, with 8.9%—essentially changing places with Florida.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. New York's share of capital gains realized by U.S. income millionaires fell from 14% in 2010, second among states, to 8.9% in 2022, dropping it to fourth place.
  2. Florida rose from 8% of millionaire capital gains realizations in 2010 to 16.7% in 2022, topping all states and essentially swapping places with New York.
  3. California, New York, Texas, and Florida together accounted for an average of 50% of U.S. capital gains realizations by taxpayers earning $1 million or more between 2010 and 2022.

Related Articles:

  • Supply and The Mam — New York City has the highest combined city-state personal tax rate in the US and the highest all-in corporate income tax rate at 17.4%, and the highest industrial, retail and multifamily property taxes per square foot among ten major cities. New York State ranks first in tax collections per capita.
  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — New York state's share of US taxpayers reporting over $1m in income fell from 12.7% in 2010 to 8.7% in 2022, and the Citizens Budget Commission estimates state and city income tax receipts from that group would have been $13bn higher had the share held. Job growth has concentrated in lower-paid health care and social assistance.
  • The Stationary Bandits of New York City — New York City's construction costs exceed international benchmarks: Paris installs metro platform edge doors for about €3.7m per station while the Metropolitan Transportation Authority says it needs $55m per station. The author argues stringent crane operator licensing and sidewalk shed regulations protect a small number of unionized contractors from competition.

Tuesday, March 10, 2026

AI Summary. US spending on old-age entitlement programs rose from about 6% of GDP in 2000 to almost 9% in 2023, and had it stayed at its 2000 share the 2023 primary deficit would have been roughly 0.8% of GDP rather than 3.3%. The authors attribute projected further growth to retiring cohort sizes, rising life expectancy, and rising health costs.

Lisa Dettling and Luke Pardue Aspen Economic Strategy Group
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The Baby Boom, greater life expectancy, and rising medical costs sharply increased federal deficits over the past 30 years. If elderly entitlements had stayed at their 2000 share of GDP, the 2023 primary deficit would be ~0.8%, rather than 3.3%, of GDP.

How much does old-age entitlement growth drive the federal deficit?

Core argument: US spending on old-age entitlement programs rose from 2.5% of GDP in the mid-1960s to about 6% in 2000 and almost 9% in 2023, and is projected to keep growing relative to GDP.

In the mid-1960s, spending on old-age entitlement programs was 2.5% of GDP. [It rose to] about 6% of GDP in 2000 to almost 9% in 2023, and is projected to continue to grow relative to GDP. If entitlements for the elderly had remained at their 2000 share of GDP, the 2023 primary deficit would be ~0.8% of GDP rather than 3.3%. The projected growth in these spending programs can be attributed to (1) the size of cohorts expected to enter into retirement (due to past fertility rates and immigration), (2) CBO’s expectation that life expectancy will continue to rise, and (3) rising health costs. Figure 4a shows that cohort sizes are the primary driver of the growth in old-age entitlement spending in the first ten years of CBO’s projections because the still relatively large cohorts born just after the baby boom in 1960–1970 are expected to enter retirement at that time (fertility rates were about 3, on average, from 1960–1970). After 2035, rising life expectancy is the main driver of growth, as the cohorts born in the 1970s and 1980s were much smaller than their predecessors (fertility rates were below 2 in that period). Second, figure 4a shows that if old-age dependency ratios were to remain at their 2024 level throughout the projection, old-age entitlement program spending would grow much more slowly, reaching only 9.8 percent of GDP in 2055 instead of 12.6 percent. Outlays continue to grow even without a rise in the dependency ratio because [per CBO] health costs for Medicare will continue to rise.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US spending on old-age entitlement programs rose from 2.5% of GDP in the mid-1960s to about 6% in 2000 and almost 9% in 2023, and is projected to keep growing relative to GDP.
  2. Had entitlements for the elderly stayed at their 2000 share of GDP, the 2023 US primary deficit would have been roughly 0.8% of GDP rather than 3.3%.
  3. If old-age dependency ratios held at their 2024 level, old-age entitlement spending would reach 9.8% of GDP in 2055 instead of 12.6%, with growth continuing because CBO expects Medicare health costs to keep rising.

Related Articles:

  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
  • How Much Would Continued Low Fertility Affect the US Standard of Living? — Modeling of a rise in the total fertility rate from one to two finds it takes 41 years before the ratio of labor income to consumption needs across age groups exceeds its starting level. The authors argue this delay makes pro-natalist policies economically unappealing to older voters and short-horizon politicians.
  • Demographics, Wealth, and Global Imbalances in the Twenty-First Century — Because the elderly hold much more wealth than the young and on average do not draw it down much as they age, the authors' model projects no "great demographic reversal": population aging is estimated to push global rates of return down by about 1.07pp and raise global wealth from 456% to 498% of world GDP.

AI Summary. Local economic distress is associated with wider male-female gaps in educational attainment: men are 1–2% less likely than women to hold a high school diploma in the most prosperous places, versus 4–5% less likely in the most distressed places. In distressed counties, 53% of women but only 43% of men have at least some college education.

Sarah Eckhardt Agglomerations
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American men in distressed counties are 24% less likely to be employed than their peers in prosperous counties, while women are 19% less likely. This is likely downstream from a widening gender gap in high school graduation rates in distressed counties.

Does local economic distress widen male-female gaps in educational attainment?

Core argument: In distressed counties, 53% of women have at least some college education versus 43% of men, a 10 percentage point difference, according to the Distressed Communities Index.

In our latest release of the Distressed Communities Index, we highlighted the very strong relationship between local economic distress and the gap in educational outcomes between men and women. Men in the most prosperous places are 1–2% less likely to have attained a high school diploma than women; men in mid-tier places are 2–3% less likely; and men in the most distressed places are 4–5% less likely. Nationally, 90% of women and 89% of men over 25 have a high school diploma — close to parity. But this relatively small gap in educational attainment is significantly larger in distressed places. When men and women with only a high school diploma, versus those with any college education, are separated out, the attainment gaps widen further. On average, 53% of women in distressed counties have received at least some college education, while only 43% of men have — a 10 percentage point difference.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In distressed counties, 53% of women have at least some college education versus 43% of men, a 10 percentage point difference, according to the Distressed Communities Index.
  2. Men are 1–2% less likely than women to have attained a high school diploma in the most prosperous places, 2–3% less likely in mid-tier places, and 4–5% less likely in the most distressed places.
  3. Nationally, 90% of women and 89% of men over 25 hold a high school diploma, close to parity, but the gap is significantly larger in distressed places.

Related Articles:

  • The Geography of American Exceptionalism — The US population is split evenly among urban, suburban, and rural areas, but 64% of those living at suburban densities reside in prosperous or comfortable ZIP codes, versus 36% in rural and 38% in urban ones. County distress scores correlate strongly with life expectancy, with prosperous counties averaging 5.3 years longer.
  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • “Compensate the Losers?” Economic Policy and Partisan Realignment in the US — The authors argue that partisan realignment by education reflects Democrats' declining supply of "predistribution" policies such as job guarantees, higher minimum wages, protectionism, and stronger unions, which less-educated Americans favor while more-educated Americans prefer taxes and transfers. They estimate changing views of the parties' economic policies explain roughly half the shift.

AI Summary. Researchers at the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution estimate net migration into the US may have turned negative for the first time in at least 50 years. That decline coincided with rising joblessness among US-born workers, whose labor force participation has fallen in recent months to near its lowest level since 2021.

Jonnelle Marte Bloomberg
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While immigration may have been negative in 2025, the native-born unemployment rate is now 4.7%, up from 4.3% in January 2025. The labor force participation rate for native workers hasn’t risen since the start of the immigration crackdown.

Has falling immigration boosted employment for US-born workers?

Core argument: Net migration into the US may have been negative in 2025 for the first time in at least 50 years, according to estimates from researchers at the center-right American Enterprise Institute and the center-left Brookings Institution.

Net migration into the US may have been negative in 2025 for the first time in at least 50 years, according to estimates from researchers at the center-right American Enterprise Institute and center-left Brookings Institution. That squeeze coincided with a rise in joblessness among the native-born, even as some businesses say it’s becoming more challenging to fill positions. The labor participation for prime-age workers is near the highest since 2001, government data published last Friday show, but that of people over 16 who were born in the US has dropped in recent months, and is near the lowest level since 2021. The labor participation for prime-age workers is near the highest since 2001, government data published last Friday show, but that of people over 16 who were born in the US has dropped in recent months, and is near the lowest level since 2021.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Net migration into the US may have been negative in 2025 for the first time in at least 50 years, according to estimates from researchers at the center-right American Enterprise Institute and the center-left Brookings Institution.
  2. Labor force participation among US-born people over 16 has dropped in recent months to near its lowest level since 2021, while prime-age participation sits near its highest since 2001, according to government data.
  3. The migration squeeze coincided with rising joblessness among native-born workers, while some businesses say filling positions is becoming more challenging.

Related Articles:

  • Unprecedented ‘Jobless Boom’ Tests Limits of US Economic Expansion — Forecasters expect US gross domestic product to have expanded 2.7% over the year while employment barely grew, a divergence drawing comparisons to the "jobless recovery" that followed the early-2000s technology stock collapse. Unlike that episode, which began with a recession, this "jobless boom" is occurring without one — a first in the postwar era.
  • Macroeconomic Implications Of Immigration Flows In 2025 And 2026: January 2026 Update — The authors estimate that job growth consistent with full employment was 20,000–50,000 a month in the second half of 2025, while reported nonfarm payroll growth averaged about 14,500 and unemployment rose 0.3 percentage points. They project immigration policy changes will keep potential employment growth low, reducing GDP growth by roughly 0.2 percentage points in 2025 and 0.1 in 2026.
  • What Sweeping Revisions and a Blowout Month Tell Us About the U.S. Job Market — Labor Department revisions lowered previously estimated job gains for the past two calendar years, cutting the combined net change in construction, manufacturing, and retail by 115,000 jobs. Healthcare added about 437,000 jobs and social assistance about 321,000 over 12 months, while all other private-sector jobs combined shrank.

AI Summary. A young K-12 teacher in New York City earns $62,000 versus $37,000 in Jackson, Mississippi, where teacher pay is the nation's lowest. After adjusting for housing, commuting, taxes, and other cost-of-living differences, the New York City teacher is worse off, suggesting salaries are not a source of savings.

Aziz Sunderji Home Economics
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A young teacher in NYC earns $62,000 dollars, compared to the $37,000 earned by a peer teacher in Jackson, Mississippi. Aziz Sunderji finds that “after housing, commute, taxes, and other cost-of-living differences, the NYC teacher is actually worse off.”

Do higher big-city teacher salaries leave teachers better off after costs?

Core argument: A young K-12 teacher in New York City, the country's most expensive school district, earns $62,000, versus $37,000 for a comparable teacher in Jackson, Mississippi, where teacher pay is the nation's lowest.

A young K-12 teacher in New York City—the most expensive school district in the country—earns $62,000. A comparable teacher in Jackson, Mississippi, where teacher pay is the nation’s lowest, earns $37,000. Could salaries be a source of savings, helping to bring school costs here closer to the national average? The chart suggests not: after housing, commute, taxes, and other cost-of-living differences, the NYC teacher is actually worse off.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A young K-12 teacher in New York City, the country's most expensive school district, earns $62,000, versus $37,000 for a comparable teacher in Jackson, Mississippi, where teacher pay is the nation's lowest.
  2. After housing, commute, taxes, and other cost-of-living differences, the New York City teacher is worse off than the Jackson, Mississippi teacher despite the $25,000 higher salary.
  3. Teacher salaries appear unlikely to be a source of savings for bringing New York City school costs closer to the national average.

Related Articles:

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  • Housing and the American Worker — Wages net of housing costs were once substantially higher in high-density areas than low-density areas for workers both with and without college education, but over the past half-century that urban wage premium has persisted only for college-educated workers, not for those with a high school degree or less.
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AI Summary. Chinese exports rose nearly 22% year-over-year in the first two months of 2026, exceeding expectations and producing a record trade surplus for the period. Growth is concentrated in less labor-intensive goods such as batteries, cars and chips, while an alternative wage measure sits near its lowest level outside the pandemic.

Bloomberg Staff Bloomberg
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In the first two months of the year, China’s exports were 22% above their level a year earlier. A Goldman analysis found that as of Q3 2025, wages had grown at close to their lowest y/y level on record, excluding the pandemic period.

Does surging export growth lift wages for China's factory workers?

Core argument: Chinese exports rose almost 22% from a year earlier in the first two months of 2026, exceeding expectations and producing a record trade surplus for the period, according to official data.

Official data on Tuesday showed Chinese exports surged almost 22% from a year earlier in the first two months of 2026, an increase that was more than expected and resulted in a record trade surplus for the period. Future technologies such as batteries, cars and chips — deemed essential for competing with the US — are taking a larger share of exports, but those products are less labor intensive. Perhaps more alarming for global trade, the trend only appears set to get worse in the short term as an explosion of AI and robotics spawns so-called dark factories that require no human workers. An alternative measure of China’s wage growth compiled by Goldman Sachs is hovering around the lowest level outside the pandemic in data going back to the beginning of the century. Further masking the pain is gig work, which now accounts for about 40% of urban employment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Chinese exports rose almost 22% from a year earlier in the first two months of 2026, exceeding expectations and producing a record trade surplus for the period, according to official data.
  2. Batteries, cars and chips — technologies deemed essential for competing with the US — are taking a larger share of Chinese exports, but those products are less labor intensive, and AI and robotics are spawning dark factories requiring no human workers.
  3. An alternative measure of Chinese wage growth compiled by Goldman Sachs is hovering near its lowest level outside the pandemic in data going back to the beginning of the century, with gig work now about 40% of urban employment.

Related Articles:

  • The True Cost of China’s Falling Prices — Prices fell for 51 of 67 consumer items tracked over a two-year period in China, while the broader GDP deflator, which includes upstream sectors, declined for 10 straight quarters, indicating deflation is more entrenched in industry. The share of "zombie" firms whose profits cannot cover debt interest rose from 19% to 34% over five years.
  • China’s Trade Surplus, Part I — China's very high investment rates, combined with a shrinking workforce and slowing productivity, produce sharply diminishing returns, making its decades-old high-savings, high-investment growth model unsustainable. The author argues China's leaders resist a pivot toward consumption because of ideology and geopolitical ambition, with the leadership rejecting welfare spending as breeding dependency.
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.