Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
Buy the Books
  • Macro Roundup
  • About Roundup
  • About Ed Conard
  • Highlights
  • Topics
  • Subscribe
Edward Conard
  • twitter
  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • youtube

Macro Roundup

  • Email
  • Text Message (SMS)
  • Twitter/X
  • LinkedIn
  • Facebook
  • WhatsApp Message
Subscribe to Macro Roundup Emails
Select topics to choose: articles that mention them (broader) or articles mainly about them (focused)
  • Mentions 0
  • Primary focus 0
Showing all 7,294 Macro Roundup articles
When you search for any topic (like GDP, Inflation, or Banking), choose:
Choose search scope

Tuesday, February 24, 2026

The Old Economy Begins To Take Its Revenge

AI Summary. The author argues that capital rotates between the financial economy's asset-light booms and the physical economy, with commodity capacity constraints and the use of critical materials as geopolitical leverage now making returns on physical investment more attractive. In this view, higher interest rates reflect the better returns and capital spending needed to expand production capacity.

Jeff Currie Carlyle
Date Posted:
February 24, 2026

Since October 2025, equities tied to energy and infrastructure are up 30–50%, while technology related stocks are down 5–10%. Jeff Currie argues we are in a “decade-long physical capex super-cycle” as demand has run into physical capacity constraints.

Are commodity constraints shifting capital from financial to physical investment?

Core argument: Commodity capacity constraints, worsened by the "weaponization" of the periodic table, raise prices and shift demand toward physical over financial capital, which the author argues pushes interest rates higher and creates an inflation-duration trade-off.

Given the capacity constraints many commodity markets face today, which are made worse by the “weaponization” of the periodic table, as the global economy grinds against physical constraints and prices rise, the need for physical capital over financial capital leads to higher interest rates, creating an inflation-duration trade-off. As the cost of capital falls and investors expand their horizons, they become more focused on duration and longer-term growth opportunities. As longer duration financial returns become more attractive than physical ones, capital is redirected into the financial economy, i.e. the Nifty Fifty, Dot-com Boom and FAANG/Mag Seven Boom. Note that these were all ‘asset-light’ booms. The Nifty Fifty was about brands like Coca-Cola or McDonalds that were asset-light scalable franchises in the same way that Microsoft software was in the 1990s or Google was in the 2010s. Eventually, however, demand catches up to physical capacity constraints, creating better returns in the physical economy than the financial economy, motivating the redirection of capital back into the physical economy, i.e. 1968-1980 and 2002-2014. The higher cost of capital simply reflects the better returns in the physical economy and the need to attract capex to expand production capacity, which is where we are today.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Commodity capacity constraints, worsened by the "weaponization" of the periodic table, raise prices and shift demand toward physical over financial capital, which the author argues pushes interest rates higher and creates an inflation-duration trade-off.
  2. The Nifty Fifty, dot-com and FAANG/Magnificent Seven booms were all asset-light episodes in which a falling cost of capital drew investors toward longer-duration financial returns rather than physical ones.
  3. When demand catches up to physical capacity constraints, returns in the physical economy exceed those in the financial economy and capital is redirected toward expanding production capacity, as in 1968–1980 and 2002–2014, which the author identifies as today's condition.

Related Articles:

  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.
  • The Macro Implications of the AI Capex Boom — Artificial intelligence capital spending is estimated to add roughly 1.4 percentage points to US growth in one year and about 1.5 points the next, comparable to business investment's contribution during the tech bubble. A material part of that estimate reflects profits at Nvidia and a few other chipmakers that are unlikely to be recycled back into the economy.
  • Power Politics: Energy Self-Sufficiency in a Modern Mercantilist World — China leads in adding power to the grid, with more than 30,000 miles of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines versus zero in the US and lead times for large transformers of 48 weeks against a US average of 143 weeks. This positions China to accommodate new demand sources such as artificial intelligence.
  • Investment
  • Energy
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Productivity

AI Is Simultaneously Aiding and Replacing Workers, Wage Data Suggest

AI Summary. Wage data suggest greater artificial intelligence exposure is associated with lower wage growth in occupations where experienced workers earn little premium over entry-level workers, and with higher wage growth where that premium is large. The authors interpret this as AI substituting for workers in jobs requiring little tacit knowledge while complementing experienced workers elsewhere.

J. Scott Davis Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Date Posted:
February 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database

For occupations with a very low experience premium, AI exposure lowered wage growth, likely due to substitution of AI for costly experienced workers. At the top of the experience distribution, AI raised wage growth, as it complements experienced workers.

How does AI exposure affect wage growth across experience premiums?

Core argument: For occupations with a 0% experience premium, a 1 SD increase in AI exposure is associated with a 0.28 percentage point reduction in post-2022 wage growth, with a clearly negative confidence interval.

Chart 5 presents the estimated effect of a one-standard-deviation (1 SD) increase in an occupation’s AI exposure on an occupation’s post-2022 wage growth. For occupations with the median experience premium (40%), a 1 SD increase in AI exposure is associated with a 0.05ppt decline in wage growth. The 90% confidence interval for this estimate clearly includes zero, indicating that for an occupation with the median experience premium, AI exposure doesn’t much affect wage growth. However, for an occupation with a 0% experience premium, increased AI exposure is associated with a 0.28 percentage point reduction in wage growth. The confidence interval for this estimate is clearly negative. For occupations with a very low experience premium, AI exposure has a more negative effect on wage growth since AI substitutes for both entry and experienced workers. The low experience premium suggests there is not much tacit knowledge required for the occupation, so experienced workers are easily substituted by AI. Conversely, for occupations in the 90th percentile of the experience premium distribution, increased AI exposure is associated with a 0.2 percentage point increase in wage growth. For these occupations, AI exposure has less of a negative effect, and likely even a positive effect on wages, as AI substitutes for entry level workers but complements experienced workers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. For occupations with a 0% experience premium, a 1 SD increase in AI exposure is associated with a 0.28 percentage point reduction in post-2022 wage growth, with a clearly negative confidence interval.
  2. For occupations in the 90th percentile of the experience premium distribution, a 1 SD increase in AI exposure is associated with a 0.2 percentage point increase in wage growth, consistent with AI substituting for entry-level workers while complementing experienced ones.
  3. At the median experience premium of 40%, a 1 SD increase in AI exposure is associated with a 0.05 percentage point decline in wage growth, and the 90% confidence interval includes zero.

Related Articles:

  • Young Workers’ Employment Drops In Occupations With High AI Exposure — Among young labor market entrants, the rate of finding jobs has held steady only in occupations with low exposure to artificial intelligence, declining by more than 3 percentage points for the most AI-exposed group from its recent peak. The decline reflects fewer people entering these jobs rather than exits, with small aggregate effects.
  • Looking for the Ladder — The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
  • Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence — Using payroll records covering millions of US workers, the authors find employment for workers aged 22–25 in occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence, such as software developers and customer service representatives, declined 6%, while employment for older workers in those occupations rose 6–9%. Employment in less-exposed occupations grew comparably across age groups.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Anthropic Says DeepSeek, MiniMax Distilled AI Models for Gains

AI Summary. Anthropic says three Chinese artificial intelligence developers — DeepSeek, MiniMax Group, and Moonshot — violated its terms of service by using thousands of fraudulent accounts to generate more than 16m exchanges with its Claude models. The company says this practice, known as distillation, lets rival labs improve their own models by training on outputs from more powerful systems.

Margi Murphy and Shirin Ghaffary Bloomberg
Date Posted:
February 24, 2026

Anthropic reported that three leading Chinese AI developers “illicitly” extracted results from Claude by training their own models on the outputs from the more powerful system, a tactic known as “distillation.”

Anthropic reported that three leading Chinese AI developers “illicitly” extracted results from Claude by...

Are Chinese AI labs using fraudulent accounts to distill rival models?

Core argument: Anthropic said DeepSeek, MiniMax Group, and Moonshot violated its terms of service by generating more than 16 million exchanges in total with its Claude models using thousands of fraudulent accounts to "illicitly extract" results.

Anthropic said three leading artificial intelligence developers in China worked to "illicitly extract" results from its AI models to bolster the capabilities of rival products, adding to growing concerns in the US about Chinese firms improperly gaining an edge. The San Francisco-based company said DeepSeek, MiniMax Group, and Moonshot violated its terms of service by generating more than 16 million exchanges in total with its Claude models using thousands of fraudulent accounts. With this tactic, known as distillation, Chinese AI labs can rapidly improve their models by training them on the outputs from more powerful systems, Anthropic said. DeepSeek generated more than 150,000 exchanges with Claude, and MiniMax generated more than 13 million, Anthropic said, with a focus on reconstructing Claude’s more advanced capabilities. The Claude maker said it was able to pinpoint the three companies with “high confidence” based on information on internet protocol addresses, metadata and “corroboration from industry partners who observed the same actors and behaviors on their platforms.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Anthropic said DeepSeek, MiniMax Group, and Moonshot violated its terms of service by generating more than 16 million exchanges in total with its Claude models using thousands of fraudulent accounts to "illicitly extract" results.
  2. MiniMax generated more than 13 million exchanges with Claude and DeepSeek more than 150,000, with a focus on reconstructing Claude's more advanced capabilities, according to Anthropic.
  3. Anthropic said it pinpointed the three companies with "high confidence" based on internet protocol addresses, metadata, and corroboration from industry partners that observed the same actors and behaviors on their platforms.

Related Articles:

  • Rough Notes, Feb 20, 2026: AI Capex in Q4 GDP, Anthropic Revenues, Agentic Domains, etc. — An early estimate puts the floor contribution of artificial intelligence capital spending to fourth-quarter US GDP growth at about 64%, and likely closer to 80% including externalities and multipliers, though the calculation is not adjusted for imports. The author also notes that token price deflation persists and that US-China token price differences are immense and growing.
  • The Geopolitics of AI: Decoding the New Global Operating System — The performance gap between the top American and Chinese AI models narrowed from 9.3% to 1.7%, with Chinese firms relying on cheaper open-source models—DeepSeek prices usage 20-40x below OpenAI's ChatGPT. This price advantage could win adoption in developing countries and build dependency on Chinese AI ecosystems.
  • China’s DeepSeek Uses Banned Nvidia Chips for AI Model, Report Says — Chinese AI developer DeepSeek used Nvidia Blackwell chips that were smuggled into China through countries where their sale was permitted, according to a report citing unnamed sources. The chips were installed in data centers abroad, then dismantled and shipped to China after clearing inspection by server-equipment companies.
  • Innovation/Research
  • China
  • Productivity
  • Security

Why Tariffs Aren’t Shrinking the U.S. Trade Deficit

AI Summary. The U.S. goods trade deficit reached a record $1.24tn as goods imports rose 4.3%, while major exporters including Germany, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan launched spending programs largely tilted toward manufacturers dependent on overseas markets. The Brookings Institution argues reining in large U.S. fiscal deficits would reduce the shortfall more effectively than pressing other countries to buy more American goods.

Tom Fairless and Gavin Bade Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
February 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database

American tariffs haven’t had a significant impact on the chronic surplus countries’ current accounts, in part due to policy responses aimed at competitiveness and continued high saving, while US consumption remains strong amidst its large fiscal deficit.

Would cutting fiscal deficits shrink the trade gap more than tariffs?

Core argument: The U.S. goods trade deficit rose to a record $1.24 trillion in 2025, driven by a 4.3% increase in goods imports.

The U.S. trade deficit in goods rose to a record high of $1.24 trillion in 2025, driven by a 4.3% increase in goods imports. Big exporting countries—Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and others—have launched government spending programs that are largely tilted toward supporting manufacturers dependent on overseas markets, directly providing credit support to exporters and small and midsize businesses. Germany’s surplus appears to be stabilizing at around 5% of GDP, higher than its fair value—a measure based on the country’s demographics and economic development—which the European Commission estimates at around 1% to 2% of GDP. China’s current-account surplus is expected to reach 4.3% of GDP this year amid surging exports and weak domestic demand, according to Goldman Sachs. Meanwhile, the U.S. current-account deficit is running at about 4% [of GDP] for the latest 12-month period, roughly double its level in 2019. Its scale partly reflects America’s much faster recovery from the pandemic than other countries, said Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, a senior fellow at Brookings. If the U.S. still wants to reduce its deficit, he argued, reining in its large fiscal deficits would be more effective than coercing other countries into importing more U.S. goods.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. goods trade deficit rose to a record $1.24 trillion in 2025, driven by a 4.3% increase in goods imports.
  2. Germany's surplus appears to be stabilizing at about 5% of GDP, above the 1% to 2% fair value estimated by the European Commission, while Goldman Sachs expects China's current-account surplus to reach 4.3% of GDP this year.
  3. The U.S. current-account deficit is running at about 4% of GDP over the latest 12 months, roughly double its 2019 level, and Brookings senior fellow Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti argues that reining in fiscal deficits would be more effective than pressing other countries to import more U.S. goods.

Related Articles:

  • US Notches One of Its Biggest Annual Trade Gaps Since 1960 — The US goods and services trade deficit reached $901.5bn for the year, one of the largest in data going back to 1960. US companies increased imports of computers and accessories by nearly $145bn from the prior year, an acceleration in demand that reflects large-scale artificial intelligence investment.
  • The Dangerous Triumph Of Neo-Mercantilism — Neo-mercantilism is thriving in both China, which pairs infant-industry promotion with large trade surpluses, and in a United States focused on external deficits and protecting domestic markets. The author argues this will likely fracture the world economy, and that a new multilateral treaty could include a mechanism to combat large structural trade surpluses.
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • GDP
    • Trade (not deficits)

China Is Not Dumping US Treasuries

AI Summary. China's state-owned financial institutions added $100bn in foreign assets in one month and $70bn the next, absorbing dollars from the country's trade surplus as exporters sought to sell dollars for renminbi. The author argues dollar accumulation has shifted from China's foreign exchange agency to state banks, which either buy Treasuries or lend to investors who do.

Brad Setser Financial Times
Date Posted:
February 24, 2026

Talk of “dollar diversification” to the contrary, China bought a record $170B in US dollars and foreign securities in December and January. The lower visibility reflects a shift in the action from SAFE to the state owned banks as they sell renminbi.

Is China still accumulating dollar assets through its state banks?

Core argument: China's big state-owned financial institutions added an unprecedented $100bn to foreign assets in December and another $70bn in January, warehousing the dollars China Inc bought in the market.

The formal foreign exchange reserves of China’s central bank have not been rising rapidly, but do not be fooled. The dollars that China Inc bought in the market in the past few months are being warehoused by the country’s big state-owned financial institutions, which added an unprecedented $100bn to foreign assets in December and another $70bn in January. These huge, market-moving numbers showed that China’s massive trade surplus once again flows through the balance sheet of its core state financial institutions. Exporters now want to sell their dollars for renminbi to capture the renminbi’s expected appreciation. To offset that demand for renminbi, China’s state banks had to buy a ton of foreign exchange. [Though] the number of Treasuries that Chinese investors hold in US custodians has fallen sharply over time, that does not mean that China’s state — broadly defined — stopped accumulating dollars. Rather, dollar asset accumulation has shifted from China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange agency (SAFE) ($3.4tn in foreign exchange reserves,an estimated 50-55% [of which are] in dollars) to the state banks (about $3tn in assets, with maybe 70% in dollars, according to my estimates from China’s own data for the commercial banks). If Chinese state investors are not directly buying Treasuries, they are lending money to other global investors who are. That is the only way the global flow of funds can add up.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's big state-owned financial institutions added an unprecedented $100bn to foreign assets in December and another $70bn in January, warehousing the dollars China Inc bought in the market.
  2. Dollar asset accumulation has shifted from SAFE, which holds $3.4tn in foreign exchange reserves with an estimated 50–55% in dollars, to the state banks, with about $3tn in assets and perhaps 70% in dollars.
  3. Chinese exporters want to sell dollars for renminbi to capture the renminbi's expected appreciation, and China's state banks had to buy large amounts of foreign exchange to offset that demand.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Currency is Now Facing Substantial Appreciation Pressure — China's yuan faces appreciation pressure while Beijing maintains its commitment to currency stability, testing trading partners' willingness to absorb China's growing export surplus. If nominal appreciation is limited to a few percentage points, the real effective exchange rate stays at its depreciated level and China is likely to keep gaining global market share.
  • China’s Economy: Rightsizing 2025, Looking Ahead to 2026 — The authors argue China's official growth figures are inconsistent with ten consecutive quarters of deflation, estimating that real GDP is around 11% below official levels, with most of the adjustment in investment. That would imply a drop of roughly 9 percentage points in China's share of global investment, helping explain its export surge.
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • China
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Trade (not deficits)

China Slams Dozens of Japanese Companies With Export Curbs

AI Summary. China froze exports of "dual-use" materials with both civilian and military applications, including rare earth magnets, to 20 Japanese companies and placed 20 more on a new watch list. The move deepens a dispute with Tokyo and shows Beijing using its dominance in critical supply chains to exert diplomatic pressure.

Ryan McMorrow, Joe Leahy, Harry Dempsey and Leo Lewis Financial Times
Date Posted:
February 24, 2026

China is freezing exports of “dual-use” materials to Japan, in an effort to “curb Japan’s ‘remilitarisation’ and nuclear ambitions.”

China is freezing exports of “dual-use” materials to Japan, in an effort to “curb Japan’s ‘remilitarisation’ and...

Is China using its critical supply chain dominance as diplomatic leverage?

Core argument: China's commerce ministry said it would freeze exports of "dual-use" materials, which have both civilian and military applications, to 20 Japanese companies, while adding another 20 groups to a new "watch list".

China has restricted exports of rare earth magnets and other critical materials to dozens of leading Japanese companies in an escalation of a dispute with Tokyo. China’s commerce ministry on Tuesday said it would freeze the flow of “dual-use” materials, which have applications to both civilian and military industries, to 20 Japanese companies. Another 20 groups are being added to a new “watch list”. The restrictions deepen a row with Japan and illustrate how Beijing is wielding its dominance in critical supply chains to exert diplomatic pressure. The global automotive industry is heavily dependent on China for rare-earth magnets. The announcement hit Japanese share prices, with MHI falling as much as 3%, Kawasaki Heavy shedding 4%, IHI Group losing 5.7% and NEC dropping more than 6%. Subaru fell 3.5%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's commerce ministry said it would freeze exports of "dual-use" materials, which have both civilian and military applications, to 20 Japanese companies, while adding another 20 groups to a new "watch list".
  2. Japanese shares fell on the announcement, with NEC dropping more than 6%, IHI Group losing 5.7%, Kawasaki Heavy shedding 4%, Subaru falling 3.5% and MHI down as much as 3%.
  3. The restrictions illustrate how Beijing is wielding its dominance in critical supply chains to exert diplomatic pressure, with the global automotive industry heavily dependent on China for rare-earth magnets.

Related Articles:

  • How Japan Built a Rare-Earth Supply Chain Without China — Japan has reduced its reliance on Chinese rare earths, with industry estimates putting China's share of Japanese rare-earth imports at roughly 60% to 70%, down from 90% or more. Japan's alternative chain runs from an Australian open-pit mine through a separation plant in Malaysia to Japanese magnet makers supplying automakers.
  • Japan Builds Up ‘Missile Archipelago’ Near Taiwan to Counter China — Japan is installing missile batteries, radar towers, ammunition storage and other combat facilities across the 160-island Ryukyu chain, whose southern end lies about 110km east of Taiwan. It is also deploying F-35 fighter jets and long-range missiles on Kyushu and expanding its amphibious rapid deployment force.
  • Japan PM Takaichi Vows To Boost Defense Spending To 2% of GDP by March — Japan plans to raise defense-related spending to 2% of gross domestic product in the fiscal year ending March 2026, two years ahead of the existing target date of March 2028. The government also set economic goals it says require no tax increases and prioritized domestic energy sources including nuclear power and Japanese-developed perovskite solar cells.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Trade (not deficits)
  • Security

Wednesday, February 25, 2026

The Post‑Pandemic Global R*

AI Summary. Using an econometric model extracting the common trend in real interest rates across advanced economies, the authors estimate that the global neutral real interest rate fell about 3.5 percentage points from 1990 to 2019, then rose about 1 percentage point after COVID, leaving global and U.S. estimates near 0.5%.

Marco Del Negro, Elena Elbarmi, and Michael Pham Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:
February 25, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Using a model that extracts common trends in multiple series, FRBNY estimates that both global and US r* rose by about 1pp post-COVID to ~0.5%. The neutral rate had fallen from 3% in the early 1990s to < 0% after the GFC, and even further in the 2010s.

How much has the global neutral real interest rate shifted?

Core argument: Global r* fell from about 3% in the early 1990s to below 0% after the financial crisis, continued declining through the 2010s, and then rose by about 1 percentage point after COVID, per an econometric model extracting the common real-rate trend across countries.

After the late 1980s, we can talk of a global r*, since the trends in real rates are one and the same across advanced countries [see charts in gallery]. We provide a measure of “global” r* using data on short- and long-term yields and inflation for several countries, based on an econometric model that extracts the common trend in real rates across all the countries in the sample. Global r* fell from about 3% in the early 1990s to below 0% after the financial crisis. It continued declining in the 2010s and then rose by about 1 percentage point after COVID. By and large, the U.S. r* has tracked global r* since the late 1980s, except that it declined comparatively more in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The dashed black line in the chart shows the posterior median of global r* with the shaded areas showing the 68 and 95% coverage intervals. The dotted black line shows the posterior median of U.S. r*.By 2024, the end of the sample, the Bayesian “median posterior” estimates of both global and U.S. r* are around 0.5% (more precisely, 0.31 and 0.46). The large posterior coverage intervals shown in the chart are there to remind us that extracting trend from cycle is a difficult task. [But although] the level of r* is very uncertain, the model is able to detect changes in r* over time with greater statistical confidence. The first row of the table [] reports the decline in global and U.S. r* from 1990 to 2019, by our calculations. The median estimate of the decline is about 3.5pp for both the world and the U.S. Although the exact magnitude of the decline is uncertain, there is no question statistically that such a decline in r* had taken place from the 1990s to before COVID.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Global r* fell from about 3% in the early 1990s to below 0% after the financial crisis, continued declining through the 2010s, and then rose by about 1 percentage point after COVID, per an econometric model extracting the common real-rate trend across countries.
  2. Median posterior estimates put both global and U.S. r* near 0.5% by 2024 — 0.31% and 0.46% respectively — with wide posterior coverage intervals underscoring the difficulty of separating trend from cycle.
  3. The median estimated decline in r* from 1990 to 2019 is about 3.5 percentage points for both the world and the U.S., and the authors judge the occurrence of such a decline statistically beyond question despite uncertainty about its exact magnitude.

Related Articles:

  • What Next for r*? A Capital Market Equilibrium Perspective On The Natural Rate of Interest — A capital-market equilibrium model estimates that the steady-state safe natural rate of interest across advanced economies has fallen from about 5% to about 0%, driven by slower growth, demographics, higher mark-ups, and rising risk premia. The author estimates that artificial-intelligence-driven growth and heightened inflation risk could each raise it by about 1 percentage point.
  • The Race Between Asset Supply and Asset Demand — The authors estimate that demand for assets has outpaced supply by roughly 400% of GDP versus 100%, making rising asset demand the leading contributor to falling interest rates. They project that debt sustainability requires fiscal consolidation exceeding 10% of GDP, though debt could reach 250% of GDP without raising interest rates.
  • Demographics, Wealth, and Global Imbalances in the Twenty-First Century — Because the elderly hold much more wealth than the young and on average do not draw it down much as they age, the authors' model projects no "great demographic reversal": population aging is estimated to push global rates of return down by about 1.07pp and raise global wealth from 456% to 498% of world GDP.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

Entire Market Structure Exposed To A Big Move

AI Summary. The share of S&P 500 stocks moving more than 10% in a single day has increased, and high dispersion alongside low implied correlation suggests stocks are trading more on their own fundamentals. Combined with extremely elevated options activity, these larger idiosyncratic moves leave market structure more vulnerable to an abrupt, outsized move.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
February 25, 2026

An uptick in the share of S&P 500 firms moving >10% in a single day, with a lower correlation of returns across firms and bigger gaps between winners and losers, suggests that individual stocks “are increasingly trading on their own fundamentals.”

Do bigger single-stock swings leave market structure vulnerable to an abrupt move?

Core argument: The share of S&P 500 constituents moving more than 10% in a single day has risen, with high dispersion and low implied correlation suggesting stocks are increasingly trading on their own fundamentals.

The share of S&P 500 names moving more than 10% in a single day has increased, and high dispersion and low implied correlation suggest stocks are increasingly trading on their own fundamentals. At the same time, options activity remains extremely elevated, consistent with heavy retail speculation and leverage-like exposure. Larger idiosyncratic moves and outsized options participation leave the market structure more fragile and more vulnerable to an abrupt, outsized move.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of S&P 500 constituents moving more than 10% in a single day has risen, with high dispersion and low implied correlation suggesting stocks are increasingly trading on their own fundamentals.
  2. Options activity remains extremely elevated, consistent with heavy retail speculation and leverage-like exposure.
  3. Larger idiosyncratic single-stock moves combined with outsized options participation leave market structure more fragile and more vulnerable to an abrupt, outsized move.

Related Articles:

  • Is It a Bubble? — Transformational technologies have historically generated excessive enthusiasm and investment, producing more infrastructure than needed, asset prices that prove too high, and losses for those funding them, while also accelerating adoption. AI enthusiasm is argued to fit this pattern, with debt financing having the potential to magnify the effects.
  • Which U.S. Stocks Generated the Highest Long-Term Returns? — Of the 29,078 U.S. common stocks in a database spanning nearly a century, 51.6% had negative cumulative returns, while 17 stocks returned more than 5m% — led by Altria at 265m%. Those top performers averaged annualized returns of just 13.47%, underscoring the value of time invested.
  • The Old Economy Begins To Take Its Revenge — The author argues that capital rotates between the financial economy's asset-light booms and the physical economy, with commodity capacity constraints and the use of critical materials as geopolitical leverage now making returns on physical investment more attractive. In this view, higher interest rates reflect the better returns and capital spending needed to expand production capacity.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

The Death of the Trump Trade

AI Summary. Global stocks in the US-heavy MSCI World Index are up 2%, versus 9% excluding the US — shaping up as the worst year for US stocks relative to the rest of the world since at least 1995. Bank of America surveys show record investor allocation to euro assets.

Katie Martin Financial Times
Date Posted:
February 25, 2026

The MSCI World Index net US stocks is up 9% year to date, while the S&P 500 is slightly down, the biggest shortfall in US returns relative to the rest of the world since 1995. BofA investor surveys show the largest positive allocation to euro assets on record.

Are US stocks lagging the rest of the world by record margins?

Core argument: The MSCI World Index, heavily skewed toward the US, is up 2% so far in 2026, versus 9% excluding the US, shaping up to be the worst year for US stocks relative to the rest of the world since at least 1995.

Global stocks, measured in the widely tracked MSCI World Index and skewed heavily towards the US, are up by 2% so far in 2026. That’s decent. But if you strip out the US, you’re up a much rosier 9%. This is shaping up to be the worst year for US stocks compared with the rest of the world since at least 1995. Regular surveys of investors by Bank of America show the biggest positive allocation to euro assets on record in an impressive global rebalancing. The bank’s European survey shows over a third now hold a higher allocation to EU stocks than benchmarks would usually suggest, up from just 9% three months ago. A net 22% now say they hold a lower-than-benchmark allocation to the US, from just 6% at the end of 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The MSCI World Index, heavily skewed toward the US, is up 2% so far in 2026, versus 9% excluding the US, shaping up to be the worst year for US stocks relative to the rest of the world since at least 1995.
  2. Bank of America investor surveys show the biggest positive allocation to euro assets on record, with over a third of European respondents holding above-benchmark allocations to EU stocks, up from 9% three months earlier.
  3. A net 22% of investors in Bank of America's survey report a lower-than-benchmark allocation to the US, up from 6% at the end of 2025.

Related Articles:

  • Foreigners Rebuff ‘Sell America’ and Buy a Net $1.6 Trillion in Assets — Treasury Department data show overseas investors bought a net $1.55tn of long-term US financial assets, up from $1.18tn the prior year, including $720bn in equities and just under $409bn in Treasury notes and bonds. China was a net seller of $208.6bn, with its Treasury holdings ending at $683.5bn.
  • 2026 Outlook: Tech Tonic — A Broadening Bull Market — Most major equity markets have outperformed the US, with Europe, China and Asia generating almost double US total returns in dollar terms and gains of 54% in Italy, 73% in Spain and 71% in Korea. US returns have been driven by strong earnings, particularly in technology, while Europe's have come largely from rising valuations.
  • American Unexceptionalism — The S&P 500 has outperformed other developed-market equities by a cumulative 150% over the past fifteen years, but the authors attribute about 80% of that gap to a strengthening dollar and expanding relative valuations rather than fundamentals such as dividends, buybacks, and organic growth. U.S. valuations sit around the 90th percentile on price-to-earnings measures.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

Living With Mom And Dad At 30

AI Summary. Homeownership among married 30-year-olds has changed little (63% to 60%), and rose from 25% to 29% among single 30-year-olds living alone, while 30-year-olds living with parents are mostly male, never-married, and without a college degree. Among men without a college degree, the marriage rate fell from 58% to 36%.

Aziz Sunderji Home Economics
Date Posted:
February 25, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The share of American 30-year-olds living with their parents or roommates nearly doubled btw 1990 and 2025, from 17% to 32%. Aziz Sunderji finds that this group is largely responsible for the age cohort’s 15pp decline in homeownership over that period.

Do falling marriage rates explain more 30-year-olds living with parents?

Core argument: Among men without a college degree, the group most likely to live with their parents, the marriage rate has fallen from 58% to 36%.

Among married 30-year-olds, the homeownership rate has barely budged—63% in 1990, 60% today. Among single 30-year-olds living alone, the homeownership rate actually rose, from 25% to 29%. The typical 30-year-old living at home is male (61%), has never been married (89%), and doesn’t have a college degree (73%). Only 27% have a bachelor’s, compared to 42% of all 30-year-olds. In the early 1990s the profile of those living at home at 30 looked nearly identical: 64% male, 77% never married, and less educated than average. [However], in the ’90s, a greater proportion of young, less educated men would have gotten married and moved out. Among men without a college degree—the group most likely to be living with their parents—the marriage rate has plunged from 58% to 36%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Among men without a college degree, the group most likely to live with their parents, the marriage rate has fallen from 58% to 36%.
  2. Homeownership among married 30-year-olds has barely moved, from 63% in 1990 to 60% today, while among single 30-year-olds living alone it rose from 25% to 29%.
  3. The typical 30-year-old living at home is male (61%), never married (89%), and without a college degree (73%), with only 27% holding a bachelor's versus 42% of all 30-year-olds.

Related Articles:

  • Changes in Milestones of Adulthood — Among US young adults aged 25–34, the share completing a high school or college degree rose 9 percentage points to 83%, while the share ever married fell 18 points to 44% and the share living with a child fell 16 points to 39%. Economic milestones became more common as family formation milestones became less common.
  • What Explains Low Millennial Home Ownership? — At age 30, 31% of Millennials still live with parents or roommates versus 19% of Boomers, and only 61% of Millennial household heads are married versus 77% of Boomers; the analysis attributes most of the 18-percentage-point home ownership gap (25% versus 43%) to these two differences. Among married household heads, the ownership gap narrows to 8 points.
  • Young Adults Are Growing Increasingly Economically Dislocated — The share of young adults who are neither in education, employed, seeking work, nor caring for children is rising in many countries, among both young men and young women. Including stay-at-home parents in the standard "not in education, employment or training" measure obscures this increase.
  • Housing
  • GDP
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage

South Korea Baby Bump Grows

AI Summary. South Korea's total fertility rate rose to 0.8, up from 0.75 and an all-time low of 0.72, which the national statistics agency attributes to a post-pandemic rebound in marriages and more favorable attitudes toward childbearing. The government's mid-range projection still implies a population decline of 10mn by 2067.

Daniel Tudor Financial Times
Date Posted:
February 25, 2026

South Korea’s fertility rate rose for the second consecutive year to .8, from its trough of .72 in 2023. The current level implies that 100 young Koreans today will have ~16 grandchildren.

Does a rising fertility rate reverse an expected population decline?

Core argument: South Korea's total fertility rate rose to 0.8 last year from 0.75 in 2024 and an all-time low of 0.72 in 2023, according to official data released Wednesday.

Korea’s total fertility rate — the average number of children a woman is expected to have over her lifetime — climbed to 0.8 last year, up from 0.75 in 2024 and an all-time low of 0.72 in 2023, official data released on Wednesday showed. Park Hyun-jung, director of population trends at Statistics Korea, attributed the rise to a rebound in marriages after the pandemic and improved perceptions around childbearing. Attitudes towards childbirth outside marriage — long a taboo — had also relaxed slightly, she said. In 2024, 5.8% of Korean children were born out of wedlock, up from 4.7% the year earlier. Jeong Jae-hoon, a professor at Seoul Women’s University, said the rise in births came from a relatively larger cohort of women born in the mid-1990s who were now at peak childbearing age. But women born in the 2000s made up a smaller group, he added, meaning that even if TFR rises to 1.27 — the Korean government’s mid-range projection — the overall population will decline by 10mn by 2067.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. South Korea's total fertility rate rose to 0.8 last year from 0.75 in 2024 and an all-time low of 0.72 in 2023, according to official data released Wednesday.
  2. Park Hyun-jung, director of population trends at Statistics Korea, attributed the increase to a post-pandemic rebound in marriages and improved perceptions of childbearing; births outside wedlock reached 5.8% of Korean children in 2024, up from 4.7% a year earlier.
  3. Jeong Jae-hoon of Seoul Women's University said the rise in births came from a relatively larger cohort of women born in the mid-1990s, and that even if the fertility rate reaches the government's mid-range projection of 1.27, South Korea's population will decline by 10mn by 2067.

Related Articles:

  • Two Is Already Too Many — South Korea's low fertility rate reflects in part decades of government antinatalist policy: family planning centered on contraceptive distribution is estimated to have averted 1.8m–2.1m births by 1976 at about $103 per prevented birth in today's money. Fertility fell from six children per woman in 1960 to three by 1978.
  • The Case for Gradual Population Decline — South Korea's fertility rate fell below 1.7 in 1985 and its share of population aged 20-40 has fallen 20% since 2000, yet it ranked first in Bloomberg's Innovation Index and twelfth in a global soft power ranking. The author argues low fertility does not inevitably cause technological and cultural stagnation.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
  • Family/Marriage
  • Workforce
    • Demographics

How Russia’s Fatalities Compare With Ukraine’s

AI Summary. A model estimates Russian casualties in the full-scale Ukraine war at 1.1m–1.4m, including 230,000–430,000 dead, equivalent to roughly one in 25 Russian men aged 18–49 killed or severely wounded. One estimate puts Ukrainian casualties at 600,000 with 100,000–140,000 dead—lower in absolute terms but a higher share of its population.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
February 25, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The Economist estimates one in 25 Russian men btw the ages of 18 and 49 have been killed or wounded in Ukraine since 2022. CSIS estimates Ukrainian casualties at one in 16. Russian losses are escalating; today it is “losing more men than it can recruit.”

How do Russian and Ukrainian war casualties compare?

Core argument: The Economist's model puts Russian casualties at 1.1m–1.4m, including 230,000–430,000 dead, implying that one in 25 Russian men aged 18–49 may have been killed or severely wounded since the full-scale war began.

Our model suggests that Russian casualties are now between 1.1m and 1.4m, of whom 230,000-430,000 are dead. That would mean one in 25 Russian men between the ages of 18 and 49 may have been killed or severely wounded since the start of the full-scale war. There are too few reliable estimates of Ukrainian deaths to construct a similar meta-estimate. One single estimate, published on January 27th by CSIS, a think-tank, put total Ukrainian casualties at 600,000 as of December, including 100,000-140,000 dead. Though much lower than Russia’s casualties in absolute terms, as a share of its population it is higher—equivalent to about one in 16 Ukrainian men aged 18-49 before the war. These figures exclude civilian deaths, for which reliable data are scarcer still. Ukrainian losses appeared heaviest early in the war: American officials estimated that 70,000 soldiers had already been killed by August 2023. Russia’s campaign, by contrast, has only grown bloodier. Some estimates suggest that it is now losing roughly 1,000 soldiers a day. Our modelling shows that as many may have died in the past year as in the first three combined. It is losing more men than it can recruit.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Economist's model puts Russian casualties at 1.1m–1.4m, including 230,000–430,000 dead, implying that one in 25 Russian men aged 18–49 may have been killed or severely wounded since the full-scale war began.
  2. CSIS estimated total Ukrainian casualties at 600,000 as of December, including 100,000–140,000 dead, a lower absolute figure than Russia's but a higher share of population, equivalent to about one in 16 prewar Ukrainian men aged 18–49.
  3. Some estimates put Russia's losses at roughly 1,000 soldiers a day, and The Economist's modelling suggests as many may have died in the past year as in the first three combined, more men than Russia can recruit.

Related Articles:

  • Russian War Spending May Be Maxed Out — Despite large increases in value-added, excise, income, and social insurance taxes, deficits financed roughly two-thirds of the rise in Russia's consolidated budget spending, including more than 80% of the federal spending increase. Russian government debt remains very low relative to national income, yet officials plan slower nominal spending growth and no additional military and national security spending in ruble terms.
  • Russians Shun Putin’s Plea for More Babies as Population Shrinks — Russia's population decline has accelerated, with births falling 3.4% to 1.22m — the lowest level in roughly 25 years — while deaths rose 3.3% to 1.82m, according to Russia's Federal Statistics Service. The decline is attributed in part to Russia's war on Ukraine, though detailed mortality data has been classified and war deaths enter the statistics with long delays.
  • The Russian Paradox: So Much Education, So Little Human Capital — Russia is an exception to the global correspondence between educational attainment and human capital, combining an advanced educational profile with strikingly poor health outcomes and only weak contributions to knowledge production and skills-intensive service exports. World Health Organization estimates put male life expectancy at age 15 near that of the world's least developed countries.
  • Security
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics


Loading More Posts

End of content

No more pages to load

© Copyright 2026 Coherent Research Institute · All Rights Reserved · Privacy · Terms