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Friday, February 6, 2026

Claude Code is the Inflection Point

Doug O'Laughlin, Jeremie Eliahou Ontiveros, Jordan Nanos, Dylan Patel, et al. Semianalysis

Date Posted:: February 6, 2026
Is Database:: Database

The Semianalysis team argues that Claude Code is an inflection point for AI agents; 4% of GitHub public commits are being authored by Claude Code today, and the team projects that will rise to 20% by the end of the year.

4% of GitHub public commits are being authored by Claude Code right now. At the current trajectory, we believe that Claude Code will be 20%+ of all daily commits by the end of 2026. We believe that Claude Code is the inflection point for AI “Agents” and is a glimpse into the future of how AI will function. It is set to drive exceptional revenue growth for Anthropic in 2026, enabling the lab to dramatically outgrow OpenAI. Now software engineering has and always will be the gold standard information work. But as the quality has finally crossed over a critical threshold, the relationship between coders and their tools have flipped. Coders are effectively just harnessing a black box tool to achieve outcomes, and that was all possible because not only the quality but the cost of the intelligence of tokens has fallen an amazing amount. One developer with Claude Code can now do what took a team a month. The cost of Claude Pro or ChatGPT is $20 dollars a month, while a Max subscription is $200 dollars respectively. The median US knowledge worker costs ~350-500 dollars a day fully loaded. An agent that handles even a fraction of their workflow a day at ~6-7 dollars is a 10-30x ROI not including improvement in intelligence. Accenture just signed a deal to train 30,000 professionals on Claude, the largest Claude Code deployment to date.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Claude Code authors 4% of public GitHub commits, and the author projects it will reach 20%+ of all daily commits by the end of 2026, driving revenue growth that lets Anthropic outgrow OpenAI.
The author argues an agent costing ~$6–7 a day against a median US knowledge worker's fully loaded ~$350–500 a day delivers a 10–30x return, with Claude Pro at $20 a month and Max at $200.
Accenture signed a deal to train 30,000 professionals on Claude, described as the largest Claude Code deployment to date.

Big Tech’s ‘Breathtaking’ $660bn Spending Spree Reignites AI Bubble Fears

Stephen Morris, Michael Acton and Rafe Rosner-Uddin Financial Times

Date Posted:: February 6, 2026

Amazon, Google, Meta and Microsoft plan to spend ~$660B on capex in 2026. All four experienced sell-offs “as investors fret that the ‘breathtaking’ capital expenditures are outpacing the earnings potential of the new technology.”

Big Tech stocks have sold off heavily after the companies unveiled plans to spend $660bn this year on AI, as investors fret that the “breathtaking” capital expenditures are outpacing the earnings potential of the new technology. Amazon, Google and Microsoft are set to lose a combined $900bn in market value since filing their quarterly earnings over the past week. Even a 14% boost to their combined annual revenue to $1.6tn was not enough to overcome the pessimism. Apple, which has sat out the AI capex arms race, was the only Silicon Valley behemoth to emerge unscathed, with shares up 7.5% since it reported record sales.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Amazon, Google and Microsoft are set to lose a combined $900bn in market value since reporting quarterly earnings, after Big Tech unveiled plans to spend $660bn this year on AI.
A 14% increase in combined annual revenue to $1.6tn was not enough to offset investor concern that AI capital expenditures are outpacing the technology's earnings potential.
Apple, which has sat out the AI capital expenditure arms race, saw its shares rise 7.5% since reporting record sales, the only Silicon Valley giant to emerge unscathed.

Data Update 5 for 2026: Risk and Hurdle Rates

Aswath Damodaran Musings on Markets

Date Posted:: February 6, 2026

The median cost of capital for a US firm is 7.79%, Damodaran finds. He notes we are now “in our fourth year with US dollar risk-free rates around 4%, and companies and investors seem to have become acclimatized to the resulting costs of capital.”

In corporate finance and valuation, an undervalued skill is having perspective, a sense of what comprises typical, and what is a high or a low value. It is for that reason that I compute a histogram of costs of capital of all publicly traded firms at the start of 2026. To run a business or invest in one, you need hurdle rates, and that is what costs of equity and debt measure. While models and equations may be how you get these numbers, it is always worth going back to first principles, whenever you face questions on what to do. Thus, recognizing that the cost of capital is an opportunity cost, i.e., the rate of return you can earn elsewhere in the market, on investments of equivalent risk, should be a prompt to use betas that reflect the risk in investments, rather than the entities making the investment, and updated costs of borrowing for the cost of debt. As we enter 2026, we are now in our fourth year with US dollar riskfree rates around 4%, and companies and investors seem to have become acclimatized to the resulting costs of capital, and the shock of seeing dollar riskfree rates surge in 2022, pushing up costs of capital across the board seem to have faded.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Damodaran computes a histogram of costs of capital for all publicly traded firms at the start of 2026, arguing that perspective on typical, high, and low values is an undervalued skill in corporate finance and valuation.
US dollar riskfree rates have stayed around 4% for a fourth year, and Damodaran argues companies and investors have acclimatized, with the shock of the 2022 surge that pushed up costs of capital having faded.
Damodaran argues the cost of capital is an opportunity cost—the return available elsewhere in the market on investments of equivalent risk—implying betas should reflect the risk of the investments rather than the entities making them, alongside updated borrowing costs.

Welfare Use by Immigrants and the U.S.-Born, 2024

Steven Camarota and Karen Zeigler Center For Immigration Studies

Date Posted:: February 6, 2026

In 2024, 59% of households headed by an immigrant used at least one major welfare program, compared to 37% of native-headed households; 86% of immigrant households and 74% of U.S. born households have at least one worker.

Figure 1 and Table 1 report our estimates of welfare use from the SIPP based on the nativity of the household head. The figure shows that welfare use is common for both immigrant and native households. Based on the 2024 SIPP, 52.7% of all immigrant-headed households and 37.3% of households headed by the U.S.-born used at least one major program. The 15.4 percentage points higher rate for all immigrants relative to the U.S.-born is statistically significant. If we excluded naturalized American citizens and look only at households headed by a non-citizen, it shows a welfare use rate of 58.6% — more than 21 percentage points higher than the U.S.-born. This is also a statistically significant difference. The high welfare use of immigrant households is not explained by an unwillingness to work. In fact, 86% of all immigrant households have at least one worker, compared to just 74% of U.S.-born households. Income determines welfare eligibility, so many low-wage workers access welfare. Our best estimate is that 51% of households headed by legal immigrants use at least one major welfare program. Among illegal immigrants we estimate the rate is 61%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Based on the 2024 SIPP, 52.7% of immigrant-headed households used at least one major welfare program versus 37.3% of U.S.-born-headed households, a statistically significant gap of 15.4 percentage points.
Households headed by non-citizens show a welfare use rate of 58.6%, more than 21 percentage points above the U.S.-born rate, a statistically significant difference.
The authors estimate that 51% of households headed by legal immigrants and 61% of those headed by illegal immigrants use at least one major welfare program, while 86% of immigrant households have at least one worker compared with 74% of U.S.-born households.

Monday, February 9, 2026

Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic?

Zhengyang Jiang, Hanno Lustig, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh and Mindy Xiaolan National Bureau of Economic Research

Date Posted:: February 9, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

US government bonds, normally safe assets, become risky in times of war because of negative real returns due to bursts of inflation. As in the fiscal theory of the price level, capital losses on the debt erase government liabilities and thus help absorb fiscal shocks.

The U.S. and the U.K. have managed to bring down high government debt/GDP ratios resulting from wars without resorting to explicit default, but rather through a combination of surprise inflation and financial repression. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that government bonds are safe assets, government bonds severely underperform in wartime, not only in absolute terms, but also relative to equities, housing, and GDP growth rates. This result contrasts with the returns to government bonds during financial crises, when bonds tend to outperform stocks. Wars and pandemics are different because fiscal spending is much higher and governments force bondholders to bear a substantial share of that fiscal burden through a combination of financial repression and surprise inflation.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Government bonds severely underperform during wartime in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and GDP growth, contradicting the conventional wisdom that government bonds are safe assets.
The U.S. and U.K. reduced high war-driven government debt/GDP ratios without explicit default, relying instead on a combination of surprise inflation and financial repression that forced bondholders to bear a substantial share of the fiscal burden.
Bond performance in wars and pandemics contrasts with financial crises, when government bonds tend to outperform stocks, a difference attributed to much higher fiscal spending during wars and pandemics.

Warsh Call for Fed-Treasury Accord Stirs Debate in $30 Trillion Bond Market

Ye Xie, Michael MacKenzie, and Maria Eloisa Capurro Bloomberg

Date Posted:: February 9, 2026

Warsh has raised the prospect of revisiting the Fed’s relationship with Treasury, potentially allowing “a public agreement that synchronizes the Fed’s balance sheet with Treasury financing [and] explicitly ties monetary operations to deficits.”

Warsh has voiced support for overhauling the relationship between the Treasury and the Fed with a new version of an agreement struck in 1951. That pact had dramatically limited the Fed’s footprint in the bond market — something that’s not true today, after trillions of dollars of securities purchases during the global financial and Covid crises. The nominee did say in a CNBC interview last year that an agreement could “describe plainly and with deliberation” what the Fed’s balance-sheet size would be, with the Treasury laying out its debt-issuance plans. Looming over any Fed-Treasury talks would be Trump, who last year argued that one of the central bank’s duties in setting interest rates is to mind the government’s debt costs. Those are currently running at an annual clip of around $1 trillion, or half the budget deficit. “Rather than insulating the Fed, it could look more like a framework for yield-curve control,” Tim Duy, chief US economist at SGH Macro Advisors, said of the accord. “A public agreement that synchronizes the Fed’s balance sheet with Treasury financing explicitly ties monetary operations to deficits.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Fed nominee Warsh supports a new version of the 1951 Treasury-Fed accord, telling CNBC that such an agreement could state plainly the Fed's balance-sheet size while the Treasury lays out its debt-issuance plans.
Tim Duy, chief US economist at SGH Macro Advisors, argues such an accord could look more like a framework for yield-curve control than insulation for the Fed, because synchronizing the Fed's balance sheet with Treasury financing ties monetary operations to deficits.
US government debt costs are running at an annual clip of around $1 trillion, or half the budget deficit, and Trump has argued that minding those costs is one of the Fed's duties in setting interest rates.

Chart of the Day: AI Capex, From Bonanza to Burden

Paul Kedrosky Notes on Complexity

Date Posted:: February 9, 2026
Is Database:: Database

The Mag7 had a (marginal) capex multiplier of ~$60 in 2024 and $15 in 2025. By January 2026, this multiplier had likely turned negative, as the four largest capex announcements “collectively destroyed $475B of market cap on $320B of incremental guidance.”

Initially companies were rewarded by markets for promising vast [AI related] capex increases. The future isn't cheap! But that reaction to spending is now reversing, as stock price reactions to outsized spending announcements have increasingly shown. This may be belated, but it was inevitable. Tech companies, once valued for their low debt and low capital intensity, are now among the leaders in both, a dubious distinction. And don't get me started about maintenance capital implied by current spending. Markets have come to similar views, reversing the multiple it gives public companies for AI capex. Check the following graph, from my analysis, to see how the AI capex multiple has collapsed, and likely gone negative. Again, this shouldn't be surprising. As Ben Graham famously said, “In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run, it is a weighing machine”. Markets have, however briefly, begun weighing AI-related capex, and found its current size ... portly.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The author's analysis shows the market multiple awarded to AI-related capex has collapsed and likely turned negative, reversing an earlier period when companies were rewarded for promising vast capex increases.
Stock price reactions to outsized AI spending announcements have increasingly reversed, a shift the author calls belated but inevitable.
Tech companies, once valued for low debt and low capital intensity, now rank among the leaders in both, a distinction the author calls dubious given the maintenance capital implied by current spending.

Public Markets Are a Shrinking Part of the US Economy

Torsten Sløk, Rajvi Shah, and Shruti Galwankar Apollo

Date Posted:: February 9, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

While 81% of American firms with revenue greater than $100mm are private, S&P 500 firms made up over half of economy-wide corporate profits at the end of 2025, while representing 18% of the workforce.

Most of the time in financial markets is spent on discussing Nvidia, Apple and Coca-Cola, but these firms and the rest of the S&P 500 companies only make up a very small part of the US economy. For example, employment in S&P 500 companies is only 18% of total US employment. Similarly, capex by S&P 500 companies is only 21% of total capex in the US economy. [Notable] facts about public markets and private markets: [One] employment in S&P 500 companies is 18% of total US employment. [Two] employment in firms with more than 500 employees is 24.9 million, and total US employment is 160 million. [Three] privately owned firms account for almost 80% of job openings. [Four] 81% of firms with revenues greater than $100 million are private. [Five] Less than half of all corporate debt outstanding is from S&P 500 companies. [Six] S&P 500 profits make up roughly half of economy-wide corporate profits. [Seven] Capex by S&P 500 companies is 21% of total capex in the US economy. Bottom line: Public markets are a small part of the overall economy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Employment at S&P 500 companies accounts for 18% of total US employment, and their capital expenditures make up 21% of total US capex.
Privately owned firms account for almost 80% of US job openings, and 81% of firms with revenues above $100 million are private.
S&P 500 companies account for roughly half of economy-wide corporate profits and less than half of all corporate debt outstanding.

Is Inherited Wealth Bad?

Daniel Waldenström Aeon

Date Posted:: February 9, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

Existing data show ~80% of private wealth in early 20th-century Europe was inherited. In France and Sweden that fell to ~40% by 1975, but has since risen. In the US, the share of inherited wealth hovered btw 50 and 60% over the last century.

Figure 1 [tracks inheritance flows] using long-run data for France, Sweden and the UK. Around 1900, inheritance flows amounted to roughly 15-25% of national income, compared with 10-15% today. Meanwhile, inheritance flows relative to total private wealth have declined steadily over the past century, with no recent reversal. Most strikingly, while roughly 80% of private wealth in early 20th-century Europe was inherited, that share has fallen to between 40 and 60%, whereas the US has maintained a similarly lower level throughout the past century. In other words, a far greater share of wealth is now accumulated over individual lifetimes through work, saving, and entrepreneurship. In fast-growing, lower-wealth economies such as China and India, inheritance flows amount to a relatively modest 6-7% of national income. By contrast, in richer but more slowly growing economies like Japan, Germany and France, inheritance flows are nearly twice as large, at around 11-12%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Inherited wealth's share of private wealth in Europe has fallen from roughly 80% in the early 20th century to between 40 and 60%, while the US has maintained a similarly lower level throughout the past century.
Inheritance flows in France, Sweden and the UK ran at roughly 15–25% of national income around 1900 versus 10–15% today, and have declined steadily relative to total private wealth with no recent reversal.
Inheritance flows amount to 6–7% of national income in fast-growing, lower-wealth economies such as China and India, against around 11–12% in richer, more slowly growing Japan, Germany and France.

The Likelihood of Persistently Low Global Fertility

Michael Geruso and Dean Spears Journal of Economic Perspectives

Date Posted:: February 9, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Low fertility is likely to persist as a global phenomenon as pro-natal policies have been insufficient to “adequately challenge conventions, challenge social orders, and challenge what gets society’s attention, power, and investment.”

At the start of Figure 1, in 1700, there were perhaps about 30 million births annually. For comparison, estimates from Kaneda and Haub (2022) indicate that there were perhaps 18 million births per year globally 2000 years ago. In 2012, at the peak, there were 146 million births worldwide. Annual births have been falling since. In the hypothetical scenario in which the world converged to an average total fertility rate of 1.5 and held at that level, then by 2300, annual global births would have fallen back down below 16 million. Thus, birth rates that are already common today in most of the world would lead to a decline in the number of global births that could be more rapid than the increase of recent centuries. Moreover, notice that the decline does not end where the graph does: As long as birth rates hold at any level below two children per two adults—even at some steady, unchanging level—the slide down would continue indefinitely. What about much more transformative changes, larger than anything yet seen. Could that avoid global depopulation? Nobody has tried anything that would adequately challenge conventions, challenge social orders, and challenge what gets society’s attention, power, and investment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Global annual births peaked at 146 million in 2012 and have been falling since, compared with roughly 30 million in 1700 and an estimated 18 million per year 2000 years ago, per Kaneda and Haub (2022).
In a hypothetical scenario where the world converges on a total fertility rate of 1.5 and holds there, annual global births would fall below 16 million by 2300, a decline that could be more rapid than the increase of recent centuries.
As long as birth rates hold at any level below two children per two adults, even a steady one, the decline in global births would continue indefinitely.

The Semianalysis team argues that Claude Code is an inflection point for AI agents; 4% of GitHub public commits are being authored by Claude Code today, and the team projects that will rise to 20% by the end of the year.

Are AI coding agents reversing the relationship between coders and their tools?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Amazon, Google, Meta and Microsoft plan to spend ~$660B on capex in 2026. All four experienced sell-offs “as investors fret that the ‘breathtaking’ capital expenditures are outpacing the earnings potential of the new technology.”

Is Big Tech's AI spending outpacing the technology's earnings potential?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

The median cost of capital for a US firm is 7.79%, Damodaran finds. He notes we are now “in our fourth year with US dollar risk-free rates around 4%, and companies and investors seem to have become acclimatized to the resulting costs of capital.”

How high are hurdle rates for publicly traded firms today?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

In 2024, 59% of households headed by an immigrant used at least one major welfare program, compared to 37% of native-headed households; 86% of immigrant households and 74% of U.S. born households have at least one worker.

Do immigrant households use welfare at higher rates than U.S.-born households?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

US government bonds, normally safe assets, become risky in times of war because of negative real returns due to bursts of inflation. As in the fiscal theory of the price level, capital losses on the debt erase government liabilities and thus help absorb fiscal shocks.

Do government bonds remain safe assets during wars and pandemics?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Warsh has raised the prospect of revisiting the Fed’s relationship with Treasury, potentially allowing “a public agreement that synchronizes the Fed’s balance sheet with Treasury financing [and] explicitly ties monetary operations to deficits.”

Would a new Fed-Treasury accord tie monetary policy to deficits?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

The Mag7 had a (marginal) capex multiplier of ~$60 in 2024 and $15 in 2025. By January 2026, this multiplier had likely turned negative, as the four largest capex announcements “collectively destroyed $475B of market cap on $320B of incremental guidance.”

Are markets now penalizing companies for large AI capital spending?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

While 81% of American firms with revenue greater than $100mm are private, S&P 500 firms made up over half of economy-wide corporate profits at the end of 2025, while representing 18% of the workforce.

How much of the US economy do public companies represent?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Existing data show ~80% of private wealth in early 20th-century Europe was inherited. In France and Sweden that fell to ~40% by 1975, but has since risen. In the US, the share of inherited wealth hovered btw 50 and 60% over the last century.

Has the inherited share of private wealth declined over the past century?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Low fertility is likely to persist as a global phenomenon as pro-natal policies have been insufficient to “adequately challenge conventions, challenge social orders, and challenge what gets society’s attention, power, and investment.”

How far would global births fall under persistently low fertility?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

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