Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, February 4, 2026

AI Summary. US analytics and software stocks sold off after AI company Anthropic launched productivity tools for its Claude Cowork platform that can help automate legal work, with Gartner down 21%, S&P Global and FactSet down 11%, and a JPMorgan US software index off 7%. Private equity firms including Ares Management and KKR each fell 10%.

George Steer, Emily Herbert and Melissa Heikkilä Financial Times
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Software firms and sponsors with heavy software exposure have experienced a sell-off, as investors price in the risk of disruption due to AI. A JPM index that tracks software stocks has fallen 18% this year.

Are new AI automation tools driving selloffs in analytics and software stocks?

Core argument: Gartner fell 21% and S&P Global 11%, with Intuit and Equifax both down more than 10%, FactSet off 11% and Moody's 9%, after Anthropic launched Claude Cowork productivity tools that can help automate legal work.

Markets were dragged lower by large declines for a host of analytics groups following AI company Anthropic’s launch of productivity tools for its Claude Cowork platform that can help automate legal work. Analytics groups Gartner and S&P Global dropped 21% and 11%, respectively, while Intuit and Equifax both declined more than 10%. Moody’s fell 9% and FactSet lost 11%. A JPMorgan index tracking US software stocks slid 7%, taking its loss this year to 18%. Private equity groups, many of which have piled into software in recent years, also tumbled. Ares Management dropped 10%, as did KKR, and Apollo fell 4.8%. “The current indiscriminate sell-off resembles the DeepSeek-driven decline of January 2025, which ultimately proved unfounded,” Bank of America analyst Vivek Arya said on Wednesday, referring to the hundreds of billions of dollars briefly wiped off the value of major US tech stocks by the advances of the Chinese AI start-up early last year.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Gartner fell 21% and S&P Global 11%, with Intuit and Equifax both down more than 10%, FactSet off 11% and Moody's 9%, after Anthropic launched Claude Cowork productivity tools that can help automate legal work.
  2. A JPMorgan index tracking US software stocks slid 7%, extending its loss this year to 18%, while private equity groups that have piled into software also fell, with Ares Management and KKR each down 10% and Apollo down 4.8%.
  3. Bank of America analyst Vivek Arya said the indiscriminate sell-off resembles the DeepSeek-driven decline of January 2025, which briefly wiped hundreds of billions of dollars off major US tech stocks and ultimately proved unfounded.

Related Articles:

  • Concentrated Growth: The Role Of The IT Sector — Since 1988, total factor productivity in the information technology sector has risen about 178%, versus about 12% across all non-IT sectors combined, while aggregate productivity rose about 40%. The IT sector accounts for roughly 45% of cumulative aggregate productivity growth, once sectoral linkages to downstream industries are weighted in.
  • Four Takeaways from Microsoft’s Satya Nadella at WEF Today — Microsoft's chief executive says the price of AI model usage ("tokens") falls by roughly half every three months. Commentary argues that such rapid deflation pulls demand forward, encourages overbuilding, and commoditizes models, shifting competitive advantage to orchestration and context rather than the model layer.
  • The Geopolitics of AI: Decoding the New Global Operating System — The performance gap between the top American and Chinese AI models narrowed from 9.3% to 1.7%, with Chinese firms relying on cheaper open-source models—DeepSeek prices usage 20-40x below OpenAI's ChatGPT. This price advantage could win adoption in developing countries and build dependency on Chinese AI ecosystems.

AI Summary. Investors' willingness to pay for enterprise software earnings has been declining for years, a re-rating that predates recent headlines about artificial intelligence displacing software and has continued even as the broader equity market advanced. Price-to-earnings multiples in the sector remain high despite this sustained revaluation.

Paul Kedrosky Applied Complexity
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Kedrosky notes that investors started re-rating software earnings in 2022, around the launch of ChatGPT. Still-high P/E multiples “shouldn’t distract from a fundamental revaluation that’s been going on for some time, despite an advancing equity market.”

Has the re-rating of enterprise software been underway for years?

Core argument: The re-rating of enterprise software valuations arguably began closer to ChatGPT's launch in late 2022 rather than with the recent "SaaSpocalypse" headlines, though the decline has accelerated of late.

There are endless headlines about the ongoing SaaSpocalypse, the re-rating of tech companies, especially in enterprise software, as AI is thought to be eating ... software itself. But as the chart shows, it arguably began years ago, closer to the launch of ChatGPT in late 2022, even if it has recently accelerated. The chart shows the re-rating of the enterprise tech sector: the declining price investors are willing to pay for software earnings. Granted, the P/E multiple is still hefty, in part because of the mix of holdings in the enterprise tech IGV ETF, but that shouldn't distract from a fundamental revaluation that's been going on for some time, despite an advancing equity market.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The re-rating of enterprise software valuations arguably began closer to ChatGPT's launch in late 2022 rather than with the recent "SaaSpocalypse" headlines, though the decline has accelerated of late.
  2. The price investors are willing to pay for enterprise software earnings has been declining for some time, even as the broader equity market advanced.
  3. The P/E multiple of the enterprise tech IGV ETF remains hefty, partly because of the mix of its holdings, but a fundamental revaluation of the sector has been under way.

Related Articles:

  • Society’s Technical Debt and Software’s Gutenberg Moment — Every wave of technological innovation has been unleashed by something costly becoming cheap enough to waste, and large language models are collapsing the cost and complexity of producing software. The authors argue that decades of underproduced software have left society with immense technical debt that is poised to contract, releasing a wave of innovation.
  • Smothering Heights — The four largest cloud computing firms are devoting rising shares of revenue to capital spending and research, with Meta's combined share reaching 70%. Unlike past investment booms, this one has been financed mostly from internal cash flow: 28 direct AI stocks make up 50% of S&P 500 market value but just 5% of its net debt.
  • Concentrated Growth: The Role Of The IT Sector — Since 1988, total factor productivity in the information technology sector has risen about 178%, versus about 12% across all non-IT sectors combined, while aggregate productivity rose about 40%. The IT sector accounts for roughly 45% of cumulative aggregate productivity growth, once sectoral linkages to downstream industries are weighted in.

AI Summary. Declines in mental health among American workers are concentrated among those aged 18-22, a group that reports the greatest difficulty making ends meet, and the rise in despair is most pronounced among workers in that age group without a college education. For all other age groups, despair rates among workers were lower than among non-workers.

David Blanchflower and Alex Bryson National Bureau of Economic Research
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Survey evidence suggests that the worsened mental health of the young in recent years is particularly concentrated among those who are less-educated and working. For the 2021–2025 cohort of 18–22 year olds, “despair” is higher for workers than non-workers.

Which young workers account for rising despair among Americans?

Core argument: Declines in mental health are most pronounced among American workers ages 18–22, a group likely drawn from lower socioeconomic classes that reports the greatest difficulty making ends meet.

Declines in mental health are most pronounced among the youngest workers ages 18-22, who are likely drawn from lower socioeconomic classes and report the greatest difficulties making ends meet. Chart 7a and 7b show changes in despair over time for non-workers and workers. The rise is especially marked in the later period among young workers. Chart 8 shows that the change observed in the age/despair relation is driven by those aged 18-22. The chart plots the difference between despair rates for workers and non-workers. For all age groups other than the youngest in all years the relation was negative [i.e.] that despair rates of workers were lower than of non-workers. Chart 9 shows the importance of education. The rise in despair for those workers ages 18-22 is most apparent among those without a college education. In the years 2021-2025 52% (weighted) of ages 18-22 had a high school diploma with a further 11% who were dropouts. In the same years those ages 23-29 29% were high school graduates, 8% were dropouts, 28% had some college and 35% had 4 years + of college. Chart 9 shows the rise in despair is particularly pronounced for the least educated workers, covering high school dropouts and graduates, and more than it is for less educated non-workers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Declines in mental health are most pronounced among American workers ages 18–22, a group likely drawn from lower socioeconomic classes that reports the greatest difficulty making ends meet.
  2. For every age group other than the youngest, in all years, despair rates of workers were lower than those of non-workers, with the change in the age/despair relation driven by those aged 18–22.
  3. The rise in despair among workers ages 18–22 is most apparent among those without a college education, and in 2021–2025 52% (weighted) of that age group held a high school diploma, with a further 11% dropouts.

Related Articles:

  • US College Students’ Well-Being — A study of US college students finds moderate-to-severe depression reported by 26% of students at one elite institution, 22% reporting moderate-to-severe anxiety and 10% contemplating suicide. Poorer mental health is associated with being female, little exercise, low grades, and financial aid; financial stress is associated with higher suicidal thoughts.
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.

AI Summary. An analysis by the nonprofit Class Action finds that freshman enrollment of underrepresented minority students rose 8% at public flagship universities, while at the nation's 50 most selective schools black freshman enrollment fell 27% and Latino enrollment fell 10%. At the 12 "Ivy Plus" schools, black freshman enrollment fell two percentage points, a 25% drop in share.

Stephanie Saul New York Times
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After 2023’s Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, black and Hispanic enrollment at the 50 most competitive colleges and universities declined 27 and 10%, respectively, while “flagship” state universities enrolled 8% more underrepresented minorities.

How are minority enrollment shifts differing between selective and public universities?

Core argument: Black freshman enrollment fell 27% and Latino enrollment fell 10% at the nation's 50 most selective schools, according to an analysis by the nonprofit Class Action.

Overall, freshman enrollment of underrepresented minority groups increased by 8% at public flagship universities. The analysis, by a nonprofit organization, Class Action, concludes that those schools were among institutions that benefited as a result of higher rejection rates for black and Hispanic students at the nation’s 50 most selective schools. At those top 50 schools, black freshman enrollment was down by 27% and Latino enrollment down by 10%. Many four-year private schools with less selective admission requirements than the Ivy League also saw big increases. The data show a significant impact on the demographics of the nation’s very top schools. Black freshman enrollment declined by two percentage points at the 12 schools known as the Ivy Plus, which includes the eight schools in the Ivy League as well as Duke, Stanford, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of Chicago. But that represented a 25% drop in the share of back students in the freshman class, the report noted.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Black freshman enrollment fell 27% and Latino enrollment fell 10% at the nation's 50 most selective schools, according to an analysis by the nonprofit Class Action.
  2. Freshman enrollment of underrepresented minority groups rose 8% at public flagship universities, which Class Action concludes benefited from higher rejection rates for black and Hispanic students at the most selective schools.
  3. Black freshman enrollment declined by two percentage points at the 12 Ivy Plus schools — the eight Ivy League institutions plus Duke, Stanford, MIT and the University of Chicago — a 25% drop in their share of the freshman class.

Related Articles:

  • Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges — Children from top-1% families are more than 2x as likely as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores to attend an Ivy-Plus college, with two-thirds of the gap attributable to higher admissions rates. The authors attribute this advantage to legacy preferences, weight on non-academic credentials, and athlete recruitment.
  • The Long-Run Impacts of Banning Affirmative Action in US Higher Education — State-level bans on affirmative action in US higher education are estimated to reduce under-represented minority women's college degree completion, earnings, and employment relative to non-Hispanic White women, driven largely by effects on Hispanic women, widening racial and ethnic gaps among women. Effects on under-represented minority men are more ambiguous and vary across states.
  • Military Officer Quality in the All-Volunteer Force — The authors find a steady decline in U.S. Marine Corps officers' General Classification Test scores, which is statistically associated with the expansion of college attendance and explains 96% of the measured change. They also find a positive association between African American officers and mean test scores, arguing affirmative action has not lowered officer quality.

AI Summary. U.S. Border Patrol recorded 237,538 migrant encounters at the U.S.-Mexico border in fiscal 2025, down from more than 1.5m the prior year and a record of over 2.2m in fiscal 2022, the lowest annual total since 1970. Encounters were far higher in the first four months of that fiscal year than afterward.

John Gramlich Pew Research Center
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A Pew analysis finds U. S. Border Patrol encounters with migrants at the southern border have fallen to their lowest level in more than 50 years. The headline decline is likely understated as it still includes Biden’s last four months in office.

How far have migrant encounters at the southern border fallen?

Core argument: The Border Patrol recorded 237,538 migrant encounters at the U.S.-Mexico border in fiscal 2025, the lowest total in any fiscal year since 1970, according to historical Border Patrol data.

The Border Patrol recorded 237,538 encounters with migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border in the 2025 fiscal year, which began in October 2024 and ended in September 2025. That was down from more than 1.5 million encounters in fiscal 2024, more than 2 million in fiscal 2023 and a record of more than 2.2 million in fiscal 2022. The 2025 total was the lowest in any fiscal year since 1970, according to historical data from the Border Patrol. While annual statistics show a huge decline in migrant encounters at the U.S.-Mexico border in the 2025 fiscal year, these numbers understate the decrease that has occurred since Trump’s second term began on Jan. 20, 2025. The federal fiscal year runs from October to the end of September, so fiscal 2025 included nearly four months of the Biden administration. Migrant encounters during Biden’s last four months in office were much higher than in the months after Trump’s return.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Border Patrol recorded 237,538 migrant encounters at the U.S.-Mexico border in fiscal 2025, the lowest total in any fiscal year since 1970, according to historical Border Patrol data.
  2. Migrant encounters fell from a record of more than 2.2 million in fiscal 2022 and more than 2 million in fiscal 2023 to more than 1.5 million in fiscal 2024 and 237,538 in fiscal 2025.
  3. The fiscal 2025 total understates the decline since Trump's second term began on Jan. 20, 2025, because the October-to-September fiscal year included nearly four months of the Biden administration, when encounters were much higher.

Related Articles:

  • New Population Estimates Show Historic Decline in Net International Migration — The U.S. Census Bureau estimates net international migration peaked at 2.7m in 2024 and fell to 1.3m in 2025, with a projected decline to roughly 321,000 in 2026 if current trends continue. The Bureau notes that continued trends would produce the first net negative migration in more than 50 years.
  • Macroeconomic Implications Of Immigration Flows In 2025 And 2026: January 2026 Update — The authors estimate that job growth consistent with full employment was 20,000–50,000 a month in the second half of 2025, while reported nonfarm payroll growth averaged about 14,500 and unemployment rose 0.3 percentage points. They project immigration policy changes will keep potential employment growth low, reducing GDP growth by roughly 0.2 percentage points in 2025 and 0.1 in 2026.
  • How Many People Has Trump Deported So Far? — A New York Times analysis of federal data finds about 230,000 people deported after arrests inside the US and 270,000 at the border, with interior deportations already exceeding the prior administration's four-year total. Southwest border crossings have fallen to record lows, and roughly 40,000 people self-deported for a stipend.

AI Summary. China's leadership overhauling the senior ranks of its military signals relative comfort with the country's external environment, including cross-strait dynamics, as US commitments to Taiwan appear uncertain and Taiwanese politics shift in Beijing's favor. The author argues the purge shows Xi using cross-strait calm to prepare the military for possible conflict over Taiwan.

Jonathan Czin and John Culver Foreign Affairs
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Czin and Culver argue Zhang’s purge indicates that Xi is “relatively comfortable with China’s external environment” and is taking advantage of the window to prepare the military for the “unwelcome eventuality” of military conflict over Taiwan.

Does a military leadership purge signal preparation for conflict over Taiwan?

Core argument: Xi's willingness to strip China's high command down to its studs signals he is relatively comfortable with China's external environment, especially the cross-strait dynamic, and is using that calm to prepare the People's Liberation Army for possible conflict over Taiwan.

Xi’s willingness to strip the high command down to its studs and renovate it at this moment is also a signal that he is relatively comfortable with China’s external environment—especially the cross-strait dynamic. The Trump administration does not seem to be especially ready to defend Taiwan: U.S. President Donald Trump said “it’s up to Xi” what China does regarding Taiwan, and the National Defense Strategy released by his administration last month omitted any mention of Taiwan. Meanwhile, the political dynamic in Taiwan seems to be shifting in Beijing’s favor ahead of the island’s next national election in 2028. Support for Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and his Democratic Progressive Party, which takes a harder line against Beijing, has declined since its failed effort last summer to recall legislators in the opposition party, the Kuomintang, and a new leadership in the Kuomintang is calling for more reconciliation with Beijing. But cutting this deeply into his own network to excise the rot in the PLA does not indicate that Xi is distracted from the possibility of military conflict over Taiwan. Instead, it shows just how serious he is about ensuring that the military is ready for such an unwelcome eventuality. He is taking advantage of the cross-strait calm to prepare.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Xi's willingness to strip China's high command down to its studs signals he is relatively comfortable with China's external environment, especially the cross-strait dynamic, and is using that calm to prepare the People's Liberation Army for possible conflict over Taiwan.
  2. The Trump administration does not appear especially ready to defend Taiwan, with Trump saying "it's up to Xi" what China does regarding Taiwan and its National Defense Strategy omitting any mention of Taiwan.
  3. Support for Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and his Democratic Progressive Party has declined since its failed effort to recall Kuomintang legislators, while new Kuomintang leadership calls for more reconciliation with Beijing ahead of Taiwan's 2028 election.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Military Says Top General Undermined Xi Jinping’s Authority — China's military newspaper has accused two top generals — the vice chair of the Central Military Commission and the People's Liberation Army's chief of staff — of trampling the "chairman responsibility system" that gives China's leader supreme decision-making power over the armed forces, alongside corruption charges.
  • The Sinister Disappearance Of China’s Bosses — China's liuzhi detention system operates alongside normal policing, requiring no court approval and denying detainees lawyers, with windowless cells, constant lighting and round-the-clock supervision. Stock-exchange filings show 39 executives at listed companies disappearing into the system by the end of September, exceeding the prior year's record.
  • Xi Jinping Says He Is Preparing China for War — China's leadership has emphasized war readiness, announcing a 7.2% increase in the defense budget—which has doubled over the past decade—and plans to reduce dependence on foreign grain imports. China has also opened National Defense Mobilization recruitment offices across the country, while cities in Fujian Province opposite Taiwan build or upgrade air-raid shelters.

Thursday, February 5, 2026

AI Summary. Decomposition analysis attributes Latin America's fertility decline largely to women aged 20–29 and those with lower education, and finds successive cohorts are having fewer children rather than postponing motherhood. Falling birth counts among mothers drive the decline in completed fertility, with rising childlessness accounting for under 10% on average.

Milagros Onofri, Inés Berniell, Raquel Fernández, and Azul Menduiña National Bureau of Economic Research
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The crude birth rate in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) fell by two-thirds between 1950 and 2023. A cohort analysis shows that the declines in completed fertility are due primarily to fewer children per mother rather than by rising childlessness.

Are women having fewer children rather than delaying motherhood?

Core argument: Rising childlessness accounts for less than 10% on average of the decline in completed fertility across Latin American cohorts, with the decline driven primarily by reductions in fertility among mothers.

Decompositions by age, education, and age-education groups reveal that the largest contributors to the decline in period fertility were younger women, particularly those of age 20–29, and especially from women with lower levels of education. A cohort perspective based on completed fertility allows us to examine whether these changes arise from women postponing motherhood or ultimately having fewer children. Our analysis shows that successive cohorts of Latin American women are not merely delaying births but rather are having fewer children on average. Furthermore, the decomposition analysis shows that declines in completed fertility are driven primarily by reductions in fertility among mothers rather than by rising childlessness. In this respect, Latin American patterns differ markedly from those observed in the United States: while changes in cohort childlessness play the main role in explaining the modest increase in completed fertility in the US between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s cohorts, rising childlessness accounts for less than 10% on average of the decline in completed [LAC] fertility.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Rising childlessness accounts for less than 10% on average of the decline in completed fertility across Latin American cohorts, with the decline driven primarily by reductions in fertility among mothers.
  2. Decompositions by age and education attribute the largest contributions to Latin America's period fertility decline to women aged 20–29, especially those with lower levels of education.
  3. Successive cohorts of Latin American women are having fewer children on average rather than merely postponing motherhood, unlike in the United States, where cohort childlessness mainly explains the modest increase in completed fertility between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s cohorts.

Related Articles:

  • Latin America’s Perpetual Growth Crisis — Per capita GDP in the US grew a cumulative 20% over a decade, about 2% a year, outpacing Latin American economies; Colombia, Peru and Chile fared best in the region but still fell well short, while Mexico and Brazil underperformed. The author argues Ecuador's and Argentina's dollar pegs preclude growth.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.

AI Summary. Modeling of a rise in the total fertility rate from one to two finds it takes 41 years before the ratio of labor income to consumption needs across age groups exceeds its starting level. The authors argue this delay makes pro-natalist policies economically unappealing to older voters and short-horizon politicians.

David Weil Journal of Economic Perspectives
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David Weil finds that it takes 41 years after a rise in the fertility rate for the “support ratio” to rise above its initial value, allowing for increased consumption – an “unfortunate implication for pro-natalist policies” at the political level.

How long does a fertility increase take to raise living standards?

Core argument: A rise in the total fertility rate from one to two takes 41 years from its onset before the adjusted support ratio rises above its initial value.

A rising working-age share acts like a tailwind allowing consumption per capita. This has an unfortunate implication for pro-natalist policies. This is shown in the dashed line in Figure 3, which traces out the dynamics following a rise in the total fertility rate from one to two. It takes 41 years from the onset of the fertility increase for the adjusted support ratio (the weighted sum of population by age group, where the weights are average labor income by age, divided by a similar sum where the weights are average consumption by age) to rise above its initial value. Conceptually, the adjusted support ratio functions just as the working-age share of the population in the simple calculations above: The larger its value, the higher consumption will be relative to the earnings of working-age adults. The existence of this demographic debit suggests that policies designed to raise fertility would not be appealing (at least on economic grounds) to elderly or near elderly voters, and would similarly be an unappetizing choice for politicians whose planning horizon rarely extends so far into the future.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A rise in the total fertility rate from one to two takes 41 years from its onset before the adjusted support ratio rises above its initial value.
  2. The adjusted support ratio — population by age weighted by average labor income, divided by a similar sum weighted by average consumption by age — functions like the working-age share, with higher values permitting higher consumption relative to working-age earnings.
  3. This demographic debit suggests policies designed to raise fertility would not appeal, at least on economic grounds, to elderly or near-elderly voters, nor to politicians whose planning horizons rarely extend so far into the future.

Related Articles:

  • The Demographic Outlook: 2026 to 2056 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the US population rises from 349m to 364m between 2026 and 2056, with annual growth slowing from 0.3% over the next decade to 0.1% thereafter before reaching zero and then shrinking. Declining fertility is projected to push deaths above births starting in 2030, increasingly offsetting net immigration.
  • The Case for Gradual Population Decline — South Korea's fertility rate fell below 1.7 in 1985 and its share of population aged 20-40 has fallen 20% since 2000, yet it ranked first in Bloomberg's Innovation Index and twelfth in a global soft power ranking. The author argues low fertility does not inevitably cause technological and cultural stagnation.
  • The US Has One of the Highest Fertility Rates Among Peer Countries — The tempo-adjusted fertility rate, which accounts for shifts in the timing of births, shows the US rate falling since roughly 2009-10 and dropping below the 2.1 births-per-woman replacement level around 2017, reaching 1.82 in 2022. The US decline is less severe than in many peer countries.

AI Summary. Eli Lilly launched lower-priced vials of its obesity drug Zepbound to extend supply beyond injector pens, later cutting vial prices by 50%, and resolved its shortage while rival Novo Nordisk's persisted. Ending the shortage required compounding pharmacies to stop selling copies of Lilly's medicine.

Madison Muller Bloomberg
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Despite revolutionizing health care with GLP-1 drugs, Novo Nordisk has been outcompeted by Eli Lilly, in part through better management. Both firms were confronted with production bottlenecks in 2024; Lilly’s have been resolved while Novo’s are ongoing.

How did one obesity drugmaker end its shortage before its rival?

Core argument: Eli Lilly launched vials of Zepbound in April 2024 and later cut vial prices by 50%, easing manufacturing bottlenecks tied to injector pens and offering patients a price closer to that of copycat drugs.

At first, the companies were telling similar stories. Both were racing to meet demand while their stocks surged on the hype. Novo became Europe’s most valuable company at one point. Lilly became the first pharmaceutical company to surpass a $500 billion valuation and kept growing from there. And while shortages were ongoing and both drugmakers worked to resolve production bottlenecks, Lilly took a critical step that its competitor did not. In April 2024, the company launched vials of Zepbound that allowed it to extend its supplies. This helped ease the drugmaker’s manufacturing woes, which stemmed from the injector pens. Months later, it cut prices for the vials by 50% — giving patients a more affordable option that was closer in price to what copycat drugs were selling for. By late 2024, Lilly’s supply shortage was over — meaning compounding drugmakers had to stop selling Lilly’s medicine — while Novo’s continued to drag on.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Eli Lilly launched vials of Zepbound in April 2024 and later cut vial prices by 50%, easing manufacturing bottlenecks tied to injector pens and offering patients a price closer to that of copycat drugs.
  2. Lilly's supply shortage ended by late 2024, requiring compounding drugmakers to stop selling copies of its medicine, while Novo Nordisk's shortage continued.
  3. Novo Nordisk became Europe's most valuable company at one point, and Lilly became the first pharmaceutical company to surpass a $500 billion valuation.

Related Articles:

  • The Plan To Rescue Novo Nordisk — Novo Nordisk's Wegovy dominated the weight-loss drug market until Eli Lilly launched Zepbound, which brought in $4.9bn in sales in 2024, three-quarters as much as Wegovy. Bloomberg forecasts that by 2030 Lilly will control more than half of the global obesity drug market, versus a third for Novo.
  • Today’s Most Important Technology — The share of patients taking semaglutide for weight control rather than type 2 diabetes rose from under 10% in 2019 to 41.7%. Obesity and overweight, affecting 1 in 8 people worldwide, cost the global economy $2tn — nearly 70 cents on the dollar from premature mortality and lost productivity — an impact projected to double by 2035 absent intervention.
  • How Would Authorizing Medicare to Cover Anti-Obesity Medications Affect the Federal Budget? — The Congressional Budget Office projects that authorizing Medicare coverage of anti-obesity medications would raise federal spending by about $35bn on net over 2026–2034, with direct costs rising from $1.6bn to $7.1bn a year. Offsetting savings from improved beneficiary health would be small, under $50m initially and reaching $1.0bn.

AI Summary. Google plans to roughly double its capital spending to a range of $175bn–$185bn, far above analyst expectations of about $120bn, funding its bet on artificial intelligence. Growth in its advertising and cloud businesses supports the outlay, following capital spending of $91.4bn in the prior year.

Stephen Morris Financial Times
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Google is planning on doubling its capital expenditure in 2026 to ~$175–185B. Google spent $91.4B on capex in 2025.

Are strong advertising and cloud earnings funding a doubling of AI spending?

Core argument: Google raised its 2026 capital expenditure forecast to $175bn–$185bn, roughly double its 2025 spending and far above analysts' expectations of about $120bn.

Google said it plans to double its capital expenditure this year to as much as $185B as strong growth in its advertising and cloud businesses added to the search giant’s financial firepower for its huge bet on AI. The Mountain View, California-based group increased its forecast for capex in 2026 to a range of $175B to $185B, far exceeding analysts’ expectations of about $120B. Fourth-quarter capital investment almost doubled to $27.9B compared with the year before, pushing spending in 2025 to $91.4B.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Google raised its 2026 capital expenditure forecast to $175bn–$185bn, roughly double its 2025 spending and far above analysts' expectations of about $120bn.
  2. Google's fourth-quarter capital investment almost doubled from a year earlier to $27.9bn, bringing 2025 capital spending to $91.4bn.
  3. Google attributed added financial firepower for its AI bet to growth in its advertising and cloud businesses.

Related Articles:

  • The Macro Implications of the AI Capex Boom — Artificial intelligence capital spending is estimated to add roughly 1.4 percentage points to US growth in one year and about 1.5 points the next, comparable to business investment's contribution during the tech bubble. A material part of that estimate reflects profits at Nvidia and a few other chipmakers that are unlikely to be recycled back into the economy.
  • Four Takeaways from Microsoft’s Satya Nadella at WEF Today — Microsoft's chief executive says the price of AI model usage ("tokens") falls by roughly half every three months. Commentary argues that such rapid deflation pulls demand forward, encourages overbuilding, and commoditizes models, shifting competitive advantage to orchestration and context rather than the model layer.
  • Smothering Heights — The four largest cloud computing firms are devoting rising shares of revenue to capital spending and research, with Meta's combined share reaching 70%. Unlike past investment booms, this one has been financed mostly from internal cash flow: 28 direct AI stocks make up 50% of S&P 500 market value but just 5% of its net debt.

AI Summary. The U.S., Japan and the European Union announced they will conclude a memorandum of understanding on jointly supporting mining, refining, processing and recycling projects, with the U.S. and Mexico implementing a similar action plan. U.S. officials said the group of nations would set a price floor for critical minerals.

Gavin Bade Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

The US, Japan, Mexico and the EU have proposed an effort to create a non-Chinese rare earths supply chain via a “preferential trade zone” that would impose tariffs on rare earths that originate outside of it and establish a price floor within.

Are allied nations coordinating to set a price floor for critical minerals?

Core argument: The U.S., Japan and the EU said in a joint statement they will conclude a memorandum of understanding within 30 days on jointly supporting projects in mining, refining, processing and recycling.

The U.S., Japan and the EU will conclude a memorandum of understanding within 30 days on how they can jointly support projects in mining, refining, processing and recycling, the governments said in a joint statement. The U.S. and Mexico will implement a similar action plan over the next 60 days, the U.S. Trade Representative’s office said in a separate statement. “If you have someone who is dominant, who can flood a market with a particular material, they have the ability to essentially destroy the economic value of a company or a country’s production,” Interior Secretary Doug Burgum said Tuesday at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, previewing the policies, “And so that’s why, within this club of nations, there would be a price floor.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S., Japan and the EU said in a joint statement they will conclude a memorandum of understanding within 30 days on jointly supporting projects in mining, refining, processing and recycling.
  2. The U.S. and Mexico will implement a similar action plan over the next 60 days, according to the U.S. Trade Representative's office.
  3. Interior Secretary Doug Burgum said that within this club of nations there would be a price floor, arguing a dominant producer that can flood a market with a material is able to destroy the economic value of a company's or country's production.

Related Articles:

  • Underestimating China — China's productive capacity is three times that of the United States and exceeds the next nine countries combined, with its share of global manufacturing quintupling to 30% while the U.S. share halved to about 15%. The authors argue Washington must convert its alliances into a platform for pooled capacity building.
  • Why China Keeps Winning The Trade War — Governments seeking supply-chain leverage face limited visibility into their own supply chains, and China's rare earth licensing requirements for multinationals may be partly intended to give Beijing that visibility and allow more precise targeting of future restrictions. Effective measures must impose asymmetric costs, and keeping foreign manufacturers dependent on drip-fed supply is central to Beijing's strategy.
  • Mad Libs: Just Fill In The Blanks — China expanded its rare earth export controls to require licenses for any product containing more than 0.1% by value of Chinese rare earths or made with equipment containing them, with a presumption of denial for military uses and scrutiny of advanced semiconductor uses. Aggressive enforcement would affect industries from chips and autos to aerospace, defense and medical equipment.

AI Summary. New York City has the highest combined city-state personal tax rate in the US and the highest all-in corporate income tax rate at 17.4%, and the highest industrial, retail and multifamily property taxes per square foot among ten major cities. New York State ranks first in tax collections per capita.

Michael Cembalest J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

At ~15%, NYC has the highest combined city-state personal tax rate in the US, and the top marginal corporate income tax rate at 17.4%. The city also has the highest industrial, retail and multifamily property taxes per square foot of 10 major cities.

Does New York City impose the highest taxes among major US cities?

Core argument: New York City carries the highest all-in corporate income tax rate in the US at 17.4%, combining state and city taxes plus the MTA surcharge, along with the highest combined city-state personal tax rate.

NYC has the highest combined city-state personal tax rate in the US and the highest all-in corporate income tax rate at 17.4% (state plus city plus MTA surcharge). According to the [Citizens Budget Commission], New York State is the highest tax jurisdiction in the US based on tax collections per capita and #2 on tax collections per $1,000 of personal income. NYC has the highest industrial, retail and multifamily property taxes per square foot of ten major cities.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. New York City carries the highest all-in corporate income tax rate in the US at 17.4%, combining state and city taxes plus the MTA surcharge, along with the highest combined city-state personal tax rate.
  2. The Citizens Budget Commission ranks New York State as the highest tax jurisdiction in the US by tax collections per capita and #2 by tax collections per $1,000 of personal income.
  3. New York City has the highest industrial, retail, and multifamily property taxes per square foot among ten major cities.

Related Articles:

  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — New York state's share of US taxpayers reporting over $1m in income fell from 12.7% in 2010 to 8.7% in 2022, and the Citizens Budget Commission estimates state and city income tax receipts from that group would have been $13bn higher had the share held. Job growth has concentrated in lower-paid health care and social assistance.
  • The Stationary Bandits of New York City — New York City's construction costs exceed international benchmarks: Paris installs metro platform edge doors for about €3.7m per station while the Metropolitan Transportation Authority says it needs $55m per station. The author argues stringent crane operator licensing and sidewalk shed regulations protect a small number of unionized contractors from competition.
  • Behavioral Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners: Evidence from California — A California ballot measure raising top marginal income tax rates by up to 3 percentage points prompted an additional 0.8% of the affected tax base to leave the state, with an estimated income elasticity of 2.5–3.2 for high earners who stayed. The authors estimate these responses eroded 45.2% of windfall revenues within one year and 60.9% within two.