Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
Buy the Books
  • Macro Roundup
  • About Roundup
  • About Ed Conard
  • Highlights
  • Topics
  • Subscribe
Edward Conard
  • twitter
  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • youtube

Macro Roundup

  • Email
  • Text Message (SMS)
  • Twitter/X
  • LinkedIn
  • Facebook
  • WhatsApp Message
Subscribe to Macro Roundup Emails
Select topics to choose: articles that mention them (broader) or articles mainly about them (focused)
  • Mentions 0
  • Primary focus 0
Showing all 7,315 Macro Roundup articles
When you search for any topic (like GDP, Inflation, or Banking), choose:
Choose search scope

Tuesday, February 3, 2026

Poverty and Dependency in the United States, 1939–2023

AI Summary. Extending a consistent poverty measure back to 1939, the authors estimate US absolute poverty fell from 48.5% to 19.5% between 1939 and 1963, driven by growth in market income rather than government transfers net of taxes. Poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty than before.

Richard Burkhauser and Kevin Corinth National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
February 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Btw 1939 and 1963, the % of Americans below LBJ’s absolute poverty line (3× the cost of a minimal meal plan), fell from 48.5 to 19.5, driven by rising market income. Post-1964, most (for non-blacks, all) drops were the result of transfers, not earnings.

Did market income or government transfers drive the largest poverty declines?

Core argument: Absolute poverty in the United States fell from 48.5% to 19.5% between 1939 and 1963, a 29 percentage point reduction that occurred before the major expansion of safety net programs such as SNAP, Medicaid, and refundable tax credits.

The major innovation of this paper is to extend a comprehensive and consistent measure of poverty back to 1939, exploiting a quarter century of data before the War on Poverty began. From 1939-1963, absolute poverty fell from 48.5% to 19.5%, a 29 percentage point reduction. This pre-war progress provides important context for previously documented success in reducing poverty afterwards, since it occurred before the major expansion of safety net programs like SNAP, Medicaid, and refundable tax credits. During that 1939–1963 period, it was the growth of market income rather than government transfers net of taxes that reduced poverty rates. In fact, poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty was declared than in the 24 years before, even when applying the same initial poverty rate to both periods. Our results do not imply that poverty would have necessarily continued to fall at the same rate after 1963 in the absence of the War on Poverty. A pre versus post comparison is conflated by contemporaneous macroeconomic and social changes, such as slower economic growth in the post-1963 period. Conversely, any claim that the War on Poverty was necessary for poverty to decline should be accompanied by an attempt to understand why it had already been falling in the quarter century before it was declared.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Absolute poverty in the United States fell from 48.5% to 19.5% between 1939 and 1963, a 29 percentage point reduction that occurred before the major expansion of safety net programs such as SNAP, Medicaid, and refundable tax credits.
  2. From 1939 to 1963, growth of market income rather than government transfers net of taxes reduced poverty rates, according to a poverty measure extended consistently back to 1939.
  3. Poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty was declared than in the 24 years before, even applying the same initial poverty rate to both periods, though the authors note the comparison is conflated by contemporaneous macroeconomic and social changes, including slower post-1963 growth.

Related Articles:

  • Evaluating the Success of the War on Poverty since 1963 Using an Absolute Full-Income Poverty Measure — The authors estimate that an absolute full-income poverty measure, which counts a fuller set of income sources and adjusts thresholds only for inflation, fell from 19.5% to 1.6%, versus an official decline to 10.5%. They also find relative poverty reductions modest and government dependence more than doubled among working-age adults.
  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • Government Benefit Programs Already Do A Lot To Help Low Income Families — For a two-adult, three-child family, existing taxes and government benefits bring take-home resources to about $58,000 with no earnings, $79,000 with $20,000 of earnings, and $90,000 with $80,000 of earnings plus $15,000 in employer health premiums. A $75,000 gap in earnings and work-related benefits narrows to $11,000 in take-home pay.
  • Poverty/Crime
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • Workforce

Productivity Stagnation in the Construction Industry: An International Perspective

AI Summary. The authors estimate that tighter land use regulation accounts for 40% of the gap in productivity growth between US construction and the rest of the economy, with weak innovation and quality mismeasurement each accounting for 20%. Across major economies, regulation and mismeasurement explain most of US construction's underperformance.

Elsie Peng Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:
February 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Post-1965, measured labor productivity in US construction averaged ~ -0.6% per year, compared to +1.6% economy-wide. GS attributes ~40% of the gap to tighter land-use rules, ~20% to weak innovation, and ~20% to mismeasurement of quality improvements.

Why has construction productivity growth lagged the rest of the economy?

Core argument: The authors estimate that tightening US land use regulations accounts for 40% of the productivity growth gap between construction and the rest of the US economy since 1965.

Our analysis shows that, within the US, the tightening of land use regulations has accounted for 40% of the gap in productivity growth between construction and the rest of the economy since 1965, and the lack of innovation and quality mismeasurement have each accounted for 20%. Looking across countries, we find that more severe tightening of land use regulations and greater quality mismeasurement account for most of the underperformance of the US construction industry since 1991, relative to other major G10 countries.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that tightening US land use regulations accounts for 40% of the productivity growth gap between construction and the rest of the US economy since 1965.
  2. Lack of innovation and quality mismeasurement each account for 20% of the US construction productivity growth gap relative to the rest of the economy since 1965, according to the authors' analysis.
  3. Across countries, the authors find that more severe tightening of land use regulations and greater quality mismeasurement account for most of the US construction industry's underperformance since 1991 relative to other major G10 countries.

Related Articles:

  • Stagnant Construction Productivity Is a Worldwide Problem — Construction labor productivity has been roughly flat or declining since the 1990s across most of Western Europe, Japan, and Korea, a pattern consistent with the flat US trend. Countries often held up as models — Sweden and Japan for prefabrication, China for infrastructure — show little or unremarkable construction productivity improvement.
  • Five Decades of Decline: U.S. Construction Sector Productivity — U.S. construction labor productivity in 2023 was essentially unchanged from 1948, with real output per worker in 2020 more than 30% below its 1970 level, even as aggregate U.S. labor productivity tripled between 1950 and 2020. Construction accounted for about 4.5% of U.S. GDP in 2024.
  • The Strange and Awful Path of Productivity in the U.S. Construction Sector — U.S. construction sector labor productivity and total factor productivity grew faster than the whole economy in the 1950s and 1960s, then fell, ending 2020 below their 1950 levels while economywide labor productivity and total factor productivity were 290% and 230% higher. Construction labor productivity fell about 1% a year from 1970 to 2020.
  • Housing
  • GDP
  • Productivity

U.S. Manufacturing Is in Retreat and Trump’s Tariffs Aren’t Helping

AI Summary. U.S. manufacturing employment has declined for eight straight months following the announcement of sweeping new tariffs, leaving fewer Americans working in manufacturing than at any point since the end of the pandemic. Federal figures show more than 200,000 manufacturing jobs have disappeared since 2023.

David Uberti Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
February 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

After reaching a post-GFC peak of ~12.9mm in 2023, the number of US manufacturing jobs has fallen steadily to ~12.7mm, below their pre-pandemic level of ~ 12.8mm.

Are tariffs reversing the decline in manufacturing employment?

Core argument: U.S. manufacturing has shed more than 200,000 jobs since 2023, leaving fewer Americans employed in the sector than at any point since the pandemic ended, according to federal figures.

The manufacturing boom President Trump promised would usher in a golden age for America is going in reverse. After years of economic interventions by the Trump and Biden administrations, fewer Americans work in manufacturing than any point since the pandemic ended. Manufacturers shed workers in each of the eight months after Trump unveiled “Liberation Day” tariffs, according to federal figures, extending a contraction that has seen more than 200,000 roles disappear since 2023.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. manufacturing has shed more than 200,000 jobs since 2023, leaving fewer Americans employed in the sector than at any point since the pandemic ended, according to federal figures.
  2. Manufacturers cut workers in each of the eight months following President Trump's "Liberation Day" tariff announcement, extending an ongoing contraction in factory employment.
  3. The manufacturing boom Trump promised would usher in a golden age for America has gone into reverse after years of economic interventions by the Trump and Biden administrations.

Related Articles:

  • AI Data Center Boom Threatens Trump’s Manufacturing Revival — Bloomberg Economics projects the largest participants could pour as much as $4tn into artificial intelligence infrastructure by the end of the decade, with capital spending by hyperscalers such as Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft rising from almost $400bn to as much as $600bn. It expects AI's contribution to GDP growth could reach as much as 1.5 percentage points.
  • What Would It Take to Bring Back US Manufacturing? Part 2: Making American Manufacturing More Productive — The authors argue the United States is a decade away from the scale of automated "lights-out" manufacturing needed to meet its own end-to-end demand at comparable cost. With 98% of US manufacturers being small or medium enterprises, low deployment of mature productivity technologies reflects limited commercial adoption and investment rather than technical readiness.
  • Does Manufacturing Matter? — Manufacturing capacity carries military and geopolitical importance, as shown by economic warfare over products like semiconductors and magnets. The policy-relevant question is not whether manufacturing is geopolitically useful but how much should be spent boosting it given resource constraints, and whether to target defense, dual-use, chokepoint, or broad civilian production.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Productivity
    • Investment
  • Workforce

Data Update 4 for 2026: A Risk Journey Around The World!

AI Summary. Measured in dollar market capitalization terms, India was the worst-performing sub-region globally, rising only 3.31% as the Sensex gained 8.55% in local currency and the rupee depreciated against the dollar. US equities accounted for 47% of global market capitalization but only 38% of the year's change, with Europe and China contributing larger shares.

Aswath Damodaran Musings on Markets
Date Posted:
February 3, 2026

The US share of global market capitalisation in dollar terms was 47% at the start of 2026. China’s share was 14%, and the greater EU’s 13%.

How did global equity markets perform in dollar terms?

Core argument: India was the worst-performing sub-region globally in 2025, with dollar market capitalization up only 3.31%, reflecting a Sensex gain of 8.55% in local currency combined with rupee depreciation against the dollar.

I compute the dollar returns, in aggregate dollar market capitalization terms, in 2025. India was the worst performing sub-region of the world, up only 3.31% in 2025, and those returns reflect not just a relatively below-average year in local currency terms, with the Sensex up 8.55% for the year, but a weaker currency, with the rupee depreciating against the dollar. Zeroing in on the aggregate market capitalization across the world at the start of 2026, I first created a pie chart (on the left) breaking market capitalization by region, and as you can see, US equities, in spite of a weaker dollar, accounted for 47% of global market capitalization. Evaluating just the change in market capitalization during 2025, in the second pie (on the right), you can see the reason for the slippage in the US share, with the US punching in below its weight (38% of the change) and Europe and China weighing in with larger shares.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. India was the worst-performing sub-region globally in 2025, with dollar market capitalization up only 3.31%, reflecting a Sensex gain of 8.55% in local currency combined with rupee depreciation against the dollar.
  2. US equities accounted for 47% of global aggregate market capitalization at the start of 2026, despite a weaker dollar.
  3. The US accounted for 38% of the 2025 change in global market capitalization, below its 47% share, with Europe and China weighing in with larger shares of the change.

Related Articles:

  • Data Update 1 for 2026: The Push and Pull of Data — US equities, with 5,994 firms and $69.8tn in market value, hold the largest share of global market capitalization at 46.8%, down from 48.7% a year earlier despite a 16.8% gain. Global equities added $26.3tn (+21.46%), with China best performing (+32.5% in dollar terms) and India worst (+3.31%).
  • Different Dollar Downside — The authors estimate the US dollar remains roughly 15% overvalued and argue a sharper depreciation could follow if US labor-market weakness forces deeper Federal Reserve rate cuts, particularly against a highly undervalued yen. They also flag a derating of US tech exceptionalism as a risk, since demand for US equities has helped fund the current account deficit.
  • 2026 Outlook: Tech Tonic — A Broadening Bull Market — Most major equity markets have outperformed the US, with Europe, China and Asia generating almost double US total returns in dollar terms and gains of 54% in Italy, 73% in Spain and 71% in Korea. US returns have been driven by strong earnings, particularly in technology, while Europe's have come largely from rising valuations.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

New Dutch Government To Raise ‘Freedom’ Tax For Defence

AI Summary. The Netherlands will fund defense through a "freedom contribution" levied via income tax, projected to raise more than €3bn a year, plus a company contribution projected to raise €1.7bn a year. An online newspaper poll found a majority think the money should come from the overall budget rather than an additional tax.

Barbara Moens Financial Times
Date Posted:
February 3, 2026

The Dutch government is increasing annual income taxes by €3B and corporate taxes by €1.7B to help fund its planned increase in defense spending to 3.5% of GDP from its current level of 2.49%.

The Dutch government is increasing annual income taxes by €3B and corporate taxes by €1.7B to help fund its planned increase...

Will a new income tax fund higher defense spending?

Core argument: The Netherlands' new government will levy a "freedom contribution" on citizens through income tax, eventually generating more than €3bn per year.

Dutch citizens will pay the so-called “freedom contribution” via income tax, which will eventually generate more than €3bn per year. Dutch companies will also have to pay such a contribution, which will eventually generate €1.7bn per year. According to an online poll by a Dutch newspaper, a majority believe the government should find the extra money from the overall budget rather than an additional tax.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Netherlands' new government will levy a "freedom contribution" on citizens through income tax, eventually generating more than €3bn per year.
  2. Dutch companies will also pay a "freedom contribution," eventually generating €1.7bn per year.
  3. In an online poll by a Dutch newspaper, a majority said the government should find the extra money from the overall budget rather than through an additional tax.

Related Articles:

  • Waking the Sleeping European Giant — Europe, at roughly 500m people and a $26tn economy with world-class aerospace, shipbuilding, pharmaceutical, vehicle and weapons manufacturers, has the material basis to be a military superpower. National militaries' preference for home-country suppliers has left subscale defense firms, and common procurement could raise output and lower unit costs.
  • The Costly End of Europe’s ‘Peace Dividend’ — European leaders are debating raising defence spending to 3.5% of GDP or more, a level not seen in continental Europe since the late 1960s. Sustaining that share from 1995 to 2023 would have required an extra $387bn a year across EU member states and $35bn a year for the UK, according to Financial Times calculations.
  • The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers — The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.
  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Politics
  • Security

Russian War Spending May Be Maxed Out

AI Summary. Despite large increases in value-added, excise, income, and social insurance taxes, deficits financed roughly two-thirds of the rise in Russia's consolidated budget spending, including more than 80% of the federal spending increase. Russian government debt remains very low relative to national income, yet officials plan slower nominal spending growth and no additional military and national security spending in ruble terms.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:
February 3, 2026

Matt Klein argues that Russian government spending, inclusive of off-balance-sheet military expenditures, will be difficult to sustain with oil prices at their current level.

Has Russia reached the limit of its war spending growth?

Core argument: More than 80% of the increase in Russian federal spending over the past 12 months was financed by a larger deficit, despite large increases in value-added, excise, income, and social insurance taxes.

Even with massive increases in value-added taxes, excise taxes, income taxes, and social insurance taxes, more than 80% of the increase in Russian federal spending over the past 12 months was financed by an increase in the deficit and more than 70% of the increase in spending by the “pension and social insurance fund of the Russian fund” was financed by an increase in the deficit. Across the consolidated budget, incremental deficit increases financed about two-thirds of the overall spending increase (in rubles). Relative to the Russian economy, which is more than ₽‎200 trillion, these numbers are still relatively small, and Russian government debt is extraordinarily low relative to national income, especially when viewed in comparison to other countries. Nevertheless, Russian officials seem to believe that the additional rubles pumped into the economy via these budget deficits are unwelcome, which is why they are planning for slower nominal spending growth going forward, including no additional spending on the military and national security in 2026 compared to 2025 (in rubles).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. More than 80% of the increase in Russian federal spending over the past 12 months was financed by a larger deficit, despite large increases in value-added, excise, income, and social insurance taxes.
  2. Across Russia's consolidated budget, incremental deficit increases financed about two-thirds of the overall ruble spending increase, and more than 70% of the increase in pension and social insurance fund spending.
  3. Russian officials appear to view the rubles pumped into the economy by these deficits as unwelcome and plan slower nominal spending growth, including no additional ruble spending on military and national security in 2026 compared with 2025.

Related Articles:

  • Russians Shun Putin’s Plea for More Babies as Population Shrinks — Russia's population decline has accelerated, with births falling 3.4% to 1.22m — the lowest level in roughly 25 years — while deaths rose 3.3% to 1.82m, according to Russia's Federal Statistics Service. The decline is attributed in part to Russia's war on Ukraine, though detailed mortality data has been classified and war deaths enter the statistics with long delays.
  • The Russian Paradox: So Much Education, So Little Human Capital — Russia is an exception to the global correspondence between educational attainment and human capital, combining an advanced educational profile with strikingly poor health outcomes and only weak contributions to knowledge production and skills-intensive service exports. World Health Organization estimates put male life expectancy at age 15 near that of the world's least developed countries.
  • Poland Races To Build Bomb Shelters — Poland will require real estate developers to include bomb shelter space in most new buildings, as it works to overhaul civilian defences against the threat of Russian aggression. Despite leading NATO in military spending at almost 5% of GDP, it has invested little in population protection, with most shelters dating to the communist era.
  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
  • Security

Wednesday, February 4, 2026

US Tech Stocks Hit With Fresh Wave Of Selling As Chipmaker AMD Tumbles

AI Summary. US analytics and software stocks sold off after AI company Anthropic launched productivity tools for its Claude Cowork platform that can help automate legal work, with Gartner down 21%, S&P Global and FactSet down 11%, and a JPMorgan US software index off 7%. Private equity firms including Ares Management and KKR each fell 10%.

George Steer, Emily Herbert and Melissa Heikkilä Financial Times
Date Posted:
February 4, 2026

Software firms and sponsors with heavy software exposure have experienced a sell-off, as investors price in the risk of disruption due to AI. A JPM index that tracks software stocks has fallen 18% this year.

Are new AI automation tools driving selloffs in analytics and software stocks?

Core argument: Gartner fell 21% and S&P Global 11%, with Intuit and Equifax both down more than 10%, FactSet off 11% and Moody's 9%, after Anthropic launched Claude Cowork productivity tools that can help automate legal work.

Markets were dragged lower by large declines for a host of analytics groups following AI company Anthropic’s launch of productivity tools for its Claude Cowork platform that can help automate legal work. Analytics groups Gartner and S&P Global dropped 21% and 11%, respectively, while Intuit and Equifax both declined more than 10%. Moody’s fell 9% and FactSet lost 11%. A JPMorgan index tracking US software stocks slid 7%, taking its loss this year to 18%. Private equity groups, many of which have piled into software in recent years, also tumbled. Ares Management dropped 10%, as did KKR, and Apollo fell 4.8%. “The current indiscriminate sell-off resembles the DeepSeek-driven decline of January 2025, which ultimately proved unfounded,” Bank of America analyst Vivek Arya said on Wednesday, referring to the hundreds of billions of dollars briefly wiped off the value of major US tech stocks by the advances of the Chinese AI start-up early last year.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Gartner fell 21% and S&P Global 11%, with Intuit and Equifax both down more than 10%, FactSet off 11% and Moody's 9%, after Anthropic launched Claude Cowork productivity tools that can help automate legal work.
  2. A JPMorgan index tracking US software stocks slid 7%, extending its loss this year to 18%, while private equity groups that have piled into software also fell, with Ares Management and KKR each down 10% and Apollo down 4.8%.
  3. Bank of America analyst Vivek Arya said the indiscriminate sell-off resembles the DeepSeek-driven decline of January 2025, which briefly wiped hundreds of billions of dollars off major US tech stocks and ultimately proved unfounded.

Related Articles:

  • Concentrated Growth: The Role Of The IT Sector — Since 1988, total factor productivity in the information technology sector has risen about 178%, versus about 12% across all non-IT sectors combined, while aggregate productivity rose about 40%. The IT sector accounts for roughly 45% of cumulative aggregate productivity growth, once sectoral linkages to downstream industries are weighted in.
  • Four Takeaways from Microsoft’s Satya Nadella at WEF Today — Microsoft's chief executive says the price of AI model usage ("tokens") falls by roughly half every three months. Commentary argues that such rapid deflation pulls demand forward, encourages overbuilding, and commoditizes models, shifting competitive advantage to orchestration and context rather than the model layer.
  • The Geopolitics of AI: Decoding the New Global Operating System — The performance gap between the top American and Chinese AI models narrowed from 9.3% to 1.7%, with Chinese firms relying on cheaper open-source models—DeepSeek prices usage 20-40x below OpenAI's ChatGPT. This price advantage could win adoption in developing countries and build dependency on Chinese AI ecosystems.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

Chart of the Day: The SaaSpocalypse Started Years Ago

AI Summary. Investors' willingness to pay for enterprise software earnings has been declining for years, a re-rating that predates recent headlines about artificial intelligence displacing software and has continued even as the broader equity market advanced. Price-to-earnings multiples in the sector remain high despite this sustained revaluation.

Paul Kedrosky Applied Complexity
Date Posted:
February 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Kedrosky notes that investors started re-rating software earnings in 2022, around the launch of ChatGPT. Still-high P/E multiples “shouldn’t distract from a fundamental revaluation that’s been going on for some time, despite an advancing equity market.”

Has the re-rating of enterprise software been underway for years?

Core argument: The re-rating of enterprise software valuations arguably began closer to ChatGPT's launch in late 2022 rather than with the recent "SaaSpocalypse" headlines, though the decline has accelerated of late.

There are endless headlines about the ongoing SaaSpocalypse, the re-rating of tech companies, especially in enterprise software, as AI is thought to be eating ... software itself. But as the chart shows, it arguably began years ago, closer to the launch of ChatGPT in late 2022, even if it has recently accelerated. The chart shows the re-rating of the enterprise tech sector: the declining price investors are willing to pay for software earnings. Granted, the P/E multiple is still hefty, in part because of the mix of holdings in the enterprise tech IGV ETF, but that shouldn't distract from a fundamental revaluation that's been going on for some time, despite an advancing equity market.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The re-rating of enterprise software valuations arguably began closer to ChatGPT's launch in late 2022 rather than with the recent "SaaSpocalypse" headlines, though the decline has accelerated of late.
  2. The price investors are willing to pay for enterprise software earnings has been declining for some time, even as the broader equity market advanced.
  3. The P/E multiple of the enterprise tech IGV ETF remains hefty, partly because of the mix of its holdings, but a fundamental revaluation of the sector has been under way.

Related Articles:

  • Society’s Technical Debt and Software’s Gutenberg Moment — Every wave of technological innovation has been unleashed by something costly becoming cheap enough to waste, and large language models are collapsing the cost and complexity of producing software. The authors argue that decades of underproduced software have left society with immense technical debt that is poised to contract, releasing a wave of innovation.
  • Smothering Heights — The four largest cloud computing firms are devoting rising shares of revenue to capital spending and research, with Meta's combined share reaching 70%. Unlike past investment booms, this one has been financed mostly from internal cash flow: 28 direct AI stocks make up 50% of S&P 500 market value but just 5% of its net debt.
  • Concentrated Growth: The Role Of The IT Sector — Since 1988, total factor productivity in the information technology sector has risen about 178%, versus about 12% across all non-IT sectors combined, while aggregate productivity rose about 40%. The IT sector accounts for roughly 45% of cumulative aggregate productivity growth, once sectoral linkages to downstream industries are weighted in.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

Why is the Mental Health of the Youngest American Workers in Decline?

AI Summary. Declines in mental health among American workers are concentrated among those aged 18-22, a group that reports the greatest difficulty making ends meet, and the rise in despair is most pronounced among workers in that age group without a college education. For all other age groups, despair rates among workers were lower than among non-workers.

David Blanchflower and Alex Bryson National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
February 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Survey evidence suggests that the worsened mental health of the young in recent years is particularly concentrated among those who are less-educated and working. For the 2021–2025 cohort of 18–22 year olds, “despair” is higher for workers than non-workers.

Which young workers account for rising despair among Americans?

Core argument: Declines in mental health are most pronounced among American workers ages 18–22, a group likely drawn from lower socioeconomic classes that reports the greatest difficulty making ends meet.

Declines in mental health are most pronounced among the youngest workers ages 18-22, who are likely drawn from lower socioeconomic classes and report the greatest difficulties making ends meet. Chart 7a and 7b show changes in despair over time for non-workers and workers. The rise is especially marked in the later period among young workers. Chart 8 shows that the change observed in the age/despair relation is driven by those aged 18-22. The chart plots the difference between despair rates for workers and non-workers. For all age groups other than the youngest in all years the relation was negative [i.e.] that despair rates of workers were lower than of non-workers. Chart 9 shows the importance of education. The rise in despair for those workers ages 18-22 is most apparent among those without a college education. In the years 2021-2025 52% (weighted) of ages 18-22 had a high school diploma with a further 11% who were dropouts. In the same years those ages 23-29 29% were high school graduates, 8% were dropouts, 28% had some college and 35% had 4 years + of college. Chart 9 shows the rise in despair is particularly pronounced for the least educated workers, covering high school dropouts and graduates, and more than it is for less educated non-workers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Declines in mental health are most pronounced among American workers ages 18–22, a group likely drawn from lower socioeconomic classes that reports the greatest difficulty making ends meet.
  2. For every age group other than the youngest, in all years, despair rates of workers were lower than those of non-workers, with the change in the age/despair relation driven by those aged 18–22.
  3. The rise in despair among workers ages 18–22 is most apparent among those without a college education, and in 2021–2025 52% (weighted) of that age group held a high school diploma, with a further 11% dropouts.

Related Articles:

  • US College Students’ Well-Being — A study of US college students finds moderate-to-severe depression reported by 26% of students at one elite institution, 22% reporting moderate-to-severe anxiety and 10% contemplating suicide. Poorer mental health is associated with being female, little exercise, low grades, and financial aid; financial stress is associated with higher suicidal thoughts.
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
  • Family/Marriage
  • Politics
  • Workforce

Colleges See Major Racial Shifts in Student Enrollment

AI Summary. An analysis by the nonprofit Class Action finds that freshman enrollment of underrepresented minority students rose 8% at public flagship universities, while at the nation's 50 most selective schools black freshman enrollment fell 27% and Latino enrollment fell 10%. At the 12 "Ivy Plus" schools, black freshman enrollment fell two percentage points, a 25% drop in share.

Stephanie Saul New York Times
Date Posted:
February 4, 2026

After 2023’s Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, black and Hispanic enrollment at the 50 most competitive colleges and universities declined 27 and 10%, respectively, while “flagship” state universities enrolled 8% more underrepresented minorities.

After 2023’s Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, black and Hispanic enrollment at the 50 most competitive...

How are minority enrollment shifts differing between selective and public universities?

Core argument: Black freshman enrollment fell 27% and Latino enrollment fell 10% at the nation's 50 most selective schools, according to an analysis by the nonprofit Class Action.

Overall, freshman enrollment of underrepresented minority groups increased by 8% at public flagship universities. The analysis, by a nonprofit organization, Class Action, concludes that those schools were among institutions that benefited as a result of higher rejection rates for black and Hispanic students at the nation’s 50 most selective schools. At those top 50 schools, black freshman enrollment was down by 27% and Latino enrollment down by 10%. Many four-year private schools with less selective admission requirements than the Ivy League also saw big increases. The data show a significant impact on the demographics of the nation’s very top schools. Black freshman enrollment declined by two percentage points at the 12 schools known as the Ivy Plus, which includes the eight schools in the Ivy League as well as Duke, Stanford, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of Chicago. But that represented a 25% drop in the share of back students in the freshman class, the report noted.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Black freshman enrollment fell 27% and Latino enrollment fell 10% at the nation's 50 most selective schools, according to an analysis by the nonprofit Class Action.
  2. Freshman enrollment of underrepresented minority groups rose 8% at public flagship universities, which Class Action concludes benefited from higher rejection rates for black and Hispanic students at the most selective schools.
  3. Black freshman enrollment declined by two percentage points at the 12 Ivy Plus schools — the eight Ivy League institutions plus Duke, Stanford, MIT and the University of Chicago — a 25% drop in their share of the freshman class.

Related Articles:

  • Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges — Children from top-1% families are more than 2x as likely as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores to attend an Ivy-Plus college, with two-thirds of the gap attributable to higher admissions rates. The authors attribute this advantage to legacy preferences, weight on non-academic credentials, and athlete recruitment.
  • The Long-Run Impacts of Banning Affirmative Action in US Higher Education — State-level bans on affirmative action in US higher education are estimated to reduce under-represented minority women's college degree completion, earnings, and employment relative to non-Hispanic White women, driven largely by effects on Hispanic women, widening racial and ethnic gaps among women. Effects on under-represented minority men are more ambiguous and vary across states.
  • Military Officer Quality in the All-Volunteer Force — The authors find a steady decline in U.S. Marine Corps officers' General Classification Test scores, which is statistically associated with the expansion of college attendance and explains 96% of the measured change. They also find a positive association between African American officers and mean test scores, arguing affirmative action has not lowered officer quality.
  • College
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • Test Scores

Migrant Encounters At The U.S.-Mexico Border Are At Their Lowest Level In More Than 50 Years

AI Summary. U.S. Border Patrol recorded 237,538 migrant encounters at the U.S.-Mexico border in fiscal 2025, down from more than 1.5m the prior year and a record of over 2.2m in fiscal 2022, the lowest annual total since 1970. Encounters were far higher in the first four months of that fiscal year than afterward.

John Gramlich Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
February 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A Pew analysis finds U. S. Border Patrol encounters with migrants at the southern border have fallen to their lowest level in more than 50 years. The headline decline is likely understated as it still includes Biden’s last four months in office.

How far have migrant encounters at the southern border fallen?

Core argument: The Border Patrol recorded 237,538 migrant encounters at the U.S.-Mexico border in fiscal 2025, the lowest total in any fiscal year since 1970, according to historical Border Patrol data.

The Border Patrol recorded 237,538 encounters with migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border in the 2025 fiscal year, which began in October 2024 and ended in September 2025. That was down from more than 1.5 million encounters in fiscal 2024, more than 2 million in fiscal 2023 and a record of more than 2.2 million in fiscal 2022. The 2025 total was the lowest in any fiscal year since 1970, according to historical data from the Border Patrol. While annual statistics show a huge decline in migrant encounters at the U.S.-Mexico border in the 2025 fiscal year, these numbers understate the decrease that has occurred since Trump’s second term began on Jan. 20, 2025. The federal fiscal year runs from October to the end of September, so fiscal 2025 included nearly four months of the Biden administration. Migrant encounters during Biden’s last four months in office were much higher than in the months after Trump’s return.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Border Patrol recorded 237,538 migrant encounters at the U.S.-Mexico border in fiscal 2025, the lowest total in any fiscal year since 1970, according to historical Border Patrol data.
  2. Migrant encounters fell from a record of more than 2.2 million in fiscal 2022 and more than 2 million in fiscal 2023 to more than 1.5 million in fiscal 2024 and 237,538 in fiscal 2025.
  3. The fiscal 2025 total understates the decline since Trump's second term began on Jan. 20, 2025, because the October-to-September fiscal year included nearly four months of the Biden administration, when encounters were much higher.

Related Articles:

  • New Population Estimates Show Historic Decline in Net International Migration — The U.S. Census Bureau estimates net international migration peaked at 2.7m in 2024 and fell to 1.3m in 2025, with a projected decline to roughly 321,000 in 2026 if current trends continue. The Bureau notes that continued trends would produce the first net negative migration in more than 50 years.
  • Macroeconomic Implications Of Immigration Flows In 2025 And 2026: January 2026 Update — The authors estimate that job growth consistent with full employment was 20,000–50,000 a month in the second half of 2025, while reported nonfarm payroll growth averaged about 14,500 and unemployment rose 0.3 percentage points. They project immigration policy changes will keep potential employment growth low, reducing GDP growth by roughly 0.2 percentage points in 2025 and 0.1 in 2026.
  • How Many People Has Trump Deported So Far? — A New York Times analysis of federal data finds about 230,000 people deported after arrests inside the US and 270,000 at the border, with interior deportations already exceeding the prior administration's four-year total. Southwest border crossings have fallen to record lows, and roughly 40,000 people self-deported for a stipend.
  • Immigration
  • Politics
  • Workforce

Xi the Destroyer

AI Summary. China's leadership overhauling the senior ranks of its military signals relative comfort with the country's external environment, including cross-strait dynamics, as US commitments to Taiwan appear uncertain and Taiwanese politics shift in Beijing's favor. The author argues the purge shows Xi using cross-strait calm to prepare the military for possible conflict over Taiwan.

Jonathan Czin and John Culver Foreign Affairs
Date Posted:
February 4, 2026

Czin and Culver argue Zhang’s purge indicates that Xi is “relatively comfortable with China’s external environment” and is taking advantage of the window to prepare the military for the “unwelcome eventuality” of military conflict over Taiwan.

Czin and Culver argue Zhang’s purge indicates that Xi is “relatively comfortable with China’s external...

Does a military leadership purge signal preparation for conflict over Taiwan?

Core argument: Xi's willingness to strip China's high command down to its studs signals he is relatively comfortable with China's external environment, especially the cross-strait dynamic, and is using that calm to prepare the People's Liberation Army for possible conflict over Taiwan.

Xi’s willingness to strip the high command down to its studs and renovate it at this moment is also a signal that he is relatively comfortable with China’s external environment—especially the cross-strait dynamic. The Trump administration does not seem to be especially ready to defend Taiwan: U.S. President Donald Trump said “it’s up to Xi” what China does regarding Taiwan, and the National Defense Strategy released by his administration last month omitted any mention of Taiwan. Meanwhile, the political dynamic in Taiwan seems to be shifting in Beijing’s favor ahead of the island’s next national election in 2028. Support for Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and his Democratic Progressive Party, which takes a harder line against Beijing, has declined since its failed effort last summer to recall legislators in the opposition party, the Kuomintang, and a new leadership in the Kuomintang is calling for more reconciliation with Beijing. But cutting this deeply into his own network to excise the rot in the PLA does not indicate that Xi is distracted from the possibility of military conflict over Taiwan. Instead, it shows just how serious he is about ensuring that the military is ready for such an unwelcome eventuality. He is taking advantage of the cross-strait calm to prepare.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Xi's willingness to strip China's high command down to its studs signals he is relatively comfortable with China's external environment, especially the cross-strait dynamic, and is using that calm to prepare the People's Liberation Army for possible conflict over Taiwan.
  2. The Trump administration does not appear especially ready to defend Taiwan, with Trump saying "it's up to Xi" what China does regarding Taiwan and its National Defense Strategy omitting any mention of Taiwan.
  3. Support for Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and his Democratic Progressive Party has declined since its failed effort to recall Kuomintang legislators, while new Kuomintang leadership calls for more reconciliation with Beijing ahead of Taiwan's 2028 election.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Military Says Top General Undermined Xi Jinping’s Authority — China's military newspaper has accused two top generals — the vice chair of the Central Military Commission and the People's Liberation Army's chief of staff — of trampling the "chairman responsibility system" that gives China's leader supreme decision-making power over the armed forces, alongside corruption charges.
  • The Sinister Disappearance Of China’s Bosses — China's liuzhi detention system operates alongside normal policing, requiring no court approval and denying detainees lawyers, with windowless cells, constant lighting and round-the-clock supervision. Stock-exchange filings show 39 executives at listed companies disappearing into the system by the end of September, exceeding the prior year's record.
  • Xi Jinping Says He Is Preparing China for War — China's leadership has emphasized war readiness, announcing a 7.2% increase in the defense budget—which has doubled over the past decade—and plans to reduce dependence on foreign grain imports. China has also opened National Defense Mobilization recruitment offices across the country, while cities in Fujian Province opposite Taiwan build or upgrade air-raid shelters.
  • China
  • Politics
  • Security


Loading More Posts

End of content

No more pages to load

© Copyright 2026 Coherent Research Institute · All Rights Reserved · Privacy · Terms