Do tiered status awards repeatedly boost worker performance?
Core argument: The authors estimate that the German air force's ladder of successive medals added 3,000–5,000 aerial victories to German pilots' wartime tally, 5–10% of the total 54,835 victories in their data.
We provide direct evidence from WWII that one organization, the German air force, successfully created a ladder of highly coveted medals, providing status-based incentives for fighter pilots. The number of rungs on the ladder increased periodically as more workers earned the top awards. The successive medals potentially provided pilots with an incentive to keep exerting effort. Our study demonstrates that this system successfully increased performance. Of the total 54,835 aerial victories in our data, 39.5% were scored by the 10% most able pilots by our measure of ability. Moreover, 8.6% were scored the top 1% of pilots alone. We first employ a modified event-study design and data on the monthly performance of over 5,000 German pilots to demonstrate that pilot performance increases markedly as they approach the eligibility threshold for a medal. Success rates in aerial combat immediately slump after receiving the award, suggesting a sharp change in incentives and effort. We show that this incentive effect is weaker for pilots who already possess other markers of high social status, in line with predictions from a standard signaling game. As pilots approach the successive medal in the ladder, the same effort path repeats itself. Our empirical results show that a hierarchical system of status-based incentives can repeatedly elicit effort due to status concerns. The net effect of the medal ladder was substantial—we estimate that it added between 3,000 and 5,000 victories to German pilots’ tally during the war (5-10% of the total). [Only 19% of the sample survived the war.]




