Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, January 22, 2026

AI Summary. The tempo-adjusted fertility rate, which accounts for shifts in the timing of births, shows the US rate falling since roughly 2009-10 and dropping below the 2.1 births-per-woman replacement level around 2017, reaching 1.82 in 2022. The US decline is less severe than in many peer countries.

Jeremy Horpedahl Economist Writing Every Day
Date Posted:

As of 2022, the US had a “tempo fertility rate,” which is adjusted for life-cycle effects, of 1.82 – among the highest of advanced economies, and ~ on par with Denmark, Sweden, and Iceland. All 4 countries are below the replacement rate of 2.1.

Is the US fertility decline smaller than in peer countries?

Core argument: The US tempo-adjusted fertility rate stood at 1.82 births per woman in 2022, the most recent year available, below the replacement rate of 2.1.

There is one measure which attempts to adjust the total fertility rate for changes in the timing of births. It is not a perfect prediction, but it is better to look at than the TFR in real time: the tempo-adjusted fertility rate. This measure does indeed show that the US fertility rate has been falling since about 2009-10, and that around 2017 it dipped below the replacement rate of 2.1 births per woman. In the most recent year available for the US (2022), it stands at 1.82 births, below the magic number of 2.1 births. Even so, the decline in the US of the adjusted TFR is not as dire as other countries. Using data for 2021, we can get a fairly large number of countries.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US tempo-adjusted fertility rate stood at 1.82 births per woman in 2022, the most recent year available, below the replacement rate of 2.1.
  2. The US tempo-adjusted fertility rate has been falling since about 2009–10 and dipped below the 2.1 replacement rate around 2017.
  3. The decline in the US tempo-adjusted fertility rate is less severe than in other countries, based on 2021 data covering a fairly large number of countries.

Related Articles:

  • The Eldest Millennials Had the Same Fertility as the Youngest Baby Boomers — Completed fertility for US women aged 41–44 has been stable for more than two decades, with the large decline having occurred earlier; among those with at least one native-born parent it averaged 1.88 children versus 1.87. What changed is timing: 30-year-old women averaged 1.34 children versus 0.98.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
  • The Downside of Fertility — In developed countries that modernized very rapidly, men do considerably less housework and care for others at home relative to women than in countries with more continuous growth. Larger gender gaps in household and caring hours are strongly correlated with lower fertility rates across these countries.

AI Summary. Students admitted to elite high schools just above the admissions cutoff are estimated to be 3.2pp less likely to have ever held a formal private-sector job five years later — a 16% decline versus those just missing the cutoff — and to earn 5.3% lower wages. These gaps shrink over time and are statistically insignificant after 15 years.

Francisco Cabrera-Hernández, Andrew Dustan, Daniel Osuna Gomez and María Padilla-Romo National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

In data from the Mexico City metro area over 2003–2009, students who just missed the exam score cutoff for admission to an elite high school have 5.3% higher wages after five years (2.5% after 10 years) than marginally admitted students.

Does barely getting into an elite high school lower early earnings?

Core argument: Marginal assignment to an elite high school causes a 3.2pp decline in the probability of ever having held a formal job five years later at ages 19–20, a 16% drop from the 20% base rate for students just below the cutoff.

[We] trace out the [harmful] causal impact of [marginal] assignment to an elite school [as opposed to just missing the admissions cutoff] on formal private labor market outcomes over time. Five years after the assignment process (at ages 19-20, beyond high school age), elite assignment [based on a test score marginally above the cutoff] causes a 3.2pp decline in the probability of ever having held a formal job. This is a 16% decline relative to the base rate of 20% for students missing the elite cutoff by one point. Over time, this elite disadvantage declines: after 10 years (at ages 24-25, after the typical age of college graduation), the effect is -2.1pp, while after 15 years (at ages 29-30) the estimated -0.2pp impact is statistically insignificant. While the negative effect on formal employment eventually fades, it leaves elite students with a deficit in formal labor market experience. After 5 years, elite assignment reduces the cumulative number of months with a formal job by 14%. Conditional on formal employment, marginal elite assignment causes a reduction in wages that fades out over time. Five years after assignment, elite assignment reduces wages by 5.3%. This reduction declines to 2.6% after 10 years, and [essentially vanishes] after 15 years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Marginal assignment to an elite high school causes a 3.2pp decline in the probability of ever having held a formal job five years later at ages 19–20, a 16% drop from the 20% base rate for students just below the cutoff.
  2. The elite-assignment employment disadvantage fades over time, falling to -2.1pp after 10 years (ages 24–25) and a statistically insignificant -0.2pp after 15 years (ages 29–30).
  3. Conditional on formal employment, marginal elite assignment reduces wages by 5.3% after five years and 2.6% after 10 years, and cuts cumulative months of formal work by 14% after five years.

Related Articles:

  • Marginal Returns to Public Universities — Using admission-score cutoffs across all 35 Texas public universities, the author estimates that marginally admitted students complete an additional year of four-year education, are 12 percentage points more likely to earn a bachelor's degree, and earn 5–10% more than marginally rejected peers, with gains driven by students who otherwise would not attend a four-year school.
  • Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges — Children from top-1% families are more than 2x as likely as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores to attend an Ivy-Plus college, with two-thirds of the gap attributable to higher admissions rates. The authors attribute this advantage to legacy preferences, weight on non-academic credentials, and athlete recruitment.
  • Are China’s Students Really Number One? A Statistical Riddle — China's reported 65-point jump in mean international student test scores between testing rounds coincided with a change in which provinces represented the country, swapping the most populous province for a richer, much smaller one. The author argues such swings, including a fall in low performers from 43% to 19% in reading, are unmatched elsewhere.

AI Summary. The authors argue that a major disruption in the illicit fentanyl trade, possibly tied to Chinese enforcement actions against precursor chemical manufacture and export, coincided with sharp declines in overdose deaths in both the US and Canada. China reported removing 140,000 advertisements and 14 online platforms tied to synthetic drug and precursor suppliers.

Kasey Vangelov, Keith Humphreys, Jonathan Caulkins, Harold Pollack, et al. Science
Date Posted:

US fentanyl overdose deaths (ODD) peaked in May 2023, and the ODD rate fell ~50% by the end of 2024. US and Canadian government data and Reddit forums suggest a supply crunch, likely due to a reduced flow of precursor chemicals from China.

Did a crackdown on precursor chemicals drive down overdose deaths?

Core argument: Synthesizing US and Canadian government data with Reddit discussions, the authors suggest a major disruption in the illicit fentanyl trade, possibly tied to Chinese government actions, translated into sharp reductions in overdose mortality beginning in mid- or late-2023 and continuing into 2024 in both countries.

Synthesizing data from the US and Canadian governments and from discussions on the social media platform Reddit, we suggest there was a major disruption in the illicit fentanyl trade, possibly tied to Chinese government actions, that translated into sharp reductions in overdose mortality beginning in mid- or late-2023 and continued into 2024 across both the US and Canada. Though the government of China only episodically reports its enforcement and regulatory activities, there is considerable evidence of actions against fentanyl precursor manufacture and export in late 2023. For example, in November 2023, China’s Office of the National Narcotics Control Commission published a notice reminding caution in the selling of substances that can be used to make drugs. At the same time, the government of China began more aggressive law enforcement action against synthetic drug and chemical precursor suppliers. By June 2024, the government claimed to have taken down 140,000 advertisements and 14 online platforms.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Synthesizing US and Canadian government data with Reddit discussions, the authors suggest a major disruption in the illicit fentanyl trade, possibly tied to Chinese government actions, translated into sharp reductions in overdose mortality beginning in mid- or late-2023 and continuing into 2024 in both countries.
  2. By June 2024, the government of China claimed to have taken down 140,000 advertisements and 14 online platforms, alongside more aggressive law enforcement action against synthetic drug and chemical precursor suppliers.
  3. China's Office of the National Narcotics Control Commission published a notice in November 2023 reminding sellers to exercise caution with substances that can be used to make drugs, part of the evidence of late-2023 actions against fentanyl precursor manufacture and export.

Related Articles:

  • Drug Overdoses Are On the Decline, in Charts — Preliminary estimates from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention show US overdose deaths fell 25% over a 12-month period to about 82,000, led by a falling number of fatalities involving synthetic opioids such as bootleg fentanyl.
  • The Rise in American Pain: The Importance of the Great Recession — The authors find that the rise in reported pain among Americans was almost entirely concentrated in the 2007–2010 recession period rather than following a smooth upward trend, with the disproportionate increase among the less educated also occurring primarily then. The authors state they find this jump difficult to explain.
  • Importing the Opioid Crisis? International Trade and Fentanyl Overdoses — A study using U.S. mortality and import data finds a positive state-level association between imports per resident and drug overdose death rates, driven by fentanyl and accounting for an estimated 15,000–20,000 deaths per year. The authors estimate that 10% higher imports per resident is associated with an 8.1% higher fentanyl death rate.

AI Summary. Analysts forecast a 17% rise in gold prices by end-2026, with emerging-market central bank buying averaging 60 tonnes contributing 14 percentage points and Western exchange-traded fund inflows on 50 basis points of Federal Reserve rate cuts adding 3. Risks are seen as skewed to the upside.

Daan Struyven and Lina Thomas Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:

Goldman raised their December 2026 gold price forecast from $4,900 to $5,400 per troy ounce, citing an increased private sector diversification into gold and continued central bank buying, and noting risks to the upside. Gold is currently ~$4,900 per troy ounce.

What is driving the forecast rise in gold prices?

Core argument: Gold prices are forecast to rise 17% from the January month-to-date average (13% from spot) by end-2026, with central bank buying contributing 14 percentage points of that increase.

Our forecasted 17% price increase from the January month-to-date average (or 13% from spot) by end-2026 reflects: [1] Central bank buying to average 60 tonnes in 2026 as EM central banks are likely to continue the structural diversification of their reserves into gold (contributing 14pp to the 17% price increase we expect by Dec. 26). [2] Western ETF holdings to rise as the Fed cuts the funds rate by 50bp in 2026 (contributing 3pp by Dec. 26). [3] Our assumption that hedges of global macro policy risks remain stable as these perceived risks (e.g. fiscal sustainability) may not fully resolve in 2026, implying that the high early 2026 gold price forecast is a sustainable starting point for our forecast. We see the risks to our upgraded gold price forecast as two-sided but still significantly skewed to the upside because private sector investors may diversify further on lingering global policy uncertainty.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Gold prices are forecast to rise 17% from the January month-to-date average (13% from spot) by end-2026, with central bank buying contributing 14 percentage points of that increase.
  2. Central bank gold buying is projected to average 60 tonnes in 2026 as emerging market central banks continue the structural diversification of their reserves into gold.
  3. Western ETF holdings are expected to rise as the Fed cuts the funds rate by 50bp in 2026, contributing 3 percentage points to the forecast price increase.

Related Articles:

  • Return of the Three-Headed Bond Monster Over Tokyo — Bloomberg's precious metals index, covering silver, platinum and palladium, stands at a level last seen in 1980, when repeated rounds of stagflation drove a crisis of confidence in government-issued currencies. Such a rally amid growth and moderate inflation signals something serious is amiss.
  • The Debasement Trade Roars Back — Currencies of low-public-debt countries such as Switzerland and Sweden are showing increasing correlation with daily moves in gold and silver prices. Sweden's krona has traditionally been highly volatile without safe-haven attributes, a pattern the article attributes to the "debasement trade.
  • Political Pressure on the Fed — Using data on President–Federal Reserve interactions, the author estimates that political pressure to ease monetary policy raises the price level strongly and persistently without boosting real activity, working through inflation expectations more than a typical easing. Such pressure occurred mainly in the 1970s and contributed to inflationary episodes.

AI Summary. Canada agreed to accept 49,000 Chinese electric vehicles at a 6.1% tariff, down from 100%, while China will cut its levy on Canadian canola seed to 15% from an effective rate of about 85%. Canada's canola exports to China were valued at nearly C$5bn (US$3.6bn), and Canada's original 100% electric vehicle tariff was adopted at Washington's urging.

Ilya Gridneff and Joe Leahy Financial Times
Date Posted:

As part of Canada and China’s new trade agreement, Canada will drop its 100% tariff on EVs – which matched the US level – to 6.1%, with a limit of 49,000 cars. In return, China eased tariffs on Canadian raw materials.

Will Canada cut electric vehicle tariffs in exchange for canola access?

Core argument: Canada agreed to accept 49,000 Chinese electric cars at a 6.1% tariff, down from 100%, breaking with the US, which has in effect blocked Chinese EV imports through high tariffs and restrictions.

In an important break with the US, which has in effect blocked imports of Chinese EVs using high tariffs and restrictions, Canada agreed to accept imports of 49,000 Chinese electric cars with a 6.1% tariff, down from 100%. In exchange for Canada lowering EV tariffs, China will slash its levies on Canadian canola seed imports to 15% from March 1, down from an effective rate of about 85%. Total Canadian canola exports to China were valued at almost C$5bn (US$3.6bn) in 2024. Ottawa announced its 100% tariffs on Chinese EVs in 2024 on Washington’s urging. Ottawa expected that within three years there would be “new Chinese joint-venture investment in Canada with trusted partners” to “create new auto manufacturing careers for Canadian workers,” the prime minister’s office said.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Canada agreed to accept 49,000 Chinese electric cars at a 6.1% tariff, down from 100%, breaking with the US, which has in effect blocked Chinese EV imports through high tariffs and restrictions.
  2. China will cut its levies on Canadian canola seed imports to 15% from March 1, down from an effective rate of about 85%, in exchange for Canada lowering its EV tariffs.
  3. Canadian canola exports to China were valued at almost C$5bn (US$3.6bn) in 2024, and Ottawa announced its 100% tariffs on Chinese EVs in 2024 at Washington's urging.

Related Articles:

  • How Canada Is Responding to American Mercantilism — US tariffs as high as 35% on certain goods not compliant with the US-Mexico-Canada trade agreement have coincided with falling Canadian exports, weaker business confidence and investment, a softening labor market, and a contraction in Canadian output. Canada has responded by aiming to double non-US exports within 10 years, expanding fiscal spending and deregulation, and keeping monetary policy loose.
  • Canada’s Growth Challenge: Why The Economy Is Stuck In Neutral — Canada's labor productivity is about 30% below the United States and roughly 10% below Australia's, and Canada has fallen from the 6th to the 18th most productive economy in the OECD. The authors attribute this to a shortfall in investment outside real estate, construction, and public services, plus negative multifactor productivity growth.
  • A “Heat Dome” of Immigration — Canada has adopted some of the most aggressive immigration policies in the OECD, adding 1.273m residents in a year to reach a population of 41m — proportionally equivalent to the US admitting more than 10m immigrants annually. Canadians are increasingly angry as housing prices soar, sprawl expands, and traffic worsens.

Friday, January 23, 2026

AI Summary. Means-tested transfers rose as a share of income before transfers and taxes, driven mainly by higher Medicaid spending and concentrated among households near the bottom of the income distribution. Income inequality rose both before and after transfers and taxes, while the extent to which transfers and taxes reduce inequality increased over four decades.

Daniel Page Congressional Budget Office
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Btw 2000 and 2022, means-tested transfers as a fraction of average income before transfers and taxes rose from 44.4 to 72.3% for the bottom quintile, from 6.7 to 16.2% for the 2nd quintile, and from 1.8 to 6.0% for the 3rd, driven by Medicaid and CHIP.

Do transfers and taxes reduce income inequality more than before?

Core argument: Means-tested transfers rose as a share of income before transfers and taxes, driven primarily by increased Medicaid spending and concentrated among households near the bottom of the income distribution.

Means-tested transfers’ contribution to income grew, especially for households near the bottom of the income distribution. As a percentage of income before transfers and taxes, means-tested transfers rose over time, driven primarily by an increase in Medicaid spending and especially for households near the bottom of the income distribution. Income inequality, whether measured in terms of income before transfers and taxes or income after transfers and taxes, rose. [However], the degree to which transfers and taxes reduced income inequality increased over the past four decades.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Means-tested transfers rose as a share of income before transfers and taxes, driven primarily by increased Medicaid spending and concentrated among households near the bottom of the income distribution.
  2. Income inequality rose whether measured by income before transfers and taxes or income after transfers and taxes.
  3. The degree to which transfers and taxes reduced income inequality increased over the past four decades, even as measured inequality rose.

Related Articles:

  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • The Economic Geography Of The 2024 Elections — Counties where government transfer programs such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and unemployment insurance make up at least a quarter of personal income gave Trump 63% of the vote, while counties where transfers account for less than 15% gave Harris 56%. Transfers supplied 18% of total US personal income.
  • How Progressive is the U.S. Tax System? — Three independent datasets on U.S. taxes and transfers all show the tax system has become more progressive and redistributive over recent decades. The authors find this shift is driven mainly by a large increase in transfers to households in the bottom half of the income distribution, a change missed by analyses focused on the top 1%.

AI Summary. The author argues that the dollar's value against emerging-market currencies is the most reliable leading indicator of the dollar's direction, and it has kept making new lows since the Federal Reserve's rate cut. The trade-weighted dollar against other advanced economies remains noisy and within its recent range.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:

The dollar has been falling against emerging market currencies since the Fed cut rates on December 10th. Robin Brooks argues that this is “the most reliable leading indicator” of incipient dollar depreciation.

Is the dollar against emerging markets the best signal of its direction?

Core argument: The Dollar against emerging-market currencies has fallen since the Fed's December 10 rate cut and keeps making new lows, a measure the author calls the most reliable leading indicator of Dollar direction.

The Dollar versus emerging markets (EM) has proven itself to be the most reliable leading indicator of Dollar direction. This measure has been falling ever since the Fed cut rates on December 10, a sign Dollar weakness is about to assert itself again. The black line is the trade-weighted Dollar against other advanced economies (the G10). The blue line is the Dollar versus EM. The Dollar versus the G10 is incredibly noisy and - although it’s fallen in recent days - it hasn’t yet moved below the range it’s bounced around in since the middle of 2025. But the Dollar versus EM keeps making new lows. This is the signal to watch. Dollar debasement has begun.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Dollar against emerging-market currencies has fallen since the Fed's December 10 rate cut and keeps making new lows, a measure the author calls the most reliable leading indicator of Dollar direction.
  2. The trade-weighted Dollar against the G10 advanced economies remains within the range it has traded in since the middle of 2025 despite falling in recent days, a measure the author describes as incredibly noisy.
  3. The author concludes that Dollar debasement has begun, pointing to the Dollar-versus-emerging-markets measure rather than the G10 gauge as the signal to watch.

Related Articles:

  • Different Dollar Downside — The authors estimate the US dollar remains roughly 15% overvalued and argue a sharper depreciation could follow if US labor-market weakness forces deeper Federal Reserve rate cuts, particularly against a highly undervalued yen. They also flag a derating of US tech exceptionalism as a risk, since demand for US equities has helped fund the current account deficit.
  • 2026 Outlook: Tech Tonic — A Broadening Bull Market — Most major equity markets have outperformed the US, with Europe, China and Asia generating almost double US total returns in dollar terms and gains of 54% in Italy, 73% in Spain and 71% in Korea. US returns have been driven by strong earnings, particularly in technology, while Europe's have come largely from rising valuations.
  • Return of the Three-Headed Bond Monster Over Tokyo — Bloomberg's precious metals index, covering silver, platinum and palladium, stands at a level last seen in 1980, when repeated rounds of stagflation drove a crisis of confidence in government-issued currencies. Such a rally amid growth and moderate inflation signals something serious is amiss.

AI Summary. Bank of America account data show the number of people moving in the US has more than halved since 2021, with moves to a different state or metropolitan area declining more than moves within the same area. When people do relocate across states or metro areas, they are more likely to remain within the same US Census region.

Joe Wadford Bank of America
Date Posted:

Bank of America internal data show that since 2021, the number of Americans who have moved to a different state or metropolitan statistical area has more than halved. Movers are increasingly “likely to stay in the same US Census region.”

Are Americans moving less and staying closer to home?

Core argument: The number of Americans moving has more than halved since 2021, according to Bank of America account data showing annual declines in relocations.

Fewer and fewer people are moving every year in the US, according to Bank of America account data. In fact, the number of those picking up stakes has more than halved since 2021. Diving deeper, we see the number of people moving to different states or MSAs (metropolitan statistical area) has consistently declined more than those moving within the same area over the past few years. When people do leave for another state or MSA, they are more likely to stay in the same US Census region. That trend has persisted for the past five years, despite changes in the labor market and affordability of housing. In other words, in our view, based on Bank of America data, the majority of people would rather not move too far from home no matter the circumstances.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The number of Americans moving has more than halved since 2021, according to Bank of America account data showing annual declines in relocations.
  2. Moves to different states or metropolitan statistical areas have declined more than moves within the same area in recent years, according to Bank of America data.
  3. Americans who leave for another state or metropolitan statistical area are more likely to remain within the same US Census region, a pattern that has held for five years despite changes in the labor market and housing affordability.

Related Articles:

  • Nobody’s Buying Homes, Nobody’s Switching Jobs—and America’s Mobility Is Stalling — The share of Americans moving each year has declined from about 20% in the 1950s and '60s to 7.8% in 2023, the lowest since U.S. Census records began in 1948, with moves within the same county down roughly 47% over three decades. An aging population and the rise of two-earner households are among the contributing factors.
  • Housing and the American Worker — Wages net of housing costs were once substantially higher in high-density areas than low-density areas for workers both with and without college education, but over the past half-century that urban wage premium has persisted only for college-educated workers, not for those with a high school degree or less.
  • Where is Standard of Living the Highest? Local Prices and the Geography of Consumption — The authors estimate that geographical differences in cost of living are especially large for low-income US households, and that expensive cities offer college graduates a standard of living similar to affordable cities while offering less-educated households a lower one. A high school dropout household moving from the most affordable to the most expensive commuting zone would see consumption fall 18.5%.

AI Summary. In China, about 30% of 30-year-olds were unmarried in 2023, up from 14.5% a decade earlier, while the share of 40-year-olds who were divorced roughly doubled from 2.6% to 5%. Women have outnumbered men in Chinese undergraduate and postgraduate programs since 2009, even as men outnumber women nationally.

Eleanor Olcott, Tina Hu and Haohsiang Ko Financial Times
Date Posted:

The share of Chinese 30-year-olds who were unmarried doubled btw 2013 and 2023 to ~30%. Over that period, the share of 40-year-olds who were divorced increased from 2.6% to 5%.

Are fewer marriages and more education behind China's falling birth rate?

Core argument: About 30% of Chinese 30-year-olds were unmarried in 2023, up from 14.5% in 2013, according to official data.

About 30% of 30-year-olds were unmarried in 2023, compared with 14.5% in 2013, according to official data. The rising number of people divorcing also serves as a cautionary tale for many, particularly young women. In 2013, about 2.6% of people aged 40 were divorced. A decade later, the figure was 5%. The average Chinese woman is often far more educated than her male peer. Since 2009, women have outnumbered men in undergraduate and postgraduate programmes at Chinese universities. Men outnumber women on average across the country in part due to the common practice of sex-selective abortions during the one-child policy era.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. About 30% of Chinese 30-year-olds were unmarried in 2023, up from 14.5% in 2013, according to official data.
  2. The share of 40-year-olds in China who were divorced rose from about 2.6% in 2013 to 5% a decade later, a trend that serves as a cautionary tale particularly for young women.
  3. Women have outnumbered men in Chinese undergraduate and postgraduate programmes since 2009, and the average Chinese woman is often far more educated than her male peer, while men outnumber women nationally in part because of sex-selective abortions during the one-child policy era.

Related Articles:

  • China Registers Lowest Number Of Births Since Records Began — China recorded 7.92mn births, down from 9.54mn a year earlier and the lowest since 1949, while 11.31mn people died and the population fell 3.39mn to 1.405bn. The figures indicate China is still not seeing benefits from measures to bolster its fertility rate after loosening the "one-child" policy.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
  • East Asia’s Coming Population Collapse — United Nations projections show China's population falling 8%, Japan's 18%, South Korea's 12%, and Taiwan's 8% between 2020 and 2050, while the US population rises 12%. Working-age people per person over 65 are projected to drop to about 1.8 in China and 1.2 in Japan and South Korea.