Unprecedented ‘Jobless Boom’ Tests Limits of US Economic Expansion
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Showing 763 database articles primarily about either Workforce, Demographics, Education, Family/Marriage, Gender Pay Gap, Immigration, Inequality, Minimum Wage, Poverty/Crime, Unemployment/Participation, or Wages/Income
The Heterogeneous Effects of Large and Small Minimum Wage Changes: Evidence Using a Partially Pre-Committed Analysis Plan
AI Summary. Large minimum wage increases reduce employment among young and low-education workers, while small increases have no measurable effect. Four years after enactment, large increases lower employment by ~5 percentage points for workers aged 16–25 without a high school diploma and ~3 percentage points for all workers aged 16–21.
Jeffrey Clemens and Michael Strain American Enterprise Institute- Date Posted:
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While a state-level event study finds no employment effect from small minimum-wage hikes, imputation DiD estimates show that four years after large hikes, employment is ~5pp lower for 16–25-year-olds without a HS degree and ~3pp lower for all 16–21-year-olds.
Do large minimum wage increases harm young workers more than small ones?
Core argument: Large minimum wage increases reduce employment by approximately 5 percentage points among workers aged 16–25 without a high school diploma and 3 percentage points among all workers aged 16–21 within four years of enactment.
Figure 4 reports our imputation difference-in-differences estimates for the effects of small and large minimum wage changes on employment among individuals aged 16–21 and among individuals aged 16–25 with less than a completed high school education. The samples are from the ACS [American Community Survey]. [The data span 2011-2019]. We compare estimates for large versus small increases. The estimates to the left of the vertical dashed lines reveal no concerning evidence of divergent preexisting trends. We find null effects for the states that enacted small minimum wage increases and negative effects for states with large minimum wage increases. By 4 years after the enactment of the first increase, the estimate has approached −5pp for individuals aged 16–25 with less than a completed high school education, and −3pp for the sample of all individuals aged 16–21. [Editor's note: The authors note that Section VIII of the paper, which contains the Figure 4 imputation DiD estimates, “presents estimates from a modern difference-in-differences estimator that falls outside of our pre-analysis plan.” The results are somewhat larger than those reported in the Abstract.]Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- Large minimum wage increases reduce employment by approximately 5 percentage points among workers aged 16–25 without a high school diploma and 3 percentage points among all workers aged 16–21 within four years of enactment.
- small increases produce no measurable employment effect.
- Disemployment from minimum wage increases is concentrated among the least-educated young workers and emerges only above a magnitude threshold, identifying wage-floor size—not the policy itself—as the decisive driver of employment loss.
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- The Heterogeneous Effects of Large and Small Minimum Wage Changes on Hours Worked: Evidence Using a Partially Pre-committed Analysis Plan — In CPS data from 2011–2019, relatively large statutory increases in the minimum wage reduced hours for workers, ages 16–25 with less than a high school…
- Did California’s Fast Food Minimum Wage Reduce Employment? — The 2024 rise in CA’s minimum wage in fast food restaurants from $16 to $20 raised the sector’s wages ~8% and lowered its employment by 2 to 4% relative to the…
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Falling Fertility: The Changing Value of Freedom, Fulfillment, and Family
AI Summary. Across wealthy countries, intended fertility and ideal family size fell over the past decade as children came to be seen as constraining freedom rather than conferring status or fulfillment.
Raquel Fernández, Inés Berniell and Milagros Onofri National Bureau of Economic Research- Date Posted:
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Fernández et al. cast doubt on Goldin’s hypothesis that men’s limited willingness to share domestic responsibilities is central to fertility decline, pointing instead to the erosion of the belief that children are necessary for a fulfilling life.
Does freedom from family obligations now outweigh the fulfillment children provide?
Figure 1 documents how fertility outcomes and attitudes changed over the decade. Intended fertility fell in every GGS country, from 28 to 21% on average (Figure 1a). The ideal number of children fell in 17 of the 22 ISSP countries, from 2.42 to 2.31 on average (Figure 1b). [Children] became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status (Figure 1c). Gender roles became less traditional, and the division of household work became more equal [Figures 1i]. Despite this greater sharing of chores and care, work–family conflict rose sharply. The decade saw changes that might have been expected to make the burden of children lighter, at least for women. Simultaneously, however, children became less attractive and, above all, less necessary: the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any attitude we measure [Table 2, Part II, Panel B].Related Articles:
- The Rise of Female Autonomy and the Decline of Fertility: The Role of Mismatch — In countries where women perform significantly more household and care work than men, fertility rates are substantially lower; nations with near-equal domestic labor splits average fertility rates around 1.7, while those with gaps exceeding 3 hours daily average rates below 1.4.
- Babies and the Macroeconomy — .@PikaGold notes countries with birth rates now below 1.3 saw “rapid growth in GDP per capita after a long period of stagnation or decline” as women’s new…
- The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The world’s 2024 total fertility rate (TFR) was likely ~2.17, below the replacement rate of 2.21, notes Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, intensifying…
How Many Big Macs Does Your Salary Buy?
AI Summary. U.S. workers earn the most Big Macs annually (10,215), but Swiss workers lead on an hourly basis at 7 Big Macs per hour versus the U.S. at 6, reflecting longer American working hours rather than higher hourly wages.
Economist Staff The Economist- Date Posted:
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The Economist’s venerable Big Mac Index is indicative of significantly higher after-tax, PPP-adjusted wages for American workers than for their French and German counterparts.
Does working longer hours mask stagnant American wage growth?
Core argument: American workers earn the equivalent of 10,215 Big Macs annually, topping global McWage rankings, but longer working hours reduce U.S. hourly purchasing power to six Big Macs per hour, behind Switzerland’s seven.
On an annual basis, America continues to top our McWages rankings. The average American worker earns enough to buy 10,215 Big Macs a year; Switzerland and Australia are in second and third place, respectively. But American working hours are supersized, too. On an hourly basis, Switzerland comes out on top: the average worker there earns the equivalent of seven Big Macs an hour, compared with America’s six. Australia ranks third, at five burgers for every hour worked.Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- American workers earn the equivalent of 10,215 Big Macs annually, topping global McWage rankings, but longer working hours reduce U.S. hourly purchasing power to six Big Macs per hour, behind Switzerland’s seven.
- Switzerland leads all nations in hourly McWage purchasing power at seven Big Macs per hour, with Australia third at five, demonstrating that top annual earnings and top hourly compensation do not always coincide.
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- Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans? — The gap in hours worked between Americans and non-Americans has narrowed by half since the 1990s, driven by declining U.S. work hours as expanded government health benefits reduced the need to work, while rising wages and lower barriers to employment increased hours worked in other advanced economies.
- Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — I debate @JasonFurman—Pres. Obama’s Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors—at Harvard over the effect of tax increases on the expected value of innovative…
US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits
AI Summary. Corporate profit margins have expanded ~250 basis points over the past year, approaching all-time highs, as 23% profit growth far outpaced 8% growth in corporate value added. Labor's share of income is hitting new lows, confirming that margin expansion—not faster economic growth—is the primary driver of record profit levels.
Abiel Reinhart J.P. Morgan- Date Posted:
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US corporate profit margins rose ~250bp y/y in Q2 and are approaching an all-time high. Reinhart notes that tech and communications services drove ~58% of recent S&P 500 profit growth, even as the sectors have been “steadily losing employment since late 2022.”
Are record corporate profits driven by growth or margin expansion?
Core argument: Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.
Nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national income and product accounts (NIPA) were very robust in both 2Q (41% [annual rate]) and over the last year (23%). Excluding post-recession spikes, we haven’t seen a year this strong since the mid-2000s. Higher margins [were] the key driver [of profit growth], as 23% y/y domestic profit growth was far in excess of the 8% increase in corporate value added. Profit margins (pre-tax profits divided by value added) increased close to 250bp over the last year, and are approaching all-time highs, whereas the labor share is hitting new lows.Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.
Related Articles:
- US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt — U.S. corporate pre-tax profits reached an annualized $4.8tn, or 18% of national income—the highest share since the post-WWII era—while workers' wages and benefits fell to 60% of national income, the lowest since the 1950s.
- Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate…
- The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of national income has fallen to 51%—its lowest recorded level—while corporate profits have reached 12.1% of national income, their highest share since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages have risen 3% since 2019, while inflation-adjusted corporate profits have risen 50% over the same period.
US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt
AI Summary. U.S. corporate pre-tax profits reached an annualized $4.8tn, or 18% of national income—the highest share since the post-WWII era—while workers' wages and benefits fell to 60% of national income, the lowest since the 1950s.
Myles McCormick Financial Times- Date Posted:
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Corporate profits have risen to 18% of national income, their highest share since 1947, while labor’s share has fallen to 60%, a low not seen since the 1950s. The decline in labor’s share has accelerated over the past year.
Are record corporate profits coming at workers' expense?
Pre-tax earnings hit an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war. Employees’ share from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest level since the 1950s. “Regardless of what measure you look at, workers, in terms of employee compensation, have been receiving an increasingly small share of national income over time,” said Abiel Reinhart, an economist at JPMorgan. The decline in labour’s share of income has gained pace in the past five years and especially over the past 12 months.Related Articles:
- The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share — The labor share of income has fallen 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching an all-time post-war low, driven by within-industry dynamics rather than shifts in activity across sectors.
- Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate…
- Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — Tax code changes account for roughly one-third of the decline in the worker share of U.S. business income since 1978, as firms shift from corporate to pass-through structures to reclassify wages as profits and reduce tax burdens.
America's Demoralized Men, Part II: Lost Pathways, Greater Struggles
AI Summary. Over 40% of young men identify as failures, with daily pornography use and daily gambling each associated with failure self-perception rates above 60%.
Joseph Davis, Michael Toscano and Ken Burchfiel Institute For Family Studies- Date Posted:
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An ISF survey of 2,000 American men aged 18–29 found 23% reported gambling daily and 27% watch pornography daily. 66% of the men who gambled daily reported feeling like a failure, as well as 63% of the men who watch pornography daily.
Are young men's struggles with addiction driving their sense of failure?
Core argument: 42% of young men identify as failures, with daily pornography viewers (63%) and daily gamblers (66%) reporting self-perceived failure at rates roughly 1.5× the overall average.
More than half of young men in our survey are now gamblers. Nearly 1 in 4 (23%) report that they gamble daily, plus 12% doing so more than several times a week, and a further 21% at least some of the time. 43% of young men say they watch pornography daily (27%) or several times a week (16%), with another 26% about weekly or less. More than 4 in 10 young men (42%) believe that the statement “all in all, I am inclined to think that I am a failure” describes them “very well” (15%) or “somewhat well” (27%). Those who view pornography (63%) and gamble (66%) every day—along with day trading and playing fantasy sports—are significantly more inclined to see themselves as a failure.Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- 42% of young men identify as failures, with daily pornography viewers (63%) and daily gamblers (66%) reporting self-perceived failure at rates roughly 1.5× the overall average.
- More than half of young men gamble at some frequency, with 23% doing so daily—a pattern concentrated among those also exhibiting compulsive pornography use and self-perceived failure.
- 43% of young men consume pornography daily or several times a week, with daily users (27%) disproportionately represented among those who describe themselves as failures (63%).
Related Articles:
- The Case for Prohibiting Vice — Lehman makes the case for restricting sports gambling, marijuana, and pornography. The costs of vice and its regulation are not limited to individual harm…
- Americans Increasingly See Legal Sports Betting As A Bad Thing For Society and Sports — 43% of American adults say widespread betting on sports is “a bad thing for society,” up from 34% in 2022. 47% of men under 30 say legal sports…
- Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — Paul Kedrosky argues the American economy is undergoing a fundamental shift from > 3% mean annual real GDP growth to “life under two,” or below…