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AI Summary. Average hourly earnings have grown 30% since 2019 while consumer prices rose 26%, leaving real wages up 4%.
Core argument: Average hourly earnings have risen 30% since 2019 while the CPI price level rose 26%, leaving real wages up 4% over the period.
When discussing affordability, it is important to note that while the CPI price level has increased 26% since 2019, wages have increased 30%.AI Summary. Manufacturing capacity carries military and geopolitical importance, as shown by economic warfare over products like semiconductors and magnets. The policy-relevant question is not whether manufacturing is geopolitically useful but how much should be spent boosting it given resource constraints, and whether to target defense, dual-use, chokepoint, or broad civilian production.
Core argument: Sander Tordoir offers the best argument against embracing deindustrialization, that "Europe will need drones and tanks, not just consultants," since the ability to make things carries military and geopolitical importance.
The best argument against [an] embrace of deindustrialization came from Sander Tordoir, “Europe will need drones and tanks, not just consultants.” The ability to make stuff has military and geopolitical importance. The claim that manufacturing matters for geopolitical power is obvious in the abstract. We’ve all studied the “arsenal of democracy.” We’ve lived through economic warfare around manufactured products like chips and magnets. Yet the policy relevant question is not “is manufacturing geopolitically useful?” but rather “given resource constraints and a preexisting factor allocation, how much should we spend to boost our manufacturing capabilities?” Should we target a) defense, b) dual use, c) chokepoint, or d) across-the-board civilian production? We haven’t put much collective thought into the answers. We agree that chips and magnets matter, while t-shirts don’t. What we disagree about is everything in between.AI Summary. The largest US private companies raised a record $150bn, surpassing the prior high of $92bn, as investors poured money into leading artificial intelligence firms including OpenAI and Anthropic. Venture capitalists say the cash would help insulate founders against an investment downturn while also funding growth.
Core argument: The biggest US private companies raised a record $150bn in 2025, according to PitchBook data, surpassing the previous high of $92bn set in 2021, as investors rushed to back top AI groups including OpenAI and Anthropic.
Silicon Valley’s hottest start-ups have raised $150bn in funding this year as their financial backers advise them to build “fortress balance sheets” to protect them in case the artificial intelligence investment boom turns to bust in 2026. PitchBook data showed that the biggest US private companies raised a record haul in 2025, smashing the previous high of $92bn raised in 2021, with investors rushing to back top AI groups such as OpenAI and Anthropic. Venture capitalists and industry experts said the money would help insulate founders against an investment downturn as public markets begin to fret over heavy spending on AI infrastructure — as well as fuelling growth.AI Summary. Per capita GDP in the US grew a cumulative 20% over a decade, about 2% a year, outpacing Latin American economies; Colombia, Peru and Chile fared best in the region but still fell well short, while Mexico and Brazil underperformed. The author argues Ecuador's and Argentina's dollar pegs preclude growth.
Core argument: U.S. per capita GDP grew a cumulative 20% between 2014 and 2024, about 2% per year, a pace no Latin American economy comes remotely close to matching.
The chart shows growth in per capita GDP between 2014 and 2024. There’s a couple of points worth making. First, no one comes remotely close to the US, which grew a cumulative 20% in that decade, i.e. two percent per year. Second, there are three groups of countries in Latin America: (i) Colombia (CO), Peru (PE) and Chile (CL); (ii) Mexico (MX) and Brazil (BR); and (iii) Ecuador (EC) and Argentina (AR). The first group has done reasonably well compared to the rest of the region, but still falls substantially short of the US. The second group should be doing much better and it’s here that the growth puzzle is most vexing and profound. The third group is countries that insist on pegging to the Dollar (Ecuador’s dollarization is really just an extreme version of a Dollar peg), which kills any hope for growth.AI Summary. Since 1990, U.S. output growth has come mostly from productivity gains rather than hours worked, with productivity growing faster than hours in every period; productivity grew roughly 2.5x as fast as hours from 2007 to 2019 and more than 4x as fast from 2019 to 2024. Output growth decelerated from 1990 to 2019 before a moderate resurgence after 2019.
Core argument: Productivity grew more than four times as fast as hours worked in 2019–24 and roughly two and a half times as fast in 2007–19, with productivity outpacing hours growth in every period since 1990.
Since 1990, output growth at the macroeconomic level has come mostly from increases in productivity, rather than hours worked. Output growth decelerated from 2000 to 2007, and again from 2007 to 2019, but accelerated somewhat after 2019. Hours worked showed the most significant deceleration from 2000–07 and modest growth over the past two business cycles. The end dates for the periods on the chart align with business cycles. Overall, the chart displays a decelerating trend in the annual percent changes for output from 1990 to 2019, with a moderate resurgence, so far, after 2019. Productivity grew faster than hours worked in all periods. Hours growth flattened during the 2000–07 “jobless recovery,” after the “dot-com bust” recession. Productivity growth was responsible for nearly all output growth during this period. Finally, a weak but stable growth trend for hours worked appeared in the two periods from 2007–24. In the 2007–19 period, productivity grew roughly two and a half times as fast as hours worked. In the 2019–24 period, productivity then grew more than four times as fast as hours worked. However, productivity growth in the last two business cycles—so far—has remained a little slower than in the 1990–2007 periods.AI Summary. Working hours of prime-age adults have been stable across regions over decades, including roughly a century of stability in the US apart from a dip during the Great Depression. This masks offsetting gender trends: hours generally rise for prime-age women and fall for prime-age men, a pattern the authors attribute to broader societal trends as well as economic development.
Core argument: Working hours of prime-age adults show striking stability across regions, with the U.S. series nearly flat over a century apart from the Great Depression dip in the 1930s, and Europe and Latin America stable over four decades or more.
Panel (a) in Figure 10 shows striking stability over decades of hours of work of prime-age adults in each region/country. The U.S. series displays almost perfect stability over a century (except for the Great Depression dip in the 1930s). Developing countries tend to show a slight increase, perhaps most marked in Sub-Saharan Africa. Europe and Latin America, where we have the most comprehensive set of countries, show almost perfect stability over four decades or more. However, this stability of prime-age hours over time masks striking offsetting trends by gender. Figure 10, panel (b) repeats the same time series analysis but disaggregated by gender. Working hours generally increase for prime-age women while they symmetrically decrease for prime-age men, explaining the stability in panel (a). The increase in female hours is almost universal. It is visible both in regions that have grown slowly such as Latin America and in fast growing countries such as Indonesia or Pakistan. The decrease for men comes from the intensive margin while the increase for women comes from the extensive margin. This suggests that this process is not solely related to economic development but also reflects broader societal trends.AI Summary. The US dollar has fallen 9.5% against a basket of major currencies over the year, with the euro gaining nearly 14% to above $1.17, a level last reached in 2021. The decline followed aggressive US tariffs on trading partners, which raised concerns about the economy and the dollar's haven status, and continued as the Federal Reserve resumed rate cuts.
Core argument: The dollar has fallen 9.5% against a basket of major currencies this year, its steepest annual drop in almost a decade, after President Donald Trump's trade war sparked fears for the US economy and doubts about the dollar's haven status.
The greenback has slumped 9.5% against a basket of major currencies this year, after US President Donald Trump’s trade war sparked fears for the world’s biggest economy and cast doubt over the dollar’s traditional status as a haven for investors. The euro has had the biggest gain of the major currencies against the faltering dollar, surging nearly 14% to above $1.17, a level last reached in 2021. While the dollar’s initial weakness was triggered by Trump’s launch of aggressive tariffs against the US’s trading partners in April - it was at one point down 15% against major currencies before regaining some ground - the Fed’s resumption of rate cuts in September has kept it under pressure.AI Summary. Nearly 30% of Chinese industrial firms operate at a loss, up from around 20% before the pandemic. The loss-making share has grown faster in sectors with high asset growth, reaching 34% versus 28% in low-asset-growth sectors.
Core argument: Nearly 30% of Chinese industrial firms currently operate at a loss, up from roughly 20% before the pandemic, with the share rising again since early 2022 after returning to prepandemic levels by early 2021.
Many Chinese industrial firms are losing money. For all industrial firms, this share was around 20% before the pandemic, spiked during the pandemic and returned to prepandemic levels by early 2021. The share has risen again since early 2022; nearly 30% of all industrials in China operate at a loss currently. In early 2022, the loss-making share among high- and low-growth asset groups was about the same. Since then, the loss-making share has grown more quickly in the high-growth asset sectors, reaching 34% in August 2025, compared with 28% in the low-growth asset sectors.AI Summary. China trains more rare-earth technicians and researchers than any other country, with rare-earth programs offered at 39 universities, while the United States and Europe have none. Beijing has halted most exports of rare-earth processing equipment and confiscated the passports of rare-earth technicians to keep expertise from leaving the country.
Core argument: China offers rare-earth programs at 39 universities and trains more technicians and researchers in the field than any other country, while the United States and Europe offer no such programs.
Today, China is working to cement its lead in rare earths by churning out more trained technicians and researchers than any other country. Programs in rare earths are offered by 39 universities. The United States and Europe have no such programs — not even at Iowa State University, an institution that once trained generations of American engineers in rare earths. Iowa State has not offered a course in rare earths for the last several years and has one graduate student doing independent study in the field. It plans to offer a course next year. China is determined to guard its technological lead. Beijing has halted most exports of rare-earth processing equipment. It has also taken away the passports of rare-earth technicians to prevent them from leaving the country with valuable information.