Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
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Friday, December 19, 2025

Welcome To The Age Of Zero-Sum Politics

AI Summary. Polling across the US, UK, France and Germany finds that zero-sum beliefs on the left and right are expressions of a shared worldview holding that gains for some must come at others' expense. Per capita growth across the West has averaged under 1% a year since the financial crisis.

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
Date Posted:
December 19, 2025
Is Database:
Database

More than half of young voters in the US, UK, France and Germany now back “zero sum” parties fueled by the beliefs such as “people only get rich by making others poor” on the left and “immigrants succeed at the expense of the native-born” on the right.

Do zero-sum beliefs on the left and right share one worldview?

Core argument: Per capita economic growth across the West has averaged less than 1% a year since the financial crisis, down from more than double that in the prior three decades and triple that before.

My analysis of polling by More in Common finds that in the US, UK, France and Germany zero-sum beliefs on the left (e.g. people only get rich by making others poor) and the right (e.g. immigrants succeed at the expense of the native-born) are related expressions of the same underlying worldview. Namely that there is only so much to go around and we must therefore use restrictions, exactions and preferential treatment to redress the balance between winners and losers. The emergence of these beliefs in different countries and political systems points to their being grounded in a shared reality. When economic growth is weak, upward mobility becomes limited, meaning gains really are more likely to come at another’s expense. This describes the past two decades almost perfectly. Per capita economic growth across the west has averaged less than 1% a year since the financial crisis, down from more than double that in the previous three decades and triple before that. The conveyor belt of generation-on-generation economic progress has slowed to a crawl and everyone is looking accusingly at the person a few steps ahead or the one joining the line half way along. More than half of young voters now back zero-sum parties of the right or left in the US, UK, France and Germany.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Per capita economic growth across the West has averaged less than 1% a year since the financial crisis, down from more than double that in the prior three decades and triple that before.
  2. Analysis of More in Common polling in the US, UK, France and Germany finds zero-sum beliefs on the left (people get rich only by making others poor) and right (immigrants succeed at the expense of the native-born) are expressions of the same underlying worldview.
  3. More than half of young voters in the US, UK, France and Germany back zero-sum parties of the right or left, and the emergence of these beliefs across different countries and political systems points to their being grounded in a shared reality.

Related Articles:

  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • To Understand America Today, Study the Zero-Sum Mindset — Younger generations in the United States and other rich countries hold more zero-sum views than older ones, a pattern researchers link to growing up amid slower economic growth and lower mobility. People who have surpassed their parents, or whose families rose over generations, are less likely to think in zero-sum terms.
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

U.S. Wages Still Rising Briskly, Employment Holding Up, and Inflation Still Sticky (Probably)

AI Summary. The U.S. job market looks no less healthy than a few months earlier: the rise in unemployment to 4.56% has coincided with more people actively looking for work, while the share of Americans aged 25-54 with a job held near 80.6%. Wages rising about 4% a year can explain inflation running about 1 percentage point above pre-pandemic rates.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:
December 19, 2025

Klein argues that the US labor market has not really deteriorated. The rise in the unemployment rate since March is due to increased participation. Wages are growing at 4% per year; 1pp above the pre-pandemic rate.

Does brisk wage growth explain why inflation remains above pre-pandemic rates?

Core argument: The prime-age (25–54) employment-population ratio was 80.6% in November, up slightly from 80.4% in March 2025, and has been stable since reaching a multi-decade high of just under 81% in early 2023.

Lowering interest rates could make sense if the job market were clearly in danger of rolling over. As of this writing, however, the job market still looks relatively healthy, or at least no less healthy than it did a few months ago. The headline unemployment rate (U-3) rose from 4.44% of the labor force in September to 4.56% in November. [However], the rise in unemployment since March 2025 has coincided with a rise in the share of people saying that they are actively looking for a job, rather than a decline in the proportion of people who are gainfully employed. The share of Americans aged 25-54 with a job was 80.6% in November, up slightly from March 2025, when the “prime age” employment-population ratio was 80.4%. In fact, the share of Americans aged 25-54 with a job has been remarkably stable since hitting its multi-decade high of just under 81% in early 2023. The typical American worker’s wages have consistently been rising about 4% a year since early 2023, compared to about 3% a year in 2018-2019 - large enough to explain why inflation is still running about 1pp faster than before the pandemic. The data imply that the burden for loosening policy should be high, especially given the latent risk [of] inflationary policy shocks.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The prime-age (25–54) employment-population ratio was 80.6% in November, up slightly from 80.4% in March 2025, and has been stable since reaching a multi-decade high of just under 81% in early 2023.
  2. The U-3 unemployment rate rose from 4.44% of the labor force in September to 4.56% in November, a rise that since March 2025 has coincided with more people saying they are actively looking for work rather than fewer people employed.
  3. Typical American workers' wages have risen about 4% a year since early 2023, against about 3% a year in 2018-2019, large enough to explain inflation running about 1pp faster than before the pandemic, implying a high burden for loosening policy.

Related Articles:

  • A New Era of Higher Inflation Risks — The authors argue inflation's baseline is now higher than pre-pandemic, with 2% acting more as a floor than a ceiling, noting disinflation has largely stalled and core inflation has run above target on a six-month annualized basis for five years. They expect a structurally wider range of inflation outcomes, skewed to the upside and centered higher than in the 2010s.
  • Jobless Growth — Labor demand growth may be too weak to keep pace with even modest labor supply growth: the labor market is somewhat weaker than before the pandemic, job growth has turned negative outside healthcare, and firms are focused on using AI to cut labor costs. Economists estimate most employment losses in routine manual occupations since the 1970s occurred during recessions.
  • The Jobs Chart That Really Has Us Worried — The recent jobs trajectory sits in the upper tail of historical month-to-month variation and closer to the range typically seen around past recessions, based on a comparison with paths beginning at the onset of prior recessions.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • GDP
    • Inflation
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Japan Raises Interest Rates To Highest Level In 30 Years

AI Summary. The Bank of Japan raised its policy rate by 0.25 percentage points to around 0.75%, a three-decade high, and signalled readiness to continue tightening if conditions allow. The 10-year Japanese government bond yield rose 0.05 percentage points, passing 2% to its highest level since 1999, while the yen weakened to ¥156.77 per dollar.

Leo Lewis Financial Times
Date Posted:
December 19, 2025

The yield on 10-year Japanese government debt climbed 5bp, breaching 2% and reaching its highest level since 1999, after the BOJ raised its policy rate 25bps to .75%.

Is Japan continuing to raise interest rates toward multi-decade highs?

Core argument: The Bank of Japan raised its policy rate by 0.25 percentage points to "around 0.75%", a three-decade high, and signalled readiness to continue tightening if conditions are right.

The Bank of Japan raised its policy rate by 0.25 percentage points to “around 0.75%”, a three-decade high, and signalled its readiness to continue monetary tightening if conditions are right. The yield on the benchmark 10-year Japanese government bond climbed 0.05 percentage points, breaking through 2% and reaching the highest level since 1999. The yen weakened to ¥156.77 against the dollar.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Bank of Japan raised its policy rate by 0.25 percentage points to "around 0.75%", a three-decade high, and signalled readiness to continue tightening if conditions are right.
  2. The yield on Japan's benchmark 10-year government bond rose 0.05 percentage points, breaking through 2% to reach its highest level since 1999.
  3. The yen weakened to ¥156.77 against the dollar.

Related Articles:

  • The Global Debt Crisis Builds — Long-dated forward yields such as 10-year and 20-year forwards are near their highs even as the Federal Reserve cuts rates, with the gap between those forwards and 10-year yields widening, which the author reads as a worsening buyers' strike for longer-dated government debt. Italy, France, the UK, Japan and Germany all show elevated long-term forward yields.
  • Japan’s Debt Puzzle: Sovereign Wealth Fund from Borrowed Money — Japan's public sector operates as a highly leveraged sovereign wealth fund, funding risky assets by borrowing from banks and depositors at below-market rates, with returns sustaining its debt-to-GDP ratio above 200% without primary surpluses. The authors argue the resulting duration and currency mismatches expose Japan to mark-to-market losses that could trigger a fiscal crisis or a run on the yen.
  • The Race Between Asset Supply and Asset Demand — The authors estimate that demand for assets has outpaced supply by roughly 400% of GDP versus 100%, making rising asset demand the leading contributor to falling interest rates. They project that debt sustainability requires fiscal consolidation exceeding 10% of GDP, though debt could reach 250% of GDP without raising interest rates.
  • Financial Markets
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP

The Plan To Rescue Novo Nordisk

AI Summary. Novo Nordisk's Wegovy dominated the weight-loss drug market until Eli Lilly launched Zepbound, which brought in $4.9bn in sales in 2024, three-quarters as much as Wegovy. Bloomberg forecasts that by 2030 Lilly will control more than half of the global obesity drug market, versus a third for Novo.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
December 19, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Despite revolutionizing health care with GLP-1 drugs like Wegovy, Novo Nordisk’s market cap has fallen two-thirds from its peak, and is currently only 23% that of Eli Lilly, which has now pulled ahead in sales of weight-loss injections.

Is a rival overtaking the early leader in weight-loss drugs?

Core argument: Bloomberg forecasts Eli Lilly will control more than half of the global obesity-drug market by 2030, versus a third for Novo Nordisk.

For more than two years, Novo Nordisk had the market for weight-loss drugs to itself. By 2023, sales of Wegovy had reached $4.3bn in America. That year, however, Eli Lilly, a rival that had closely watched Novo’s missteps, launched its own weight-loss injection, called Zepbound. In 2024, it brought in sales of $4.9bn, three-quarters as much as Wegovy. This year it will pull ahead. By 2030, Lilly will control more than half of the global market for obesity drugs, compared with just a third for Novo, according to forecasts from Bloomberg.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bloomberg forecasts Eli Lilly will control more than half of the global obesity-drug market by 2030, versus a third for Novo Nordisk.
  2. Eli Lilly's Zepbound, launched in 2023, brought in $4.9bn of sales in 2024, three-quarters as much as Novo Nordisk's Wegovy, and is set to pull ahead this year.
  3. Novo Nordisk had the weight-loss drug market to itself for more than two years, with Wegovy sales reaching $4.3bn in America by 2023, before Eli Lilly entered after watching Novo's missteps.

Related Articles:

  • The Long Goodbye? Incumbent Competitiveness in the 21st Century — Value creation among large American companies has become concentrated in a newer cohort of firms: businesses founded after World War II accounted for 8% of the top 50 companies' total market value in 1990 but 77% by 2024. The leading 20th-century incumbents are fading as this newer group takes over.
  • Long-Term Shareholder Returns: Evidence From 64,000 Global Stocks — A study of about 64,000 global stocks estimates net global stock market wealth creation of $75.7tn, with returns highly concentrated: the top 159 firms (0.25%) account for half of net wealth creation and the top 1,526 (2.39%) account for all of it. Fewer than half of stocks beat one-month US Treasury bills, 42.6% of non-US and 44.8% of US stocks.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.
  • Innovation/Research
  • Productivity

Monday, December 22, 2025

Macro Outlook 2026: Sturdy Growth, Stagnant Jobs, Stable Prices

AI Summary. China's growth is forecast at 4.8%, above the 4.5% consensus, with robust manufacturing offset by a housing drag on output estimated at about 1.5 percentage points as property sales run 60% below peak. Strong manufacturing and weak domestic demand are projected to lift China's current account surplus toward 1% of global output.

Jan Hatzius, Dominic Wilson, Joseph Briggs, Vickie Chang, et al. Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:
December 22, 2025

Property starts in China are down 80% from peak, and GS estimates that housing’s drag on GDP will remain at ~1½pp in 2026. GS forecasts that strong manufacturing and weak domestic demand will raise China’s surplus to ~1% of global GDP over the next 3–5 years.

Can strong manufacturing keep China's growth above consensus despite housing drag?

Core argument: The 2026 forecast for China's growth is 4.8%, above the 4.5% consensus, with the manufacturing sector expected to continue growing robustly.

Our 4.8% growth forecast for China is above the 4.5% consensus.  The Chinese manufacturing sector should continue to grow robustly. Property sales are down 60% and property starts down 80% from the peak—we estimate that the housing drag on GDP will remain around 1½pp in 2026. The combination of a strong manufacturing sector and weak domestic demand is pushing China’s current account surplus ever higher. Over the next 3-5 years, we expect an increase to almost 1% of global GDP, the biggest surplus of any country in recorded history. This is likely to weigh heavily on growth in economies that compete intensively with China such as the Euro area, and particularly Germany.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The 2026 forecast for China's growth is 4.8%, above the 4.5% consensus, with the manufacturing sector expected to continue growing robustly.
  2. Chinese property sales are down 60% and property starts down 80% from the peak, and the housing drag on GDP is estimated to remain around 1½pp in 2026.
  3. China's current account surplus is projected to rise to almost 1% of global GDP over the next three to five years, the biggest surplus of any country in recorded history, likely weighing on growth in the Euro area and particularly Germany.

Related Articles:

  • Can China Continue to Export its Way Out of its Property Slump? — The International Monetary Fund estimates Chinese public sector debt near 125% of GDP and a combined on- and off-balance-sheet fiscal deficit possibly above 12% of GDP. Since the property bubble burst, net exports have added over a percentage point to annual growth on average, with the goods surplus approaching $1.2tn, or 6% of GDP.
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
  • Power Politics: Energy Self-Sufficiency in a Modern Mercantilist World — China leads in adding power to the grid, with more than 30,000 miles of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines versus zero in the US and lead times for large transformers of 48 weeks against a US average of 143 weeks. This positions China to accommodate new demand sources such as artificial intelligence.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Growth
    • Housing
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
    • Trade (not deficits)

14-Hour Shifts and $1 a Delivery—but China’s Army of Gig Workers Keeps Growing

AI Summary. Self-employed workers make up about 30% of China's nonagricultural workforce, up from 20% in 2013, while the number of ride-hailing drivers tripled to 7.5 million over four years even as rides grew about 60%. The influx of workers into gig work is putting downward pressure on pay.

Yoko Kubota Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
December 22, 2025

Btw 2020–24, the number of ride-hailing drivers in China tripled to 7.5mm – while the number of rides grew only 60%, putting downward pressure on wages. Overall, 30% of the nonagricultural workforce is self-employed – up from 20% in 2013.

Btw 2020–24, the number of ride-hailing drivers in China tripled to 7.5mm – while the number of rides grew only 60%,...

Is China's growing gig workforce pushing down wages?

Core argument: Self-employed workers make up about 30% of China's nonagricultural workforce, up from 20% in 2013, according to data from Gavekal Dragonomics.

Self-employed workers now make up about 30% of the nonagricultural workforce in China, up from 20% in 2013, data from Gavekal Dragonomics showed.  The number of ride-hailing drivers in China tripled to 7.5 million in the four years to 2024, even though the number of rides grew only by about 60% during the same period, government data shows. So many people are entering the gig economy that it is putting downward pressure on wages, as people laid off from other industries or unable to find full-time work compete for pay.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Self-employed workers make up about 30% of China's nonagricultural workforce, up from 20% in 2013, according to data from Gavekal Dragonomics.
  2. China's ride-hailing drivers tripled to 7.5 million in the four years to 2024, while the number of rides grew only about 60% over the same period, according to government data.

Related Articles:

  • US Exceptionalism Versus Chinese Uninvestibility (Part I) — China redirected domestic savings toward de-Westernizing its industrial supply chains through tighter capital controls, suspended stock listings, and concentrated bank lending, which the author argues was deflationary and produced poor investor returns. The author argues that if the US pursues comparable supply-chain separation from China, capital would shift into lower-return activities.
  • The True Cost of China’s Falling Prices — Prices fell for 51 of 67 consumer items tracked over a two-year period in China, while the broader GDP deflator, which includes upstream sectors, declined for 10 straight quarters, indicating deflation is more entrenched in industry. The share of "zombie" firms whose profits cannot cover debt interest rose from 19% to 34% over five years.
  • China is Suffering its Own ‘China Shock’ — Academic analysis of 12 labour-intensive Chinese manufacturing industries estimates average employment fell about 14%, or nearly 4mn jobs, between 2011 and 2019, with textile roles down 40%; a further analysis of the same sectors found 3.4mn more jobs lost through 2023. Researchers argue industrial upgrading and automation are cutting demand for lower-skilled workers and depressing their wages.
  • China
  • Workforce
    • Unemployment/Participation
    • Wages/Income

In Germany, Everyone Is a Defense Manufacturer Now

AI Summary. Germany plans to nearly triple annual military spending to about $180bn by 2029, and German industrial production has posted significant gains in sectors geared toward military spending. Those gains more than offset declines in other mainstays of German industry such as vehicles and chemicals, supporting a manufacturing sector that has shrunk for seven years.

Tom Fairless Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
December 22, 2025

The tripling of Germany’s defense spending to ~$180B annually is helping its embattled manufacturing sector. For example, Schaefer, an automotive supplier, recently signed a deal with Munich‑based defense startup Helsing to scale up production of drones.

Is military spending lifting Germany's shrinking manufacturing sector?

Core argument: Germany plans to nearly triple annual military spending to around $180 billion in 2029, a buildup that is beginning to appear in the country's economic data.

Germany plans to nearly triple its annual military spending over the coming years to around $180 billion in 2029. The splurge is starting to show up in economic data. German industrial production for October showed significant gains in sectors geared toward military spending, said Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg Bank. That helped to more than offset declines in other mainstays of German industry, such as vehicles and chemicals. This is a godsend for Germany’s embattled manufacturing sector, which has steadily shrunk for seven years, squeezed by high energy prices, aggressive competition from China and U.S. tariffs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Germany plans to nearly triple annual military spending to around $180 billion in 2029, a buildup that is beginning to appear in the country's economic data.
  2. German industrial production in October posted significant gains in sectors geared toward military spending, more than offsetting declines in vehicles and chemicals, according to Berenberg Bank chief economist Holger Schmieding.
  3. Germany's manufacturing sector has shrunk steadily for seven years, squeezed by high energy prices, aggressive competition from China and U.S. tariffs.

Related Articles:

  • Will Higher Defence Spending Boost The European Economy? — Defense spending typically has a fiscal multiplier below one, meaning each euro spent raises GDP by less, so it is not a short-term growth strategy. One estimate holds that extra military spending worth 1% of GDP could lift output up to 2% long term if concentrated on research and development.
  • Europe’s Defence Tech Start-Ups Attract Investment Surge — European defence technology start-ups have raised €2.4bn since the start of 2022, including €1.4bn in the first seven months of the most recent year, up from €30mn in 2020 and €150mn in 2021, according to PitchBook data. Three of them — drone makers Helsing, Quantum Systems and Tekever — are valued above €1bn.
  • From Trains to Tanks: Germany’s Rearmament Marks Industrial Shift — Germany's defense spending has risen almost 80% since 2020 to over €90bn, according to NATO estimates, offering hiring growth in a country where nearly 250,000 manufacturing jobs have disappeared since the pandemic began. Four major defense contractors added more than 16,500 employees over three years, a gain exceeding 40%, and plan roughly 12,000 more hires.
  • Security
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

Affordability, Part IV

AI Summary. US incomes at the 60th percentile of the distribution, currently $106,000, have fallen from 43% of incomes at the 95th percentile, currently $336,000, to 31% over roughly half a century. The author argues this widening gap may make an affluent lifestyle seem unattainable to most Americans.

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:
December 22, 2025
Is Database:
Database

In 1979, 60th percentile American families earned 43% as much as 95th percentile families – the high end of their “reference group.” Today, they earn 31%. Krugman argues such gaps are driving the “general sense of declining social inclusion.”

Has the income gap between middle-class and affluent Americans widened?

Core argument: U.S. incomes at the 60th percentile, currently $106,000, equal 31% of incomes at the 95th percentile, currently $336,000, down from 43% half a century ago.

The vast majority of Americans never see how the 1%, let alone the .01%, lives. They are, however, well aware that some of the people they grew up with have bigger houses in nicer locations than they do, take more and more luxurious vacations, can give their children a better education, and so on. Let me suggest a measure that may get at the general sense of declining social inclusion: the ratio of incomes at the 60th percentile of the income distribution, currently $106,000, to incomes at the 95th percentile, currently $336,000. The cutoffs are arbitrary, partly reflecting easily accessible data. But the 60th percentile is probably a good placeholder for people who are middle class but not affluent, while the 95th percentile may be a good indicator of the very affluent who aren’t so affluent as to be removed from ordinary Americans’ reference group. Here’s what the ratio of incomes at the 60th to the 95th percentiles looks like over time. Half a century ago, middle-income families by this definition made 43% as much as upper-income — a large gap, but not enough to put the affluent in a completely different material universe. Now the ratio is down to 31%, which may well make an affluent lifestyle seem unattainable to most Americans.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. incomes at the 60th percentile, currently $106,000, equal 31% of incomes at the 95th percentile, currently $336,000, down from 43% half a century ago.
  2. Paul Krugman proposes the ratio of 60th- to 95th-percentile incomes as a measure of declining social inclusion, with the 60th percentile standing in for the middle class and the 95th for the affluent still within ordinary Americans' reference group.
  3. Most Americans never see how the top 1%, let alone the top 0.01%, lives, but are aware that people they grew up with have bigger houses, more luxurious vacations, and better education for their children.

Related Articles:

  • Income in the United States: 2024 — U.S. median household income was $83,730, not statistically different from the prior year's $82,690, according to Census Bureau estimates. Across most demographic subgroups, median household income was higher or not statistically different from the prior year, with the exception of Black households, which saw a decline.
  • How To Get Rich in 2025 — Academic estimates compiled by The Economist indicate inheritances, after falling over the 20th century, were worth about 10% of GDP on average by the end of the 2010s, with roughly $6tn inherited across the rich world in a year. Falling family sizes mean each inheritance is spread across fewer heirs.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

California Cuts Back on Costly Immigrant Healthcare

AI Summary. California's Department of Finance projects that Medi-Cal coverage for adults with "unsatisfactory immigration status" will cost $12.5bn this fiscal year, with overall Medi-Cal spending projected at $197bn, up from $104bn in the fiscal year ended mid-2019 before eligibility was expanded. The state's nonpartisan Legislative Analyst Office projects general-fund spending will exceed revenue by 4.3%, or $9.6bn.

Paul Kiernan Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
December 22, 2025

California is currently providing healthcare for 1.8mm illegal immigrants via its Medicaid program, Medi-Cal. Facing a budget deficit of 4.3% in the current fiscal year and 11% next year, the state has begun to roll back the program.

How much does expanding state health coverage to unlawful immigrants cost?

Core argument: California's Department of Finance projects Medi-Cal coverage for adults with "unsatisfactory immigration status" will cost $12.5 billion in the current fiscal year, borne largely by state taxpayers because the federal government does not cover most such Medicaid spending.

The federal government doesn’t cover most Medicaid spending for immigrants in the U.S. unlawfully. So California taxpayers had to foot the bill for the state’s expansion [of health care for illegal-immigrants], and a lot more people signed up than expected. The cost of Medi-Cal coverage for adults with “unsatisfactory immigration status” ballooned to a projected $12.5 billion for the current fiscal year, the state’s Department of Finance says. Overall Medi-Cal spending is projected to reach $197 billion, up from $104 billion in the fiscal year ended mid-2019, before Newsom gradually began expanding immigrants’ eligibility between 2020 and 2024. California’s nonpartisan Legislative Analyst Office projected that general-fund expenses will exceed revenue by 4.3%, or $9.6 billion, in the current fiscal year, and 11% in the next year. The budget difficulties have raised red flags since they are coming in a time of economic growth, and as the artificial-intelligence boom lifts compensation for California’s tech workers, boosting income taxes.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. California's Department of Finance projects Medi-Cal coverage for adults with "unsatisfactory immigration status" will cost $12.5 billion in the current fiscal year, borne largely by state taxpayers because the federal government does not cover most such Medicaid spending.
  2. Overall Medi-Cal spending is projected to reach $197 billion, up from $104 billion in the fiscal year ended mid-2019, before Governor Newsom gradually expanded immigrants' eligibility between 2020 and 2024.
  3. California's nonpartisan Legislative Analyst Office projects general-fund expenses will exceed revenue by 4.3%, or $9.6 billion, in the current fiscal year and by 11% the next year, even as economic growth and an artificial-intelligence boom lift tech compensation and income taxes.

Related Articles:

  • The Fiscal Impact of Immigration (2025 Update) — An analysis estimating immigrants' effects on output, capital, tax revenue, and descendants finds admitting one 30-year-old without a high school diploma costs the federal government $20,000 over 10 years and over $130,000 over 30 years, while a college-educated 30-year-old yields over $200,000 and $1.6m respectively.
  • Two New Estimates of the Fiscal Impact of Immigration — Estimates of immigrants' fiscal impact depend heavily on the assumptions used: the lifetime fiscal impact of a 22-year-old high school dropout shifts from negative $315,000 under one set of assumptions to a small negative number under another. The author argues the accounting approach common in this literature understates immigrants' contribution to fiscal sustainability.
  • The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: An Update — The US foreign-born population reached 51m, or 15.4% of the total, exceeding the previous high set in 1910. Estimated lifetime fiscal impact varies by education: an immigrant arriving at 25 without a high school degree imposes a $246,000 cost, while one with a graduate degree contributes $795,000.
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America’s Fight Back Against China Starts In Los Angeles—In Flip-Flops

AI Summary. El Segundo, California has developed a self-reinforcing entrepreneurial cluster of defense and hardware startups founded by former employees of SpaceX, Palantir and Anduril who cashed in stock options to launch their own firms. One of them, drone maker Neros, says it has America's highest drone production rate and has worked to remove Chinese technology, including circuit boards, from its products.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
December 22, 2025

An aerospace cluster has emerged in El Segundo, CA. Many of the firms have been founded by alumni of SpaceX, which was initially located in town. “Gundo” is an increasingly important part of America’s attempt to win a high-tech arms race against China.

An aerospace cluster has emerged in El Segundo, CA. Many of the firms have been founded by alumni of SpaceX, which was...

How is a defense hardware startup cluster forming in California?

Core argument: El Segundo, California has become a self-reinforcing entrepreneurial cluster built by former employees of SpaceX, Palantir and the defence-tech firm Anduril, whose early staff cashed in multi-million-dollar stock options and became founders themselves.

El Segundo (“Gundo”) is a bottom-up example of something that countries around the world try in vain to replicate: a genuine entrepreneurial cluster. Many of the startups are built by former employees not just of SpaceX, but of Palantir and Anduril, a defence-tech pioneer. Their early employees, cashing in multi-million-dollar stock options, became founders in their own right. This trend has grown big enough to become self-reinforcing. Many startups fail. But when they do, there are enough opportunities nearby to give employees the confidence that they will find other jobs. The sense that Gundo’s founders are quietly working on a Plan B for America as tensions rise with China is palpable at Neros, a manufacturer of lethal drones that Soren Monroe-Anderson, its co-founder, says has the highest production rate of drones in America, mostly for sale for use in Ukraine. He shows how Neros has sought to strip all traces of Chinese technology from the products, including their circuit boards. Asked why Neros does this in California, rather than in Texas, he smiles mockingly. “The best engineers in the world don’t want to live in Texas,” he snorts.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. El Segundo, California has become a self-reinforcing entrepreneurial cluster built by former employees of SpaceX, Palantir and the defence-tech firm Anduril, whose early staff cashed in multi-million-dollar stock options and became founders themselves.
  2. Neros, an El Segundo drone maker, has the highest production rate of drones in America according to co-founder Soren Monroe-Anderson, with most sold for use in Ukraine, and has sought to strip Chinese technology from its products, including circuit boards.
  3. Startups in El Segundo often fail, but enough opportunities exist nearby to give employees confidence that they will find other jobs.

Related Articles:

  • The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers — The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.
  • The Effect of High-Tech Clusters on the Productivity of Top Inventors — The authors estimate that inventor productivity rises with local high-tech cluster size, with an elasticity of patent output to cluster size of 0.0662; a 49.2% shrinkage of Rochester's cluster is associated with a 20.6% productivity drop for other local inventors. They estimate that spreading inventors uniformly across US cities would cut patent output by 11.07%.
  • ‘We Do Fail … a Lot’: Defense Startup Anduril Hits Setbacks With Weapons Tech — Defense startup Anduril has hit setbacks across several weapons programs, including engine damage to its unmanned Fury jet fighter in a ground test, a 22-acre fire caused by a counterdrone system test, and software that struggled to command unmanned boats. Former employees report its systems in Ukraine proved vulnerable to jamming.
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