Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Tuesday, December 16, 2025

AI Summary. Federal Reserve officials have become more optimistic about growth, less concerned about unemployment, and equally concerned about inflation, yet the median official now projects a lower path for short-term interest rates under appropriate monetary policy through at least 2027. The author argues economic data cannot explain this shift, pointing instead to officials reinforcing administration pressure for faster rate cuts.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:

Since June, Fed officials have become more optimistic about real growth, with no change in their inflation expectations “under appropriate policy.” This should, if anything, imply a higher FFR, suggesting the Fed is reacting to political pressure.

Why do Fed officials project lower rates despite improved growth outlook?

Core argument: Federal Reserve officials are more optimistic about growth, less worried about unemployment, and equally worried about inflation compared with six months ago, yet the median official now expects lower short-term rates under "appropriate monetary policy" through at least 2027.

Federal Reserve officials are more optimistic about the growth outlook, less worried about unemployment, and just as worried about inflation as they were six months ago. Yet the median official now expects that short term interest rates “under appropriate monetary policy” will be lower than what was expected in June through at least 2027. For the most part, this shift cannot be explained by changes in the underlying economic data, to the extent that we have it. The more plausible explanation is that a small but growing cadre of Fed officials have been reinforcing the pressure from administration officials for larger and faster reductions in interest rates. [Since June], Fed officials have become far more optimistic about the real growth outlook, although they have not gotten more optimistic about inflation “under appropriate monetary policy.” Yet, bizarrely, “appropriate monetary policy” in this scenario apparently consists of a slightly lower path for short rates than had been expected back in December 2024— before the policy shock. Fed officials are willing to tolerate excessive inflation through at least the end of 2026 even though they claim that the downside risks to growth and employment have faded.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Federal Reserve officials are more optimistic about growth, less worried about unemployment, and equally worried about inflation compared with six months ago, yet the median official now expects lower short-term rates under "appropriate monetary policy" through at least 2027.
  2. The Fed's expected path for short rates under "appropriate monetary policy" is now slightly below what was projected in December 2024, before the policy shock, even as officials have not become more optimistic about inflation.
  3. The shift in the Fed's expected rate path cannot for the most part be explained by changes in the underlying economic data, and a more plausible explanation is that a small but growing cadre of Fed officials have reinforced administration pressure for larger and faster rate cuts.

Related Articles:

  • A New Era of Higher Inflation Risks — The authors argue inflation's baseline is now higher than pre-pandemic, with 2% acting more as a floor than a ceiling, noting disinflation has largely stalled and core inflation has run above target on a six-month annualized basis for five years. They expect a structurally wider range of inflation outcomes, skewed to the upside and centered higher than in the 2010s.
  • The Middle Class Is Buckling Under Almost Five Years of Persistent Inflation — US prices for goods and services are 25% above 2020 levels, and 44% of middle-income respondents in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment survey said their finances were worse than a year earlier versus 23% who said better, with most citing higher prices. Retailers report middle-income customers pulling back on discretionary spending.
  • Political Pressure on the Fed — Using data on President–Federal Reserve interactions, the author estimates that political pressure to ease monetary policy raises the price level strongly and persistently without boosting real activity, working through inflation expectations more than a typical easing. Such pressure occurred mainly in the 1970s and contributed to inflationary episodes.

AI Summary. US individual income tax receipts over the past 12 months are $567bn higher than just before the pandemic after adjusting for inflation, with inflation a major contributor. Changes in the Standard & Poor's 500 Index explain almost half the variation in these receipts 10 months later, so a sustained stock pullback would make further deficit reduction harder.

Justin Fox Bloomberg
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Since the start of Trump’s second term, on a trailing-12-month basis, the federal deficit has declined to ~6% of GDP from 6.4% in 2024, driven by tariff revenue and an increase in personal income receipts due to the rising stock market.

Do stock market gains help drive rising income tax receipts?

Core argument: Inflation-adjusted 12-month U.S. individual income tax revenue stands $567 billion above its level just before the pandemic, with the 2021–2022 inflation wave a big contributing factor in the rise in receipts.

The inflation wave of 2021 and 2022 was a big contributing factor [in the rise in income tax receipts], but after adjusting for inflation, 12-month individual income tax revenue is still $567 billion higher than just before the pandemic. Movements in US individual income tax receipts follow movements in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index. The correlation is strongest with a 10-month lag. The r-squared is 0.49, meaning that the change in the S&P 500 “explains” almost half the change 10 months later in trailing-12-month individual income tax receipts — although of course the causality is probably more complicated than that. With the S&P 500 hitting a record last week, that should mean income tax receipts will keep rising for 10 more months. But after gaining 24% in 2023, 23% in 2024 and 16% so far this year, the S&P is also due for a sustained pullback one of these days — which would make it much harder to keep shrinking the deficit.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Inflation-adjusted 12-month U.S. individual income tax revenue stands $567 billion above its level just before the pandemic, with the 2021–2022 inflation wave a big contributing factor in the rise in receipts.
  2. Changes in the S&P 500 correlate most strongly with trailing-12-month individual income tax receipts at a 10-month lag, with an r-squared of 0.49, meaning the index "explains" almost half the later change in receipts, though causality is probably more complicated.
  3. The S&P 500's record high suggests income tax receipts will keep rising for 10 more months, but after gains of 24% in 2023, 23% in 2024 and 16% so far this year, a sustained pullback would make shrinking the deficit much harder.

Related Articles:

  • Interest Rates and the Trump Administration — Comparing average daily U.S. Treasury yields before and after the presidential election, the 10-year nominal yield rose from 3.92% to 4.29% and its inflation-adjusted counterpart from 1.74% to 1.96%, while the 30-year nominal yield rose from 4.21% to 4.77% and its inflation-adjusted counterpart from 2.03% to 2.5%.
  • CBO’s New Projections Show $1 Trillion Less in Tariff Savings — The Congressional Budget Office now projects tariffs enacted this year will reduce debt including interest by $3.0tn through 2035, down from $4.0tn, reflecting policy changes and revised assumptions about duty-free imports and costs absorbed by foreign exporters. If courts strike down the emergency-powers tariffs, the debt reduction would fall to roughly $0.9tn.
  • Across The Rich World, Fiscal Crises Loom — An analysis estimates most rich countries could keep debt stable as a share of their economies with only small primary surpluses—Britain's required surplus is 0.3% of GDP—even if all debt were refinanced immediately at current rates, but the tightening needed to stabilize debt ratios exceeds 2% of GDP in Britain and America and 3% in France.

AI Summary. If technology producers face competition, faster measured productivity growth in a tech-specialized country is passed to consumers in both countries through lower prices rather than higher relative living standards. Real GDP per worker over 1998-2024 diverged more between California and the rest of the US than between the US and Europe, largely reflecting industry composition.

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
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The US–EU productivity divergence over the past 25+ years was largely due to the tech sector. Notably, California’s outperformance relative to non-CA USA was even greater.

Does tech specialization raise a country's living standards relative to others?

Core argument: BEA data on real GDP per worker over 1998–2024 show a wider divergence between California and the United States excluding California than between the US and the EU, a gap the author attributes mainly to composition effects.

Technological progress is much faster in tech than in non‑tech. [Suppose] for historical reasons, the US has a comparative advantage that leads it to produce all the world’s tech. [U.S.] measured productivity growth [will exceed] Europe’s. But will this translate into a rising standard of living for Americans [vs]. Europeans? If there is competition among tech companies, no: rising productivity will be passed on to consumers in both countries [via] lower prices. If you find it implausible to suggest that high US productivity growth in tech doesn’t translate into significantly higher US living standards, consider productivity divergences among U.S. states. Much of the U.S. tech sector is located in California, [leading] to high measured productivity growth in California. compared with the rest of America. The graph constructed with data from the BEA, shows the percentage change in real GDP per worker over 1998-2024 for three “countries”: California, Texas, and “not-California,” i.e., the United States ex CA. This is a huge divergence — bigger than the EU/US divergence that has Europeans so worried. Yet we don’t see Texans obsessing over why they can’t be like California. [If] people think about this divergence at all, they realize that it’s mainly about composition effects.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. BEA data on real GDP per worker over 1998–2024 show a wider divergence between California and the United States excluding California than between the US and the EU, a gap the author attributes mainly to composition effects.
  2. The author argues that if one country specialized in tech and posted faster measured productivity growth, competition among tech firms would pass those gains to consumers in both countries through lower prices rather than raising relative living standards.
  3. The author notes that Texans do not obsess over matching California's productivity growth despite that larger divergence, offering the comparison as reason to doubt that Europe's tech lag means lower European living standards.

Related Articles:

  • Concentrated Growth: The Role Of The IT Sector — Since 1988, total factor productivity in the information technology sector has risen about 178%, versus about 12% across all non-IT sectors combined, while aggregate productivity rose about 40%. The IT sector accounts for roughly 45% of cumulative aggregate productivity growth, once sectoral linkages to downstream industries are weighted in.
  • From IT to AI: What Explains US Productivity Outperformance? — Larger information-technology quality adjustments and hours-worked measurement distortions explain about 30% of the average annual US-Euro area total factor productivity growth gap since 1995, leaving an adjusted gap near 0.25pp. The authors estimate greater US intangible investment spillovers contribute about 0.1pp, more efficient resource allocation about 0.1pp, and better management and larger firms about 0.05pp.
  • The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.

AI Summary. Manufacturing competitiveness is argued to stem largely from lower labor costs relative to productivity, so policies that raise the household share of income weaken competitiveness while countries that suppress wages gain at trade partners' expense. The author argues Europe must therefore intervene in its external accounts to offset foreign trade intervention rather than cut wages and welfare.

Michael Pettis Financial Times
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Pettis argues that unless the EU is “willing to dismantle its welfare system and force down wages relative to productivity to restore competitiveness,” it must either accept deindustrialisation, tariffs, or depreciation of the Euro.

Should countries intervene in trade to offset wage suppression abroad?

Core argument: Manufacturing competitiveness is a product not so much of greater efficiency as of lower labour costs relative to productivity, so policies that raise the household income share of total production undermine manufacturing competitiveness.

We live in a world in which manufacturing competitiveness is a product not so much of greater efficiency but of lower labour costs (relative to productivity). So policies that boost demand by increasing the household income share of total production also undermine manufacturing competitiveness. The result is an example of what the Polish economist Michał Kalecki described decades ago: a paradox in which a player becomes more competitive and grows faster by suppressing wages even as the overall system suffers from such a strategy. It “wins” by retaining the benefits while exporting the costs to its trade partners. That is why unless Europe is willing to dismantle its welfare system and force down wages relative to productivity — which would be bad for global growth — it has no choice but to intervene in its external accounts. The purpose of such intervention is not protectionism, but rather to reverse the consequences of trade intervention abroad.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Manufacturing competitiveness is a product not so much of greater efficiency as of lower labour costs relative to productivity, so policies that raise the household income share of total production undermine manufacturing competitiveness.
  2. Michał Kalecki described a paradox in which a player becomes more competitive and grows faster by suppressing wages even as the overall system suffers, retaining the benefits while exporting the costs to its trade partners.
  3. Unless Europe dismantles its welfare system and forces wages down relative to productivity, which would be bad for global growth, it has no choice but to intervene in its external accounts to reverse the consequences of trade intervention abroad.

Related Articles:

  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
  • China’s “Anti-Involution” Campaign: Global Implications — China's economy has slowed as domestic investment stagnates and consumer spending stays weak, with the shortfall partly offset by rising net exports. The author argues these internal problems are being passed to the rest of the world, since export values are rising about 6% a year while import values are down 2.2%.
  • How to Fix Free Trade — The article proposes a new global customs union open to countries that agree to keep their current account balances with the union within a narrow band, with variable tariffs or capital-flow taxes applied to nonmembers. It argues gains from trade are largest when trade flows are reciprocal and sustainable.

AI Summary. German exports to China have fallen by a quarter since 2019 while imports rose, and German government figures put the country's goods and services trade deficit with China on track for a record €88bn (about $102bn). German manufacturing output is down 14% from its 2017 peak, with industrial employment down almost 5% since 2019 and auto jobs down about 13%.

Tom Fairless and Bertrand Benoit Wall Street Journal
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German imports from China have risen to ~3.7% of GDP, up from ~3% in Q4 2019. Over that same period, exports to China fell from ~2.7% of GDP to ~1.9%. German manufacturing output is down 14% from its 2017 peak.

Is Germany's trade relationship with China shrinking its manufacturing sector?

Core argument: Germany's trade deficit in goods and services with China is on track to reach a record 88 billion euros (around $102 billion), according to German government figures, as total German exports to China have fallen by a quarter since 2019 while imports rocketed.

Total German exports to China have fallen by a quarter since 2019 while imports rocketed. Germany’s trade deficit in goods and services with China is on track to reach a record 88 billion euros this year, equivalent to around $102 billion, according to German government figures. This has left deep scars. Germany’s manufacturing output has fallen 14% since peaking in 2017. The industrial sector has shed almost 5% of its jobs since 2019, according to consulting firm Ernst & Young. The auto sector has lost about 13% of positions over the same period.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Germany's trade deficit in goods and services with China is on track to reach a record 88 billion euros (around $102 billion), according to German government figures, as total German exports to China have fallen by a quarter since 2019 while imports rocketed.
  2. German manufacturing output has fallen 14% since peaking in 2017.
  3. Germany's industrial sector has shed almost 5% of its jobs since 2019, with the auto sector losing about 13% of positions over the same period, according to consulting firm Ernst & Young.

Related Articles:

  • China Forces Reckoning in Europe as Trade Turns Existential — China's trade balance with Germany, Europe's largest economy, has flipped from a $25bn deficit to a $23bn surplus, driven by a collapse in imports. European leaders describe the imbalance as an existential threat to European industry and say the bloc's relationship with China has reached an inflection point.
  • Europe’s Green Energy Rush Slashed Emissions—and Crippled the Economy — Europe has cut carbon emissions 30% from 2005 levels versus 17% in the US, while the shift to renewables has helped push electricity prices higher across much of the continent. Average electricity prices for heavy industry in the European Union are roughly 2x those in the US and 50% above China.
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.

AI Summary. Ukraine's Security Service says it used underwater drones alongside the Ukrainian Navy to strike a Russian Kilo-class submarine, vessels valued at about $400mn, and estimates sanctions and limited access to high-tech components could push replacement costs to $500mn.

Christopher Miller and Anastasia Stognei Financial Times
Date Posted:

Ukraine hit a Russian Kilo-class submarine with an undersea drone in port in Novorossiysk. Ukrainian intelligence claimed the submarine was “put out of action” as a result of the attack, a claim backed by non-official Russian sources.

Can underwater drones destroy submarines that cost hundreds of millions to replace?

Core argument: An SBU official told the Financial Times that the Security Service of Ukraine, with the Ukrainian Navy, used underwater drones to strike a Russian Kilo-class submarine, the 636.3 Varshavyanka; such submarines are valued at about $400mn.

A Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) official told the Financial Times that the agency had deployed underwater drones together with the Ukrainian Navy to hit the Russian Kilo-class submarine known as the 636.3 Varshavyanka. Kilo-class submarines are valued at about $400mn. Due to international sanctions and restricted access to high-tech components, the SBU estimated the cost of building a replacement could now reach $500mn. The port of Novorossiysk has taken on greater strategic importance for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet after a series of Ukrainian attacks with naval drones and missiles, including on Sevastopol in Russian-occupied Crimea, forced several vessels to relocate to Russian ports. Russian authorities did not immediately comment on the attack.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. An SBU official told the Financial Times that the Security Service of Ukraine, with the Ukrainian Navy, used underwater drones to strike a Russian Kilo-class submarine, the 636.3 Varshavyanka; such submarines are valued at about $400mn.
  2. The SBU estimated that international sanctions and restricted access to high-tech components could push the cost of building a replacement submarine to $500mn.
  3. Novorossiysk has gained strategic importance for Russia's Black Sea Fleet after Ukrainian naval drone and missile attacks, including on Sevastopol in Russian-occupied Crimea, forced several vessels to relocate to Russian ports.

Related Articles:

  • ‘We Do Fail … a Lot’: Defense Startup Anduril Hits Setbacks With Weapons Tech — Defense startup Anduril has hit setbacks across several weapons programs, including engine damage to its unmanned Fury jet fighter in a ground test, a 22-acre fire caused by a counterdrone system test, and software that struggled to command unmanned boats. Former employees report its systems in Ukraine proved vulnerable to jamming.
  • The New Frontier for Drone Warfare Is Deep Underwater — New underwater drones can dive thousands of feet and operate for days with little human intervention, which advocates say suits them to intelligence gathering, protecting undersea infrastructure, and countering threats in the Pacific. Boeing is delivering five 85-foot Orca vehicles to the US Navy, and Australia is developing Ghost Shark with Anduril.
  • Why Every Country Needs To Master The Electric Tech Stack — Drones are the foundation of hard power in the early 21st century, so a country unable to produce them domestically is at a disadvantage. As electric motors overtake combustion engines as the core technology that makes machines move, the same supply chains and production processes used for electronics can also produce cars, drones, robots, and appliances.

Wednesday, December 17, 2025

AI Summary. Modern economies apart from Japan almost never experience outright deflation: Greece's slump with 28% unemployment brought only a few percent decline in prices, and the 2007-2009 U.S. recession slowed inflation without reversing it. Policymakers who promise to lower the overall price level cannot deliver and will face political backlash.

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
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Noting that even in post-crisis Greece, when unemployment hit 28%, the CPI fell by only a few percentage points, Krugman warns that “policymakers shouldn’t promise to bring the overall level of prices down; they won’t be able to deliver.”

Can policymakers deliver on promises to lower the overall price level?

Core argument: Greece's early-2010s slump pushed unemployment to 28% while prices fell only a few percent, illustrating that even depression-level downturns produce little deflation in modern economies.

With the unique and complicated exception of Japan, modern economies almost never experience deflation — overall falling prices. We may sometimes see price declines for commodities like eggs and falling prices for goods like computer equipment experiencing rapid technological progress. But the broad basket of consumer goods considered in the Consumer Price Index and similar measures doesn’t fall unless the economy is deeply depressed, and even then doesn’t fall by much. To see what I mean, consider the example of Greece, which experienced a Great Depression-level slump in the early 2010s. Unemployment rose to 28%, and prices did fall a bit — but only by a few percent: In the U.S., the Great Recession of 2007-2009, the worst slump since the Great Depression, led to slower inflation — prices rising more slowly than before. But it didn’t cause deflation. So would-be policymakers shouldn’t promise to bring the overall level of prices down. They won’t be able to deliver and will face a political backlash.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Greece's early-2010s slump pushed unemployment to 28% while prices fell only a few percent, illustrating that even depression-level downturns produce little deflation in modern economies.
  2. The 2007–2009 Great Recession, the worst U.S. slump since the Great Depression, slowed inflation but did not cause deflation in the overall price level.
  3. Price declines in modern economies are generally confined to commodities like eggs and technologically advancing goods like computer equipment rather than the broad Consumer Price Index basket, with Japan a unique and complicated exception.

Related Articles:

  • Affordability, Part I — Conventional data show wages have outpaced inflation for most workers, contradicting the narrative that prices have outrun incomes; the Consumer Price Index used to calculate real wages excludes borrowing costs. Many Americans rely on credit for homes and cars, and the ability of young Americans to buy first homes has deteriorated substantially.
  • The Cost of Money is Part of the Cost of Living: New Evidence on the Consumer Sentiment Anomaly — Variation in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index that inflation and unemployment cannot explain is strongly correlated with growth in consumer borrowing costs, such as mortgage and car loan rates. The authors estimate that including interest payments and homeownership costs in the consumer price index would raise measured inflation from 3% to 9%.
  • The Middle Class Is Buckling Under Almost Five Years of Persistent Inflation — US prices for goods and services are 25% above 2020 levels, and 44% of middle-income respondents in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment survey said their finances were worse than a year earlier versus 23% who said better, with most citing higher prices. Retailers report middle-income customers pulling back on discretionary spending.

AI Summary. The recent jobs trajectory sits in the upper tail of historical month-to-month variation and closer to the range typically seen around past recessions, based on a comparison with paths beginning at the onset of prior recessions.

Ben Glasner Agglomerations
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Btw September and November, the share of workers working part-time for economic reasons increased by ~20%. Ben Glasner argues this is an ill wind for the economy, as moves of this size are typically associated with rapid cooling of the labor market.

Does the recent jobs path resemble trajectories seen around past recessions?

Core argument: The path indexed to April 2025 ("Liberation Day") has risen into the upper tail of historical month-to-month variation, moving closer to the range typically observed around past recessions.

In the figure, the recent increase pushes the current path into the upper tail of historical variation and closer to the range typically observed around past recessions. The thin grey lines show trajectories that begin at the onset of past recessions. The shaded bands summarize the distribution of all historical month-to-month paths at each relative month, with the middle band capturing the 20th–80th percentile and the outer bands capturing the 5th–20th and 80th–95th percentiles. The highlighted line uses April 2025 (“Liberation Day”) as the base month for comparison.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The path indexed to April 2025 ("Liberation Day") has risen into the upper tail of historical month-to-month variation, moving closer to the range typically observed around past recessions.
  2. The chart's shaded bands summarize the distribution of all historical month-to-month paths at each relative month, with the middle band spanning the 20th–80th percentile and the outer bands the 5th–20th and 80th–95th percentiles.
  3. Thin grey lines in the figure trace trajectories that begin at the onset of past recessions.

Related Articles:

  • Jobless Growth — Labor demand growth may be too weak to keep pace with even modest labor supply growth: the labor market is somewhat weaker than before the pandemic, job growth has turned negative outside healthcare, and firms are focused on using AI to cut labor costs. Economists estimate most employment losses in routine manual occupations since the 1970s occurred during recessions.
  • OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2025 Issue 2: Resilient Growth but with Increasing Fragilities — U.S. real GDP grew at a 1.1% annualized rate over the first half of 2025, but excluding booming AI-related investment output contracted 0.1%, with non-AI investment weakening. The OECD identifies a correction in equity markets lifted by expectations of high AI returns as a key downside risk to its projections.
  • Millions of Workers Are Left Out of the ‘Low-Hire, Low-Fire’ US Job Market — Economists expect anemic payroll growth with unemployment holding at 4.3%, a relatively low rate that masks workers stuck in unwanted jobs or underemployed. Goldman Sachs economists say labor market churn—the flow into and out of jobs—has fallen well below pre-Covid levels, and unemployment among 16-to-24-year-olds reached 10.5%.

AI Summary. White men's share of positions across US culture and technology industries declined markedly over roughly a decade: from 48% to 11.9% of lower-level TV writers, 39% to 18% of Harvard humanities tenure-track posts, nearly half to under a third of Google's workforce, and 55.8% to 33.8% of mid-level Amazon managers.

Jacob Savage Compact Magazine
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Jacob Savage argues that the widespread discrimination against young white men in “high-status” sectors such as media and tech during the 2010s is a key driver of contemporary political dynamics among young men.

How much has white men's share of culture and tech jobs fallen?

Core argument: White men fell from 48% of lower-level TV writers in 2011 to 11.9% in 2024, and from 39% of Harvard humanities tenure-track positions in 2014 to 18% in 2023.

In 2011, the year I moved to Los Angeles, white men were 48% of lower-level TV writers; by 2024, they accounted for just 11.9%. The Atlantic’s editorial staff went from 53% male and 89% white in 2013 to 36% male and 66% white in 2024. White men fell from 39% of tenure-track positions in the humanities at Harvard in 2014 to 18% in 2023. The white men shut out of the culture industries didn’t surge into other high-status fields. At Google, white men went from nearly half the workforce in 2014 to less than a third by 2024—a 34% decline. In 2014, at Amazon, entry-level “professionals”—college graduates just starting out—were 42.3% white male. These were the employees who, if they’d advanced normally over the next decade, would be the mid-level managers of today. But mid-level Amazon managers fell from 55.8% white male in 2014 to just 33.8% in 2024—a decline of nearly 40%. In retrospect, 2014 was the hinge, the year DEI became institutionalized across American life.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. White men fell from 48% of lower-level TV writers in 2011 to 11.9% in 2024, and from 39% of Harvard humanities tenure-track positions in 2014 to 18% in 2023.
  2. Mid-level Amazon managers went from 55.8% white male in 2014 to 33.8% in 2024, a decline of nearly 40%, while entry-level Amazon professionals were 42.3% white male in 2014.
  3. At Google, white men fell from nearly half the workforce in 2014 to under a third by 2024, a 34% decline, part of the author's case that 2014 was the hinge year when DEI became institutionalized.

Related Articles:

  • Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
  • Military Officer Quality in the All-Volunteer Force — The authors find a steady decline in U.S. Marine Corps officers' General Classification Test scores, which is statistically associated with the expansion of college attendance and explains 96% of the measured change. They also find a positive association between African American officers and mean test scores, arguing affirmative action has not lowered officer quality.
  • US PISA Results By Subpopulation — On the international PISA student assessments, American Asian and White students ranked at the top, American Hispanic students outscored Hispanic students elsewhere, and American Black students performed well. In reading, American Asian students placed first and American White students third.

AI Summary. Precious metals prices for gold, silver, platinum and palladium have rallied following Federal Reserve meetings, with silver's gains spilling over into platinum and palladium. The author argues the rally reflects retail investors chasing a price spike rather than emerging-market central bank gold buying, occurring while the dollar is stable against other major currencies.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:

Since Powell’s Jackson Hole speech, silver has risen ~70% and gold is almost back to its October high. The dollar has remained stable against G10 currencies, in a broad “debasement” of advanced economies’ currencies relative to precious metals.

Are retail investors, not central banks, driving the precious metals rally?

Core argument: The December 10 Federal Reserve meeting acted as a catalyst for precious metals prices to rise, echoing the move that followed Jackson Hole on August 22, according to the author's chart of gold, silver, platinum and palladium.

The chart shows precious metals prices for gold (black line), silver (red line), platinum (orange line) and palladium (pink line). It also shows a trade-weighted index for the Dollar against its G10 peers (blue line). A couple of points are worth noting: (i) the latest Fed meeting on December 10 has - once again - been a catalyst for precious metals to rise, just like Jackson Hole on Aug. 22; (ii) much like the gold rally in the run-up to the IMF/WB meetings, the silver rally now is spilling over into other stuff and pulling up things like platinum and palladium; (iii) the fact that this latest rally isn’t centered around gold should put to rest all the rumors that this is about EM central banks buying gold - the precious metals rally is about retail money chasing a price spike (like every other bubble in the past); and (iv) all this is happening while USD is stable against its G10 peers, so the story here isn’t about a loss of confidence in the Dollar but about a broader loss of confidence in fiat currencies.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The December 10 Federal Reserve meeting acted as a catalyst for precious metals prices to rise, echoing the move that followed Jackson Hole on August 22, according to the author's chart of gold, silver, platinum and palladium.
  2. The silver rally is spilling over into platinum and palladium rather than being centered on gold, which the author argues counters claims that emerging-market central bank gold buying drives the move and instead points to retail money chasing a price spike.
  3. The dollar has been stable against its G10 peers during the precious metals rally, which the author reads as a broader loss of confidence in fiat currencies rather than in the dollar specifically.

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AI Summary. The US life expectancy gap between people with and without a college degree widened from 2.6 years to 6.3 years over roughly three decades, while mortality inequality across counties rose 30%. Using county- and state-level data, the authors attribute a key role to smoking rates, with secondary roles for income, other health behaviors, and state policies.

Christopher Foote, Ellen Meara, Jonathan Skinner, and Luke Stewart National Bureau of Economic Research
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The college/non-college life expectancy gap widened from 2.6–6.3 years btw 1992 and 2019, while county mortality inequality jumped 30% to the detriment of rural areas. Smoking by state predicts ~300 extra deaths per 100k for non-college grads, 0 for grads.

What explains the widening life expectancy gap by education?

Core argument: The US life expectancy gap between adults with and without a college degree widened from 2.6 years in 1992 to 6.3 years in 2019, while mortality inequality across counties rose 30%, accompanied by an increasing rural health penalty.

The education-mortality gradient has increased sharply in the last three decades, with the life expectancy gap btw people with and without a college degree widening from 2.6 years in 1992 to 6.3 years in 2019. During the same period, mortality inequality across counties rose 30%, accompanied by an increasing rural health penalty. Using county- and state-level data from the 1992–2019 period, we demonstrate that these three trends arose due to a fundamental shift in the geographic patterns of mortality among college and non-college populations. First, we find a sharp decline in both mortality rates and geographic inequality for college graduates. Second, the reverse was true for people without a college degree; spatial inequality became amplified. Third, we find that rates of smoking play a key role in explaining all three empirical puzzles, with secondary roles attributed to income, other health behaviors, and state policies. [An objection is that] the non-college smoking rate declined by somewhat more than the college rate from 1992 to 2019. [The resolution is that] college populations gave up smoking decades before non-college populations did. [The key] college/non-college comparison [is] among 55–64 year-olds, the age group for which the smoking mortality penalty is greatest.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US life expectancy gap between adults with and without a college degree widened from 2.6 years in 1992 to 6.3 years in 2019, while mortality inequality across counties rose 30%, accompanied by an increasing rural health penalty.
  2. Using county- and state-level data for 1992–2019, the authors find mortality rates and geographic inequality fell sharply for college graduates, while spatial inequality in mortality became amplified among people without a college degree.
  3. The authors attribute a key role in all three mortality trends to smoking rates, with secondary roles for income, other health behaviors, and state policies, noting that college populations gave up smoking decades before non-college populations did.

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AI Summary. About 300mm of China's 1.4bn people smoke — nearly half of adult men versus under 2% of women — and they consume 40% of the world's tobacco. The World Health Organization reports Chinese tobacco consumption fell just 4% since 2000 versus 13% globally, with up to 2.6mm smoking-related early deaths a year, 23% of all deaths.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:

21% of Chinese smoke cigarettes, consuming 40% of the world’s tobacco annually. Just under half of Chinese men smoke relative to ~2% of women.

Why does smoking remain so widespread in China?

Core argument: China has roughly 300mm smokers out of a population of 1.4B, and they consume 40% of the world's tobacco.

In a population of 1.4B, some 300mm are smokers. Most are male: nearly half of adult Chinese men smoke compared with just under 2% of women. Together they get through 40% of the world’s tobacco. According to the WHO, Chinese consumption of it has declined by just 4% since 2000, compared with 13% globally. The habit exacts a heavy toll. Every year, as many as 2.6mm Chinese die early from smoking-related illnesses (roughly as many as inhabitants of Chicago). They account for 23% of all annual deaths; in America the comparable figure is 10%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China has roughly 300mm smokers out of a population of 1.4B, and they consume 40% of the world's tobacco.
  2. Nearly half of adult Chinese men smoke, compared with just under 2% of Chinese women.
  3. As many as 2.6mm Chinese die early each year from smoking-related illnesses, 23% of all annual deaths, versus 10% in America, while the WHO reports Chinese tobacco consumption has fallen just 4% since 2000 against 13% globally.

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  • East Asia’s Coming Population Collapse — United Nations projections show China's population falling 8%, Japan's 18%, South Korea's 12%, and Taiwan's 8% between 2020 and 2050, while the US population rises 12%. Working-age people per person over 65 are projected to drop to about 1.8 in China and 1.2 in Japan and South Korea.