Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Friday, November 28, 2025

AI Summary. China's share of US direct imports fell from a peak of about 22% in 2017 to roughly 16% in 2022, 13% in 2024, and about 9% by mid-2025 — matching its share when it joined the World Trade Organization. Vietnam, Mexico, and more recently Taiwan have been the main gainers.

Laura Alfaro and Davin Chor National Bureau of Economic Research
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China’s share of direct US imports fell from a peak of ~22% in 2017 to ~13% in 2024. Between Liberation Day and July 2025, China’s share fell another 4pp, returning to ~9%, its level at the time of China’s accession to the WTO.

How far has China's share of US imports fallen?

Core argument: China's share of US direct imports fell from 21% in 2017 to 16% in 2022 and roughly 13% by 2024, then dropped another 4pp to about 9% by July 2025.

Since 2017, China has experienced a large and persistent decline in its share of the US import market. The main gainers have been Vietnam, Mexico, and (more recently) Taiwan. It is well-documented that China’s share in US direct imports fell from around 21% in 2017 to 16% in 2022. Figure 3 reveals a further drop in the US import market share held by China to around 13% by 2024. The decoupling that started under the first Trump administration thus extended through to the end of the Biden presidency, rather than undergoing any reversal. Figure 3 further hints at how these large shifts in the sources of US imports have persisted post-Liberation Day. By July 2025, China’s share in US direct imports had fallen by another 4pp relative to 2024, declining from 13% to roughly 9%. To put this in perspective, China’s share in total US imports stood at approximately 9% in 2001, in its accession year to the WTO. This climbed steadily over the next 16 years, peaking at 22% in 2017. The drop back to a 9% import share by mid-2025 thus represents a remarkable unwinding, in just half the time it took this share to reach its pre-trade war peak.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's share of US direct imports fell from 21% in 2017 to 16% in 2022 and roughly 13% by 2024, then dropped another 4pp to about 9% by July 2025.
  2. China's roughly 9% US import share by mid-2025 matches its share in 2001, its WTO accession year, unwinding a climb to a 22% peak in 2017 in half the time that climb took.
  3. Vietnam, Mexico, and more recently Taiwan have been the main gainers as China's share of the US import market declined since 2017.

Related Articles:

  • The Fracturing Of The World Economy — The US would gain relative to China from a fracturing world economy because its bloc of allies includes nearly all advanced countries, accounting for 68% of world GDP at market prices versus 26% for China's bloc. China's structural current account surplus also leaves it reliant on the US and its allies as safe places to invest those funds.
  • Mexico Is Not Just the Top Supplier to the U.S. Now It Is the Top Buyer — Mexico is now both the largest buyer of U.S. exports and the largest source of U.S. imports, with U.S. goods exports to Mexico at $226.4bn versus $225.6bn to Canada and imports from Mexico totaling $354.9bn. Mexico's growth, including its middle class, has increased demand for U.S. goods among its more than 130 million people.
  • China’s Massive Surplus Is Everywhere (Yet The IMF Still Has Trouble Seeing It Clearly) — China's manufactured goods surplus exceeds $2tn in its own customs data, about 10.5% of Chinese GDP and over 2% of world GDP, far exceeding the combined peak surpluses of Germany and Japan. The author argues the International Monetary Fund understates this by relying solely on reported current account balances, which have not similarly jumped.

AI Summary. China spent $781bn on research and development in 2023 versus $823bn in the US, according to the OECD, up from $136bn against $462bn in 2007. Chinese corporate research institutions have nearly tripled to more than 150,000 and China produces roughly 50,000 science and engineering PhDs annually versus about 34,000 in the US.

Edward White Financial Times
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Chinese total R&D spending adjusted for PPP was almost on par with the US’s in 2023.

Is China closing the gap with the US in research spending?

Core argument: China spent $781bn on R&D in 2023 versus $823bn for the US, according to the OECD, a shift from 2007 when China's $136bn was less than one-third of US spending of $462bn.

[China] is close to overtaking the US in total expenditure on R&D, with China spending $781bn and the US $823bn in 2023, according to the OECD. It is a stark change from 2007 when China’s R&D spending of $136bn was less than one-third of the $462bn spent by the US. The potential inflection point follows years of debate in the west over the wisdom of China’s state-led development model, with evidence of vast sums of state finances wasted through subsidies and corruption, and criticism over the quality of Chinese academic research and patents. According to some experts, it is not just the scale of China’s R&D budget, but a shift in the nature of that spending that warrants scrutiny. While government R&D spending in China has exceeded that of the US since 2015, Chinese companies have also rapidly increased their R&D efforts over the past decade, national statistics bureau data shows. The number of corporate R&D institutions has also nearly tripled to more than 150,000. And the number of corporate R&D personnel nearly doubled to 5mn. China is also producing around 50,000 PhD graduates in science, technology, engineering and mathematics fields annually, compared to about 34,000 from US universities.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China spent $781bn on R&D in 2023 versus $823bn for the US, according to the OECD, a shift from 2007 when China's $136bn was less than one-third of US spending of $462bn.
  2. Chinese corporate R&D institutions nearly tripled to more than 150,000 and corporate R&D personnel nearly doubled to 5mn, according to national statistics bureau data, while Chinese government R&D spending has exceeded that of the US since 2015.
  3. China produces around 50,000 STEM PhD graduates annually compared with about 34,000 from US universities, while critics of its state-led model cite state funds wasted through subsidies and corruption and question the quality of Chinese academic research and patents.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Role in Global Innovation Is Changing — Royalty receipts from intellectual property equal 0.07% of China's GDP versus 0.45% of South Korea's, but China's royalty-to-GDP ratio has grown considerably faster than that of advanced economies in recent years, narrowing the gap.
  • China’s AI University Beats Out Harvard, MIT in Race For Patents — China's Tsinghua University collected 4,986 artificial intelligence and machine learning patents from 2005 through 2024, receiving more patents annually than MIT, Stanford, Princeton and Harvard combined, and China accounts for more than half of all active patent families in those fields. US institutions still hold the most influential AI patents and produced more notable AI models, 40 to China's 15.
  • Paper Tiger? Chinese Science and Home Bias in Citations — Researchers disproportionately cite work from their own country, and measured against a benchmark that distributes world citations by the size of citing and cited countries, every country studied shows some home bias. The authors estimate China is a clear outlier at 42.3%, followed by Iran and India at 23.2% each and the US at 15.9%.

AI Summary. Long-term yields are rising as markets demand higher risk premia on fears that governments will inflate away unsustainably high debt. The 10-year Treasury yield understates this because it is pulled down by expectations of Federal Reserve rate cuts, while the 10-year yield 10 years forward has stayed high even as the 2-year yield has fallen.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
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As the 2-year Treasury yield has fallen, the 10y10y forward yield has “remained stubbornly high. Markets are demanding higher risk premia for longer-term Treasuries,” Brooks infers.

Are markets demanding higher risk premia on fears of debt inflation?

Core argument: Long-term yields are rising across markets as investors demand higher risk premia, reflecting fears that governments will try to inflate away unsustainably high debt levels.

Markets are increasingly fearful that governments will try to inflate away unsustainably high debt levels. This is why long-term yields are rising all over the place, as markets start demanding higher risk premia. As far as longer-term yields go, you don’t want to look at the 10-year Treasury yield, because that’s getting pulled down by increasingly dovish expectations for the Fed. You can take that effect out by looking at the 10y10y forward yield, which is shown in the chart in the red line. That yield has remained stubbornly high even as the 2-year yield has fallen. No matter how you cut it, markets are demanding higher risk premia for longer-term Treasuries.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Long-term yields are rising across markets as investors demand higher risk premia, reflecting fears that governments will try to inflate away unsustainably high debt levels.
  2. The 10-year Treasury yield is pulled down by increasingly dovish expectations for the Fed, so the 10y10y forward yield removes that effect.
  3. The 10y10y forward yield has remained stubbornly high even as the 2-year yield has fallen, with markets demanding higher risk premia for longer-term Treasuries.

Related Articles:

  • Buy America — Despite multi-trillion deficits, investors show no sign of concern about US government debt, and the Treasury has supported demand by shifting issuance toward maturities with the strongest buyer interest. Short-term bills now make up 22% of marketable Treasuries, absorbed largely by money market funds whose assets have grown to $7tn.
  • Investors Now See Some Corporate Bonds as Safer Bets Than Government Debt — Average net debt relative to earnings for about 2,500 companies in the MSCI ACWI global stock index improved to 1.74x in the first half of this year from 2.53x a decade earlier, indicating stronger corporate balance sheets. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund projects government debt across major economies will rise annually through 2030 to about 137% of GDP.
  • Data Update 4 for 2025: Interest Rates, Inflation and Central Banks! — Interest rates are ultimately driven by macroeconomic fundamentals, with an "intrinsic risk-free rate" defined as the sum of the inflation rate and real GDP growth tracking the observed 10-year Treasury bond yield closely. On this view, central banks' influence comes from preferential access to data on those fundamentals, their capacity to alter them, and their credibility.

AI Summary. Research using card-transaction, wealth and attitude data finds that reduced work effort, higher leisure spending and investment in risky assets including crypto are disproportionately common among young adults with little realistic prospect of affording a home, while those closer to home ownership work harder and take fewer risks. The authors argue the link is causal.

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
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Citing Lee/Yoo’s recent research John Burn-Murdoch argues young Americans’ recent upticks in “financial risk-taking, leisure spending and reduction in work effort” are responses to perceived changing economic incentives.

Does unaffordable housing push young adults toward risky bets and less work?

Core argument: Economists Seung Hyeong Lee and Younggeun Yoo find that reduced work effort, higher leisure spending and investment in risky assets including crypto are disproportionately common among young adults with little realistic prospect of affording a house.

Economists at the University of Chicago and Northwestern University used detailed data on the card transactions, wealth and attitudes of Americans to demonstrate that reduced work effort, increased leisure spending and investment in risky financial assets (including crypto) are all disproportionately common among young adults who face little to no realistic prospect of being able to afford a house. By contrast, Seung Hyeong Lee and Younggeun Yoo’s research finds that those for whom home ownership is a more realistic possibility in the medium term, or who have already attained it, take fewer risks and strive harder at work. Lee and Yoo use time series data and local house prices to show that the link between unaffordable housing and economic behaviour appears to be causal. Recent upticks in financial risk-taking, leisure spending and reduction in work effort respond to changing economic incentives. As housing affordability deteriorates, those who come to believe they are locked out of home ownership resort to a mixture of high-risk bets and what US economic commentator Kyla Scanlon calls “financial nihilism” — why strive and save when it won’t be enough to make it anyway? — while their better-placed counterparts tighten their belts.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Economists Seung Hyeong Lee and Younggeun Yoo find that reduced work effort, higher leisure spending and investment in risky assets including crypto are disproportionately common among young adults with little realistic prospect of affording a house.
  2. Lee and Yoo, economists at the University of Chicago and Northwestern University, find that those for whom home ownership is realistic in the medium term, or who already own, take fewer risks and strive harder at work.
  3. Using time series data and local house prices, Lee and Yoo argue the link between unaffordable housing and economic behaviour appears causal, with risk-taking, leisure spending and reduced work effort responding to changing economic incentives.

Related Articles:

  • “Giving Up”: The Impact of Decreasing Housing Affordability on Consumption, Work Effort, and Investment — Survey data show that among renters with net worth below $300,000, 4–6% say always giving their best effort at work is "not important," roughly twice the 2–3% rate among homeowners at all net worth levels; renters with net worth above $300,000 resemble homeowners. The authors argue that abandoning the aspiration of homeownership may reduce the value of additional work effort.
  • US Median First-Time Homebuyer Age Now At Record-High of 40 — The median age of first-time homebuyers in the US has reached a record 40, up from 33 in 2021 and 29 when the National Association of Realtors survey began in 1981. High home prices and mortgage rates are delaying homeownership for millions of Americans.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.

AI Summary. The U.S. Navy plans to cancel orders for four new warships after extensive government design changes delayed construction by years. Of 20 frigates recently built or nearing completion across 10 countries, all but one were or will be built faster than the USS Constellation, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis.

Drew FitzGerald and Lara Seligman Wall Street Journal
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The Navy is canceling the Constellation-class frigate program. The first ship in the class was supposed to launch next year but has been pushed back to 2029.

Do government design changes slow U.S. warship construction?

Core argument: The U.S. Navy plans to cancel orders for four new warships after the government's extensive design modifications set back construction by years.

The U.S. Navy plans to cancel orders for four new warships after the government’s extensive design modifications set back construction by years. Warships built in U.S. shipyards take longer and cost more to build than in other industrialized nations. Of 20 different frigates made recently or set for completion soon in 10 different countries, all but one were or will be built in less time than the USS Constellation, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. Navy plans to cancel orders for four new warships after the government's extensive design modifications set back construction by years.
  2. Of 20 frigates recently built or set for completion soon across 10 countries, all but one were or will be built in less time than the USS Constellation, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis.
  3. Warships built in U.S. shipyards take longer and cost more to build than those in other industrialized nations.

Related Articles:

  • How South Korea’s Shipyards Could Save the US Navy — US shipyards had just five commercial ships under construction compared with 1,749 in China, and China's naval fleet is projected to grow from 370 to 475 vessels in a decade versus 297 to between 305 and 317 for the US Navy, whose major shipbuilding programs are behind schedule.
  • Ship Wars — Shipyards tied to China's defense industrial base account for 15% of the country's active shipyards but 40% of commercial output by tonnage, with over 75% of their production built for firms outside China and Hong Kong. The authors argue these commercial revenues offset fixed costs and effectively subsidize China's naval expansion.
  • China’s Shipyards Are Ready for a Protracted War. America’s Aren’t — China produced more than half of the world's commercial shipbuilding output, while Europe accounts for about 5% and the US next to nothing, with most of the remainder built in South Korea and Japan. Analysts argue that in a protracted conflict China's wartime-scale yards could quickly accelerate production, replace lost ships, and repair damaged ones.

Monday, December 1, 2025

AI Summary. Declines in U.S. college enrollment are concentrated in community colleges, with four-year institutions maintaining stable enrollments and over one-third of the apparent community college drop stemming from administrative reclassification. The authors estimate that stronger labor markets explain 60% of the community college enrollment decline over 2009-19.

Joshua Goodman and Joseph Winkelmann National Bureau of Economic Research
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First-time undergraduate enrollment in public 4-year colleges has ~ doubled since 1990. In public 2-year and for-profit institutions, enrollment has ~ halved. Stronger labor markets explain 60% of the drop in enrollment in two-year colleges.

Do stronger labor markets explain falling community college enrollment?

Core argument: Strengthening labor markets explain 60% of the decline in U.S. community college enrollment from 2009–19 and nearly 50% of the decline through 2023, according to the authors.

We demonstrate that widely discussed declines in U.S. college enrollment reflect patterns concentrated in community colleges rather than a broad crisis in higher education. We show that: four-year institutions have maintained stable enrollments; over one-third of apparent community college declines stem from administrative reclassification; community college enrollments are strongly countercyclical; strengthening labor markets explain 60% of the community college enrollment decline from 2009-19 (and nearly 50% of the decline through 2023); and students on the margin between community college enrollment and employment appear unlikely to complete a degree. Figure 3 overlays six decades of first-time enrollment data with gray bars indicating years when the national unemployment rate was increasing. Of the last six such recessionary periods, all but the most recent pandemic-related rise in unemployment show local maxima in community college enrollments. Unemployment rates seem less clearly related to enrollments in public four-year colleges over this time period, or to enrollment in private four-year and for-profit colleges during the last three decades.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Strengthening labor markets explain 60% of the decline in U.S. community college enrollment from 2009–19 and nearly 50% of the decline through 2023, according to the authors.
  2. Over one-third of the apparent community college enrollment decline stems from administrative reclassification, while four-year institutions have maintained stable enrollments.
  3. Of the last six periods of rising national unemployment, all but the pandemic-related rise coincide with local maxima in community college first-time enrollment, with less clear relationships for public four-year, private four-year, and for-profit colleges.

Related Articles:

  • The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Labor Market — Labor market tightness produced an unexpected compression in the US wage distribution, with disproportionate wage growth at the bottom reducing the college wage premium and reversing nearly 40% of the rise in 90-10 wage inequality since 1980. The authors attribute this in part to increased competition for low-wage workers.
  • Are Young College Graduates Losing Their Edge in the Job Market? — Among unemployed workers aged 22–27, the rate of exiting unemployment for college graduates trended upward from 1976 to 2000 and then declined sharply, while the rate for high school graduates was stable until 2008 and now sits near its long-run average. The gap between the two groups narrowed after 2000 and closed entirely around 2019.
  • Military Officer Quality in the All-Volunteer Force — The authors find a steady decline in U.S. Marine Corps officers' General Classification Test scores, which is statistically associated with the expansion of college attendance and explains 96% of the measured change. They also find a positive association between African American officers and mean test scores, arguing affirmative action has not lowered officer quality.

AI Summary. Conventional data show wages have outpaced inflation for most workers, contradicting the narrative that prices have outrun incomes; the Consumer Price Index used to calculate real wages excludes borrowing costs. Many Americans rely on credit for homes and cars, and the ability of young Americans to buy first homes has deteriorated substantially.

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
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Real wages are up 4% relative to just before the pandemic, but Krugman flags three reasons why many Americans are worse off than it appears: high interest rates on consumer credit, lower job-finding rates, and the high prices of starter homes.

Do standard inflation measures understate rising costs by omitting borrowing costs?

Core argument: Conventional economic data, setting aside pandemic years distorted by composition effects, show that most workers were not impoverished by inflation, contradicting the narrative that an affordability crisis stems from prices outpacing incomes.

I’ve grayed out the pandemic years, during which wage data were distorted by composition effects. Looking through that confusing period, the conventional economic data show that most workers were not impoverished by inflation. So the common narrative that we have an affordability crisis because prices have outpaced incomes just isn’t right. There’s a case to be made that both economists and their conventional economic measures and the public are right because conventional statistics don’t convey the reality that the economy is worse than it looks for many workers. Let me emphasize two points in particular. First, the Consumer Price Index, which economists use to calculate the real wage, doesn’t include borrowing costs. This is despite the fact that many Americans must rely on credit to make important purchases — houses, of course, but also consumer durables, especially cars. And interest rates have risen sharply since 2022. Borrowing costs are up. Jobs are hard to find. And one crucial aspect of affordability, the ability of young Americans to buy their first houses, has deteriorated substantially.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Conventional economic data, setting aside pandemic years distorted by composition effects, show that most workers were not impoverished by inflation, contradicting the narrative that an affordability crisis stems from prices outpacing incomes.
  2. The Consumer Price Index used to calculate real wages excludes borrowing costs, even though many Americans rely on credit for houses and consumer durables such as cars, and interest rates have risen sharply since 2022.
  3. The ability of young Americans to buy their first houses has deteriorated substantially, alongside higher borrowing costs and jobs that are hard to find.

Related Articles:

  • The Middle Class Is Buckling Under Almost Five Years of Persistent Inflation — US prices for goods and services are 25% above 2020 levels, and 44% of middle-income respondents in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment survey said their finances were worse than a year earlier versus 23% who said better, with most citing higher prices. Retailers report middle-income customers pulling back on discretionary spending.
  • The Cost of Money is Part of the Cost of Living: New Evidence on the Consumer Sentiment Anomaly — Variation in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index that inflation and unemployment cannot explain is strongly correlated with growth in consumer borrowing costs, such as mortgage and car loan rates. The authors estimate that including interest payments and homeownership costs in the consumer price index would raise measured inflation from 3% to 9%.
  • Income in the United States: 2024 — U.S. median household income was $83,730, not statistically different from the prior year's $82,690, according to Census Bureau estimates. Across most demographic subgroups, median household income was higher or not statistically different from the prior year, with the exception of Black households, which saw a decline.

AI Summary. Consumption-based poverty in the U.S. fell 10.6 percentage points (81%) since 1980 and income poverty measured by an anchored Supplemental Poverty Measure fell 6.9 points (53%), while the Official Poverty Measure fell less than 2 points, suggesting the official measure understates long-run progress. The authors attribute part of the divergence to worsening underreporting of income.

Melissa Kearney and James Sullivan Aspen Economic Strategy Group
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While the “income poverty” rate using the OPM is 11.1%, the rate of “consumption poverty” fell from 13% of Americans in 1980 to 2.4% in 2023. An improved measure of the income poverty rate fell by less (6.9pp), perhaps due to underreporting of income.

Does the official poverty measure understate long-run progress against poverty?

Core argument: Consumption poverty in the United States fell 10.6 percentage points (81%) since 1980, dropping from 13% in 1980 by construction to 9% in 2000 and 2.4% in 2010.

Consumption poverty fell substantially between 1980 and 2023, falling from 13% in 1980 (by construction) to 9% in 2000 and to 2.4% in 2010. In contrast, the official rate fell by less than 2 percentage points between 1980 and 2023, erroneously suggesting that long-run progress has been minimal. The narrative about poverty trends told by the anchored Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) and the consumption measure is very different than the misleading narrative suggested by the Official Poverty Measure (OPM). Since 1980, income poverty measured using the anchored SPM has fallen by 6.9 percentage points (53%) and consumption poverty has fallen by 10.6 percentage points (81%). A leading explanation for why consumption and income poverty diverged so noticeably after the early years of the first decade of the 2000s is that the underreporting of income seems to have gotten appreciably worse. If one were to account for this underreporting, the decline in income poverty would likely be even greater.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Consumption poverty in the United States fell 10.6 percentage points (81%) since 1980, dropping from 13% in 1980 by construction to 9% in 2000 and 2.4% in 2010.
  2. The Official Poverty Measure fell by less than 2 percentage points between 1980 and 2023, erroneously suggesting minimal long-run progress, while the anchored Supplemental Poverty Measure shows income poverty down 6.9 percentage points (53%).
  3. A leading explanation for the divergence between consumption and income poverty after the early 2000s is that underreporting of income appears to have worsened appreciably; accounting for it would likely show an even greater decline in income poverty.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Nearly 22mm Americans with Affordable Care Act health insurance face sharply higher premiums if the enhanced tax credits expire. Subsidies were originally limited to households earning up to 400% of the federal poverty level — $128,600 for a family of four — before that cap was lifted, extending aid to more middle-class enrollees.

Guy Chazan Financial Times
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According to a KFF analysis, the average ACA marketplace enrollee will see their annual out-of-pocket premium rise to $1,904 in 2026 from $888 in 2025. ~22mm Americans are enrolled in healthcare coverage via the ACA.

Will premiums rise sharply if enhanced health insurance subsidies expire?

Core argument: Nearly 22 million Americans enrolled in Affordable Care Act health insurance will see premiums soar next year if their tax credits expire as expected on December 31.

[Nearly] 22mm Americans enrolled in health insurance under the Affordable Care Act will see their premiums soar next year if their tax credits expire as expected on December 31. Initially, only those earning up to 400% of the federal poverty level (FPL) — currently $128,600 a year for a family of four — qualified for the ACA tax credits. Joe Biden’s administration lifted that cap in 2021, and since then, the subsidies have been available to millions more middle-class Americans. In West Virginia, a historic number of people enrolled in health insurance as a result of the change. “Our ACA marketplace this year had about 67,000 enrollees, up from 23,000 in 2022,” said Rhonda Rogombé of the West Virginia Centre on Budget and Policy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly 22 million Americans enrolled in Affordable Care Act health insurance will see premiums soar next year if their tax credits expire as expected on December 31.
  2. ACA tax credits were initially limited to those earning up to 400% of the federal poverty level, currently $128,600 for a family of four, until the Biden administration lifted that cap in 2021, extending subsidies to millions more middle-class Americans.
  3. West Virginia's ACA marketplace had about 67,000 enrollees, up from 23,000 in 2022, according to Rhonda Rogombé of the West Virginia Centre on Budget and Policy.

Related Articles:

  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • Saved by Medicaid: New Evidence on Health Insurance and Mortality from the Universe of Low-Income Adults — Using linked Census and tax records for 37m low-income adults, the authors estimate that state Medicaid expansions raised enrollment by 12 percentage points and cut mortality among low-income adults by 2.5%, implying a 21% reduction in the mortality hazard of new enrollees. They estimate direct budgetary costs of $5.4m per life saved and $179,000 per life-year saved.
  • The Problematic Politics of Trump’s Bill: More Lower-Income Americans Are Voting GOP — The number of Republican-held seats among the one-third of U.S. House districts most reliant on Medicaid has more than doubled since 2009. Five of the 18 Republican-held districts rated competitive and 13 of the 22 competitive Democratic-held districts fall within that most Medicaid-dependent third.

AI Summary. Swiss voters rejected a proposed federal inheritance and gift tax of 50% on estates and transfers above SFr50mn, with revenue earmarked for climate-related spending, a break from Switzerland's tradition of decentralised, low-burden taxation. The French parliament separately rejected proposed wealth taxes of 2% on wealth above €100mn and 3% above €10mn.

Mercedes Ruehl and Josh Spero Financial Times
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Swiss voters overwhelmingly rejected a proposed 50% inheritance levy on estates above ~$62mm. 43% of voters turned out, with ~79% voting against the proposed tax.

Are European voters and legislators rejecting new taxes on large fortunes?

Core argument: Swiss voters rejected a Young Socialists proposal for a federal inheritance and gift tax of 50% on estates and transfers above SFr50mn (£47mn), with revenue earmarked for climate-related spending.

The proposal from the far-left Young Socialists party would have introduced a federal inheritance and gift tax of 50% on estates and transfers above SFr50mn (£47mn), marking a dramatic break from Switzerland’s tradition of decentralised, low-burden taxation. Revenue would have been earmarked for climate-related spending. In late October the French parliament voted to reject a Socialist proposal for a tax of 2% on wealth of more than €100mn. Another proposal for a 3% tax on wealth over €10mn was also rejected.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Swiss voters rejected a Young Socialists proposal for a federal inheritance and gift tax of 50% on estates and transfers above SFr50mn (£47mn), with revenue earmarked for climate-related spending.
  2. The rejected Swiss measure would have marked a break from Switzerland's tradition of decentralised, low-burden taxation.
  3. France's parliament rejected a Socialist proposal for a 2% tax on wealth above €100mn, as well as a separate proposal for a 3% tax on wealth above €10mn.

Related Articles: