Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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Monday, November 10, 2025

Marriage, Cohabitation, and Separation: A Dynamic Approach to the Second Demographic Transition

AI Summary. Four decades of U.S. monthly demographic data show marriage has declined while cohabitation has risen, both union types have become more stable, and remaining single has become more common, alongside a substantial fertility decline. A matching model estimates that rising match-formation costs outpaced gains from partnering, reducing partnership formation.

Sean Elliott University of Toronto
Date Posted:
November 10, 2025
Is Database:
Database

In the mid-1990s, individuals became more likely to cohabit and less likely to marry. After the financial crisis, remaining single became more common and fertility declined sharply. Dissolution rates for both marriage and cohabitation have declined.

Why have fewer Americans formed partnerships as marriage gave way to cohabitation?

Core argument: Four decades of monthly U.S. demographic data show marriage declining while cohabitation rose, with both union types becoming more stable over time and fertility falling substantially after the 2008 financial crisis.

Using four decades of monthly U.S. demographic data, I show that: (i) marriage has declined while cohabitation has risen, (ii) both unions have become more stable over time, and (iii) there are two inflection points: the mid-1990s, when substitution from marriage to cohabitation accelerated, and after the 2008 financial crisis, when remaining single became more common. Figure 3 summarizes these changes in one-year hazard rates. The first phase of the transition corresponds to substitution from marriage toward cohabitation; the second marks a regime in which remaining single became increasingly common. I refer to these as the first and second inflection points of the second demographic transition. Figure 3d also shows that fertility declined substantially after the 2008 financial crisis. Estimates of a nonstationary matching model show that rising match-formation costs outpaced surplus gains, reducing partnership formation, while marriage stability is driven by rising surplus and cohabitation stability by higher dissolution costs. Policy reforms in the 1990s coincide with the marriage-cohabitation substitution, and counterfactuals indicate that, coming out of the 2008 crisis, had house prices not risen so sharply, marriage formation would have been higher while cohabitation would have decreased.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Four decades of monthly U.S. demographic data show marriage declining while cohabitation rose, with both union types becoming more stable over time and fertility falling substantially after the 2008 financial crisis.
  2. The author identifies two inflection points in the second demographic transition: the mid-1990s, when substitution from marriage to cohabitation accelerated, and the post-2008 period, when remaining single became increasingly common.
  3. Estimates from a nonstationary matching model indicate rising match-formation costs outpaced surplus gains and reduced partnership formation, with marriage stability driven by rising surplus and cohabitation stability by higher dissolution costs.

Related Articles:

  • Changes in Milestones of Adulthood — Among US young adults aged 25–34, the share completing a high school or college degree rose 9 percentage points to 83%, while the share ever married fell 18 points to 44% and the share living with a child fell 16 points to 39%. Economic milestones became more common as family formation milestones became less common.
  • All Over The Rich World, Fewer People Are Hooking Up And Shacking Up — In the US, 41% of women and 50% of men aged 25-34 were single, double the share of five decades earlier, and the share of people living alone rose in 26 of 30 mostly rich OECD countries. One estimate puts the global increase in single people at over 100m in a decade.
  • The Sex Recession: The Share Of Americans Having Regular Sex Keeps Dropping — General Social Survey data show the share of US adults ages 18–64 reporting weekly sex fell from 55% in 1990 to 37% by 2024. The decline extends to married adults across age groups, whose weekly rate fell from 59% to 49%.
  • Family/Marriage
  • Workforce
    • Demographics

Four Things: OpenAI's Backstop, CoreWeave CDS, Oregon, and Humanity's TAM

AI Summary. A suggestion that the U.S. government could guarantee data-center financing, later disavowed by OpenAI's leadership, signaled that AI build-out costs have reached utility proportions. The author argues lenders may now price OpenAI more like a sovereign-backed utility than a growth company, exposing the fragility of the capital structure behind compute-intensive AI.

Paul Kedrosky Applied Complexity
Date Posted:
November 10, 2025

Paul Kedrosky notes that the flare-up around OpenAI’s proposed debt backstop suggests “how fragile the capital structure behind this compute-intensive ecosystem has become.”

Paul Kedrosky notes that the flare-up around OpenAI’s proposed debt backstop suggests “how fragile the capital...

Does talk of a government backstop change how lenders price AI firms?

Core argument: OpenAI's CFO floated a government guarantee for data-center financing, which the author reads as a signal that AI build-out costs have reached utility proportions.

The recent flare-up around OpenAI’s semi- proposed debt backstop reveals the structural tension between venture-style growth and infrastructure-scale spending, especially when the two become wrapped in the flag. The company's CFO’s comments floated the idea of a government guarantee for data-center financing — a remarkable signal that AI build-out costs have reached utility proportions. Sam Altman’s follow-up disavowed any such plan, saying OpenAI should “fail if we get it wrong,” but the damage was done. Investors now see an enterprise straddling the line between startup and state-sponsored critical infrastructure, with an overlay of an implied "Greenspan put"—that AI is so important it can't be allowed to fail. The optics matter: lenders must begin to price OpenAI more like a sovereign-backed utility than a growth company. The episode marks the point where AI financing entered the quasi-public domain. Even if the “backstop” was rhetorical, it exposed how fragile the capital structure behind this compute-intensive ecosystem has become.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. OpenAI's CFO floated a government guarantee for data-center financing, which the author reads as a signal that AI build-out costs have reached utility proportions.
  2. The author contends lenders must begin pricing OpenAI more like a sovereign-backed utility than a growth company, with the episode exposing the fragility of the capital structure behind the compute-intensive ecosystem.

Related Articles:

  • OpenAI Isn’t Yet Working Toward an IPO, CFO Says — OpenAI is seeking backing from banks, private equity, and potentially governments to help guarantee financing for AI chips, arguing such guarantees could lower borrowing costs and raise the amount of debt it can take on. The company expects to spend roughly $600bn on computing power from Oracle, Microsoft, and Amazon.
  • Minsky Moments and AI CapEx — Capital-spending forecasts for the four largest cloud providers rose nearly 50% over the year, and AI data centers are increasingly funded through leveraged and off-balance-sheet structures, including $3.2bn in senior secured notes and a roughly $30bn asset-backed financing. The author argues this marks a speculative-finance phase where borrowers must roll over principal.
  • Why We Are Not In A Bubble….Yet — The 5 largest US technology companies are worth about 16% of the global public equity market, and the top 10 US stocks nearly 25%, almost $25tn. The author argues valuations are high but not bubble-level, with the "Magnificent 7" median forward price-to-earnings ratio at 27x, roughly half that of the late-1990s leaders.
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

Capital Allocation

AI Summary. Internal financing has been the main source of capital for U.S. corporations, with steady new debt issuance except in recession years, consistent with a stable capital structure. Companies have retired equity on average, and net equity issuance remains negative even after accounting for stock-based compensation.

Michael Mauboussin and Dan Callahan Morgan Stanley
Date Posted:
November 10, 2025
Is Database:
Database

The American corporate sector has been substantially self-financing since 2000. Net equity issuance is negative even after taking stock-based compensation expenses into consideration.

How do US corporations finance themselves?

Core argument: Internal financing has been the primary source of capital for U.S. corporations since 1970, with companies also adding new debt steadily except in some recession years.

Internal financing has been the primary source [of capital for U.S. corporations since 1970]. Companies have also added new debt steadily except for some years when the economy was in recession. This issuance is consistent with a stable capital structure. Companies have retired equity on average. Note that this analysis does not include equity issuance in the form of stock-based compensation. But net equity issuance is negative even after taking SBC expense into consideration.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Internal financing has been the primary source of capital for U.S. corporations since 1970, with companies also adding new debt steadily except in some recession years.
  2. Steady debt issuance by U.S. corporations is consistent with a stable capital structure, while on average companies have retired equity rather than issued it.
  3. Net equity issuance by U.S. corporations is negative even after accounting for stock-based compensation expense, which the underlying analysis of equity issuance excludes.

Related Articles:

  • Why Global Imbalances Do Matter — From 2008 to 2023 the US household and corporate sectors ran average savings surpluses of 3.5% and 1.6% of GDP respectively, leaving the federal government as the dominant net borrower in the US economy. This suggests the benefit of persistent net capital inflows is the ability to run larger fiscal deficits and grow public debt.
  • Global Economy in Flux, Prospects Remain Dim — Global current account imbalances are projected to widen before narrowing, with trade ahead of prospective tariffs temporarily widening the US deficit and China's surplus. Narrowing is expected to work through trade policy shifts, a weaker US dollar that aids export competitiveness, and fiscal expansion in China and Germany that reduces their surpluses.
  • The US Trade Deficit and Foreign Borrowing — The authors argue US trade deficits persist because foreign investors find US financial assets attractive, but the current deficit level is not sustainable. They estimate that stabilizing the US net foreign liability position requires improving the trade balance by about 2% of GDP, or over 3% if low-cost borrowing privileges are lost.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

The Business of the Culture War

AI Summary. Cable news emphasizes cultural issues far more and economic issues far less than broadcast news or politicians, a strategy the authors trace to cultural content attracting viewers who would otherwise not watch news at all. The authors estimate cable news can account for one-third of the increase in cultural conflict since 2000.

Shakhed Noy and Aakaash Rao Harvard University
Date Posted:
November 10, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Since 1996 cable news’s incentive to attract viewers with exciting cultural news rather than economic news has shifted the political discourse and is in turn responsible for ⅓ of the increased cultural conflict since 2000, Noy and Rao estimate.

How much of rising cultural conflict does cable news explain?

Core argument: The authors estimate that cable news can account for one-third of the increase in American cultural conflict since 2000, linking the "culture war" to 1980s media technology changes and the cable networks that responded to the era's incentives.

We link the contemporary American “culture war” to changes in media technologies in the 1980s and to the cable news networks which responded to the new incentives of the era. We first show that cable news emphasizes culture-war issues much more, and economic issues much less, than older broadcast news or politicians. Using household-by-second smart TV data, we trace cable news’ emphasis on cultural over economic issues to a distinctive business strategy: culture attracts viewers who would otherwise not watch news (“mobilization”); economics attracts viewers who would otherwise watch competing news outlets (“poaching”); and the number mobilized by culture is greater than the number poached by economics, so culture increases viewership. [While] cable outlets value poaching and mobilization equally, politicians maximize vote share and so value poaching twice as much as mobilization. Cable news’ incentive to center mobilizing culture war content influences politics: constituencies more exposed to cable news assign greater importance to cultural issues, and politicians respond by supplying more cultural ads. Our estimates suggest that cable news can account for one-third of the time-series increase in cultural conflict since 2000.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that cable news can account for one-third of the increase in American cultural conflict since 2000, linking the "culture war" to 1980s media technology changes and the cable networks that responded to the era's incentives.
  2. Using household-by-second smart TV data, the authors trace cable news' cultural emphasis to a business strategy in which culture mobilizes viewers who would otherwise not watch news while economics poaches viewers from competing outlets, with mobilization exceeding poaching.
  3. Cable outlets value poaching and mobilization equally while politicians maximizing vote share value poaching twice as much as mobilization; constituencies more exposed to cable news assign greater importance to cultural issues, and politicians respond with more cultural ads.

Related Articles:

  • The Winter Of Our Discontent — Digital video has overtaken traditional TV in the attention of the average US adult, with social video platforms YouTube, TikTok and Instagram estimated at 25% of US daily video screen time. New media venues tend to monetize each hour of content at lower rates, and AI text-to-video tools are lowering barriers for new entrants to create high-quality content.
  • Bad News Bias in Gasoline Price Coverage — An analysis of over one million television transcripts finds that coverage of gasoline prices shows a negative news bias, ramping up sharply once the nominal price reaches $3.50 a gallon, most steeply at Fox News. Because that threshold is fixed in nominal terms, the inflation-adjusted trigger has fallen by one-third.
  • The Anti-Social Century — Americans spend less time with other people than in any period with reliable data back to 1965, with in-person socializing down more than 20% from 2003 to 2023 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics' American Time Use Survey. Among unmarried men and people under 25, the decline exceeded 35%.
  • Politics

The True Cost of China’s Falling Prices

AI Summary. Prices fell for 51 of 67 consumer items tracked over a two-year period in China, while the broader GDP deflator, which includes upstream sectors, declined for 10 straight quarters, indicating deflation is more entrenched in industry. The share of "zombie" firms whose profits cannot cover debt interest rose from 19% to 34% over five years.

Bloomberg Bloomberg Staff
Date Posted:
November 10, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

A Bloomberg analysis finds that prices dropped on 51 of 67 products and services in China over the past two years. 34% of Chinese firms are unable to cover interest on their debt – a 25-year high – as China’s deflationary spiral worsens.

How deeply has deflation taken hold in China's industrial sector?

Core argument: Prices fell on 51 of 67 items tracked by Bloomberg News over the last two years, while China's GDP deflator, which includes upstream sectors, has declined for 10 straight quarters, indicating deflation is more entrenched in industry.

Among 67 items tracked by Bloomberg News, prices on 51 dropped over the last two years. A broader gauge that includes upstream sectors, known as the GDP deflator, has been steadily declining for 10 quarters, indicating that deflation is much more entrenched in the industrial sector. Polysilicon, the raw material for solar panels, saw prices drop to less than a fifth of its peak in 2022. Prices for steel rebar, widely used in construction, fell to an eight-year low in May. Across the market, company results show the same pressures: the share of “zombie” firms — those whose profits can’t cover interest payments on their debt — rose from 19% to 34% over the past five years; capital and R&D spending fell for most companies, a first in a decade; and more than a third of companies across industries cut jobs in 2024.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Prices fell on 51 of 67 items tracked by Bloomberg News over the last two years, while China's GDP deflator, which includes upstream sectors, has declined for 10 straight quarters, indicating deflation is more entrenched in industry.
  2. Polysilicon, the raw material for solar panels, has fallen to less than a fifth of its 2022 peak price, and steel rebar used in construction hit an eight-year low in May.
  3. The share of Chinese "zombie" firms whose profits cannot cover debt interest payments rose from 19% to 34% over five years, capital and R&D spending fell for most companies for the first time in a decade, and over a third cut jobs in 2024.

Related Articles:

  • How NOT To Negotiate With China — Trade diversion signals deep distress in China's export sector, and the author argues a sustained 10% tariff hike would be more credible than larger ones and could counter China's rare earths leverage. Easing up on Chinese exporters instead signals weakness and discourages Europe from coordinating with the US.
  • China’s Youth Unemployment Soars To 2-Year High As Job Crunch Deepens — China's urban unemployment rate for 16- to 24-year-olds excluding students rose to 18.9% from 17.8%, the highest since the National Bureau of Statistics revised its calculation method for the series. A record 12.2m university students graduated into a job market strained by deflationary pressures and external uncertainties, with many struggling to find roles matching their education and skills.
  • Xi Overcapacity Fight Leaves Economy Vulnerable Without Stimulus — China's total debt has risen to over 300% of gross domestic product from a little over 200% a decade ago, and with the main policy rate at 1.4%, the central bank has limited room to cut. Price declines are more widespread than in past deflationary episodes, and large-scale stimulus remains off the table.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Inflation

Signs of Stress in Money Markets

AI Summary. Federal Reserve balance sheet reduction and heavy Treasury bill issuance are pushing money market funding spreads higher, with key overnight repo rates rising above the rate the Federal Reserve pays on bank reserves. The financial system is nearing the point where bank reserves are no longer ample, and persistent funding-rate volatility could affect credit markets.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
November 10, 2025
Is Database:
Database

QT, increased t-bill issuance, and the govt shutdown are all draining reserves from the banking system, putting upward pressure on money market spreads. Sløk suggests we may be “nearing the point” of switching from an ample to a scarce reserves regime.

Are bank reserves nearing the point where funding markets tighten?

Core argument: Federal Reserve balance sheet reduction and heavy Treasury bill issuance are pushing money market spreads higher, lifting SOFR and the Tri-Party General Collateral Rate above the interest rate on reserve balances.

Fed balance sheet reduction and heavy T-bill issuance are putting upward pressure on spreads in money markets. The ongoing government shutdown has amplified this dynamic, as the Treasury General Account balance has risen with delayed federal spending, further draining reserves from the banking system. With fewer reserves, funding markets face heightened competition for cash, pushing SOFR and TGCR above the IORB. Money market funds shifting from the Fed’s reverse repo facility to higher-yielding assets, combined with year-end balance sheet constraints, are adding to the strain. The bottom line is that the financial system is nearing the point where reserves are no longer ample. We are watching this development very closely because if rate volatility in funding markets persists, it could begin to have consequences for credit markets.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Federal Reserve balance sheet reduction and heavy Treasury bill issuance are pushing money market spreads higher, lifting SOFR and the Tri-Party General Collateral Rate above the interest rate on reserve balances.
  2. The government shutdown has amplified reserve scarcity, as delayed federal spending has raised the Treasury General Account balance and drained reserves from the banking system, intensifying competition for cash in funding markets.
  3. Money market funds shifting out of the Federal Reserve's reverse repo facility into higher-yielding assets, together with year-end balance sheet constraints, are adding strain, bringing the financial system near the point where reserves are no longer ample.

Related Articles:

  • Bank of America Sees US Bill Supply Boost Curbing 10-Year Yield — Bank of America expects the US Treasury to lean more heavily on short-term bill issuance, lifting bills to about 25% of outstanding debt from about 20%. Its strategists estimate the resulting reduction in longer-dated note and bond supply is equivalent to roughly $1tn of 10-year notes, worth at least 31 basis points of lower yields.
  • Treasury Market Dysfunction and the Role of the Central Bank — The authors argue the Federal Reserve could relieve Treasury market strain by buying cash Treasuries while fully hedging with offsetting short positions in Treasury derivatives, taking the other side of hedge funds' unwinding of hedged positions. Because this removes no net duration from the market, it distinguishes market-functioning purchases from quantitative easing.
  • Monetary Policy
  • GDP

Tuesday, November 11, 2025

Investor Angst Over Big Tech’s AI Spending Spills Into Bond Market

AI Summary. Investors have sold off bonds issued by large US technology companies building data centres, including Alphabet, Meta, Microsoft and Oracle, as concerns over artificial intelligence spending reached the bond market. Bank of America data show the extra yield investors demand to hold this debt over Treasuries rose to 0.78 percentage points from 0.5.

Kate Duguid and Tabby Kinder Financial Times
Date Posted:
November 11, 2025

“Jitters over Silicon Valley’s boom in spending on AI have spilled into the bond market.” According to BAC data, a basket of bonds issued by the major hyperscalers has seen an uptick in its spread over Treasuries to 0.78pp, up from 0.5pp in September.

“Jitters over Silicon Valley’s boom in spending on AI have spilled into the bond market.” According to BAC data, a basket of...

Are bond investors demanding higher yields on tech AI spending debt?

Core argument: The spread on a basket of hyperscaler bonds over Treasuries has climbed to 0.78 percentage points from 0.5 points in September, the highest since April, when Donald Trump's tariff plans sent markets reeling, according to Bank of America data.

Investors have been selling off the debt of US tech heavyweights, showing how jitters over Silicon Valley’s boom in spending on artificial intelligence have spilled into the bond market. A basket of bonds issued by so-called hyperscalers — companies that are building vast data centres, including Alphabet, Meta, Microsoft and Oracle — has sustained a hit in recent weeks. The spread, or premium in yield investors demand to buy the debt over Treasuries, has climbed to 0.78 percentage points, the highest level since Donald Trump sent markets reeling in April with his tariff plans, and up from 0.5 points in September, according to Bank of America data.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The spread on a basket of hyperscaler bonds over Treasuries has climbed to 0.78 percentage points from 0.5 points in September, the highest since April, when Donald Trump's tariff plans sent markets reeling, according to Bank of America data.
  2. Investors have been selling the debt of US tech heavyweights including Alphabet, Meta, Microsoft and Oracle, carrying jitters over AI spending into the bond market.

Related Articles:

  • Meta, xAI Starting Trend for Billions in Off-Balance Sheet Debt — Off-balance-sheet structures such as special purpose vehicles and asset-tied joint ventures are becoming the standard financing route for AI data center deals. Morgan Stanley estimates tech firms will need as much as $800bn from private credit by 2028, with roughly $1.5tn of external financing required across the AI ecosystem.
  • Minsky Moments and AI CapEx — Capital-spending forecasts for the four largest cloud providers rose nearly 50% over the year, and AI data centers are increasingly funded through leveraged and off-balance-sheet structures, including $3.2bn in senior secured notes and a roughly $30bn asset-backed financing. The author argues this marks a speculative-finance phase where borrowers must roll over principal.
  • Four Things: OpenAI’s Backstop, CoreWeave CDS, Oregon, and Humanity’s TAM — A suggestion that the U.S. government could guarantee data-center financing, later disavowed by OpenAI's leadership, signaled that AI build-out costs have reached utility proportions. The author argues lenders may now price OpenAI more like a sovereign-backed utility than a growth company, exposing the fragility of the capital structure behind compute-intensive AI.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

Japan’s Debt Puzzle: Sovereign Wealth Fund from Borrowed Money

AI Summary. Japan's public sector operates as a highly leveraged sovereign wealth fund, funding risky assets by borrowing from banks and depositors at below-market rates, with returns sustaining its debt-to-GDP ratio above 200% without primary surpluses. The authors argue the resulting duration and currency mismatches expose Japan to mark-to-market losses that could trigger a fiscal crisis or a run on the yen.

Yili Chien, Wenxin Du, and Hanno Lustig Journal of Economic Perspectives
Date Posted:
November 11, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Japan has so far avoided inflation and debt crises despite decades of slow growth and deficits that left gov debt at > twice GDP by “running a risky sovereign wealth fund” with maturity and currency mismatch, financed at below-market interest rates.

How does Japan sustain debt above 200% of GDP without surpluses?

Core argument: Japanese government debt exceeds 200% of GDP with decades of budget deficits and sluggish growth, yet inflation has remained subdued and no major debt crisis has emerged.

Japan presents a striking puzzle in public finance. Government debt exceeds 200 percent of GDP, budget deficits have persisted for decades, and economic growth has been sluggish. Yet inflation has remained subdued, and no major debt crisis has emerged. To keep its promises to bondholders and to Japanese transfer recipients, the Japanese government has combined low-interest-rate policies with risk-taking on the asset side. The Japanese public sector is running a highly leveraged and increasingly risky sovereign wealth fund, exposing its taxpayers, bondholders, and depositors to significant interest rate, exchange rate, and equity risks. The risky investments are funded by borrowing from banks and ultimately depositors at below-market rates. This strategy has worked particularly well over the past two decades, amid a generally low-yield global macroeconomic environment. Returns on risky investments have sustained the debt-to-GDP ratio in Japan despite the lack of primary surpluses. Going forward, the sizable duration and currency mismatch on the public sector’s balance sheet exposes Japan to significant mark-to-market losses that could trigger a fiscal crisis and even a run on the Japanese currency. Unlike Japan, the US government has relied more on external funding to support its deficits.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Japanese government debt exceeds 200% of GDP with decades of budget deficits and sluggish growth, yet inflation has remained subdued and no major debt crisis has emerged.
  2. Japan's public sector operates a highly leveraged sovereign wealth fund, funding risky investments by borrowing from banks and ultimately depositors at below-market rates, exposing taxpayers, bondholders, and depositors to interest rate, exchange rate, and equity risks.
  3. Returns on Japan's risky public-sector investments have sustained its debt-to-GDP ratio despite the absence of primary surpluses, while the duration and currency mismatch exposes Japan to mark-to-market losses that could trigger a fiscal crisis and even a run on the currency.

Related Articles:

  • Japan’s Debt Crisis — The Bank of Japan's holdings of Japanese government bonds are so large that maturing bonds exceed gross purchases, making it a net seller equal to -2.6% of GDP over a recent one-year period. Further cuts to gross buying would deepen the decline in its holdings and likely push longer-term Japanese yields higher.
  • Global Debt Report 2025 — About 60% of fixed-rate government debt in advanced economies maturing by 2027 — roughly $9tn — was issued before the recent interest-rate tightening, with weighted average yields below 2% versus projected 10-year rates near 3.6%, implying refinancing at nearly double the original cost. France, Spain, the UK, and the US face heightened vulnerability, with maturing debt exceeding 15% of GDP.
  • Should We Be Alarmed Or Optimistic About Japan’s Debt? — Japan's 30-year government bond yield reached an all-time high of 3.21% following weak auctions, while Morgan Stanley reports the budget deficit was nearly eliminated in the first quarter, the best public finances in almost three decades. The return of nominal wage and price growth lifted income and consumption tax revenues, offset by lower household savings.
  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits

What Is A Safe Haven Country These Days?

AI Summary. Estimates comparing the 10-year US Treasury yield with currency-hedged 10-year government bond yields in other advanced economies show the US "convenience yield" eroding steadily over the past decade, with the premium the US pays on 10-year Treasuries shrinking more recently. Sweden's convenience yield has fallen below Switzerland's, making it the top safe-haven destination on this measure.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:
November 11, 2025

The 10-year Treasury yield, relative to the trade-weighted, exchange rate-adjusted yield on 10-year governments in other advanced economies, rose over the last decade but has fallen in recent months, suggesting “many other fiscal train wrecks out there.”

Is the US losing its safe-haven advantage in government bonds?

Core argument: Brooks estimates the US "convenience yield" — the 10-year Treasury yield versus trade-weighted 10-year yields in other advanced economies swapped into US dollars via FX forwards — has eroded steadily over the past decade, a move predating the second Trump administration.

[Brooks updated his] “convenience yield” estimates. For the US, this calculation compares the 10-year Treasury yield to the trade-weighted yield on 10-year government bonds in other advanced economies after those are swapped back into US Dollars using FX forwards. [There have been] two key developments. First, the US “convenience yield” has eroded steadily over the past decade, a move that predates the second Trump administration [left chart]. But - surprisingly - it looks like the premium the US pays on 10-year Treasuries has shrunk in recent months, which [Brooks] interpret as a sign that there’s many other fiscal trainwrecks out there, so markets think the US looks ok on a relative basis [right chart]. Second, Sweden is emerging as the top safe haven destination, with a “convenience yield” that just fell below Switzerland.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Brooks estimates the US "convenience yield" — the 10-year Treasury yield versus trade-weighted 10-year yields in other advanced economies swapped into US dollars via FX forwards — has eroded steadily over the past decade, a move predating the second Trump administration.
  2. The premium the US pays on 10-year Treasuries has shrunk in recent months, which Brooks interprets as a sign that many other fiscal trainwrecks exist and markets view the US as acceptable on a relative basis.
  3. Sweden is emerging as the top safe haven destination in Brooks's estimates, with a "convenience yield" that just fell below Switzerland's.

Related Articles:

  • Across The Rich World, Fiscal Crises Loom — An analysis estimates most rich countries could keep debt stable as a share of their economies with only small primary surpluses—Britain's required surplus is 0.3% of GDP—even if all debt were refinanced immediately at current rates, but the tightening needed to stabilize debt ratios exceeds 2% of GDP in Britain and America and 3% in France.
  • The Global Debt Overhang — Across much of the G10, 30-year government bond yields have risen even as central banks cut rates, which the author reads as a sign markets are on average becoming more averse to holding government debt. Switzerland is the only country whose 30-year yield fell, while Germany and the UK stand out as disproportionate risers.
  • Global Debt Report 2025 — About 60% of fixed-rate government debt in advanced economies maturing by 2027 — roughly $9tn — was issued before the recent interest-rate tightening, with weighted average yields below 2% versus projected 10-year rates near 3.6%, implying refinancing at nearly double the original cost. France, Spain, the UK, and the US face heightened vulnerability, with maturing debt exceeding 15% of GDP.
  • Financial Markets
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP

Paycheck To Paycheck: Slowing But Growing

AI Summary. Bank of America deposit and spending data indicate nearly 24% of households in 2025 spend more than 95% of income on necessities such as housing, groceries, utilities and childcare, a 0.3 percentage point increase from the prior year, with growth nearly 3x slower.

Joe Wadford Bank of America
Date Posted:
November 11, 2025
Is Database:
Database

BAC internal data show the share of households devoting more than 95% of household income to “necessity spending” increasing 0.3pp to 24% in the first 3 quarters of 2025 compared to the same period in 2024 – ~⅓ of the previous year’s pp rise.

Is the share of households living paycheck to paycheck still rising?

Core argument: Bank of America estimates nearly 24% of households in 2025 are living "paycheck to paycheck," defined as necessity spending exceeding 95% of household income, up 0.3 percentage points from 2024 at a growth rate nearly three times lower than the prior year.

Inflation has stayed fairly high, at 3.0% year-over-year in September, and after-tax wage and salary growth, based on Bank of America deposit data, for middle- and lower-income households has not kept pace, increasing 2% and 1% YoY, respectively, in October. One way to measure how slowing wages and sticky inflation levels are pressuring consumers’ wallets is to estimate the proportion of households living “paycheck to paycheck,” using Bank of America internal consumer deposit and spending data. We define living “paycheck to paycheck” using a fairly broad definition of necessity spending, covering areas such as housing, gasoline, groceries, utility bills, internet service provider subscriptions, public transportation, and childcare. We then identify the proportion of households in which necessity spending is more than 95% of their household income, leaving them relatively little or nothing left over for “nice-to-have” discretionary spending or savings. We use this as our central indicator. Exhibit 2 shows that nearly 24% of households so far in 2025 would be classified as living “paycheck to paycheck” based on our central indicator. This is a 0.3 percentage point increase on 2024, but a growth rate nearly three times lower than last year. The share of households where necessity spending is more than 90% of their household income moved similarly.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bank of America estimates nearly 24% of households in 2025 are living "paycheck to paycheck," defined as necessity spending exceeding 95% of household income, up 0.3 percentage points from 2024 at a growth rate nearly three times lower than the prior year.
  2. After-tax wage and salary growth for middle- and lower-income households rose 2% and 1% year-over-year respectively in October, trailing inflation of 3.0% year-over-year in September, based on Bank of America deposit data.
  3. Bank of America's necessity spending definition covers housing, gasoline, groceries, utility bills, internet service provider subscriptions, public transportation, and childcare, and the share of households spending more than 90% of income on necessities moved similarly to the 95% measure.

Related Articles:

  • Real Income Growth Shifts Down, Especially For The Young — Inflation-adjusted median income growth for 25–54-year-old workers declined and has hovered near decade lows, with a more marked slowdown among those aged 25–29. The authors suggest this may reflect a reduced pace of job-to-job transitions, seen in lower hiring and quit rates.
  • Jobless Growth — Labor demand growth may be too weak to keep pace with even modest labor supply growth: the labor market is somewhat weaker than before the pandemic, job growth has turned negative outside healthcare, and firms are focused on using AI to cut labor costs. Economists estimate most employment losses in routine manual occupations since the 1970s occurred during recessions.
  • Don’t Choose Your Own Adventure: Understanding Middle-Class Earnings Trends — Using a standard price index, US men's earnings were flat from 1973 to 1989 and rose 0.4% a year thereafter, while an alternative middle-class cost-of-living index shows 0.7% annual growth in both periods and a 40% total rise instead of 13%. The author attributes weak growth to 1970s stagflation and early-1980s recessions rather than trade, immigration, or income concentration.
  • Wages/Income
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

The Demographic Trends That Shaped Mamdani’s Win

AI Summary. In New York City's mayoral race, Mamdani's average margin was 30 points in precincts with a median age under 45, and voters under 45 made up 43% of in-person ballots versus 36% in the prior governor's race. He won by over 50 points in neighborhoods where the white population share grew and the Black or Hispanic share declined.

Maya King, Jeff Adelson and Alex Lemonides New York Times
Date Posted:
November 11, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Voters under the age of 45, 46% of registered voters in New York City, made up ~43% of voters in the mayor’s race. In neighborhoods where the nonwhite population is shrinking, Mamdani won by more than 50pp.

Voters under the age of 45, 46% of registered voters in New York City, made up ~43% of voters in the mayor’s race. In...

How did age and neighborhood demographic shifts shape a mayoral victory?

Core argument: Mamdani's average margin of victory reached 30 points in precincts where the median age is under 45, among the highest of any demographic group.

In precincts where the median age is under 45, [Mamdani's] average margin of victory was 30 points — among the highest of any demographic group. Voters younger than 45 — about 46% of registered voters in the city — made up about 43% of those who cast their ballots in person early or on Election Day. That outpaces the 2022 midterms, when Gov. Kathy Hochul, a Democrat, narrowly fought off a challenge from Lee Zeldin. That year, younger voters made up 36% of those who voted. (Mail ballots, which are still being accounted for in the 2025 election, generally make up a small share of overall votes.) In neighborhoods where the nonwhite population is shrinking [Mamdani] notched some of his strongest performances. In parts of the city where the Black or Hispanic population share had declined and the white population share had grown since before the pandemic, Mr. Mamdani won by more than 50 percentage points.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Mamdani's average margin of victory reached 30 points in precincts where the median age is under 45, among the highest of any demographic group.
  2. Voters younger than 45, about 46% of New York City's registered voters, cast about 43% of in-person early and Election Day ballots, up from 36% in the 2022 midterms, when Kathy Hochul narrowly fought off Lee Zeldin.
  3. Mamdani won by more than 50 percentage points in parts of the city where the Black or Hispanic population share had declined and the white population share had grown since before the pandemic.

Related Articles:

  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — New York state's share of US taxpayers reporting over $1m in income fell from 12.7% in 2010 to 8.7% in 2022, and the Citizens Budget Commission estimates state and city income tax receipts from that group would have been $13bn higher had the share held. Job growth has concentrated in lower-paid health care and social assistance.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
  • Why is New York City Shrinking? — New York City's population is shrinking as domestic out-migration has accelerated, with those leaving tending to be younger, higher-income, and with fewer children than the city's overall population. Census Bureau surveys that ask movers their reasons indicate jobs matter more than any other consideration, including housing affordability.
  • Politics

Universal Child Care Can Harm Children

AI Summary. Studies of Quebec's shift to universal child care found increases in aggression, anxiety and hyperactivity among children and declines in motor and social skills, with large estimated effects. Researchers attribute the contrast with successful small randomized trials to slipping quality when a pilot is scaled up while holding down costs.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
November 11, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Baker, et al found that a shift to universal child care led to a rise in aggression, anxiety and hyperactivity among Quebecer children. James Heckman, who found very high returns to a small, high quality pilot program, warns against low-cost imitations.

Does scaling up universal child care harm children's development?

Core argument: Two studies by Baker, Gruber, and Mulligan found that Quebec's shift to universal child care appeared to raise aggression, anxiety and hyperactivity among children and lower motor and social skills, with large effects.

Two studies by Baker, Gruber, and Mulligan found that shifting to universal child care appeared to lead to a rise in aggression, anxiety and hyperactivity among Quebecer children, as well as a fall in motor and social skills, [and] the effects were large. How can this be? There is, after all, lots of evidence—in the form of small, randomised controlled trials—in support of similar schemes. [e.g.] In 2010, James Heckman and co-authors calculated that, on conservative assumptions, the investment made in the children [in the famous Perry study] returned 7-10% a year to society—comparable to the historical rate of return on equity. Quebec had tried, while keeping costs down, to imitate a small pilot on a grand scale. Standards inevitably slipped. When Heckman was asked by the NYT about the province’s experience, he noted how different it was from the trials he had studied. “These were warehouses,” he said. “They were fairly impersonal, there wasn’t any real quality. Quality has to be a sine qua non of the whole enterprise.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Two studies by Baker, Gruber, and Mulligan found that Quebec's shift to universal child care appeared to raise aggression, anxiety and hyperactivity among children and lower motor and social skills, with large effects.
  2. James Heckman and co-authors calculated in 2010 that, on conservative assumptions, the investment in children in the Perry study returned 7–10% a year to society, comparable to the historical rate of return on equity.
  3. Heckman told the New York Times that Quebec's child-care settings were "warehouses" that were fairly impersonal and lacked real quality, unlike the trials he had studied, and argued that quality has to be a sine qua non.

Related Articles:

  • The Long-Run Impacts of a Universal Child Care Program — A universal childcare program in Quebec raised childcare use by over 40% of the baseline rate but is associated with lasting declines in noncognitive outcomes such as anxiety and aggression, persisting into the school years. The authors estimate boys saw the largest deterioration, with criminal accusations up 19% and convictions up 22%, while cognitive test score effects were mixed.
  • Universal Childcare, Maternal Labor Supply and Family Well-Being — The authors find Quebec's universal childcare raised the share of children aged 0-4 in care by 14 percentage points relative to the rest of Canada and married women's labor force participation by 7.7 percentage points. Tax revenue from added maternal work fell short of subsidy costs, and child and parental outcomes worsened.
  • Birth Rates Are Falling In The Nordics. Are Family-Friendly Policies No Longer Enough? — Falling Nordic birth rates are now driven by childlessness rather than smaller families, with roughly three-quarters of Finland's recent fertility decline attributable to people who have no children. Nearly 40% of Finnish men with low education are childless at 45, and most have no partners.
  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
  • Politics


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