Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Tuesday, October 21, 2025

AI Summary. The authors argue inflation's baseline is now higher than pre-pandemic, with 2% acting more as a floor than a ceiling, noting disinflation has largely stalled and core inflation has run above target on a six-month annualized basis for five years. They expect a structurally wider range of inflation outcomes, skewed to the upside and centered higher than in the 2010s.

Ziad Hindo and James Riseley Bridgewater Associates
Date Posted:

Hindo and Riseley suggest that inflation risk is “tilted asymmetrically to the upside and centered higher than the 2010s.” A continuation of the 4% per year inflation of the first half of the 2020s would represent a “return to baseline.”

Is 2% inflation now a floor rather than a ceiling?

Core argument: Core inflation has run above the Fed's target in six-month annualized terms for five straight years, and disinflation has basically stalled out for much of the last 12–18 months, with 2% now more a floor than a ceiling.

The resting heart rate of inflation looks higher than it did pre-pandemic, with 2% more a floor than a ceiling. On the one hand, inflation is benign relative to pandemic-era highs and our systematic estimates expect it to continue falling somewhat. On the other hand, it is still clearly a thorn in the Fed’s side, disinflation has basically stalled out for much of the last 12–18 months, and core has now been running above target (in six-month annualized core terms) for five whole years. The last half-mile is the hardest, and failing to get there can result in sustained inflation accrual that is painful for most portfolios. The 1970s and 1980s are the canonical proof point that once you’ve let the cat out of the bag, it can be hard to get it back in. One inflation wave can lay the foundations for the second by attuning players in the economy to inflation and rewiring how they respond to price pressures—even ones quite divorced from the initial price shock. That amplifies the risks associated with subsequent shocks and all else equal increases the odds they manifest in wage-price spirals. We expect a structurally wider cone of inflation outcomes, tilted asymmetrically to the upside and centered higher than the 2010s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Core inflation has run above the Fed's target in six-month annualized terms for five straight years, and disinflation has basically stalled out for much of the last 12–18 months, with 2% now more a floor than a ceiling.
  2. The authors expect a structurally wider cone of inflation outcomes, tilted asymmetrically to the upside and centered higher than in the 2010s, even as their systematic estimates expect inflation to continue falling somewhat.
  3. One inflation wave can lay the foundations for a second by attuning economic players to inflation and rewiring how they respond to price pressures, amplifying the odds that subsequent shocks manifest in wage-price spirals, with the 1970s and 1980s as the canonical proof point.

Related Articles:

  • Are We Heading For A New Inflation Surge? — The analysis finds post-pandemic headline and core inflation closely tracking the pattern of the early 1970s, with the spike in each case taking about three years to be brought under control and followed by roughly 18 months of relative stability. If the parallel holds, a renewed inflation flare-up would be expected.
  • Data Update 4 for 2025: Interest Rates, Inflation and Central Banks! — Interest rates are ultimately driven by macroeconomic fundamentals, with an "intrinsic risk-free rate" defined as the sum of the inflation rate and real GDP growth tracking the observed 10-year Treasury bond yield closely. On this view, central banks' influence comes from preferential access to data on those fundamentals, their capacity to alter them, and their credibility.
  • Our Thoughts on Large US Deficits and Their Impact on Bond Yields — Total borrowing in the US is about average despite high government deficits, as high public borrowing has contributed to the need for higher interest rates that have depressed private sector borrowing. Risk premiums on long-dated debt look about average, with no market signs that economic or debt limits are currently being hit.

AI Summary. The authors estimate that a 25% tariff on European still wines led foreign producers to cut prices by 5.2%, leaving about 25% of tariff revenue borne abroad, while U.S. importers raised distributor prices 5.4% and consumer prices rose 6.9%. Because markups compound across stages, the dollar increase in consumer costs can exceed the tariffs actually paid.

Aaron Flaaen, Ali Hortaçsu, Felix Tintelnot, Nicolás Urdaneta, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

Data from the 2019–2021 period of US tariffs on European wines show that ~25% of the tariff at the border is paid by foreign producers, but after augmentation by markups at the distributor-retailer level, the $ pass-through to consumers exceeds 100%.

Who bears the cost of tariffs along the supply chain?

Core argument: Foreign producers lowered prices by 5.2% following the applied 25% U.S. tariff on still wines with ≤14% alcohol by volume, with roughly 25% of tariff revenue paid by foreign producers and the remainder paid within the United States.

In order to estimate the price effects of the tariffs, we exploit the fact that they were levied only on still wines with ≤ 14% alcohol by volume. We compare price changes along the distribution chain for products that were tariffed to a control group of wines that were not tariffed. We find that tariff pass-through at the border is incomplete, as foreign producers lower their price by 5.2% following the applied 25% tariff; ~25% of the tariff revenue is paid by foreign producers, while the remainder is paid within the United States. At the next stage of the chain, we find the U.S. importer increases the price charged to their distributors by an average of 5.4%. Tariff pass-through continues to be incomplete at this subsequent stage: the importer absorbs some portion of the tariffs as lower markups. Finally, tracking these particular wines at the stage of final sales by retailers, we find that the consumer price increases by 6.9%. While such a % increase implies incomplete pass-through given a 25% tariff, the multiple stages of markups implies the corresponding dollar value change in consumer prices could be higher than the actual tariffs paid. For example, for a wine that costs $5 at the border prior to tariffs, our point estimate implies $1.59 in higher consumer costs relative to $1.19 in tariffs paid per bottle [see chart].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Foreign producers lowered prices by 5.2% following the applied 25% U.S. tariff on still wines with ≤14% alcohol by volume, with roughly 25% of tariff revenue paid by foreign producers and the remainder paid within the United States.
  2. U.S. importers raised the prices charged to distributors by an average of 5.4% and consumer prices rose 6.9%, both indicating incomplete pass-through of the 25% tariff.
  3. Because markups apply at multiple stages, the estimates imply that a wine costing $5 at the border before tariffs generates $1.59 in higher consumer costs against $1.19 in tariffs paid per bottle.

Related Articles:

  • Goods Inflation And The Tariffs — Tariff pass-through to consumer goods prices has varied widely by category, with household appliances and household supplies passing on nearly all or more than the estimated tariff cost while clothing, new cars, and telephone equipment show minimal or negative price effects. Across 19 products the authors estimate about 50% pass-through to consumption goods prices.
  • Are Businesses Absorbing the Tariffs or Passing Them on to Their Customers? — About three-quarters of manufacturing and service firms facing tariff-driven cost increases reported passing at least some of those costs to customers through higher prices, while roughly a quarter of each said they absorbed the full increase without raising prices. Nearly a third of manufacturers and about 45% of service firms reported full pass-through.
  • The U.S. Is Not “Winning the Trade War” — The U.S. is the world's largest single source of demand for manufactured goods but remains far smaller than the rest of the world combined, implying foreign producers will mostly avoid bearing the direct cost of tariffs. Consistent with this, the dollar has fallen about 7% against trading partners' currencies while pre-tariff import prices rose about 1%.

AI Summary. The US has exempted dozens of products from its reciprocal tariffs and offered to carve out hundreds more, from farm products to airplane parts, for countries that strike trade deals. The administration is simultaneously expanding tariffs grounded in Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, covering metals, autos, heavy trucks, pharmaceuticals and furniture.

Gavin Bade and Jesse Newman Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

The White House is quietly exempting products that the US doesn’t domestically produce from reciprocal tariffs. The WSJ reports that the shift in tariffs reflects a “desire to hedge its bets should the court strike down its broad levies.”

Is the US shifting away from broad tariffs toward sector-specific ones?

Core argument: President Trump has exempted dozens of products from his reciprocal tariffs and offered to carve out hundreds more, from farm products to airplane parts, for countries that strike trade deals with the U.S.

President Trump in recent weeks has exempted dozens of products from his so-called reciprocal tariffs and offered to carve out hundreds more goods from farm products to airplane parts when countries strike trade deals with the U.S. The offer to exempt more products from tariffs reflects a growing sentiment among administration officials that the U.S. should lower levies on goods that it doesn’t domestically produce, say people familiar with administration planning. The shift on the reciprocal tariffs reflects the Trump team’s desire to hedge its bets should the court strike down its broad levies, according to people familiar with the administration’s thinking. At the same time, Trump’s team is expanding its use of tariffs based on more established legal authority: Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Trump has already deployed that law to underpin tariffs on metals and automobiles, and this month announced a new tranche of duties aimed at heavy trucks, pharmaceuticals and furniture.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. President Trump has exempted dozens of products from his reciprocal tariffs and offered to carve out hundreds more, from farm products to airplane parts, for countries that strike trade deals with the U.S.
  2. The expanded exemption offer reflects growing sentiment among administration officials that the U.S. should lower levies on goods it does not domestically produce, according to people familiar with administration planning.
  3. Trump's team is expanding its use of tariffs based on Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, already used for metals and automobiles and now extended to heavy trucks, pharmaceuticals and furniture.

Related Articles:

  • Tariffs Are Generating Meaningful New Revenue — New U.S. tariffs are estimated to generate $1.3tn in net new revenue through the end of the current presidential term and $2.8tn through 2034 before economic effects, about $600bn more than previously enacted tariffs. If a court ruling striking down some tariffs is upheld, the remainder could raise as little as $800bn through 2034.
  • Short-Run Effects of 2025 Tariffs So Far — The authors estimate US tariffs raised $146bn in net customs duty revenues over the first eight months of 2025, with roughly $88bn of that attributable to new 2025 tariffs. August's new-tariff revenue of about $23bn ran roughly a fifth below the $29bn per month projected from statutory rates.
  • Are Businesses Absorbing the Tariffs or Passing Them on to Their Customers? — About three-quarters of manufacturing and service firms facing tariff-driven cost increases reported passing at least some of those costs to customers through higher prices, while roughly a quarter of each said they absorbed the full increase without raising prices. Nearly a third of manufacturers and about 45% of service firms reported full pass-through.

AI Summary. Labor demand growth may be too weak to keep pace with even modest labor supply growth: the labor market is somewhat weaker than before the pandemic, job growth has turned negative outside healthcare, and firms are focused on using AI to cut labor costs. Economists estimate most employment losses in routine manual occupations since the 1970s occurred during recessions.

David Mericle and Pierfrancesco Mei Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:
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Weak labor demand is not keeping pace with “modest” labor supply growth. Outside of the healthcare sector, job growth is now net negative. Mericle and Mei note that the impact of AI on the labor market may “not become apparent until a recession hits.”

Is labor demand too weak to absorb modest labor supply growth?

Core argument: Economists Nir Jaimovich and Henry Siu estimate that since the 1970s most employment losses in routine manual occupations have occurred during recessions, with about half of the total decline in their employment share taking place in recessions.

The key question is whether labor demand growth is and might remain a bit too weak to keep up with even modest labor supply growth. There are already some concerning signs of this. The labor market is now somewhat weaker than it was just before the pandemic, job growth has turned negative on net in recent months outside of the healthcare industry, and company management teams are increasingly focused on using AI to reduce their labor costs, a potentially long-lasting headwind to labor demand. History also suggests that the full consequences of AI for the labor market might not become apparent until a recession hits. Economists Nir Jaimovich and Henry Siu have estimated that since the 1970s, most employment losses in routine manual occupations—those particularly exposed to the technological innovations of the past half-century—have come during recessions. Around half of the total decline in the employment share of these occupations has taken place in recessions.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Economists Nir Jaimovich and Henry Siu estimate that since the 1970s most employment losses in routine manual occupations have occurred during recessions, with about half of the total decline in their employment share taking place in recessions.
  2. Job growth has turned negative on net in recent months outside of the healthcare industry, and the labor market is somewhat weaker than it was just before the pandemic.
  3. Company management teams are increasingly focused on using AI to reduce labor costs, a potentially long-lasting headwind to labor demand whose full consequences for the labor market might not become apparent until a recession hits.

Related Articles:

  • Millions of Workers Are Left Out of the ‘Low-Hire, Low-Fire’ US Job Market — Economists expect anemic payroll growth with unemployment holding at 4.3%, a relatively low rate that masks workers stuck in unwanted jobs or underemployed. Goldman Sachs economists say labor market churn—the flow into and out of jobs—has fallen well below pre-Covid levels, and unemployment among 16-to-24-year-olds reached 10.5%.
  • Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence — Using payroll records covering millions of US workers, the authors find employment for workers aged 22–25 in occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence, such as software developers and customer service representatives, declined 6%, while employment for older workers in those occupations rose 6–9%. Employment in less-exposed occupations grew comparably across age groups.
  • What the Graduate Unemployment Story Gets Wrong — Comparing recent graduates with others newly entering the labor market, rather than with all non-graduates of similar age, shows those without a degree are faring worse: US unemployment among recent college graduates is up 1.3 percentage points from its low, versus 2.4 points for recent entrants without a degree.

AI Summary. Gold fell as much as 6.3% after reaching a record $4,381.52 an ounce, its largest drop in 12 years, following a weeks-long rally to successive highs. Contributing factors included positive US-China trade talks, a stronger dollar, overstretched technical indicators, and the end of a seasonal buying period in India.

Jack Ryan and Yvonne Yue Li Bloomberg
Date Posted:

Gold fell by as much as 6.3% (5.2% as of now) today after hitting a record high on Monday. Year-to-date, gold has risen 55%.

Why did gold prices drop sharply after hitting a record high?

Core argument: Gold fell by as much as 6.3%, its largest drop in 12 years, a day after reaching a record high of $4,381.52 an ounce.

Gold slid the most in 12 years after a weeks-long furious rally that sent the precious metal to successive record highs. Bullion prices fell by as much as 6.3% after hitting a fresh peak of $4,381.52 an ounce the previous day. A confluence of factors dragged down the precious metal including positive trade talks between China and the US, a stronger dollar, overstretched technicals, and uncertainty on investor positioning due to the government shutdown and the end of a seasonal buying spree in India.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Gold fell by as much as 6.3%, its largest drop in 12 years, a day after reaching a record high of $4,381.52 an ounce.
  2. The gold selloff followed a weeks-long rally that had carried bullion to successive record highs.
  3. Factors weighing on gold included positive US-China trade talks, a stronger dollar, overstretched technicals, uncertainty on investor positioning tied to the government shutdown, and the end of a seasonal buying spree in India.

Related Articles:

  • Gold Prices Top $4,000 for First Time — Gold topped $4,000 a troy ounce for the first time, with futures rising more than 50% in a year — a bigger run-up than during the pandemic or the 2007-09 recession, and the largest since the inflationary shock of 1979. Central-bank buying has helped gold surpass the euro as the world's second-largest reserve asset.
  • De-Dollarization? Diversification? Exploring Central Bank Gold Purchases and the Dollar’s Role in International Reserves — Central banks' gold accumulation is generally not associated with reducing the dollar's share of international reserves at the country level, apart from a few prominent cases, and is more consistent with modest overall diversification. Gold's role as an official-sector store of value has grown, but its use as a unit of account and medium of exchange remains limited.

AI Summary. Chinese banks have shifted their trade financing toward the renminbi, which now accounts for 72% of the roughly $250bn of Chinese trade credit extended since 2017, up from 17% of about $150bn during 2017-2021. The dollar share of Chinese trade credit is falling, and dollar trade credit provision may be negative.

Martin Lynge Rasmussen Money: Inside and Out
Date Posted:
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Between 2017 and 2021, only 17% of $150B of Chinese trade financing was denominated in RMB. Since 2022, $100B in trade financing has been RMB denominated, opening up an avenue for China to de-dollarize.

Is trade financing shifting from dollars to renminbi?

Core argument: Renminbi accounts for 72% of the cumulative $250bn of Chinese trade credit extended since 2017, up from 17% of the roughly $150bn provided during 2017–2021.

Chinese banks have begun to provide substantial amounts of renminbi-denominated trade financing in the last 1-2 years. The current scale is not unusual per se. What is notable is that the financing now seems to be heavily renminbi-denominated. Chinese trade credit added up to around $150bn during 2017-2021, and only 17% was in RMB. However, since 2022, the composition has changed, and renminbi has grown so quickly that it now makes up 72% of the cumulative $250bn extended since 2017. In other words, the Dollar share of Chinese trade credit is dropping sharply. In fact, the provision of USD trade credit may be negative.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Renminbi accounts for 72% of the cumulative $250bn of Chinese trade credit extended since 2017, up from 17% of the roughly $150bn provided during 2017–2021.
  2. Chinese banks have begun providing substantial renminbi-denominated trade financing, with the overall scale not unusual but the currency composition shifting heavily toward renminbi since 2022.
  3. The dollar share of Chinese trade credit is dropping sharply, and the provision of US dollar trade credit may be negative.

Related Articles:

  • China FX Diversification and the Dollar — The dollar's share of China's cross-border transfers has fallen from 80-85% to 40-45% over roughly 15 years, with the decline driven mainly by higher renminbi flows, and the renminbi's share of global trade financing has risen from about 2% to over 7%. China's foreign exchange reserve composition and onshore trading remain dollar-dominated.
  • China Emerges From Trade Chaos With Record Exports, Surplus — China posted a record half-year trade surplus of about $586bn, with exports up 5.8% year-over-year to $325bn and imports up 1.1%. Shipments to the US fell 16.1% from a year earlier, while exports to the 10 Southeast Asian nations in the Asean group rose 17%.
  • Why China Should Revalue the Renminbi—And Why It Can’t Easily Do So — A stronger renminbi would erode Chinese manufacturers' competitiveness at a time when Beijing depends on them for employment and output, because that competitiveness and China's weak household consumption stem from the same transfers. In the short term a rising currency could cut export demand faster than domestic demand rises, risking job losses, falling industrial profits, and financial stress.

Wednesday, October 22, 2025

AI Summary. A slowdown in housing supply growth has weighed on affordability, with the share of housing stock available for sale or rent below its historical average, implying a gap between supply and demand. The analysis estimates that restoring affordability would require roughly 3–4mn additional units, or 2–2.6% of current stock, with California and Florida facing the largest shortages.

Elsie Peng and Pierfrancesco Mei Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:
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A Goldman analysis suggests restoring housing affordability to late 1990s levels will require construction of 3–4mm new units, equivalent to 2–2.6% of the current housing stock.

How many additional housing units would restoring affordability require?

Core argument: The authors estimate that fixing the U.S. housing shortage and restoring affordability requires roughly 3–4mn additional housing units, equal to 2–2.6% of the current housing stock.

A sharp and prolonged slowdown in the growth of housing supply following the 2007-09 Great Recession has weighed on affordability. The share of total housing stock available for sale or rental is now below its historical average, which implies a gap between supply and demand. Our analysis suggests that fixing the shortage and restoring affordability will require around 3–4mn additional housing units, or 2-2.6% of the current housing stock. Among states, we find that California and Florida have the largest shortages. Other studies estimate the national housing shortfall to be around 1.5-5.5mn units, or 1-3.7% of the current housing stock. While it is hard to directly compare some of these estimates to ours because they used different assumptions and reference points for affordability, their median estimate is broadly in line with our findings.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that fixing the U.S. housing shortage and restoring affordability requires roughly 3–4mn additional housing units, equal to 2–2.6% of the current housing stock.
  2. A sharp and prolonged slowdown in housing supply growth after the 2007–09 Great Recession has weighed on affordability, with the share of total housing stock available for sale or rental now below its historical average.
  3. The analysis finds California and Florida have the largest state-level housing shortages, while other studies estimate the national shortfall at 1.5–5.5mn units, or 1–3.7% of the current housing stock, with a median broadly in line with the authors' findings.

Related Articles:

  • Inflation Adjusted House Prices 2.7% Below 2022 Peak — Inflation-adjusted US house prices are 2.7% below their 2022 peak. An affordability index built from median income, a 15% down payment, and 30-year fixed mortgage rates shows the monthly principal-and-interest payment on a $500,000 house rose 94% over four years as prices climbed 24% and mortgage rates went from 2.87% to 6.72%.
  • America’s Housing Affordability Crisis and the Decline of Housing Supply — Housing production intensity has fallen substantially, especially in fast-growing Sunbelt markets once known for building, converging toward the low rates long seen on the coasts and in declining industrial centers. The authors argue incumbent-controlled regulation explains the weakening link between high prices, high demand areas, and new construction.
  • The Price of Housing in the United States — Real housing price appreciation in the United States has varied widely across regions, with West Coast cities rising earlier while prices in other regions remained comparable in real terms to decades earlier. The authors find essentially no relationship between real price growth and zoning restrictiveness in the earliest period studied, and progressively steeper gradients in later periods.

AI Summary. The business hiring rate is very low by historical standards, not far above its level during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, and private job-postings data suggest the picture is getting worse. Consumer survey responses show a narrow 8-point gap between those saying jobs are plentiful and hard to get, while long-term unemployment has soared.

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:

Non-government layoffs are not high, but business hiring is not far above its level during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. The number of labor market participants unemployed for more than 27 weeks rose from 1.45mm to 1.95mm between May and August 2025.

Is the labor market weaker than headline unemployment suggests?

Core argument: The Conference Board's spread between respondents saying jobs are "plentiful" versus "hard to get" narrowed to 8 points (27 versus 19), down from roughly 40 points in late 2019 before Covid.

The rate at which businesses are hiring is very low by historical standards, not far above its level during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. These data aren’t currently being updated because of the government shutdown, but we get a more up-to-date picture from private sources, such as job postings from Indeed.com, and they suggest that the picture is, if anything, getting worse. The influential monthly consumer survey conducted by the Conference Board asks people whether jobs are “plentiful” or “hard to get.” In late 2019, on the eve of Covid, almost half of respondents said jobs were plentiful, versus around 10% saying hard to get — a spread of around 40 points. In the latest Conference Board survey the spread was only 8 points, 27 versus 19. This tells us that American workers are very worried that if they should happen to lose their job, they’ll have a hard time finding another. And they’re right. Overall unemployment hasn’t risen that much, but the number of long-term unemployed — would-be workers who have been jobless for more than 6 months — had soared as of August, and has probably continued to rise since then.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Conference Board's spread between respondents saying jobs are "plentiful" versus "hard to get" narrowed to 8 points (27 versus 19), down from roughly 40 points in late 2019 before Covid.
  2. The U.S. business hiring rate is very low by historical standards, not far above its level during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, and Indeed.com job postings suggest the picture is getting worse.
  3. The number of Americans jobless for more than six months had soared as of August even as overall unemployment rose little, while the government shutdown has halted updates to official hiring data.

Related Articles:

  • Jobless Growth — Labor demand growth may be too weak to keep pace with even modest labor supply growth: the labor market is somewhat weaker than before the pandemic, job growth has turned negative outside healthcare, and firms are focused on using AI to cut labor costs. Economists estimate most employment losses in routine manual occupations since the 1970s occurred during recessions.
  • How America’s AI Boom Is Squeezing The Rest Of The Economy — About a sixth of America's 2% real GDP growth over the past year came from investment in computer and communications equipment and data centres, and one estimate puts the artificial intelligence boom's total contribution to growth at 40%. Average electricity bills rose 7%, attributed in part to data-centre demand, while housebuilding and non-AI business investment slumped and real consumption flatlined.
  • Honey, AI Capex Keeps Eating … Everything — The author estimates that AI-related capital spending contributed between 0.6% and 1.3% of a quarter's 3% U.S. GDP growth, based on information technology equipment and intellectual property investment data. Google, Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft alone spent about $69bn in the quarter, roughly half of all information technology equipment spending on an annualized basis.

AI Summary. Amazon's automation team expects robotics to let the company avoid hiring more than 160,000 U.S. workers it would otherwise need by 2027, saving about 30 cents per item picked, packed and delivered. Executives hope to keep the U.S. workforce flat even while selling twice as many products by 2033.

Karen Weise New York Times
Date Posted:

The New York Times reports that Amazon’s automation team expects the company can avoid hiring more than 160,000 workers it would otherwise need in the US by 2027 due to increased automation.

Can robots let a retailer double sales without adding workers?

Core argument: Amazon's automation team expects robotics to let the company avoid hiring more than 160,000 U.S. workers it would otherwise need by 2027, saving about 30 cents on each item picked, packed and delivered.

Amazon’s U.S. workforce has more than tripled since 2018 to almost 1.2 million. But Amazon’s automation team expects the company can avoid hiring more than 160,000 people in the United States it would otherwise need by 2027. That would save about 30 cents on each item that Amazon picks, packs and delivers to customers. Executives told Amazon’s board last year that they hoped robotic automation would allow the company to continue to avoid adding to its U.S. workforce in the coming years, even though they expect to sell twice as many products by 2033. That would translate to more than 600,000 people whom Amazon didn’t need to hire.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Amazon's automation team expects robotics to let the company avoid hiring more than 160,000 U.S. workers it would otherwise need by 2027, saving about 30 cents on each item picked, packed and delivered.
  2. Amazon executives told the company's board that they hoped robotic automation would let Amazon avoid adding to its U.S. workforce in coming years even while selling twice as many products by 2033, equating to more than 600,000 people not hired.
  3. Amazon's U.S. workforce has more than tripled since 2018 to almost 1.2 million.

Related Articles:

  • Amazon Is on the Cusp of Using More Robots Than Humans in Its Warehouses — Amazon employs about 1.56m people overall and is approaching having more robots than human workers in its warehouses, with robots supplanting some employees and helping slow hiring. A Wall Street Journal analysis estimates its average employees per facility fell to roughly 670, a 16-year low, while packages shipped per employee rose from about 175 in 2015 to about 3,870.
  • America Is Missing The New Labor Economy – Robotics Part 1 — Building an identical robotic arm in the US costs about 2.2x more than in China, and US-labeled components still depend heavily on Chinese parts and materials with no scalable alternative. The author argues China is the only country positioned to capture full-scale intelligent robotic automation, which would let it outcompete the US across production.
  • How AI & Robots are Smashing Economics, and Why It Matters — As artificial intelligence and robots make wages less responsive to employment conditions, the link between tight labor markets and inflation weakens, undermining central banks' inflation-targeting frameworks. The author argues central banks would then need far larger interest-rate moves to achieve the same effect, producing more volatile and less predictable outcomes.

AI Summary. Research by Bloomberg Intelligence estimates that $7.7tn of the $20tn in US economic growth since 2000 is spending to recover from or prepare for disasters, reaching nearly $1tn in a recent 12-month span versus a 1990s annual average closer to $80bn in current dollars.

Eric Roston Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The US spent just under $1T in the 12 months ending in June on “recovering from or preparing for disasters,” according to a Bloomberg analysis. During the 1990s, the annual average was only $80B in current dollars.

How much of US economic growth comes from disaster spending?

Core argument: Bloomberg Intelligence senior analyst Andrew John Stevenson estimates about $7.7 trillion of the $20 trillion increase in US GDP since 2000 — to $29 trillion last year — is spending related to recovering from or preparing for disasters.

The US is now always paying to recover from disasters, and this is contributing a larger and larger share of GDP growth. The US economy has grown by $20 trillion since 2000, to $29 trillion last year. About $7.7 trillion of that is spending related to recovering from or preparing for disasters, according to research by Andrew John Stevenson, a senior analyst at Bloomberg Intelligence. The country spent almost $1 trillion in the 12 months ending in June. In the 1990s, the annual average was closer to $80 billion in current dollars. The money goes to insurers and waste haulers, power grid equipment manufacturers and engineering contractors, hardware stores and self-storage facilities. Stevenson created [the Prepare and Repair Index] a set of about 100 large public companies across many sectors that together outperformed the S&P 500 by 6.5% a year from October 2015 to October 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bloomberg Intelligence senior analyst Andrew John Stevenson estimates about $7.7 trillion of the $20 trillion increase in US GDP since 2000 — to $29 trillion last year — is spending related to recovering from or preparing for disasters.
  2. US disaster-related spending reached almost $1 trillion in the 12 months ending in June, against an annual average closer to $80 billion in current dollars in the 1990s, according to Stevenson's research.
  3. Stevenson's Prepare and Repair Index of about 100 large public companies across many sectors outperformed the S&P 500 by 6.5% a year from October 2015 to October 2025.

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  • Runaway Insurance Costs Bring Back Talk of Price Caps — State regulators have approved home insurance rate increases averaging 50% and auto increases averaging 42%, outpacing a 26% rise in consumer prices over the same period, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence and Labor Department data.
  • Insurance: Climbing Costs Cut Into Consumer Budgets — Bank of America internal data show median household property insurance payments (auto and home) rose 6% year-over-year and more than 40% over five years, lifting such payments to 5% of income. Younger generations saw the largest increases, though Gen X payments also rose 45%.
  • The World Is Getting Riskier. Americans Don’t Want to Pay for It — Americans' resistance to paying to insure against risks from illness, old age, and natural and financial disasters is growing alongside those risks; JPMorgan estimated wildfires around Los Angeles caused $50bn in losses, of which only $20bn were insured. Socializing risk removes the price signal that encourages the insured to mitigate their own exposure.

AI Summary. China is a key driver of rising gold prices through central bank purchases, arbitrage trading, and greater speculative and safe-haven buying by households. Higher business uncertainty in the US is also pushing gold prices up.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:

Citing a rise in gold stock levels in Chinese warehouses, central bank purchases, and increased safe-haven demand from Chinese households, Torsten Sløk argues China is playing a key role in the rise of gold prices.

Is China driving the rise in gold prices?

Core argument: China is playing a key role in the rise in gold prices through central bank purchases, arbitrage trading, and increased speculative and safe-haven demand by Chinese households.

China is playing a key role in the ongoing rise in gold prices because of central bank purchases, arbitrage trading, and increased speculative and safe-haven demand by households. Higher business uncertainty in the US is also pushing gold prices up.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China is playing a key role in the rise in gold prices through central bank purchases, arbitrage trading, and increased speculative and safe-haven demand by Chinese households.
  2. Higher business uncertainty in the United States is also pushing gold prices up.

Related Articles:

  • Gold Slumps Most in 12 Years as Record-Breaking Rally Cools — Gold fell as much as 6.3% after reaching a record $4,381.52 an ounce, its largest drop in 12 years, following a weeks-long rally to successive highs. Contributing factors included positive US-China trade talks, a stronger dollar, overstretched technical indicators, and the end of a seasonal buying period in India.
  • State of Chinese Gold Demand — Gold broke above its $3,200–$3,400 range to a record high above $3,600, with the near-term catalyst identified as threats to Federal Reserve independence driving US investor demand. Chinese total gold demand bottomed near $9bn and nearly doubled to $16bn before moderating to about $13bn as private-sector buying partially normalized.
  • De-Dollarization? Diversification? Exploring Central Bank Gold Purchases and the Dollar’s Role in International Reserves — Central banks' gold accumulation is generally not associated with reducing the dollar's share of international reserves at the country level, apart from a few prominent cases, and is more consistent with modest overall diversification. Gold's role as an official-sector store of value has grown, but its use as a unit of account and medium of exchange remains limited.

AI Summary. Bird flu has killed nearly 7m farmed birds in the United States in recent months, including about 1.3m turkeys, pressuring the nation's turkey supply. The virus has affected more than 180m farmed birds, spread to over 1,000 dairy herds across 18 states, and infected at least 70 people, mostly farmworkers.

Emily Anthes and Apoorva Mandavilli New York Times
Date Posted:

Bird flu is surging in part due to the fall migration, resulting in the deaths of almost 7mm farmed birds in the US since the start of September.

How widely has bird flu spread across poultry, cattle, and people?

Core argument: Bird flu has killed nearly seven million farmed birds in the United States since the beginning of September, including about 1.3 million turkeys, putting pressure on the nation's turkey supply ahead of Thanksgiving.

After a quiet summer, the virus has hit dozens of poultry flocks, resulting in the deaths of nearly seven million farmed birds in the United States since the beginning of September. Among them: about 1.3 million turkeys, putting pressure on the nation’s turkey supply in the run-up to Thanksgiving. Reports of infected wild birds have also surged this fall, and three states — Idaho, Nebraska and Texas — have identified outbreaks in dairy cows. Since early 2022, the virus has affected more than 180 million farmed birds and killed countless wild ones. But it has also infected dozens of new species, suggesting that it has changed significantly over time. In early 2024, it spilled over into dairy cows, eventually spreading to more than 1,000 herds in 18 states. And it has infected at least 70 people, mostly farmworkers, resulting in several hospitalizations and one death.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bird flu has killed nearly seven million farmed birds in the United States since the beginning of September, including about 1.3 million turkeys, putting pressure on the nation's turkey supply ahead of Thanksgiving.
  2. Since early 2022, the virus has affected more than 180 million farmed birds and infected dozens of new species, suggesting it has changed significantly over time.
  3. Bird flu spilled over into dairy cows in early 2024 and spread to more than 1,000 herds in 18 states, and it has infected at least 70 people, mostly farmworkers, resulting in several hospitalizations and one death.

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