Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, October 2, 2025

AI Summary. JPMorgan analysts estimate that the Federal Reserve's Treasury holdings have fallen $180bn as it pursues quantitative tightening, while commercial banks' holdings are down $60bn and foreign official holdings down $50bn. The analysts describe simultaneous negative demand from all three buyer types as rare and say they remain concerned about the lack of structural demand for Treasuries.

Tracy Alloway Bloomberg
Date Posted:

JPM estimates that since the start of the year, the Fed’s treasury holdings dropped $180B and commercial banks’ holdings have decreased by $60B. Foreign official holdings fell by $50B over the last 6 months on a rolling basis, according to the analysis.

Is structural demand for Treasuries falling across all major buyers?

Core argument: JPMorgan's Jay Barry and Srini Ramaswamy estimate the Federal Reserve's Treasury holdings have fallen $180bn year to date as the central bank embarks on quantitative tightening.

Jay Barry and Srini Ramaswamy estimate that the Fed’s Treasury holdings have dropped by $180 billion year to date as the central bank embarks on quantitative tightening. Meanwhile, commercial banks’ collective holdings of Treasuries have fallen by $60 billion this year, after growing more than $700 billion in 2020 through 2021. And foreign governments are also stepping back, with official holdings having dropped $50 billion over the past six months. “The reversal in demand has been stunning as it has been rare for demand from each of these three investor types to all be negative at the same time,” the analysts say. [They caution] “We remain concerned about the (lack of) structural demand for Treasuries.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. JPMorgan's Jay Barry and Srini Ramaswamy estimate the Federal Reserve's Treasury holdings have fallen $180bn year to date as the central bank embarks on quantitative tightening.
  2. Commercial banks' collective Treasury holdings have fallen $60bn this year, after growing more than $700bn from 2020 through 2021, according to the JPMorgan analysts.
  3. Foreign official holdings of Treasuries have dropped $50bn over the past six months, and Barry and Ramaswamy call the simultaneous reversal in demand across all three investor types stunning and rare, citing concern about the lack of structural demand.

Related Articles:

  • Fiscal Risk from Rising Bond Yields — US interest rates fell for roughly 40 years before the pandemic, allowing maturing high-coupon debt to be refinanced at lower rates and keeping federal interest expense manageable even as debt rose. Because Congressional Budget Office projections assume the 10-year Treasury yield drifts down to 3.8% from about 4.1%, the author argues its debt-service projections face upside risk.
  • Why Microsoft Has Lower Borrowing Costs Than the U.S. — Two AAA-rated Microsoft bonds trade at yields slightly below equivalent U.S. Treasurys, an unusual negative spread given that companies are more likely to default than a government able to tax and that corporate bonds are harder to sell. Demand for high-quality corporate debt has compressed the AAA corporate spread to 0.3 percentage point over Treasurys.
  • Our Thoughts on Large US Deficits and Their Impact on Bond Yields — Total borrowing in the US is about average despite high government deficits, as high public borrowing has contributed to the need for higher interest rates that have depressed private sector borrowing. Risk premiums on long-dated debt look about average, with no market signs that economic or debt limits are currently being hit.

AI Summary. The author estimates a US convenience yield by subtracting currency-hedged foreign yields from US Treasury yields, finding it persists at the 1-year maturity but has eroded at 5- and 10-year maturities. The erosion at longer maturities reflects global markets pricing a larger US-specific risk premium.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:

While the dollar’s weakness is likely being driven by the same fiscal deterioration that is spiking long yields in Germany and Japan, the imposition of tariffs had a real impact on the US’s convenience yield relative to other safe havens.

Has the US convenience yield eroded at longer Treasury maturities?

Core argument: The US convenience yield on Treasuries, measured as US yields minus FX-hedged trade-weighted foreign yields, remains in place at the 1-year tenor but has eroded at the 5- and 10-year tenors in annual averages from 2007 to 2025.

The left chart above calculates the convenience yield on US Treasuries at 1-, 5- and 10-year tenors. The way I do this is to subtract from US yields the trade-weighted average foreign yield after I’ve used FX forwards of the appropriate tenor to hedge foreign yields back into Dollars. The result is an interest differential, where a positive number means that US yields are below the foreign, $-denominated yield. On a longer horizon - the chart shows annual averages for this differential from 2007 to 2025 - the US convenience yield remains in place for 1-year Treasuries (red line), but has eroded for 5-year (blue line) and 10-year (black line) Treasuries. This difference is no surprise. It’s at longer tenors that risk premia have built and eroded the US convenience yield. The fact that a 1-year convenience yield remains in place is thus of little comfort. The right chart shows exactly the same data but zooms in on daily data starting in January 2024. It shows that the US was in the process of clawing back its convenience yield earlier this year, until the chaos of “Liberation Day” snuffed that out. The 5- and 10-year differentials fell back sharply, a sign that global markets priced a larger US-specific risk premium at longer tenors.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US convenience yield on Treasuries, measured as US yields minus FX-hedged trade-weighted foreign yields, remains in place at the 1-year tenor but has eroded at the 5- and 10-year tenors in annual averages from 2007 to 2025.
  2. Daily data starting in January 2024 show the US clawing back its convenience yield until "Liberation Day," after which the 5- and 10-year differentials fell back sharply.
  3. The erosion of the US convenience yield at longer tenors is attributed to risk premia building at those tenors, with the post-"Liberation Day" drop read as global markets pricing a larger US-specific risk premium.

Related Articles:

  • The Relentless Rise in Gold Prices — Gold prices rose 16% following a Federal Reserve speech signaling further interest-rate easing, after months of flat prices. The dollar remained stable against other major currencies during the rally, suggesting a flight out of major currencies generally amid fears of inflation and currency debasement rather than out of the dollar specifically.
  • Tariffs, the Dollar, and Equities: High-Frequency Evidence from the Liberation Day Announcement — Following a sweeping US tariff announcement, the dollar's effective exchange rate depreciated rather than appreciating as standard international macroeconomic models predict: all G10 currencies gained against the dollar while the most freely floating emerging market currencies gained less or fell. The authors read this as advanced economies rebalancing away from dollar assets.
  • Global Debt Report 2025 — About 60% of fixed-rate government debt in advanced economies maturing by 2027 — roughly $9tn — was issued before the recent interest-rate tightening, with weighted average yields below 2% versus projected 10-year rates near 3.6%, implying refinancing at nearly double the original cost. France, Spain, the UK, and the US face heightened vulnerability, with maturing debt exceeding 15% of GDP.

AI Summary. A draft European Union proposal would raise the tariff on steel imports to 50%, up from the current 25% duty applied once quotas are exhausted, and cut the quota volume allowed in before the higher rate applies by nearly half. The move would align the bloc's rate with the 50% US tariff on steel and aluminum.

Alberto Nardelli Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The EU is planning on hiking tariffs on steel imports to 50%, matching the US’s current rate. The bloc is hoping to negotiate a lower rate with the US while fending off cheap Chinese imports.

Is the EU doubling its steel tariff to match US rates?

Core argument: The European Union plans to raise steel import tariffs to 50%, up from the 25% duty applied once quotas are exhausted, and cut by nearly half the volume allowed in before the higher rate applies, according to a draft proposal seen by Bloomberg.

The European Union plans to hike tariffs on steel imports to 50% and cut by nearly a half the volume of steel that’s allowed in before that higher rate is imposed, according to a draft proposal seen by Bloomberg. The EU currently has a temporary mechanism in place to safeguard its steel industry, which imposes a 25% duty on most imports once quotas are exhausted. That mechanism expires in June and the EU has been working to replace it with a more permanent regulation, which it plans to unveil next week. The bloc’s steel industry has faced a severe crisis in recent years as it grapples with cheap imports from China and other Asian economies. Furthermore, US President Donald Trump increased tariffs on steel and aluminum imports to 50% shortly after taking office. Separately, the EU is hoping to negotiate arrangements with the Trump administration that would lower the 50% rates the bloc’s steel and aluminium exports to the US currently face. The move will align the bloc’s rate with the US, which has sought to push back against overcapacity from China.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The European Union plans to raise steel import tariffs to 50%, up from the 25% duty applied once quotas are exhausted, and cut by nearly half the volume allowed in before the higher rate applies, according to a draft proposal seen by Bloomberg.
  2. The European Union's temporary steel safeguard mechanism expires in June, and the bloc plans to unveil a more permanent replacement regulation that would align its rate with the 50% US tariff on steel and aluminum imports.
  3. The European Union is seeking arrangements with the Trump administration to lower the 50% rates its steel and aluminium exports to the US face, while its steel industry grapples with cheap imports from China and other Asian economies.

Related Articles:

  • The Boom in New Steel Mills Is Outpacing Demand — US steelmakers have gained market share from imports but have not prevented prices from slipping amid soft demand from major buyers such as the auto and construction industries. About 21m tons of additional US steel production capacity has been announced, started or completed over four years, roughly a quarter of last year's total US output.
  • Steel Productivity has Plummeted Since Trump’s 2018 Tariffs — Output per hour in the U.S. steel industry has fallen 32% since 2017, following the imposition of 25% tariffs on steel imports, while output per hour for the economy as a whole rose 15%. U.S. steel-using firms, which employ roughly 45x as many Americans as steel producers, pay about 75% more for steel than global competitors.
  • Underestimating China — China's productive capacity is three times that of the United States and exceeds the next nine countries combined, with its share of global manufacturing quintupling to 30% while the U.S. share halved to about 15%. The authors argue Washington must convert its alliances into a platform for pooled capacity building.

AI Summary. More than 116m Americans use TikTok each month, with 18-to-25-year-olds spending nearly an hour a day scrolling or posting videos. Teenagers spend more time on TikTok than on YouTube and Instagram combined.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:

Americans, ages 18–24, spend more than three hours a day on social media; nearly an hour of it on TikTok. More than 116mm Americans use TikTok monthly.

How much of young Americans' attention does TikTok command?

Core argument: More than 116m Americans use TikTok every month, with the app especially popular among young Americans.

More than 116m Americans use TikTok every month. It is particularly popular among young Americans. The most voracious are 18 to 25 year-olds who, in June, spent nearly an hour a day scrolling or posting videos. For teenagers it is the app of choice: they spend more time on TikTok than on YouTube and Instagram combined.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. More than 116m Americans use TikTok every month, with the app especially popular among young Americans.
  2. Americans aged 18 to 25 are TikTok's most voracious users, spending nearly an hour a day in June scrolling or posting videos.
  3. American teenagers spend more time on TikTok than on YouTube and Instagram combined.

Related Articles:

  • Trump Signs TikTok Order With US App Valued at $14 Billion — A US ownership deal for TikTok's American operations values the app at $14bn, with Oracle, Silver Lake Management and Abu Dhabi-based MGX in talks to invest and take board seats. The US entity would lease a copy of ByteDance's algorithm and retrain it under Oracle's oversight, which some US lawmakers doubt satisfies the divestment law.
  • Why the TikTok Era Spells Trouble For The Establishment — Video-first platforms like TikTok and Instagram reward charisma, energy and delivery over being first with news, a shift that favors political outsiders and upstart media outlets less tied to establishment politicians and freer to publish what mainstream outlets would not. Research finds the newest class of news influencers lean slightly right, and even those with other politics are anti-establishment.
  • Teens Used To Be Happier. What Changed? — The share of US high school seniors describing themselves as "very happy" peaked at 24.8% and remained around 24.4% before falling to 11.4% at its low, recovering only to 12.7%, well below the 17.9% recorded before the pandemic. The decline coincided with smartphones and social media becoming pervasive.

Friday, October 3, 2025

AI Summary. The author argues that large language models are compressing variance in knowledge domains such as writing, coding, finance, and reasoning, much as baseball lost its .400 hitters when top performers' relative distinctiveness faded. As rising general competence masks the tails of the distribution, societies become less able to identify, reward, and sustain true outliers.

Paul Kedrosky Applied Complexity
Date Posted:

Drawing a parallel with the disappearance of .400 hitters as average player performance improved, Kedrosky argues LLM adoption means rising baseline intellectual performance while “true outliers” are more difficult to find and sustain.

Do AI models make top performers harder to identify?

Core argument: The author argues that large language models are compressing variance across knowledge domains including writing, coding, finance, reasoning, and creating, pushing the tails of performance distributions closer to the mean and thinning them.

All distributions are compressing at once under the evolutionary pressure of LLMs. Like batting averages in baseball, variance in many/most knowledge domains is collapsing. The consequence: our ability to identify true outliers—our “.400 hitters” of thought, design, or creativity—erodes. The tails of the distribution exist, but they are closer to the mean, less populated, and masked by the rising competence of everyone else. This is not about tools “making us better.” It is about the compression of variance in creative domains where variance mattered: writing, coding, finance, reasoning, and creating. Just as baseball lost its .400 hitters—not because top hitters no longer existed, but because their relative distinctiveness disappeared—intellectual and creative .400 hitters will become much harder to detect. Evolution does not necessarily march toward higher peaks but toward tighter distributions around a plateau. Once variance collapses, the outliers vanish into the baseline. And societies that cannot recognize outliers cannot reward or sustain them. Or they seize upon stranger differentiators, divorced from actual performance, which is a topic for another day.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author argues that large language models are compressing variance across knowledge domains including writing, coding, finance, reasoning, and creating, pushing the tails of performance distributions closer to the mean and thinning them.
  2. The author draws an analogy to baseball's disappearance of .400 hitters, which reflected the loss of top hitters' relative distinctiveness rather than their absence, to argue intellectual and creative outliers will become much harder to detect.

Related Articles:

  • Long-Term Shareholder Returns: Evidence From 64,000 Global Stocks — A study of about 64,000 global stocks estimates net global stock market wealth creation of $75.7tn, with returns highly concentrated: the top 159 firms (0.25%) account for half of net wealth creation and the top 1,526 (2.39%) account for all of it. Fewer than half of stocks beat one-month US Treasury bills, 42.6% of non-US and 44.8% of US stocks.
  • Which U.S. Stocks Generated the Highest Long-Term Returns? — Of the 29,078 U.S. common stocks in a database spanning nearly a century, 51.6% had negative cumulative returns, while 17 stocks returned more than 5m% — led by Altria at 265m%. Those top performers averaged annualized returns of just 13.47%, underscoring the value of time invested.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.

AI Summary. Citigroup estimates annual spending on artificial intelligence equipment has risen by 0.9% of GDP a year, a bigger surge than at the comparable point of the 1995-2004 internet boom, when productivity growth averaged 2.9% a year and economic growth reached 3.3%. Citigroup economists argue recent growth has been boosted by demand from that investment rather than by supply-side productivity gains.

Greg Ip Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Citing a Citi analysis, Greg Ip suggests that over the next several years, “AI could raise productivity growth by 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points a year—less than the ‘Internet Revolution of 1995–2000,’ except in the most bullish scenario.”

Is AI investment boosting growth through demand rather than productivity?

Core argument: Citigroup estimates annual spending on AI equipment has risen by 0.9% of GDP a year since 2023, a bigger surge than at the equivalent point of the 1995–2004 internet boom.

Economists at Citigroup recently compared the [1995-2000 “Internet Revolution” to today]. The prior boom began in 1995 with the initial public offering of Netscape and the full commercialization of network infrastructure developed by the National Science Foundation. In the first five years of the boom, annual internet-related investment rose by a massive 1.25% of GDP. Annual productivity growth averaged 2.9% from 1995 to 2004, double the rate of the prior two decades. At that rate, per capita incomes double in 24 instead of 47 years. The productivity boost lifted annual economic growth to 3.3%. Citi estimates annual spending on AI equipment has risen by 0.9% of GDP a year since 2023, a bigger surge than at the equivalent point of the 1995-2004 boom. Nathan Sheets of Citi said GDP growth has been boosted by the demand-side fuel of all that AI investment, not by its supply-side productivity benefits.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Citigroup estimates annual spending on AI equipment has risen by 0.9% of GDP a year since 2023, a bigger surge than at the equivalent point of the 1995–2004 internet boom.
  2. Annual internet-related investment rose by 1.25% of GDP in the first five years of the boom that began in 1995, while productivity growth averaged 2.9% from 1995 to 2004, double the rate of the prior two decades.
  3. Nathan Sheets of Citigroup said GDP growth has been boosted by the demand-side fuel of AI investment rather than by its supply-side productivity benefits.

Related Articles:

  • The Blob: Capital, China, Chips, Chicago and Chilliwack — Data center construction spending has eclipsed office construction, and the specialized power rates most data centers pay fall short of covering the cost of a new natural gas plant, leaving other customers to bear part of the bill. In the PJM grid region, data center demand accounted for 70% of the increase in electricity costs over the past year.
  • Honey, AI Capex is Eating the Economy — Capital spending on AI data centers is around 20% of railroads' peak spending as a share of GDP and is rising quickly, having already surpassed the dot-com era peak in telecom investment. Unlike long-lived rail infrastructure, data centers are short-lived assets requiring frequent hardware replacement, and the capital is being reallocated from other sectors.
  • The Productivity Slowdown in Advanced Economies: Common Shocks or Common Trends? — Total factor productivity is the main factor accounting for differences in labor productivity growth across countries and over time, and its growth has been lackluster across large advanced economies since the mid-2000s. The authors find this slowdown appears in both manufacturing and market services, with U.S. productivity growth slowing before the Great Recession.

AI Summary. Other English-speaking countries such as the UK, Canada, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand direct more pension spending toward preventing old-age poverty and far less toward middle- and upper-income retirees, with maximum US Social Security benefits running two to four times higher in dollar terms. One proposed reform would base benefits on years worked rather than contributions.

Andrew Biggs American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:

Andrew Biggs notes that the maximum Social Security payout for a high-income couple is almost $100,000 annually, 2 to 4 times higher in dollar terms than the payouts for their peers in other Anglosphere countries.

Should public pensions target old-age poverty rather than higher-income retirees?

Core argument: The maximum U.S. Social Security benefit approaches $100,000 per year for a high-income couple, two to four times higher in dollar terms than benefits paid in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand.

Most Anglo countries, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand, focus more of their pension resources on preventing poverty in old age and less, much less, on paying benefits to middle and upper income seniors. The maximum Social Security benefit, which today approaches $100,000 per year for a high-income couple, is two to four times higher in dollar terms than is paid in these other countries. A middle-income couple retiring today receives over $58,000 in combined annual benefits. By 2050, they’ll get over $81,000. At some point, a safety net becomes something else entirely. [One example of a possible reform that would reduce costs] but maintain benefits for lower-income workers and provide a stronger safety net against poverty in old age, is that Americans would earn Social Security benefits based not on how much they paid into the program but upon how many years they worked, no matter how little they earned or paid into the system. But the plan would provide incentives to work longer, as continued work would result in higher benefits.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The maximum U.S. Social Security benefit approaches $100,000 per year for a high-income couple, two to four times higher in dollar terms than benefits paid in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand.
  2. Most Anglo countries concentrate more pension resources on preventing old-age poverty and much less on benefits for middle- and upper-income seniors, while a middle-income U.S. couple retiring today collects over $58,000 in combined annual benefits, rising to over $81,000 by 2050.
  3. One proposed reform would base Social Security benefits on years worked rather than amounts paid in, reducing costs while maintaining benefits for lower-income workers and providing higher benefits for those who continue working.

Related Articles:

  • Trends in the Distribution of Family Wealth, 1989 to 2022 — The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the top 10% of U.S. families held 60% of all wealth in 2022, up from 56% in 1989, with the top 1% holding 27%, up from 23%. The rest of the top half saw its share fall from 37% to 33%, while the bottom half held 6% in both years.
  • Social Security and Trends in Wealth Inequality — The authors estimate that including Social Security in household wealth leaves top wealth shares little changed over three decades, with the top 10% and top 1% shares rising 1.1 and 1.6 percentage points versus roughly 9 and 6 points for marketable wealth alone. Social Security wealth grew from $7tn to $39tn.
  • Europe’s Right-Wing Populists Swerve Left on the Economy — Right-wing populist parties across Europe, including the Sweden Democrats, Austria's Freedom Party, Germany's Alternative for Germany and France's National Rally, have shifted from small-government, low-tax, free-trade platforms toward calls for higher welfare benefits, subsidies and protectionism, often alongside pro-market positions.

AI Summary. An analysis of 250,000 adults in more than 50 countries finds time spent on social media peaked in 2022 and has since declined steadily, with developed-world adults aged 16 and older averaging 2 hours 20 minutes daily, almost 10% below 2022. North America is the exception, where usage continues to climb.

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
Date Posted:

According to an FT analysis, time spent on social media globally has declined 10% since its 2022 peak. An exception is North America, where in 2024 users spent 15% more time on social media than Europeans.

Is global time spent on social media declining?

Core argument: Adults aged 16 and older across the developed world spent an average of 2 hours 20 minutes per day on social media at the end of 2024, down almost 10% since the 2022 peak, according to GWI data on 250,000 adults in more than 50 countries compiled for the FT.

It has gone largely unnoticed that time spent on social media peaked in 2022 and has since gone into steady decline, according to an analysis of the online habits of 250,000 adults in more than 50 countries carried out for the FT by the digital audience insights company GWI. And this is not just the unwinding of a bump in screen time during pandemic lockdowns — usage has traced a smooth curve up and down over the past decade-plus. Across the developed world, adults aged 16 and older spent an average of two hours and 20 minutes per day on social platforms at the end of 2024, down by almost 10% since 2022. Notably, the decline is most pronounced among the erstwhile heaviest users — teens and 20-somethings. There is one notable exception to this promising international trend: North America, where consumption of social media’s diet of extreme rhetoric, engagement bait and slop continues to climb. By 2024 it had reached levels 15% higher than Europe.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Adults aged 16 and older across the developed world spent an average of 2 hours 20 minutes per day on social media at the end of 2024, down almost 10% since the 2022 peak, according to GWI data on 250,000 adults in more than 50 countries compiled for the FT.
  2. The decline in social media time is most pronounced among teens and 20-somethings, formerly the heaviest users, and usage has traced a smooth rise and fall over more than a decade rather than an unwinding of pandemic lockdown screen time.
  3. North America is the exception to the international decline, with social media consumption still climbing and reaching levels 15% above Europe by 2024.

Related Articles:

  • What Are TikTok’s New Owners Buying? — More than 116m Americans use TikTok each month, with 18-to-25-year-olds spending nearly an hour a day scrolling or posting videos. Teenagers spend more time on TikTok than on YouTube and Instagram combined.
  • Teens Used To Be Happier. What Changed? — The share of US high school seniors describing themselves as "very happy" peaked at 24.8% and remained around 24.4% before falling to 11.4% at its low, recovering only to 12.7%, well below the 17.9% recorded before the pandemic. The decline coincided with smartphones and social media becoming pervasive.
  • What’s Behind the Rapid Rise in LGBTQ Identity? — Young women use social media more than young men and are more likely to encounter accounts featuring LGBTQ topics, and research finds young women identifying as gay, lesbian, bisexual or queer are much more active on these platforms than straight women of the same age.

AI Summary. Inflation-adjusted US house prices are 2.7% below their 2022 peak. An affordability index built from median income, a 15% down payment, and 30-year fixed mortgage rates shows the monthly principal-and-interest payment on a $500,000 house rose 94% over four years as prices climbed 24% and mortgage rates went from 2.87% to 6.72%.

Bill McBride Calculated Risk
Date Posted:

Nationally, real house prices are now 2.7% below the 2022 peak and 9.8% above the 2006 peak. “Affordability” remains at levels last seen in the early 1980s, when 30-year mortgage rates were over 14%.

How have house prices and mortgage rates changed monthly payments?

Core argument: Inflation-adjusted U.S. house prices stand 2.7% below their 2022 peak, based on the Case-Shiller National Index, seasonally adjusted.

I’ve put together my own affordability index [using] median income from the Census Bureau (estimated 2024 and 2025), assumed a 15% down payment, and used a 2% estimate for property taxes, insurance and maintenance. This is probably low for high property tax states like New Jersey and Texas, and too high for lower property tax states. For house prices, I used the Case-Shiller National Index, Seasonally Adjusted (SA). Also, for the down payment - there wasn’t a significant difference between 15% and 20%. For mortgage rates, I used the Freddie Mac PMMS (30-year fixed rates). Here is what the index looks like (lower is more affordable). In July 2021, the payment on a $500,000 house, with a 20% down payment and 2.87% 30-year mortgage rates, would be around $1,658 for principal and interest. The monthly payment for the same house, with house prices up 24% over four years and mortgage rates at 6.72% in July 2025, would be $3,218 - an increase of 94%! Almost double the payment for the same house!

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Inflation-adjusted U.S. house prices stand 2.7% below their 2022 peak, based on the Case-Shiller National Index, seasonally adjusted.
  2. The monthly principal-and-interest payment on a $500,000 house rose 94%, from about $1,658 in July 2021 at a 2.87% 30-year mortgage rate to $3,218 in July 2025 at 6.72%, with prices up 24% over four years.
  3. The affordability index uses Census Bureau median income with 2024 and 2025 estimated, a 15% down payment, a 2% estimate for property taxes, insurance and maintenance, and Freddie Mac PMMS 30-year fixed rates, with little difference between 15% and 20% down.

Related Articles:

  • Why Are Young Adults in the English-Speaking World So Unhappy? — The share of young adults regularly experiencing stress and anger has risen sharply in the US, Canada, UK, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand while remaining largely stable elsewhere in the West. Real house prices since 1995 are up 85% in the US and over 200% in the other five countries.
  • How America’s AI Boom Is Squeezing The Rest Of The Economy — About a sixth of America's 2% real GDP growth over the past year came from investment in computer and communications equipment and data centres, and one estimate puts the artificial intelligence boom's total contribution to growth at 40%. Average electricity bills rose 7%, attributed in part to data-centre demand, while housebuilding and non-AI business investment slumped and real consumption flatlined.
  • Rapidly Growing Treasury Supply Crowding Out Other Types of Credit Growth — Roughly half of all fixed income issuance coming to market over the past year has been US Treasuries, meaning investors must allocate a growing share of dollars to financing the government. The argument is that lower government debt would free up more funds for consumer borrowing and business investment.

AI Summary. New York City's Democratic mayoral front-runner has proposed ending the public school system's gifted and talented program for kindergartners while keeping current participants and a separate third-grade admissions track. The program enrolls about 2,500 of the city's 55,000 kindergartners, selected by teachers during pre-K, and is often viewed as a stepping stone to competitive middle and high schools.

Troy Closson New York Times
Date Posted:

Zohran Mamdani, the Democratic front-runner for Mayor in New York City, is campaigning on ending the city’s small gifted and talented programs for kindergarten students at public schools. The program enrolls 2,500 out of 55,000 kindergartners.

Should gifted education for kindergartners be eliminated in public schools?

Core argument: Zohran Mamdani, the Democratic front-runner for New York City mayor, said he would end the city's kindergarten gifted and talented program, which enrolls about 2,500 students out of 55,000 kindergartners.

Zohran Mamdani, the Democratic front-runner for mayor, said this week that he planned to end the city’s gifted and talented program for kindergarten students at public schools if he is elected. Students who are already in gifted classes would remain in the program, and his campaign said on Thursday that he would keep a separate track next year that admits students in third grade. New York’s program stands apart from many other major cities that admit children into gifted classes starting in later grades. It is small: New York’s school system enrolls about 2,500 students out of 55,000 kindergartners. Children are selected during pre-K by their teachers. The highly selective program is often viewed as a stepping stone to the city’s competitive middle and high schools. Many families clamor for access to gifted classes as a way of ensuring that high-achieving children can be challenged and receive prime educational opportunities in later grades.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Zohran Mamdani, the Democratic front-runner for New York City mayor, said he would end the city's kindergarten gifted and talented program, which enrolls about 2,500 students out of 55,000 kindergartners.
  2. Students already in New York's gifted classes would remain in the program, and Mamdani's campaign said he would keep a separate track next year admitting students in third grade.
  3. New York's program, in which children are selected during pre-K by their teachers, stands apart from many other major cities that admit children into gifted classes starting in later grades.

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