Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Friday, September 19, 2025

AI Summary. Global investors are continuing to buy US stocks and bonds while purchasing derivatives that hedge against further dollar declines, with Deutsche Bank reporting that flows into dollar-hedged exchange-traded funds holding US assets have outpaced unhedged funds for the first time this decade. Foreign investors own roughly $20tn of US stocks and about $14tn of US debt.

Ye Xie, Carter Johnson, and Anya Andrianova Bloomberg
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Year to date, the S&P 500’s return was 12.8% in dollar terms and 6% in yen terms; in euros, the return was – 1%. Hedged investment into US bonds and equities overtook unhedged holdings, according to Deutsche Bank.

Are foreign investors hedging currency risk while still buying US assets?

Core argument: Flows into dollar-hedged ETFs that buy US assets have outpaced unhedged funds since around mid-year, the first time this decade, a shift Deutsche Bank says occurred at an unprecedented clip.

It turns out that all the “Sell America” angst swirling in markets earlier this year was misplaced. The real mantra from global investors is more like “Hedge America” — that is, keep snapping up US stocks and bonds but do so while buying derivatives that protect those investments against any further declines in the dollar. Starting around mid-year, and for the first time this decade, flows into dollar-hedged exchange-traded funds that buy US assets have outpaced those into unhedged funds, according to Deutsche Bank AG, which said the shift occurred at an unprecedented clip. Government data showing foreign holdings of Treasuries rose to a record in July. Overseas investors collectively own about $20 trillion of US stocks and some $14 trillion in US debt, including Treasuries, mortgage and corporate bonds.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Flows into dollar-hedged ETFs that buy US assets have outpaced unhedged funds since around mid-year, the first time this decade, a shift Deutsche Bank says occurred at an unprecedented clip.
  2. Foreign investors collectively own roughly $20 trillion of US stocks and about $14 trillion of US debt, including Treasuries, mortgage and corporate bonds.
  3. Government data showed foreign holdings of Treasuries rose to a record in July.

Related Articles:

  • American Unexceptionalism — The S&P 500 has outperformed other developed-market equities by a cumulative 150% over the past fifteen years, but the authors attribute about 80% of that gap to a strengthening dollar and expanding relative valuations rather than fundamentals such as dividends, buybacks, and organic growth. U.S. valuations sit around the 90th percentile on price-to-earnings measures.
  • Foreign Investors In US Assets Rush For Protection Against Swings In Dollar — Hedged investments into US bonds and equities are outstripping unhedged holdings for the first time in four years, according to Deutsche Bank analysis, with about 80% of roughly $7bn flowing into foreign-domiciled US equity exchange traded funds over three months done on a hedged basis, up from about 20%. Falling US interest rates have made such currency hedges cheaper.
  • Are Foreigners Selling US Assets (Part II) — Proprietary flow tracking shows foreign bond flows into US assets, an outlier low in one month, have substantially normalized, suggesting an allocation shift away from dollar assets may have peaked. The authors argue traditional fundamentals, such as the US business cycle and Federal Reserve policy, will matter more for any further dollar weakness.

AI Summary. US interest rates fell for roughly 40 years before the pandemic, allowing maturing high-coupon debt to be refinanced at lower rates and keeping federal interest expense manageable even as debt rose. Because Congressional Budget Office projections assume the 10-year Treasury yield drifts down to 3.8% from about 4.1%, the author argues its debt-service projections face upside risk.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
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Robin Brooks argues that prior to the pandemic, US debt service was “manageable” even as debt soared, as older, higher-coupon debt was rolled over into lower-coupon debt. That dynamic has now reversed.

Do official debt-service projections understate the risk from rising bond yields?

Core argument: CBO assumes the 10-year Treasury yield drifts down to 3.8% from roughly 4.1% over the coming decade, which the author argues leaves upside risk, perhaps substantial, to CBO's debt service projections.

As the bottom right chart shows, US interest rates were on a 40 year downtrend in the run-up to COVID, which meant that high coupon debt was getting continuously replaced with low coupon debt, keeping the interest expense manageable even as debt soared. This accident of history has run its course. If anything, it’s likely that US and global interest rates are trending up from here, which could push our debt service much higher. CBO projections assume a slight downward trend for the 10-year Treasury yield over the coming decade (to 3.8% from around 4.1% currently). As a result, there’s very likely upside risk - perhaps substantially so - to CBO’s debt service projections. Our luck has run out.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CBO assumes the 10-year Treasury yield drifts down to 3.8% from roughly 4.1% over the coming decade, which the author argues leaves upside risk, perhaps substantial, to CBO's debt service projections.
  2. US interest rates fell over a 40-year downtrend before COVID, replacing high-coupon debt with low-coupon debt and keeping interest expense manageable even as debt soared.
  3. The author argues that the decades-long decline in rates has run its course and that US and global interest rates are likely trending up, which could push debt service much higher.

Related Articles:

  • How A Global Debt Crisis Starts — Far-forward government bond yields — what markets price for the 10-year yield 10 and 20 years ahead — have risen in Japan, the UK, France and Germany, with Japan's 10-year yield 20 years forward at 4.5%. The US 10y20y forward yield has fallen slightly, which the author attributes to safe-haven inflows.
  • Global Debt Report 2025 — About 60% of fixed-rate government debt in advanced economies maturing by 2027 — roughly $9tn — was issued before the recent interest-rate tightening, with weighted average yields below 2% versus projected 10-year rates near 3.6%, implying refinancing at nearly double the original cost. France, Spain, the UK, and the US face heightened vulnerability, with maturing debt exceeding 15% of GDP.
  • Our Thoughts on Large US Deficits and Their Impact on Bond Yields — Total borrowing in the US is about average despite high government deficits, as high public borrowing has contributed to the need for higher interest rates that have depressed private sector borrowing. Risk premiums on long-dated debt look about average, with no market signs that economic or debt limits are currently being hit.

AI Summary. Linking Dutch genetic data to tax records, the authors estimate that moving a person 10 percentiles higher in a genetic index raises their own income by 0.9 percentiles and their child's by 0.7 percentiles. They attribute about 50% of this to transmitted genes and the rest to environmental pathways.

Sjoerd van Alten, Silvia Barcellos, Leandro Carvalho, Titus Galama, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
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A 10-percentile increase in a person’s polygenic index (PGI) raises that person’s income by 0.9 percentiles and that of their child by 0.7 percentiles; ~1/2 is direct genetic transmission, and ~ 1/2 the effect of parent’s genes on nurturing capacity.

How much of genetic influence on children's income comes through environment?

Core argument: Linking Dutch Lifelines Cohort genetic data to 2006–2022 tax records, the authors find that moving a reference 10 percentiles higher in the polygenic index distribution raises that person's own income by 0.9 percentiles and their offspring's by 0.7 percentiles.

We examine how the genetics of one generation influences the SES [Socioeconomic Status] of the next by linking genetic data from the Dutch Lifelines Cohort to tax records for 2006-2022. Figure 5 plots the next-generation genetic effect against the same-generation genetic effect for each SES measure. The 22.5-degree line represents a benchmark where the next-generation genetic effects are half as large as the same-generation genetic effects. The figure indicates a high degree of persistence in the effects of the reference’s genetics across generations: e.g. moving a reference 10 percentiles higher in the PGI distribution increases that reference’s own income by 0.9 percentiles, and their offspring’s income by 0.7 percentiles. For most outcomes, the markers lie closer to the 45-degree line than to the 22.5-degree line, suggesting that genetic transmission is not the sole mechanism through which one generation’s genetics affects the next. Genetic transmission explains about 50% of the total effect, while genotypic assortative mating contributes little. This implies that the remaining 50% must be attributed to genetic nurture—the influence of the reference’s genetics operating through environmental pathways, even when these genetic markers are not transmitted to the offspring.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Linking Dutch Lifelines Cohort genetic data to 2006–2022 tax records, the authors find that moving a reference 10 percentiles higher in the polygenic index distribution raises that person's own income by 0.9 percentiles and their offspring's by 0.7 percentiles.
  2. Genetic transmission explains about 50% of the total effect of one generation's genetics on the next generation's socioeconomic status, with genotypic assortative mating contributing little.
  3. The authors attribute the remaining 50% to genetic nurture, the influence of the reference's genetics operating through environmental pathways even when those genetic markers are not transmitted to the offspring.

Related Articles:

  • The Inheritance Of Social Status: England, 1600 to 2022 — Using a genealogical database of 422,374 English people with rarer surnames, the authors find social status persists strongly even among distant relatives, with status correlations declining by a constant factor of 0.79 per step in the lineage across all status measures and eras studied. The authors argue this constancy suggests social interventions have modest effects.
  • For Whom the Bell Curve Tolls: A Lineage of 400,000 English Individuals 1750-2020 Shows Genetics Determines Most Social Outcomes — A study of 402,000 English individuals across 1750–2020 estimates an intergenerational occupational status correlation of 0.88 and a genetic correlation between spouses of 0.76, which the authors interpret as a strong genetic basis for the persistence of social status. The authors argue that highly assortative mating around status genetics limits what policy can do to raise social mobility.
  • Like Great-Grandparent, Like Great-Grandchild? Multigenerational Mobility in American History — Using data on multiple ancestors, the authors estimate a small grandparent effect on children's status among white American families and conclude it largely reflects measurement error in the father's status rather than causal transmission. Including Black families raises estimated multigenerational status transmission, as racial economic gaps have converged more slowly than within-race family gaps.

AI Summary. Among US women born 1975–1979 who have completed childbearing, conservatives average 2.1 children, moderates 1.8, and liberals 1.5; among those born 1985–1989 the figures are 2.1, 1.9, and 1.7. Birthrates and marriage rates are lower for all ideological groups than before 1975.

Scott Yenor and Lyman Stone Institute for Family Studies
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In county survey data of 12,316 female respondents born btw 1985 and 1989, those who identify as conservative have a completed fertility rate of 2.1, relative to moderates’ rates of 1.9, and liberals’ 1.7.

Do conservative women have more children than liberal women?

Core argument: Conservative women born 1975–1979 have a completed family size of 2.1 children, at replacement, compared with 1.8 for moderates and 1.5 for liberals in the same cohort.

Conservative women born between 1975 and 1979—women who are finished having children—have a completed family size of 2.1, right at replacement. Moderate women in the same age group have 1.8 children, and liberal women just 1.5. Narrower gaps exist between conservatives born between 1985 and 1989, who have a completed fertility rate of 2.1, while moderates are at 1.9 and liberals 1.7. Conservative women born between 1995 and 1999 have, so far, only had 0.7 children, the same as moderates. Liberals in the same cohort average 0.4 so far. Differences between conservative and liberal women should not be overstated. Birthrates are lower for all groups when compared to the state of fertility before 1975. Marriage rates for all groups are lower, too. Yet the differences are large enough that the parties ultimately appeal to manifestly different constituencies.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Conservative women born 1975–1979 have a completed family size of 2.1 children, at replacement, compared with 1.8 for moderates and 1.5 for liberals in the same cohort.
  2. Among women born 1985–1989, the ideological fertility gap narrows, with conservatives at 2.1 children, moderates at 1.9, and liberals at 1.7.
  3. Birthrates and marriage rates are lower for all ideological groups than before 1975, yet the differences are large enough that the parties appeal to manifestly different constituencies.

Related Articles:

  • The Downside of Fertility — In developed countries that modernized very rapidly, men do considerably less housework and care for others at home relative to women than in countries with more continuous growth. Larger gender gaps in household and caring hours are strongly correlated with lower fertility rates across these countries.
  • America’s Fertility Crash Reaches A New Low — US birth-rate declines have been concentrated in states that were historically the most fertile, including Alaska, North Dakota and Utah, while long-low-fertility states such as Connecticut and Massachusetts fell by less than the national average. States with above-average fertility a decade ago account for more than 80% of the national decline.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.

Monday, September 22, 2025

AI Summary. A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.

Edward Conard Macro Roundup
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I debate @JasonFurman—Pres. Obama’s Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors—at Harvard over the effect of tax increases on the expected value of innovative risk-taking and the magnitude of changes needed to equilibrate America’s fiscal policy.

Do higher taxes reduce the expected value of innovative risk-taking?

Core argument: In a debate with Jason Furman, Ed Conard argues that driving U.S. debt below 100% of GDP is critical given rising interest rates and CBO's failure to assume periodic budget-busting recessions.

I debate Jason Furman on changes needed to equilibrate America’s fiscal policy. I argue that spending increases slow growth, not tax increases needed to pay for them; that tax cuts are temporary; that, unlike Europe, which lacks investment-worthy ideas, tax increases will reduce the expected value of America’s innovative risk-taking; and that driving debt below 100% of GDP is critical with rising interest rates and CBO’s failure to assume periodic budget-busting recessions. Read more

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In a debate with Jason Furman, Ed Conard argues that driving U.S. debt below 100% of GDP is critical given rising interest rates and CBO's failure to assume periodic budget-busting recessions.
  2. Conard argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to pay for them, slow growth, and that tax cuts are temporary.
  3. Conard argues that tax increases will reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking, unlike in Europe, which he contends lacks investment-worthy ideas.

Related Articles:

  • Why the U.S. Economy Is Trouncing Europe’s — Only about 12% of Americans score at the highest levels on international academic tests versus 34% at the lowest, yet the U.S. has created nearly 250 companies worth over $10bn ($30tn in value) against Europe's 14, and median U.S. disposable household income is 25% above Germany's. The author argues expanding high-skilled immigration is the fastest way to accelerate growth.
  • Mitigating Benefits Cliffs for Low-Income Families: District of Columbia Career Mobility Action Plan as a Case Study — The authors estimate that a hypothetical low-income family with children receives $68,686 in government support at an income of $11,000 but only $22,709 at $65,000, while its tax liability rises from $842 to $12,835. The lost assistance plus higher taxes fully offsets the $54,000 income gain.
  • A Visualization of Europe’s Non-Bubbly Economy — The Draghi report notes that no European Union company with a market capitalization above €100bn was founded from scratch in the past fifty years, while all six US companies valued above €1tn were. The 13 EU companies founded in that period and worth at least $10bn total about $400bn, versus nearly $30tn for their US counterparts.

AI Summary. The share of U.S. prime-age men out of the labor force has more than quadrupled from about 2.5% to around 11%, with most supported by parents, wives, or partners rather than disability insurance. The shift toward knowledge and services has reduced male-coded jobs across all advanced countries, including Germany.

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
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11% of American men 25–54 are neither employed nor looking for work. The destruction of low-skilled, “male-coded” jobs, Krugman argues, has led these men to look for support from parents and female partners.

Why are more prime-age men out of the labor force?

Core argument: The share of U.S. prime-working-age men out of the labor force has risen from around 2.5% in the 1950s to around 11%, meaning more than 1 in 10 are neither employed nor seeking work.

In the 1950s only a tiny fraction of men in their prime working years — around 2.5% — were out of the labor force. That percentage has now more than quadrupled, to around 11%. That is, more than 1 out of 10 men of prime working age are neither employed nor looking for work. What are these non-working men living on? Some are receiving government aid via disability insurance. Mostly, however, they’re being supported by “cohabitants’” i.e. living with parents, or relying on income earned by wives or other partners. Around 1980, the U.S. economy became increasingly oriented towards knowledge and services rather than manual labor and industry. This worked to the advantage of large metropolitan areas that already possessed highly educated workforces. Yet many small industrial towns and cities were damaged economically, stranded by economic change. The same economic transformation also reduced the number of male-coded jobs while it increased the number of female-coded jobs. The percentage of jobs created by sectors that are male-coded -- that disproportionately employ men without higher education -- has declined in all advanced countries [including Germany], even though Germany runs huge trade surpluses in manufactured goods.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of U.S. prime-working-age men out of the labor force has risen from around 2.5% in the 1950s to around 11%, meaning more than 1 in 10 are neither employed nor seeking work.
  2. Non-working prime-age men are supported mostly by cohabitants — living with parents or relying on income earned by wives or other partners — with some receiving government disability insurance.
  3. The share of jobs created by male-coded sectors, which disproportionately employ men without higher education, has declined in all advanced countries, including Germany despite its large trade surpluses in manufactured goods.

Related Articles:

  • Bachelors Without Bachelor’s: Gender Gaps in Education and Declining Marriage Rates — Marriage rates for college-educated women have remained stable over the past fifty years even as the relative supply of college-educated men declined, with the overall decline in marriage driven almost entirely by fewer marriages between non-college women and non-college men. The education gap in women's marriage rates is larger in areas where non-college men face the highest joblessness and incarceration.
  • Post-Pandemic Recovery for America’s Prime Age Labor Force: A Tale of Two Sexes — Prime-age women's labor force participation climbed about 5 points above its pre-pandemic level over a decade, while prime-age men's rose barely a point, only just regaining pre-pandemic levels. Despite economic expansion and labor shortages, work rates for prime-age American men are barely as high as at the trough of the severe Reagan-era recession.
  • The Declining Labor Market Prospects of Less-Educated Men — The decline in labor force participation among less-educated men is partly attributed to greater willingness to be supported by family income, with participation falling despite stable wages, pointing to factors beyond labor demand. Changes in family structure, including fewer stable marriages and more men living with relatives, reduce incentives to work.

AI Summary. US Census data show the first-marriage rate among 22- to 45-year-olds fell 9% between 2008 and 2023, to 60 marriages per 1,000 never-married Americans. Marriage rates declined far less for college graduates and top-third earners than for those with less education and lower incomes.

Rachel Wolfe Wall Street Journal
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Americans aged 22–45 are seeking financial stability before marrying, shifting from marriage as a starting point to an achievement after career and wealth building. This change delays marriage, increases selectivity, and lowers the overall marriage rate.

Is marriage increasingly concentrated among higher-earning, college-educated Americans?

Core argument: The first-marriage rate among 22- to 45-year-old Americans fell 9% between 2008 and 2023, to 60 marriages per 1,000 never-married Americans, according to Bowling Green University's National Center for Marriage & Family Research.

The marriage rate, that is the rate of new marriages to the overall population, has been on a long downward trajectory, census data shows. Between 2008 and 2023, the first-marriage rate among 22- to 45-year-olds declined 9%, to 60 marriages per 1,000 never-married Americans, according to an analysis by Bowling Green University’s National Center for Marriage & Family Research. Overall marriage rates have declined much less for 22- to 45-year-olds with a bachelor’s degree than they have for those with less than a college education between 2008 and 2023, according to an analysis of census data by the Institute for Family Studies. The share of married adults in the top third of earners also fell slightly, while dropping much more for the bottom two thirds of the income spectrum. While 59% of American 37-year-olds with parents in the top income quartile were married as of 2019 [according to Benjamin Goldman, an economics professor at Cornell University] only 30% of those from the bottom quartile could say the same.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The first-marriage rate among 22- to 45-year-old Americans fell 9% between 2008 and 2023, to 60 marriages per 1,000 never-married Americans, according to Bowling Green University's National Center for Marriage & Family Research.
  2. Marriage rates among 22- to 45-year-olds with a bachelor's degree declined much less than among those with less than a college education between 2008 and 2023, according to an Institute for Family Studies analysis of census data.
  3. Among American 37-year-olds, 59% of those with parents in the top income quartile were married as of 2019, versus 30% of those from the bottom quartile, according to Cornell economics professor Benjamin Goldman.

Related Articles:

  • The Growing Link Between Marriage, Fertility, and Partisanship — Among US women born 1975–1979 who have completed childbearing, conservatives average 2.1 children, moderates 1.8, and liberals 1.5; among those born 1985–1989 the figures are 2.1, 1.9, and 1.7. Birthrates and marriage rates are lower for all ideological groups than before 1975.
  • Changes in Milestones of Adulthood — Among US young adults aged 25–34, the share completing a high school or college degree rose 9 percentage points to 83%, while the share ever married fell 18 points to 44% and the share living with a child fell 16 points to 39%. Economic milestones became more common as family formation milestones became less common.
  • The Downside of Fertility — In developed countries that modernized very rapidly, men do considerably less housework and care for others at home relative to women than in countries with more continuous growth. Larger gender gaps in household and caring hours are strongly correlated with lower fertility rates across these countries.

AI Summary. Across rich countries, longer lifespans and falling birth rates mean fewer working-age people supporting those too young, old, or sick to work, straining the tax levels and public services electorates expect. Immigration faces fierce political opposition, risking a loop in which restrictions worsen fiscal pressures and services, deepening opposition further.

Stephen Bush and John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
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Efforts by advanced economies to offset demographic decline via immigration have been met with widespread public opposition. Slower growth associated with lower immigration likely means “ever greater demands on the purse of the native-born population.”

Can rich countries sustain public services and taxes without immigration?

Core argument: Across the rich world, longer lifespans and falling birth rates are pushing care-dependency ratios—the number of workers supporting the young, old and sick—below the level needed to sustain the public services and tax levels electorates expect.

Across the rich world, almost every state faces a version of the same problem: their people are living longer and having fewer children. Every year, tens of thousands of citizens will hit state pension age or retire, and fewer of us are having enough children to maintain our care-dependency ratio (the number of working people supporting those who are too young, too old or too sick to work themselves) at a point that provides the standard of public services and the levels of tax that modern electorates have grown accustomed to. But politicians have a problem: immigration is the subject of fierce political opposition. Democracies risk falling into a doom loop, in which restrictions on immigration mean ever greater demands on the purse of the native-born population and ever worse services, which in turn deepens opposition towards immigration and therefore creates yet greater pressures, and so on.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Across the rich world, longer lifespans and falling birth rates are pushing care-dependency ratios—the number of workers supporting the young, old and sick—below the level needed to sustain the public services and tax levels electorates expect.
  2. Tens of thousands of citizens in rich countries reach state pension age or retire each year, while birth rates remain too low to sustain the working population supporting them.
  3. Democracies risk a doom loop in which immigration restrictions raise the fiscal burden on the native-born population and worsen public services, which deepens opposition to immigration and intensifies the pressures further.

Related Articles:

  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
  • Changing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Growth Trajectory — Sub-Saharan Africa's working-age population is growing nearly 3% a year, versus close to zero in much of the world, and is projected to exceed China's within about a decade and reach a quarter of the global total. With modest productivity growth near 2%, the region is likely among the world's fastest-growing.
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.

AI Summary. The H-1B visa program is the main pathway to the U.S. for highly skilled foreign workers, and critics argue it gives jobs to foreigners at the expense of native-born workers. A Pew Research Center analysis found India-born workers received nearly three-quarters of these visas, with China-born workers a distant second at a bit more than one in 10.

Justin Lahart Wall Street Journal
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The H-1B program has been the main pathway to the US for highly skilled foreign workers. The Trump administration is switching from a lottery system to a $100,000 fee borne by the hiring entity.

Does a high skilled-visa fee help American workers?

Core argument: India-born workers received nearly three-quarters of H-1B visas in 2023, with China-born workers a distant second at a bit more than one in 10, according to a Pew Research Center analysis.

The H-1B program, created by Congress in 1990, is the main pathway to the U.S. for highly skilled foreign workers. It has long generated controversy, with critics contending that it gives jobs to foreigners at the expense of native workers. Workers born in India accounted for nearly three-quarters of these visas in 2023, a Pew Research Center analysis found. China-born workers were a distant second, accounting for a bit more than one in 10 visas.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. India-born workers received nearly three-quarters of H-1B visas in 2023, with China-born workers a distant second at a bit more than one in 10, according to a Pew Research Center analysis.
  2. The H-1B program, created by Congress in 1990, is the main pathway to the U.S. for highly skilled foreign workers, and critics contend it gives jobs to foreigners at the expense of native workers.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. China's economy has slowed as domestic investment stagnates and consumer spending stays weak, with the shortfall partly offset by rising net exports. The author argues these internal problems are being passed to the rest of the world, since export values are rising about 6% a year while import values are down 2.2%.

Matt Klein  The Overshoot
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China’s persistently weak consumer spending since Covid, now 17% below the pre-pandemic trend, has led to an entirely export-led recovery of Chinese manufacturing, with flat imports creating negative spillovers for the rest of the world, Klein argues.

Is China's domestic slowdown being passed to the rest of the world?

Core argument: The 2024 increase in China's trade surplus contributed more to China's reported growth rate than in any year since 1997, partly offsetting a domestic slowdown in which investment stagnates and consumer spending remains weak.

China’s economy has slowed sharply in 2025 as domestic investment stagnates and consumer spending remains persistently weak, as it has ever since the imposition of “Covid Zero”. The investment slowdown is a recent choice, and while the motivations for it are understandable, the danger—for China and for the world as a whole—is that it is much easier for the party-state to cut excessive spending in one part of the economy than it is to raise spending where it is most needed by enough to make up the difference. So far, the impact of the domestic slowdown has been partly offset by soaring net exports. In 2024 the increase in China’s trade surplus contributed more to the reported growth rate than in any year since 1997.  So far in 2025, the dollar value of China’s goods exports is rising about 6% a year, which is about the same as the full-year growth rate in 2024. But unlike last year, when spending on imports rose by 2.5% in January-August, or by 1.1% for the full year, so far in 2025, the dollar value of Chinese imports is down by 2.2%. China’s internal problems are therefore being dumped on the rest of the world. Businesses and workers elsewhere are earning less income because spending in China is too low.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The 2024 increase in China's trade surplus contributed more to China's reported growth rate than in any year since 1997, partly offsetting a domestic slowdown in which investment stagnates and consumer spending remains weak.
  2. The danger of China's investment pullback is that the party-state finds it easier to cut excessive spending in one part of the economy than to raise spending where it is most needed by enough to make up the difference.
  3. The dollar value of China's goods exports is rising about 6% a year in 2025, matching the full-year 2024 rate, while the dollar value of Chinese imports is down 2.2%, after rising 1.1% for full-year 2024.

Related Articles:

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