Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Friday, September 12, 2025

AI Summary. The Congressional Budget Office projects U.S. population growth averaging 0.2% per year through 2055, less than one-fifth the 0.9% annual average from 1975 to 2024. Deaths are projected to exceed births beginning in 2031, with net immigration more than accounting for population growth from 2031 to 2055.

Daniel Crown and Katherine Keisler-Starkey Congressional Budget Office
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

CBO forecasts that the US population will increase by only 17mm over the next 25 years. Deaths will exceed births starting in 2031, after which point net population growth will be entirely driven by immigration.

Will immigration account for all U.S. population growth in coming decades?

Core argument: CBO projects the U.S. population will grow an average 0.2% per year from 2025 to 2055, less than one-fifth the 0.9% average annual rate recorded from 1975 to 2024.

In CBO’s projections, the population grows at an average rate of 0.2% per year. That rate is less than one-fifth the average annual growth rate seen from 1975 to 2024, when it was 0.9% per year. The annual number of births is projected to exceed the annual number of deaths through 2030. Those net births account for about one-quarter of projected population growth over the 2025–2030 period; net immigration accounts for the rest. Beginning in 2031, annual deaths exceed annual births in CBO’s projections, and net immigration is projected to more than account for the population growth from 2031 to 2055. As a result of the downward revisions to net immigration and fertility rates, the agency now projects that the population will grow more slowly over the next 30 years than the agency projected it would in January. In CBO’s current projections the population will be 4.5 million people smaller (or 1.2%) in 2035 and 5.4 million people smaller (or 1.5%) in 2055 than the population was in the agency’s projections in January.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CBO projects the U.S. population will grow an average 0.2% per year from 2025 to 2055, less than one-fifth the 0.9% average annual rate recorded from 1975 to 2024.
  2. CBO projects births will exceed deaths through 2030, with net births accounting for about one-quarter of population growth over 2025–2030 and net immigration the rest; from 2031 to 2055, deaths exceed births and net immigration more than accounts for growth.
  3. Following downward revisions to net immigration and fertility rates, CBO projects the population will be 4.5 million smaller (1.2%) in 2035 and 5.4 million smaller (1.5%) in 2055 than in its January projections.

Related Articles:

  • The Demographic Outlook: 2025 to 2055 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the U.S. population will grow from 350m to 372m over three decades, an average of 0.2% per year, less than a quarter of the 0.9% average annual rate from 1975 to 2024. Deaths are projected to exceed births beginning in 2033, with net immigration more than accounting for population growth thereafter.
  • That Reported Multi-Million Decline In US Immigrants Just Doesn’t Add Up — A reported 2.2m drop in the US foreign-born population in the household survey implies implausible labor-market outcomes: either payroll employment would need downward revision by millions, or the true unemployment rate would be at a 72-year low of 2.6% with a dangerously overheating economy.
  • The Cost of Illegal Immigration — The US foreign-born population rose by 6.6mm to 51.6mm over a roughly three-year span, lifting immigrants to 15.6% of the population, above the prior records of 14.8% in 1890 and 14.7% in 1910. The authors estimate about 13.7mm illegal immigrants now live in the US, a net increase of 3.7mm.

AI Summary. Analysis of nationally representative US 12th-grade survey data finds that trends in adolescent internalizing symptoms such as depression, anxiety, and persistent worry diverged by political beliefs, sex, and parental education. Liberal female adolescents showed the largest increases in depressive symptoms, especially those whose parents had lower education levels.

Catherine Gimbrone, Lisa Bates, Seth Prins and Katherine Keyes SSM - Mental Health
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Btw 2005 and 2018, both the highest levels and the sharpest increases in scores for Depressive Affect (DA) were among female adolescents who self-identified as “liberal” rather than “conservative,” particularly in the presence of low parental education. Flagged by Tyler Cowen.

Do trends in adolescent depression symptoms differ by political beliefs?

Core argument: Analyzing nationally representative annual cross-sectional samples of US 12th-grade students from 2005 to 2018 in Monitoring the Future data, the authors find trends in adolescent internalizing symptoms diverged by political beliefs, sex, and parental education.

Adolescent internalizing symptoms (e.g. depression) [as well as anxiety, somatic symptoms, persistent worry, withdrawal, and self-critical thoughts] have increased over the past decade in the US, particularly among girls. The reasons are unclear. We hypothesize that increasing exposure to politicized events has contributed to these trends in adolescent internalizing symptoms, and that effects may be differential by political beliefs and sociodemographic characteristics. We analyzed nationally-representative annual cross-sectional samples of 12th-grade students from 2005 to 2018 using Monitoring the Future data. We examined self-reported political beliefs, sex, and parental education as predictors of four internalizing symptom scales over time, including depressive affect. Trends in adolescent internalizing symptoms diverged by political beliefs, sex, and parental education over time, with female liberal adolescents experiencing the largest increases in depressive symptoms, especially in the context of demographic risk factors including [low] parental education.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Analyzing nationally representative annual cross-sectional samples of US 12th-grade students from 2005 to 2018 in Monitoring the Future data, the authors find trends in adolescent internalizing symptoms diverged by political beliefs, sex, and parental education.
  2. Female liberal adolescents experienced the largest increases in depressive symptoms, especially alongside demographic risk factors including low parental education, according to the authors' analysis.
  3. The authors hypothesize that increasing exposure to politicized events contributed to rising internalizing symptoms among US adolescents, including depression, anxiety, somatic symptoms, persistent worry, withdrawal, and self-critical thoughts.

Related Articles:

  • US College Students’ Well-Being — A study of US college students finds moderate-to-severe depression reported by 26% of students at one elite institution, 22% reporting moderate-to-severe anxiety and 10% contemplating suicide. Poorer mental health is associated with being female, little exercise, low grades, and financial aid; financial stress is associated with higher suicidal thoughts.
  • The Girls Are Not Alright: Responses to Three Claims that the Youth Mental Health Crisis Is Exaggerated — U.S. Centers for Disease Control data on nonfatal self-harm show a 518% increase in hospitalizations following emergency department visits among girls aged 10–14, with a large rise also among girls aged 15–19. Because suicide deaths vary by sex and age, low suicide rates among teen girls do not mean teen girls are not struggling.
  • The Anti-Social Century — Americans spend less time with other people than in any period with reliable data back to 1965, with in-person socializing down more than 20% from 2003 to 2023 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics' American Time Use Survey. Among unmarried men and people under 25, the decline exceeded 35%.

AI Summary. Far-forward government bond yields — what markets price for the 10-year yield 10 and 20 years ahead — have risen in Japan, the UK, France and Germany, with Japan's 10-year yield 20 years forward at 4.5%. The US 10y20y forward yield has fallen slightly, which the author attributes to safe-haven inflows.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Brooks expresses alarm at the “unprecedented” sharp rise in market-implied Japanese and European forward yields at the long end, “as the debt crisis in the Eurozone still festers.” The “less worrying” picture for the US is likely a safe haven effect.

What are far-forward bond yields signaling about government debt?

Core argument: Japan's 10y20y forward yield stands at 4.5%, a level unprecedented in recent history, with the UK at similarly unprecedented levels and France not far behind.

Each chart shows the 2-year government bond yield (black), the 10-year government bond yield (blue) and then also 10y10y (orange) and 10y20y (red) forward yields. The 10y10y forward yield is what markets price for the 10-year yield in 10 years’ time, while the 10y20y forward is the [market-projected]10-year yield in 20 years’ time.The appeal of the latter two metrics is that they strip out what’s going on with very short-term yields, which are currently getting pulled down by mounting expectations of a US recession. What’s going on with long-term yields is thoroughly alarming in many places. Japan is perhaps the scariest picture, with the 10y20y forward yield at 4.5%, a yield level that’s unprecedented in recent history. The UK is at similarly unprecedented levels and France isn’t far behind. Even Germany has seen a sharp rise in its 10y20y forward yield, which is remarkable given that it usually gets safe haven inflows when global debt markets wobble. The US in this international comparison looks far less worrying. While long-term yields elsewhere have continued to rise, its 10y20y forward yield has fallen a bit. I put that down to safe haven inflows as the fiscal crisis in France once again reminds global markets that the debt crisis in the Euro zone still festers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Japan's 10y20y forward yield stands at 4.5%, a level unprecedented in recent history, with the UK at similarly unprecedented levels and France not far behind.
  2. Germany's 10y20y forward yield has risen sharply, which the author calls remarkable given that German debt usually receives safe haven inflows when global debt markets wobble.
  3. The US 10y20y forward yield has fallen slightly while long-term yields elsewhere continued rising, which the author attributes to safe haven inflows as France's fiscal crisis reminds markets of the festering Euro zone debt crisis.

Related Articles:

  • Long-Term US Yields Are Not Falling — Short- and medium-term US government bond yields have fallen more than the forward yields markets price for the 10-year rate 10 and 20 years ahead. The author argues this indicates upward pressure on longer-term yields persists, only partly offset by US recession fears.
  • The Rising Tide of Government Interest Costs — A model of forward interest rate curves, projected deficits, and debt maturity structures estimates that government interest spending on marketable debt will rise across G10 economies by an average of 0.5 percentage points of GDP by 2029, with France, Japan, and the United States facing the largest increases.
  • Global Debt Report 2025 — About 60% of fixed-rate government debt in advanced economies maturing by 2027 — roughly $9tn — was issued before the recent interest-rate tightening, with weighted average yields below 2% versus projected 10-year rates near 3.6%, implying refinancing at nearly double the original cost. France, Spain, the UK, and the US face heightened vulnerability, with maturing debt exceeding 15% of GDP.

AI Summary. Mexico has proposed raising tariffs on imports from countries it lacks trade agreements with, covering roughly $52bn of goods including autos, steel, textiles, toys, home appliances and footwear, to bolster domestic production and substitute Asian imports. China has warned it would retaliate, saying countries must not sacrifice third parties' interests under coercion.

WSJ Staff Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

China has threatened retaliation against proposed Mexican tariffs on Chinese imports. Cars made in China make up 20% of domestic Mexican car sales.

Will China retaliate against Mexico's proposed tariffs on Asian imports?

Core argument: Mexico's proposed tariff hike on imports from countries without a trade agreement would affect roughly $52 billion of imports, including autos, steel, textiles, toys, home appliances and footwear, according to the Mexican government.

Earlier this week, Mexico announced a plan to hike tariffs on imports of key goods from countries with which it doesn’t have a trade agreement as part of efforts to bolster domestic production and substitute imports from Asia. If passed, the proposal would affect around $52 billion worth of imports, including autos, steel, textiles, toys, home appliances and footwear, according to the Mexican government. Beijing has warned Mexico to think twice before moving ahead with [the] plan to raise tariffs that could hurt Chinese automakers, saying it would retaliate against the measure. “At a time when the U.S.’s abuse of tariffs has sparked widespread global opposition, countries should strengthen communication and coordination to jointly safeguard free trade and multilateralism, and must not sacrifice the interests of third parties due to coercion,” a Chinese commerce ministry spokesperson said in a statement.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Mexico's proposed tariff hike on imports from countries without a trade agreement would affect roughly $52 billion of imports, including autos, steel, textiles, toys, home appliances and footwear, according to the Mexican government.
  2. Mexico framed the tariff plan as an effort to bolster domestic production and substitute imports from Asia, and Beijing has warned it would retaliate against a measure that could hurt Chinese automakers.
  3. A Chinese commerce ministry spokesperson said countries should strengthen communication and coordination to safeguard free trade and multilateralism amid the U.S.'s abuse of tariffs, and must not sacrifice the interests of third parties due to coercion.

Related Articles:

  • China Emerges From Trade Chaos With Record Exports, Surplus — China posted a record half-year trade surplus of about $586bn, with exports up 5.8% year-over-year to $325bn and imports up 1.1%. Shipments to the US fell 16.1% from a year earlier, while exports to the 10 Southeast Asian nations in the Asean group rose 17%.
  • China Delays Approval of BYD’s Mexico Plant Amid Fears Tech Could Leak to US — China's commerce ministry has withheld the approval that domestic automakers need to manufacture abroad, holding up BYD's planned Mexican car plant, which the company said would create 10,000 jobs and build 150,000 vehicles a year. Officials are concerned that Mexico's proximity to the US could give Mexico, and possibly the US, access to BYD's advanced technology and knowhow.
  • Will China Take Over the Global Auto Industry? — The global auto market has historically been regional, with most cars sold in a region also built there. Overcapacity in China's internal combustion sector, expanding electric-vehicle capacity, ample state bank credit, and a weaker yuan could concentrate global auto production in China absent restrictions such as the US 100% tariff on Chinese electric vehicles.

Monday, September 15, 2025

AI Summary. Bond yields for French companies including L'Oréal, Airbus and Axa have fallen below those on French government debt of similar maturity, with 10 French firms trading at a negative spread to the sovereign — the most in data going back to 2006, according to Goldman Sachs. Sovereign yields typically set a baseline for corporate bonds.

Ian Smith, Emily Herbert, and Olaf Storbeck Financial Times
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

GS data show that at least 10 French firms are trading at a negative spread to the French sovereign. “Sovereign borrowing costs typically act as a baseline for yields on corporate bonds.”

Are corporate borrowing costs now falling below government yields?

Core argument: Goldman Sachs data show 10 French companies, including L'Oréal, Airbus and Axa, recently traded at a negative spread to French government bonds of similar maturity, the most in data going back to 2006.

Yields on the bonds of groups including L’Oréal, Airbus and Axa have sunk below those on French government debt of similar maturity in recent weeks [according to data compiled by Goldman Sachs]. Sovereign borrowing costs typically act as a baseline for yields on corporate bonds. This pattern has occasionally inverted in the Eurozone — where German bonds serve as the true risk-free benchmark and other member states’ trade at an additional “spread” — particularly during the bloc’s debt crisis a decade and a half ago. But the Goldman Sachs data shows that 10 French companies were recently trading at a negative spread to the French sovereign — which as one of the region’s biggest, wealthiest economies has usually enjoyed relatively low yields — the most in data going back to 2006. Across the euro area as a whole, more than 80 companies had bond yields below France’s, according to Goldman.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Goldman Sachs data show 10 French companies, including L'Oréal, Airbus and Axa, recently traded at a negative spread to French government bonds of similar maturity, the most in data going back to 2006.
  2. More than 80 companies across the euro area had bond yields below France's, according to Goldman Sachs, even though France has usually enjoyed relatively low yields as one of the region's biggest, wealthiest economies.
  3. Sovereign borrowing costs typically act as a baseline for corporate bond yields, and this pattern has inverted in the Eurozone only occasionally, particularly during the bloc's debt crisis a decade and a half ago.

Related Articles:

  • Back to the Barricades, and the Bond Spreads — The gap between French and German 10-year government bond yields is near the highs reached during France's political crises, and French stocks have resumed sharp underperformance versus the rest of Europe. France's finance minister warned the country might need assistance from the International Monetary Fund.
  • Global Debt Report 2025 — About 60% of fixed-rate government debt in advanced economies maturing by 2027 — roughly $9tn — was issued before the recent interest-rate tightening, with weighted average yields below 2% versus projected 10-year rates near 3.6%, implying refinancing at nearly double the original cost. France, Spain, the UK, and the US face heightened vulnerability, with maturing debt exceeding 15% of GDP.
  • Brazil’s Slow-Burning Economic Crisis Might Be the U.S. Future — Brazil illustrates a feedback loop in which higher interest rates raise debt-servicing costs—now over 7% of GDP—which in turn lift risk premia and inflation expectations, making fiscal policy less sustainable still. U.S. long-term rates have not fallen despite Federal Reserve cuts, partly reflecting an $11tn debt increase and markets pricing the risk that debt is managed through higher inflation.

AI Summary. Japan's long-dated forward government bond yields have risen, which the author attributes partly to the Bank of Japan's efforts to unwind its large holdings of Japanese government debt. With exceptionally high government debt, keeping interest rates low risks further yen depreciation and uncontrolled inflation, while allowing yields to rise risks debt sustainability.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

If Japan sticks with low interest rates, it faces a further drop in the yen and worsening inflation. Rising yields put Japan’s debt sustainability at risk. “This catch-22 means a debt crisis is much closer than people think,” Brooks argues.

Does a central bank's bond unwind trap a heavily indebted government?

Core argument: Japan's 10y20y forward yield, backed out from 10-, 20- and 30-year government bond yields, has risen markedly, partly because the Bank of Japan is attempting to extricate itself from its massive holdings of Japanese government debt.

The [left] chart above shows what’s going on with Japan’s yield curve. It shows the 2-year yield (black line), the 10-year yield (blue line), the 10y10y forward yield (orange line) and the 10y20y forward yield (red line). The latter two are backed out from 10-, 20- and 30-year government bond yields and reflect what markets price for 10-year in 10 and 20 years’ time. What’s striking is how much the 10y20y forward yield has risen, which - as the [right] chart shows - is partly due to the Bank of Japan trying to extricate itself from its massive holdings of Japanese government debt. Indeed, given how little progress the Bank of Japan has made in this regard, the rise in [the] 10y20y forward yield is quite shocking. The bottom line is that exceptionally high government debt is putting Japan in a terrible bind. If Japan sticks with low interest rates, it risks further Yen depreciation, which could cause inflation to run out of control. If it anchors the Yen by allowing yields to rise further, this could put Japan’s debt sustainability at risk.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Japan's 10y20y forward yield, backed out from 10-, 20- and 30-year government bond yields, has risen markedly, partly because the Bank of Japan is attempting to extricate itself from its massive holdings of Japanese government debt.
  2. The Bank of Japan has made little progress unwinding its Japanese government bond holdings, which makes the rise in the 10y20y forward yield striking.
  3. Japan's exceptionally high government debt creates a bind: sticking with low interest rates risks further yen depreciation and inflation running out of control, while letting yields rise to anchor the yen could put debt sustainability at risk.

Related Articles:

  • Global Debt Report 2025 — About 60% of fixed-rate government debt in advanced economies maturing by 2027 — roughly $9tn — was issued before the recent interest-rate tightening, with weighted average yields below 2% versus projected 10-year rates near 3.6%, implying refinancing at nearly double the original cost. France, Spain, the UK, and the US face heightened vulnerability, with maturing debt exceeding 15% of GDP.
  • Data Update 4 for 2025: Interest Rates, Inflation and Central Banks! — Interest rates are ultimately driven by macroeconomic fundamentals, with an "intrinsic risk-free rate" defined as the sum of the inflation rate and real GDP growth tracking the observed 10-year Treasury bond yield closely. On this view, central banks' influence comes from preferential access to data on those fundamentals, their capacity to alter them, and their credibility.
  • How A Global Debt Crisis Starts — Far-forward government bond yields — what markets price for the 10-year yield 10 and 20 years ahead — have risen in Japan, the UK, France and Germany, with Japan's 10-year yield 20 years forward at 4.5%. The US 10y20y forward yield has fallen slightly, which the author attributes to safe-haven inflows.

AI Summary. French pensioners receive larger government payments than in any other western country and begin receiving them several years earlier, leaving over-65s with higher average incomes than the working-age population — a situation without precedent internationally or in France's own history. Proposals to raise the retirement age or delay pension increases have triggered nationwide protests and government collapses.

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Since 1970, cumulative real income growth for pensioners in France and the UK has outpaced that of the workers who support them. French pensioners over the age of 65 have higher incomes than working-age adults.

Do generous pension payments leave retirees with higher incomes than workers?

Core argument: French pensioners receive larger government payments than pensioners anywhere else in the West and begin collecting them several years earlier, leaving over-65s with higher average incomes than the working-age population — a situation unique internationally and in France's own history.

French pensioners receive larger cheques from the government than their counterparts anywhere else in the west, and they start getting them several years earlier. The result is a situation in which over-65s now have higher average incomes than the working age population — unique both internationally and in France’s own history. Even the rumour of threats to this arrangement is met with mass public outrage and opposition from left and right. Macron’s proposal to nudge the retirement age up towards the lower end of western norms was met with nationwide protests. Barnier’s suggestion of a six-month delay to the latest scheduled increase in pension payments led to the first of two collapsed governments in the past 10 months. Bayrou’s refusal to scrap the same pledges brought about the second.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. French pensioners receive larger government payments than pensioners anywhere else in the West and begin collecting them several years earlier, leaving over-65s with higher average incomes than the working-age population — a situation unique internationally and in France's own history.
  2. Macron's proposal to raise France's retirement age toward the lower end of Western norms triggered nationwide protests, with opposition to any threat to pension arrangements coming from both left and right.
  3. Barnier's proposed six-month delay to a scheduled pension payment increase and Bayrou's refusal to scrap the same pledges each brought down a French government, accounting for two collapses in the past 10 months.

Related Articles:

  • How A Global Debt Crisis Starts — Far-forward government bond yields — what markets price for the 10-year yield 10 and 20 years ahead — have risen in Japan, the UK, France and Germany, with Japan's 10-year yield 20 years forward at 4.5%. The US 10y20y forward yield has fallen slightly, which the author attributes to safe-haven inflows.
  • Europeans ‘Less Hard-Working’ Than Americans, Says Norway Oil Fund Boss — Norway's sovereign wealth fund argues that American companies are outpacing European rivals on innovation and technology because the US more readily accepts failure and risk and because Americans work harder and are more ambitious. US shares now make up almost half of the fund's equity holdings, up from 32% a decade earlier, while UK holdings fell from 15% to 6%.
  • The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.

AI Summary. ChatGPT had been adopted by around 10% of the world's adult population, with non-work messages growing from 53% to more than 70% of usage; work usage is more common among educated users in highly paid professional occupations. The authors find "Practical Guidance," "Seeking Information," and "Writing" account for nearly 80% of conversations.

Aaron Chatterji, Thomas Cunningham, David Deming, Zoe Hitzig, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

As of July 2025, ChatGPT was used at least weekly by ~10% of the global adult population. 70% of usage was non-work related. Work usage was most common for educated users in high-pay professional occupations.

How do people actually use ChatGPT?

Core argument: ChatGPT had been adopted by around 10% of the world's adult population by July 2025, less than three years after its November 2022 launch, with an early male skew that has narrowed dramatically.

We document the growth of ChatGPT’s consumer product from its launch in November 2022 through July 2025, when it had been adopted by around 10% of the world’s adult population. Early adopters were disproportionately male but the gender gap has narrowed dramatically. Using a privacy-preserving automated pipeline, we classify usage patterns within a representative sample of ChatGPT conversations. We find steady growth in work-related messages but even faster growth in non-work-related messages, which have grown from 53% to more than 70% of all usage. Work usage is more common for educated users in highly-paid professional occupations. We classify messages by conversation topic and find that “Practical Guidance,” “Seeking Information,” and “Writing” are the three most common topics and collectively account for nearly 80% of all conversations. Writing dominates work-related tasks, highlighting chatbots’ unique ability to generate digital outputs compared to traditional search engines. Computer programming and self-expression both represent relatively small shares of use. Overall, we find that ChatGPT provides economic value through decision support, which is especially important in knowledge-intensive jobs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. ChatGPT had been adopted by around 10% of the world's adult population by July 2025, less than three years after its November 2022 launch, with an early male skew that has narrowed dramatically.
  2. Non-work-related messages grew from 53% to more than 70% of all ChatGPT usage, outpacing steady growth in work-related messages, with work usage more common among educated users in highly-paid professional occupations.
  3. "Practical Guidance," "Seeking Information," and "Writing" account for nearly 80% of ChatGPT conversations, with Writing dominating work-related tasks while computer programming and self-expression represent relatively small shares.

Related Articles:

  • Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence — Using payroll records covering millions of US workers, the authors find employment for workers aged 22–25 in occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence, such as software developers and customer service representatives, declined 6%, while employment for older workers in those occupations rose 6–9%. Employment in less-exposed occupations grew comparably across age groups.
  • Shorting the AI Jobs Apocalypse — Employment for workers aged 22-25 and 26-30 has declined relative to its pre-ChatGPT trend and relative to older workers in the same occupation, but the age groups shown are not equally sized. The authors argue that combining all age groups shows software developer jobs have continued to grow overall.
  • The Rapid Adoption of Generative AI — A nationally representative U.S. survey found 39% of people aged 18-64 used generative AI, with more than 24% of workers using it in the prior week and nearly one in nine using it every workday. The authors estimate 0.5-3.5% of U.S. work hours are currently assisted by generative AI.

AI Summary. U.S. household and nonprofit net worth equals roughly 8.5 years of personal consumption spending, down from a peak of 9 years but above the 7.7-year average of 2018-2019. The author argues that cutting interest rates with inflation persistent risks unleashing this untapped financial firepower as additional consumer spending that would largely show up in higher prices rather than higher output.

Matthew Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:

Since 2019, American households have accumulated $59T in net wealth. Overall household net worth could finance 8.5 years of current spending. “Lowering interest rates would be…particularly risky given the financial position of American consumers.”

Does high household net worth make rate cuts inflationary?

Core argument: U.S. household and nonprofit net worth in mid-2025 equaled about 8.5 years of personal consumption spending, down from a 2021 peak of 9 years but above the 2018–2019 average of 7.7 years.

Based on the latest numbers, inflation in the recent past will be revised up, but the current inflation rate will probably not change very much. Lowering interest rates in these conditions would be dangerous even under normal circumstances. But it is particularly risky given the financial position of American consumers. The value of household (and nonprofit) assets minus liabilities as of mid-2025 was worth about 8.5 years worth of personal consumption spending as of 2025Q2. That is down from the peak of 9 years of consumption in 2021, but notably higher than the 2018-2019 average of 7.7 years. American households have enormous untapped financial firepower at their disposal, which, so far, they have largely refrained from using. Any attempt to meaningfully open the taps risks unleashing a massive flood of additional consumer spending, much of which would probably get translated into higher prices rather than higher output.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. household and nonprofit net worth in mid-2025 equaled about 8.5 years of personal consumption spending, down from a 2021 peak of 9 years but above the 2018–2019 average of 7.7 years.
  2. The latest numbers imply inflation in the recent past will be revised up while the current inflation rate probably changes little.
  3. Lowering interest rates amid persistent inflation would be dangerous and is particularly risky because American households hold untapped financial firepower whose release would likely translate into higher prices rather than higher output.

Related Articles:

  • Gold Surpasses Inflation-Adjusted Record High Set in 1980 — Gold's spot price reached an all-time high of $3,674.27 an ounce, surpassing the inflation-adjusted peak set when gold topped out at $850 in January 1980. That earlier peak came amid a collapsing US currency, an inflation spike, and a recession.
  • U.S. Job Market Still (Surprisingly?) Good. Inflation Risk Is Paramount — The employment rate for Americans aged 25–54 has held essentially unchanged at a multi-decade high of 80.7%, just below its recent peak of 80.9%, alongside robust growth in hours worked. Because overall unemployment has risen while prime-age employment stayed stable, job market weakness is concentrated among Americans under 25.

AI Summary. Wage growth for the lowest-paid quartile of US workers has slowed to just above the headline inflation rate, consistent with the view that companies are holding onto staff while showing little interest in bidding up pay for lower-skilled workers. With inflation not tamed and tariffs yet to feed through to employment and production decisions, the risk ahead is stagflation.

John Authers Bloomberg
Date Posted:

As the Fed’s cutting cycle likely renews amid indicators of labor market weakening, measures of core inflation remain above 3%. John Authers notes, “The Fed is going to cut, and there is a strong case for it to do so…the risk ahead is stagflation.”

Is wage growth for the lowest-paid workers falling toward inflation?

Core argument: Wage increases for the lowest-paid quartile in the Atlanta Fed's wage tracker have slowed sharply and now sit only just above headline inflation, consistent with the view that firms are hoarding labor while declining to bid up pay for lower-skilled workers.

The Atlanta Fed’s wage tracker, based on census data, slices and dices pay rises several ways. Wage increases for the first quartile, the 25% of the population who are paid the least, have pegged back sharply and are now only just above the headline rate of inflation. This is in line with the theory that companies are hoarding labor and reluctant to make layoffs, but have very little interest in bidding up for lower-skilled workers. It’s not a coincidence that the two times real pay rises for the lowest paid went negative in recent history came during the administrations of Barack Obama and Joe Biden — and both times they were followed by a Trump election victory. The Fed is going to cut, and there is a strong case for it to do so. With inflation not tamed and tariffs still to filter through into employment and production decisions, the risk ahead is stagflation.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Wage increases for the lowest-paid quartile in the Atlanta Fed's wage tracker have slowed sharply and now sit only just above headline inflation, consistent with the view that firms are hoarding labor while declining to bid up pay for lower-skilled workers.
  2. The two occasions when real pay rises for the lowest paid turned negative in recent history came under the Obama and Biden administrations, and both were followed by a Trump election victory.
  3. With inflation not tamed and tariffs still to filter through into employment and production decisions, the risk ahead is stagflation even as the Federal Reserve moves to cut rates.

Related Articles:

  • Mid-Year Outlook: At the Crossroads of Stagflation—What’s Next? — Foreign investors hold roughly $18.5tn in US equities (about 20% of the market), $7tn in Treasuries and $5tn in credit (about 30% of each), and foreign participation in 30-year Treasury auctions has trended down in recent months. Combined with US fiscal challenges, the authors argue this reliance on foreign demand is a vulnerability.
  • Income in the United States: 2024 — U.S. median household income was $83,730, not statistically different from the prior year's $82,690, according to Census Bureau estimates. Across most demographic subgroups, median household income was higher or not statistically different from the prior year, with the exception of Black households, which saw a decline.
  • Gold Surpasses Inflation-Adjusted Record High Set in 1980 — Gold's spot price reached an all-time high of $3,674.27 an ounce, surpassing the inflation-adjusted peak set when gold topped out at $850 in January 1980. That earlier peak came amid a collapsing US currency, an inflation spike, and a recession.