Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, September 11, 2025

AI Summary. A model of forward interest rate curves, projected deficits, and debt maturity structures estimates that government interest spending on marketable debt will rise across G10 economies by an average of 0.5 percentage points of GDP by 2029, with France, Japan, and the United States facing the largest increases.

George Cole Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:

Goldman finds shortening the weighted average maturity (WAM) of debt would have a “limited effect” in lowering the interest burden. Given the current US term structure, one added rate cut would have a bigger effect than a 2-year shortening of WAM.

How much will government interest costs rise across advanced economies?

Core argument: The authors estimate interest spending on marketable debt will rise by an average of 0.5pts of GDP across G10 economies by 2029, based on the current forward curve, projected deficit paths, and existing weighted average maturities.

To project future government interest costs, we build a model based on future interest rate curves, the path for future deficits, and the term structure of future debt issuance. Using the current forward curve, projected deficit paths, and existing WAMs, we can estimate a baseline rise in interest rate costs over time. Using this model we estimate that interest rate spending on marketable debt will rise across G10 economies on average by 0.5pp of GDP by 2029. Although the increase varies, we estimate countries such as France, Japan, and the United States will face the largest increases in higher interest costs given the future path for deficits, debt, and the current forward curve. We observe that reducing the policy rate has a stronger impact on reducing the increase in interest costs in the US where a 100bp of additional cut could reduce the interest cost increase by 0.51pp of GDP. The US had the lowest sensitivity to a change in WAM: adding just an additional cut would have a stronger effect than actively reducing the WAM by 2 years. Combining these measures would result in a bigger saving.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate interest spending on marketable debt will rise by an average of 0.5pts of GDP across G10 economies by 2029, based on the current forward curve, projected deficit paths, and existing weighted average maturities.
  2. France, Japan, and the United States face the largest projected increases in interest costs, according to the authors' model of future rate curves, deficit paths, and debt term structure.
  3. The authors estimate an additional 100bp of policy rate cuts would reduce the U.S. interest cost increase by 0.51pts of GDP, a stronger effect than reducing the weighted average maturity by 2 years, with the U.S. showing the lowest sensitivity to maturity changes.

Related Articles:

  • Fed Rate Cuts Won’t Make Long Yields Fall — Markets have moved to price 125 basis points of Federal Reserve rate cuts, double the amount priced earlier, yet the 30-year Treasury yield has risen from 4.78% to 4.92%, showing policy rate cuts need not lower long-term yields. The author argues doubts about Federal Reserve independence could raise long yields further through higher risk premia.
  • Data Update 4 for 2025: Interest Rates, Inflation and Central Banks! — Interest rates are ultimately driven by macroeconomic fundamentals, with an "intrinsic risk-free rate" defined as the sum of the inflation rate and real GDP growth tracking the observed 10-year Treasury bond yield closely. On this view, central banks' influence comes from preferential access to data on those fundamentals, their capacity to alter them, and their credibility.
  • Our Thoughts on Large US Deficits and Their Impact on Bond Yields — Total borrowing in the US is about average despite high government deficits, as high public borrowing has contributed to the need for higher interest rates that have depressed private sector borrowing. Risk premiums on long-dated debt look about average, with no market signs that economic or debt limits are currently being hit.

AI Summary. Short- and medium-term US government bond yields have fallen more than the forward yields markets price for the 10-year rate 10 and 20 years ahead. The author argues this indicates upward pressure on longer-term yields persists, only partly offset by US recession fears.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:

While 2-year yields are falling as “expectations for more Fed cuts are building,” Brooks notes the back of the yield curve isn’t “falling nearly as much, a sign that the debt glut remains very much top of mind for markets.”

Are long-term bond yields falling as much as shorter-term yields?

Core argument: From August 21, the day before Chair Powell's dovish Jackson Hole speech, the US 2-year yield fell 25 basis points and the 10-year fell 28, while the 10y10y forward fell 22 basis points and the 10y20y forward 16.

The chart shows government bond yields, where I use 10-, 20- and 30-year yields to construct a 10y10y forward (pink) and 10y20y forward (orange) yield. These yields are what markets price for the 10-year yield 10 and 20 years from now. It’s clear that the 2-year yield (black) is falling sharply, as expectations for more Fed cuts are building. The 10-year yield (blue) is also falling, but the 10y10y and 10y20y forward yields aren’t falling nearly as much. Looking at this from August 21 (the day before Chair Powell’s very dovish speech at Jackson Hole) to now, the 2-year yield is down 25 basis points, the 10-year is down 28 basis points, while the 10y10y forward is down only 22 basis points and the 10y20y forward is down only 16 basis points. This tells you that upward pressure on longer-term yields is still very much there, which US recession fears are only mitigating somewhat.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. From August 21, the day before Chair Powell's dovish Jackson Hole speech, the US 2-year yield fell 25 basis points and the 10-year fell 28, while the 10y10y forward fell 22 basis points and the 10y20y forward 16.
  2. The 10y10y and 10y20y forward yields, constructed from 10-, 20- and 30-year yields to price the 10-year yield 10 and 20 years ahead, are falling far less than the 2- and 10-year yields.
  3. The smaller declines in far-forward yields indicate that upward pressure on longer-term US yields persists, with US recession fears only mitigating it somewhat.

Related Articles:

  • Global Debt Report 2025 — About 60% of fixed-rate government debt in advanced economies maturing by 2027 — roughly $9tn — was issued before the recent interest-rate tightening, with weighted average yields below 2% versus projected 10-year rates near 3.6%, implying refinancing at nearly double the original cost. France, Spain, the UK, and the US face heightened vulnerability, with maturing debt exceeding 15% of GDP.
  • Global Bond Rout — The Netherlands' $2tn pension system, the European Union's largest, is shifting from defined-benefit to defined-contribution plans, reducing its need to hold long-dated government bonds as a hedge against promised future payouts. The expected drop in demand for long-duration bonds is putting upward pressure on yields.
  • Why Are Long-Term Yields Rising? — Japan and Germany both have 30-year government bond yields near 3.3% despite gross government debt of 240% of GDP versus just above 60%, a gap attributed to the Bank of Japan's large-scale bond purchases. As the Bank of Japan steps back from capping long-term yields, Japan's 30-year yield is likely to rise further.

AI Summary. Gold's spot price reached an all-time high of $3,674.27 an ounce, surpassing the inflation-adjusted peak set when gold topped out at $850 in January 1980. That earlier peak came amid a collapsing US currency, an inflation spike, and a recession.

Yvonne Yue Li, Yihui Xie, Jack Ryan, and Sybilla Gross Bloomberg
Date Posted:

Gold has surpassed its real peak in 1980, hitting an all-time, inflation-adjusted high of $3,674.27 per Troy ounce. When gold hit $850 nominal in January 1980 (~ $3,590 in 2025 dollars), the US was grappling with a collapsing currency and stagflation.

Has gold surpassed its inflation-adjusted record high?

Core argument: Spot gold hit an all-time high of $3,674.27 an ounce after rising about 5% so far this month, exceeding the inflation-adjusted peak set on Jan. 21, 1980, when prices topped out at $850.

The spot price of gold has surged about 5% so far this month, with prices hitting an all-time high of $3,674.27 an ounce. It’s set more than 30 nominal records already in 2025, but the latest leg of the rally has also taken it through an inflation-adjusted peak set on Jan. 21, 1980, when prices topped out at $850. When gold hit $850 in January 1980, the US was grappling with a collapsing currency, a spike in inflation and an unfolding recession. The price had doubled over the previous two months, after US President Jimmy Carter issued a freeze on Iranian assets in response to a hostage crisis in Tehran, raising the perceived risk of holding dollar assets for some foreign central banks.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Spot gold hit an all-time high of $3,674.27 an ounce after rising about 5% so far this month, exceeding the inflation-adjusted peak set on Jan. 21, 1980, when prices topped out at $850.
  2. Gold has set more than 30 nominal record highs in 2025, with the latest leg of the rally carrying it past the 1980 inflation-adjusted record.
  3. When gold reached $850 in January 1980, the US faced a collapsing currency, an inflation spike and an unfolding recession, and the price had doubled over the prior two months after President Jimmy Carter froze Iranian assets.

Related Articles:

  • De-Dollarization? Diversification? Exploring Central Bank Gold Purchases and the Dollar’s Role in International Reserves — Central banks' gold accumulation is generally not associated with reducing the dollar's share of international reserves at the country level, apart from a few prominent cases, and is more consistent with modest overall diversification. Gold's role as an official-sector store of value has grown, but its use as a unit of account and medium of exchange remains limited.
  • Taking Stock: Dollar Assets, Gold, and Official Foreign Exchange Reserves — Gold accounts for about 10% of aggregate official foreign exchange reserves, roughly its level in the early 2000s. International Monetary Fund country data indicate most added official gold holdings came from a few central banks, with over half of reported accumulation from China and Russia and about a quarter from several emerging markets.
  • All That Glitters Is Cognitive Dissonance — Gold has risen more than 37% over the year, its strongest annual showing in more than three decades and a plausible path toward $4,000 an ounce, even as the Nasdaq Composite Index sets records. Central bank accumulation has been crucial, with gold purchases topping 1,000 tons for a third consecutive year.

AI Summary. Using high-frequency administrative data, the authors find most U.S. workers experience substantial month-to-month pay fluctuations even within ongoing jobs, with lower-income hourly workers facing more instability than higher-income salaried workers, largely because of firm-driven swings in hours. The authors present causal evidence that this instability raises consumption volatility and job separations.

Peter Ganong, Pascal Noel, Christina Patterson, Joseph Vavra, et al. National Bureau Of Economic Research
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

High frequency data show that many US workers – especially lower-income, hourly workers – face month-to-month, hours-induced, and within-firm pay fluctuations. Contrary to the Permanent Income Hypothesis, this affects consumption stability and utility.

How does month-to-month pay instability affect workers' consumption and job separations?

Core argument: High-frequency administrative data show that the majority of U.S. workers face substantial month-to-month pay fluctuations even within ongoing employment relationships, instability that analyses of annual data have masked.

This paper uses high frequency administrative data to show that the majority of U.S. workers experience substantial month-to-month fluctuations in pay, even within ongoing employment relationships. This earnings instability is pervasive, but it has been masked in past analysis of annual data. Moreover, this instability is unequally distributed: lower-income, hourly workers face more instability than higher-income, salaried workers because earnings instability arises in large part from firm-driven fluctuations in hours. This earnings instability is a meaningful source of economic risk: we provide causal evidence that it increases consumption volatility and also leads to greater job separations, and we find that workers have a high willingness to pay to reduce earnings instability. These findings suggest that [in contradiction to the time-honored permanent income hypothesis (PIH)], short-term earnings risk is a significant and previously underappreciated feature of the labor market

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. High-frequency administrative data show that the majority of U.S. workers face substantial month-to-month pay fluctuations even within ongoing employment relationships, instability that analyses of annual data have masked.
  2. Earnings instability falls disproportionately on lower-income, hourly workers relative to higher-income, salaried workers, arising in large part from firm-driven fluctuations in hours.
  3. Causal evidence indicates that earnings instability raises consumption volatility and job separations, and workers show a high willingness to pay to reduce it, suggesting short-term earnings risk is an underappreciated labor market feature.

Related Articles:

  • Unions, Wages and Hours — After adjusting for worker characteristics, the gap between union and non-union members' hourly earnings has been declining since the Great Recession, while the union differential in weekly wages has been more stable at roughly 15 log points. That weekly gap reflects both a higher hourly wage (about 10 log points) and longer working hours (about 5 log points).
  • Poverty, Hardship and Government Transfers — Income-based poverty measures show a large decline followed by a large increase, while consumption-based poverty declines steadily; the authors attribute the gap to low-income households saving, then dissaving and borrowing. They estimate that expanded child tax credits, stimulus payments, and pandemic unemployment benefits each played similar or larger roles in reducing poverty.

Friday, September 12, 2025

AI Summary. The Congressional Budget Office projects U.S. population growth averaging 0.2% per year through 2055, less than one-fifth the 0.9% annual average from 1975 to 2024. Deaths are projected to exceed births beginning in 2031, with net immigration more than accounting for population growth from 2031 to 2055.

Daniel Crown and Katherine Keisler-Starkey Congressional Budget Office
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

CBO forecasts that the US population will increase by only 17mm over the next 25 years. Deaths will exceed births starting in 2031, after which point net population growth will be entirely driven by immigration.

Will immigration account for all U.S. population growth in coming decades?

Core argument: CBO projects the U.S. population will grow an average 0.2% per year from 2025 to 2055, less than one-fifth the 0.9% average annual rate recorded from 1975 to 2024.

In CBO’s projections, the population grows at an average rate of 0.2% per year. That rate is less than one-fifth the average annual growth rate seen from 1975 to 2024, when it was 0.9% per year. The annual number of births is projected to exceed the annual number of deaths through 2030. Those net births account for about one-quarter of projected population growth over the 2025–2030 period; net immigration accounts for the rest. Beginning in 2031, annual deaths exceed annual births in CBO’s projections, and net immigration is projected to more than account for the population growth from 2031 to 2055. As a result of the downward revisions to net immigration and fertility rates, the agency now projects that the population will grow more slowly over the next 30 years than the agency projected it would in January. In CBO’s current projections the population will be 4.5 million people smaller (or 1.2%) in 2035 and 5.4 million people smaller (or 1.5%) in 2055 than the population was in the agency’s projections in January.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CBO projects the U.S. population will grow an average 0.2% per year from 2025 to 2055, less than one-fifth the 0.9% average annual rate recorded from 1975 to 2024.
  2. CBO projects births will exceed deaths through 2030, with net births accounting for about one-quarter of population growth over 2025–2030 and net immigration the rest; from 2031 to 2055, deaths exceed births and net immigration more than accounts for growth.
  3. Following downward revisions to net immigration and fertility rates, CBO projects the population will be 4.5 million smaller (1.2%) in 2035 and 5.4 million smaller (1.5%) in 2055 than in its January projections.

Related Articles:

  • The Demographic Outlook: 2025 to 2055 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the U.S. population will grow from 350m to 372m over three decades, an average of 0.2% per year, less than a quarter of the 0.9% average annual rate from 1975 to 2024. Deaths are projected to exceed births beginning in 2033, with net immigration more than accounting for population growth thereafter.
  • That Reported Multi-Million Decline In US Immigrants Just Doesn’t Add Up — A reported 2.2m drop in the US foreign-born population in the household survey implies implausible labor-market outcomes: either payroll employment would need downward revision by millions, or the true unemployment rate would be at a 72-year low of 2.6% with a dangerously overheating economy.
  • The Cost of Illegal Immigration — The US foreign-born population rose by 6.6mm to 51.6mm over a roughly three-year span, lifting immigrants to 15.6% of the population, above the prior records of 14.8% in 1890 and 14.7% in 1910. The authors estimate about 13.7mm illegal immigrants now live in the US, a net increase of 3.7mm.

AI Summary. Analysis of nationally representative US 12th-grade survey data finds that trends in adolescent internalizing symptoms such as depression, anxiety, and persistent worry diverged by political beliefs, sex, and parental education. Liberal female adolescents showed the largest increases in depressive symptoms, especially those whose parents had lower education levels.

Catherine Gimbrone, Lisa Bates, Seth Prins and Katherine Keyes SSM - Mental Health
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Btw 2005 and 2018, both the highest levels and the sharpest increases in scores for Depressive Affect (DA) were among female adolescents who self-identified as “liberal” rather than “conservative,” particularly in the presence of low parental education. Flagged by Tyler Cowen.

Do trends in adolescent depression symptoms differ by political beliefs?

Core argument: Analyzing nationally representative annual cross-sectional samples of US 12th-grade students from 2005 to 2018 in Monitoring the Future data, the authors find trends in adolescent internalizing symptoms diverged by political beliefs, sex, and parental education.

Adolescent internalizing symptoms (e.g. depression) [as well as anxiety, somatic symptoms, persistent worry, withdrawal, and self-critical thoughts] have increased over the past decade in the US, particularly among girls. The reasons are unclear. We hypothesize that increasing exposure to politicized events has contributed to these trends in adolescent internalizing symptoms, and that effects may be differential by political beliefs and sociodemographic characteristics. We analyzed nationally-representative annual cross-sectional samples of 12th-grade students from 2005 to 2018 using Monitoring the Future data. We examined self-reported political beliefs, sex, and parental education as predictors of four internalizing symptom scales over time, including depressive affect. Trends in adolescent internalizing symptoms diverged by political beliefs, sex, and parental education over time, with female liberal adolescents experiencing the largest increases in depressive symptoms, especially in the context of demographic risk factors including [low] parental education.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Analyzing nationally representative annual cross-sectional samples of US 12th-grade students from 2005 to 2018 in Monitoring the Future data, the authors find trends in adolescent internalizing symptoms diverged by political beliefs, sex, and parental education.
  2. Female liberal adolescents experienced the largest increases in depressive symptoms, especially alongside demographic risk factors including low parental education, according to the authors' analysis.
  3. The authors hypothesize that increasing exposure to politicized events contributed to rising internalizing symptoms among US adolescents, including depression, anxiety, somatic symptoms, persistent worry, withdrawal, and self-critical thoughts.

Related Articles:

  • US College Students’ Well-Being — A study of US college students finds moderate-to-severe depression reported by 26% of students at one elite institution, 22% reporting moderate-to-severe anxiety and 10% contemplating suicide. Poorer mental health is associated with being female, little exercise, low grades, and financial aid; financial stress is associated with higher suicidal thoughts.
  • The Girls Are Not Alright: Responses to Three Claims that the Youth Mental Health Crisis Is Exaggerated — U.S. Centers for Disease Control data on nonfatal self-harm show a 518% increase in hospitalizations following emergency department visits among girls aged 10–14, with a large rise also among girls aged 15–19. Because suicide deaths vary by sex and age, low suicide rates among teen girls do not mean teen girls are not struggling.
  • The Anti-Social Century — Americans spend less time with other people than in any period with reliable data back to 1965, with in-person socializing down more than 20% from 2003 to 2023 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics' American Time Use Survey. Among unmarried men and people under 25, the decline exceeded 35%.

AI Summary. Far-forward government bond yields — what markets price for the 10-year yield 10 and 20 years ahead — have risen in Japan, the UK, France and Germany, with Japan's 10-year yield 20 years forward at 4.5%. The US 10y20y forward yield has fallen slightly, which the author attributes to safe-haven inflows.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Brooks expresses alarm at the “unprecedented” sharp rise in market-implied Japanese and European forward yields at the long end, “as the debt crisis in the Eurozone still festers.” The “less worrying” picture for the US is likely a safe haven effect.

What are far-forward bond yields signaling about government debt?

Core argument: Japan's 10y20y forward yield stands at 4.5%, a level unprecedented in recent history, with the UK at similarly unprecedented levels and France not far behind.

Each chart shows the 2-year government bond yield (black), the 10-year government bond yield (blue) and then also 10y10y (orange) and 10y20y (red) forward yields. The 10y10y forward yield is what markets price for the 10-year yield in 10 years’ time, while the 10y20y forward is the [market-projected]10-year yield in 20 years’ time.The appeal of the latter two metrics is that they strip out what’s going on with very short-term yields, which are currently getting pulled down by mounting expectations of a US recession. What’s going on with long-term yields is thoroughly alarming in many places. Japan is perhaps the scariest picture, with the 10y20y forward yield at 4.5%, a yield level that’s unprecedented in recent history. The UK is at similarly unprecedented levels and France isn’t far behind. Even Germany has seen a sharp rise in its 10y20y forward yield, which is remarkable given that it usually gets safe haven inflows when global debt markets wobble. The US in this international comparison looks far less worrying. While long-term yields elsewhere have continued to rise, its 10y20y forward yield has fallen a bit. I put that down to safe haven inflows as the fiscal crisis in France once again reminds global markets that the debt crisis in the Euro zone still festers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Japan's 10y20y forward yield stands at 4.5%, a level unprecedented in recent history, with the UK at similarly unprecedented levels and France not far behind.
  2. Germany's 10y20y forward yield has risen sharply, which the author calls remarkable given that German debt usually receives safe haven inflows when global debt markets wobble.
  3. The US 10y20y forward yield has fallen slightly while long-term yields elsewhere continued rising, which the author attributes to safe haven inflows as France's fiscal crisis reminds markets of the festering Euro zone debt crisis.

Related Articles:

  • Long-Term US Yields Are Not Falling — Short- and medium-term US government bond yields have fallen more than the forward yields markets price for the 10-year rate 10 and 20 years ahead. The author argues this indicates upward pressure on longer-term yields persists, only partly offset by US recession fears.
  • The Rising Tide of Government Interest Costs — A model of forward interest rate curves, projected deficits, and debt maturity structures estimates that government interest spending on marketable debt will rise across G10 economies by an average of 0.5 percentage points of GDP by 2029, with France, Japan, and the United States facing the largest increases.
  • Global Debt Report 2025 — About 60% of fixed-rate government debt in advanced economies maturing by 2027 — roughly $9tn — was issued before the recent interest-rate tightening, with weighted average yields below 2% versus projected 10-year rates near 3.6%, implying refinancing at nearly double the original cost. France, Spain, the UK, and the US face heightened vulnerability, with maturing debt exceeding 15% of GDP.

AI Summary. Mexico has proposed raising tariffs on imports from countries it lacks trade agreements with, covering roughly $52bn of goods including autos, steel, textiles, toys, home appliances and footwear, to bolster domestic production and substitute Asian imports. China has warned it would retaliate, saying countries must not sacrifice third parties' interests under coercion.

WSJ Staff Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

China has threatened retaliation against proposed Mexican tariffs on Chinese imports. Cars made in China make up 20% of domestic Mexican car sales.

Will China retaliate against Mexico's proposed tariffs on Asian imports?

Core argument: Mexico's proposed tariff hike on imports from countries without a trade agreement would affect roughly $52 billion of imports, including autos, steel, textiles, toys, home appliances and footwear, according to the Mexican government.

Earlier this week, Mexico announced a plan to hike tariffs on imports of key goods from countries with which it doesn’t have a trade agreement as part of efforts to bolster domestic production and substitute imports from Asia. If passed, the proposal would affect around $52 billion worth of imports, including autos, steel, textiles, toys, home appliances and footwear, according to the Mexican government. Beijing has warned Mexico to think twice before moving ahead with [the] plan to raise tariffs that could hurt Chinese automakers, saying it would retaliate against the measure. “At a time when the U.S.’s abuse of tariffs has sparked widespread global opposition, countries should strengthen communication and coordination to jointly safeguard free trade and multilateralism, and must not sacrifice the interests of third parties due to coercion,” a Chinese commerce ministry spokesperson said in a statement.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Mexico's proposed tariff hike on imports from countries without a trade agreement would affect roughly $52 billion of imports, including autos, steel, textiles, toys, home appliances and footwear, according to the Mexican government.
  2. Mexico framed the tariff plan as an effort to bolster domestic production and substitute imports from Asia, and Beijing has warned it would retaliate against a measure that could hurt Chinese automakers.
  3. A Chinese commerce ministry spokesperson said countries should strengthen communication and coordination to safeguard free trade and multilateralism amid the U.S.'s abuse of tariffs, and must not sacrifice the interests of third parties due to coercion.

Related Articles:

  • China Emerges From Trade Chaos With Record Exports, Surplus — China posted a record half-year trade surplus of about $586bn, with exports up 5.8% year-over-year to $325bn and imports up 1.1%. Shipments to the US fell 16.1% from a year earlier, while exports to the 10 Southeast Asian nations in the Asean group rose 17%.
  • China Delays Approval of BYD’s Mexico Plant Amid Fears Tech Could Leak to US — China's commerce ministry has withheld the approval that domestic automakers need to manufacture abroad, holding up BYD's planned Mexican car plant, which the company said would create 10,000 jobs and build 150,000 vehicles a year. Officials are concerned that Mexico's proximity to the US could give Mexico, and possibly the US, access to BYD's advanced technology and knowhow.
  • Will China Take Over the Global Auto Industry? — The global auto market has historically been regional, with most cars sold in a region also built there. Overcapacity in China's internal combustion sector, expanding electric-vehicle capacity, ample state bank credit, and a weaker yuan could concentrate global auto production in China absent restrictions such as the US 100% tariff on Chinese electric vehicles.