Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, August 28, 2025

AI Summary. Analysts estimate Nvidia will sell roughly 6m Blackwell and 5.5m GB chips over a two-year span, and that if half are installed and run at capacity in America they would add 25GW to power demand. Bernstein projects a US shortfall of 17–62GW by 2030 depending on chip efficiency; Morgan Stanley puts the gap at 45GW by 2028.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
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If half of the Nvidia chips sold btw February 2024 and February 2026 are employed in the US, that alone will increase power demand 25 GW. The US added 27GW of energy production in 2023.

Can America's power supply keep up with AI chip demand?

Core argument: Analysts project Nvidia will sell about 6m Blackwell and 5.5m GB chips between February 2024 and February 2026, and if half land in America and run at capacity they would add 25 gigawatts of power demand.

Analysts predict that between February 2024 and February 2026 Nvidia will have sold some 6m Blackwells and 5.5m GBS. Assume that half of these end up in America, in line with its home market’s historical revenue share. If installed and operated at capacity, those chips would raise American power demand by 25 gigawatts. That is almost twice as much as all of America’s utility-scale producers added in 2022 and not far off the 27GW they managed in 2023. And that is not counting next-generation Rubin chips Nvidia plans to launch next year, or AI racks sold by rivals such as AMD, not to mention other power sinks such as electric cars. Between 2022, when ChatGPT ignited the AI boom, and the 12 months to June this year, the combined capital spending of America’s 50 biggest listed electricity providers rose by 30%, to $188bn—a compound annual increase of 7%, adjusting for inflation. According to S&P Global, a data provider, they are planning to add new plants with a collective capacity of 123GW, on top of the 565GW currently in operation. Bernstein estimates a potential power shortfall in America of 17GW by 2030 if the chips get more energy efficient, and 62GW if they don’t. Morgan Stanley puts the gap at 45GW by 2028.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Analysts project Nvidia will sell about 6m Blackwell and 5.5m GB chips between February 2024 and February 2026, and if half land in America and run at capacity they would add 25 gigawatts of power demand.
  2. The 25GW of added demand is almost twice what America's utility-scale producers added in 2022 and near the 27GW they added in 2023, excluding Nvidia's planned Rubin chips, rivals' AI racks and electric cars.
  3. Bernstein estimates an American power shortfall of 17GW by 2030 if chips grow more energy efficient and 62GW if they do not, while Morgan Stanley puts the gap at 45GW by 2028.

Related Articles:

  • Heliocentrism — An energy use must be electrified before green grid electricity can decarbonize it, and while US grid decarbonization continues at a steady pace, the electricity share of final US energy consumption has grown little. Transmission line growth runs well below Department of Energy targets for 2030 and 2035, and transformer delivery times have stretched from 4–6 weeks to 2–3 years.
  • AI Demand Drives Record Electricity Supply Costs In Largest US Market — PJM, the largest US power market, procured capacity at a record $329.17 per megawatt-day, up 22% from the prior year, and will pay producers $16.1bn to meet demand over a one-year delivery period, a 10% increase. The grid operator expects customer energy bills to rise 1–5%, depending on how utilities and states pass on costs.
  • Power Check: Watt’s Going On With The Grid? — Bank of America Global Research estimates US electricity demand will grow at a 2.5% compound annual rate through 2035, up from 0.5% annually over the prior decade, driven by building electrification, data centers, industrial demand, and electric vehicles. Meeting it requires greater utility investment in grid capacity.

AI Summary. The gap between French and German 10-year government bond yields is near the highs reached during France's political crises, and French stocks have resumed sharp underperformance versus the rest of Europe. France's finance minister warned the country might need assistance from the International Monetary Fund.

John Authers Bloomberg
Date Posted:
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The 10-year French OATS spread over German bunds yields is nearing the highs sparked by last year’s political crises. France’s finance minister warned that the country may need an IMF bailout like that of the UK in 1976.

Are French bond spreads and stocks signaling renewed political risk?

Core argument: The spread of 10-year French OATs over German bunds has returned to nearly the highs reached during last year's French political crises, ending a nine-month respite from concerns about French politics.

After a nine-month respite, we need to start worrying about French politics again. The key chart, with trigger warnings for all those who lived through the euro zone sovereign debt crisis, is this one: The spread of 10-year French OATS over German bund yields is almost back to its highs during last year’s political crises. French stocks have resumed sharp underperformance of the rest of Europe. [Prime Minister] Francois Bayrou, is calling a confidence vote Sept. 8 that he is likely to lose. Worse still, his finance minister warned in as many words that France might need help from the International Monetary Fund, awaking extremely unpleasant memories in the UK, which accepted a bailout in 1976.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The spread of 10-year French OATs over German bunds has returned to nearly the highs reached during last year's French political crises, ending a nine-month respite from concerns about French politics.
  2. French Prime Minister Francois Bayrou has called a confidence vote for September 8 that he is likely to lose, while French stocks have resumed sharp underperformance versus the rest of Europe.
  3. France's finance minister warned that the country might need assistance from the International Monetary Fund, recalling the UK's acceptance of a bailout in 1976.

Related Articles:

  • Bayrou Stakes French Premiership On Wooing Socialists On Budget — France's government proposed a €44bn fiscal package for 2026 that freezes spending across government except defence, freezes pensions and welfare benefits, tightens unemployment benefit eligibility, and scraps two national holidays to raise an estimated €4.2bn. The plan aims to narrow a deficit of 5.85% of GDP to 4.6%, a target analysts doubt will be met.
  • Global Debt Report 2025 — About 60% of fixed-rate government debt in advanced economies maturing by 2027 — roughly $9tn — was issued before the recent interest-rate tightening, with weighted average yields below 2% versus projected 10-year rates near 3.6%, implying refinancing at nearly double the original cost. France, Spain, the UK, and the US face heightened vulnerability, with maturing debt exceeding 15% of GDP.

AI Summary. In the euro zone, high-debt countries run larger budget deficits than low-debt ones. The author argues that European Central Bank backstops eliminate the risk of a debt crisis and therefore any political incentive to pursue unpopular spending cuts or tax increases, with France's fiscal standoff a symptom.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:

Brooks blames the fact that “high debt countries run bigger budget deficits than low debt ones” on moral hazard created by the ECB. “If there’s no risk of a debt crisis, why bother with arduous reforms that will get you booted out of office?”

Do central bank backstops remove incentives for fiscal consolidation?

Core argument: Euro zone high-debt countries run bigger budget deficits than low-debt ones, a pattern the author attributes to the ECB removing the left tail of the distribution and with it any incentive for fiscal consolidation.

In the Euro zone, the perverse pattern that’s emerged is that high debt countries run bigger budget deficits than low debt ones, as the chart above shows. By removing the left tail of the distribution, the ECB in effect removes any incentive for policy makers to pursue fiscal consolidation. After all, spending cuts and tax hikes are never popular. If there’s no risk of a debt crisis, why bother with arduous reforms that will get you booted out of office. The current stand-off in France over fiscal consolidation is a direct reflection of this dysfunction. Without the risk of a serious debt crisis, why should the opposition back government efforts to bring the budget under control? ECB actions are skewing incentives and France is a symptom of that.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Euro zone high-debt countries run bigger budget deficits than low-debt ones, a pattern the author attributes to the ECB removing the left tail of the distribution and with it any incentive for fiscal consolidation.
  2. The author argues that without the risk of a debt crisis, policy makers have no reason to pursue unpopular spending cuts and tax hikes that would cost them office.
  3. France's stand-off over fiscal consolidation reflects this dysfunction, in the author's view, since the opposition has no reason to back budget control absent the threat of a serious debt crisis.

Related Articles:

  • Global Debt Report 2025 — About 60% of fixed-rate government debt in advanced economies maturing by 2027 — roughly $9tn — was issued before the recent interest-rate tightening, with weighted average yields below 2% versus projected 10-year rates near 3.6%, implying refinancing at nearly double the original cost. France, Spain, the UK, and the US face heightened vulnerability, with maturing debt exceeding 15% of GDP.
  • The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
  • Why Denmark is Raising its Retirement Age to 70, Europe’s Highest — Denmark's state pension age is tied to life expectancy under a parliamentary agreement that sets adjustments every five years with 15 years' notice and caps increases at one year at a time. Under this system the pension age is set to rise from 67 to 70, keeping public finances healthy long term.

AI Summary. The authors document frequent, sustained departures from the Taylor rule—under which policy rates move more than one-for-one with inflation—and argue optimal monetary policy does not always require such a response, since central banks can look through inflation not expected to persist. They attribute that flexibility to credibility built on track record and central bank independence.

Emi Nakamura, Venance Riblier and Jon Steinsson Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Date Posted:

Credible central banks shouldn’t follow Taylor rules that prescribe a >1-for-1 response of the policy rate to inflation, but “should look through…inflation that is not expected to persist,” as the Fed did in its post-covid “immaculate disinflation.”

Must central banks always raise rates more than one-for-one with inflation?

Core argument: The authors document frequent deviations from the Taylor rule, particularly over the past 20 years, with interest rates varying less than one-for-one with inflation for sustained periods.

We show that deviations from the Taylor rule [and related formulae that, roughly speaking, prescribe > 1-for-1 responses of the policy rate to inflation] have occurred frequently, particularly over the past 20 years. In many cases, interest rates vary less than one-for-one with inflation for sustained periods. We argue that optimal monetary policy does not always dictate a more than one-for-one response of interest rates to inflation. One way to interpret these results is that central banks should look through the part of inflation that is not expected to persist. The Fed’s policy deviated strongly from the Taylor rule during this period and ultimately managed to bring about an “immaculate disinflation.” Figure 14 plots core PCE inflation and 1-year inflation expectations for the GDP deflator from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. During the post-Covid inflation episode, the market was confident that the Fed would act aggressively if inflation persisted or de-anchoring of expectations started to occur. This high degree of credibility is partly due to the Fed’s strong track record, but also partly due to institutions such as central bank independence, valuable assets that can be destroyed much faster than they were built up.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors document frequent deviations from the Taylor rule, particularly over the past 20 years, with interest rates varying less than one-for-one with inflation for sustained periods.
  2. The authors argue that optimal monetary policy does not always dictate a more than one-for-one response of interest rates to inflation, and that one interpretation is that central banks should look through the part of inflation not expected to persist.
  3. The Fed's policy deviated strongly from the Taylor rule during the post-Covid inflation episode and ultimately brought about an "immaculate disinflation," with credibility attributed partly to its track record and partly to institutions such as central bank independence.

Related Articles:

Friday, August 29, 2025

AI Summary. By allowing senior workers to complete tasks independently, artificial intelligence may reduce entry-level opportunities and impede younger workers' acquisition of tacit knowledge, the practical expertise that resists codification. The authors estimate this could lower the long-run annual growth rate of U.S. per capita output by 0.05 to 0.35 percentage points, depending on scale.

Enrique Ide arXiv
Date Posted:

“By enabling senior workers to accomplish more tasks independently, AI may inadvertently reduce entry-level opportunities, raising concerns about how future generations will acquire essential expertise” and potentially lowering growth in per capita GDP.

Does automating entry-level work slow long-run growth by blocking knowledge transfer?

Core argument: Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest AI-driven automation of entry-level work could lower the long-run annual growth rate of U.S. per capita output by 0.05 to 0.35 percentage points, depending on the scale of automation.

By enabling senior workers to accomplish more tasks independently, AI may inadvertently reduce entry-level opportunities, raising concerns about how future generations will acquire essential expertise, [in particular] tacit knowledge—practical insights that resist codification and are critical for workplace success. While automation delivers immediate productivity gains, it can undermine long-term growth by hindering younger workers’ acquisition of tacit skills. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest AI-driven entry-level automation could lower the long-run annual growth rate of U.S. per capita output by 0.05 to 0.35 percentage points, depending on its scale. AI co-pilots—systems providing access to tacit-like expertise once obtained only through direct experience—can partially offset these losses by assisting individuals who fail to develop adequate skills early in their careers, but may also weaken junior workers’ incentives to engage in hands-on learning. These findings challenge the view that AI will automatically lead to higher economic growth, highlighting the need to safeguard—or deliberately create—entry-level opportunities to fully realize AI’s potential.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest AI-driven automation of entry-level work could lower the long-run annual growth rate of U.S. per capita output by 0.05 to 0.35 percentage points, depending on the scale of automation.
  2. By enabling senior workers to complete more tasks independently, AI may reduce the entry-level opportunities through which younger workers acquire tacit knowledge—practical insights that resist codification and are critical for workplace success.
  3. AI co-pilots can partially offset these losses by giving workers who fail to build skills early access to tacit-like expertise, but may also weaken junior workers' incentives to engage in hands-on learning.

Related Articles:

  • Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence — Using payroll records covering millions of US workers, the authors find employment for workers aged 22–25 in occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence, such as software developers and customer service representatives, declined 6%, while employment for older workers in those occupations rose 6–9%. Employment in less-exposed occupations grew comparably across age groups.
  • Artificial Intelligence in the Knowledge Economy — The authors model artificial intelligence in the knowledge economy and find that non-autonomous AI acting only as a co-pilot tends to benefit the least knowledgeable workers most, while autonomous AI that can also act as a co-worker primarily benefits the most knowledgeable. Job-posting evidence shows declines in low-knowledge white-collar postings alongside increases in high-knowledge roles.
  • Generative AI at Work — A study of 5,179 customer support agents finds that access to a generative AI conversational assistant raised issues resolved per hour by 14% on average, with the largest gains for novice and low-skilled workers and minimal effect on experienced, highly skilled ones. The authors also find AI assistance improved customer sentiment, reduced requests for managerial intervention, and improved employee retention.

AI Summary. Inflation-adjusted US house prices are 2.5% below their 2022 peak. An affordability estimate finds that the monthly principal-and-interest payment on a $500,000 home rose 97% over four years, as house prices climbed 27% and 30-year fixed mortgage rates went from about 3.0% to 6.8%.

Bill McBride Calculated Risk
Date Posted:

Nationally, real house prices are now 2.5% below the 2022 peak and 10% above the 2006 peak. “Affordability” remains at levels last seen in the early 1980s, when 30-year mortgage rates were over 14%. @calculatedrisk

How much have house prices and mortgage payments changed since peak?

Core argument: Inflation-adjusted U.S. house prices stand 2.5% below their 2022 peak.

I’ve put together my own affordability index [using] median income from the Census Bureau (estimated 2024 and 2025), assumed a 15% down payment, and used a 2% estimate for property taxes, insurance and maintenance. This is probably low for high property tax states like New Jersey and Texas, and too high for lower property tax states. For house prices, I used the Case-Shiller National Index, Seasonally Adjusted (SA). Also, for the down payment - there wasn’t a significant difference between 15% and 20%. For mortgage rates, I used the Freddie Mac PMMS (30-year fixed rates). Here is what the index looks like (lower is more affordable). In June 2021, the payment on a $500,000 house, with a 20% down payment and 2.98% 30-year mortgage rates, would be around $1,681 for principal and interest. The monthly payment for the same house with house prices up 27% over four years and mortgage rates at 6.82% in May 2025, would be $3,305 - an increase of 97%! Almost double the payment for the same house!

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Inflation-adjusted U.S. house prices stand 2.5% below their 2022 peak.
  2. The monthly principal and interest payment on a $500,000 house with 20% down rose 97%, from $1,681 in June 2021 at a 2.98% 30-year mortgage rate to $3,305 in May 2025 at 6.82%, with prices up 27%.
  3. The affordability index uses Census Bureau median income (2024 and 2025 estimated), a 15% down payment, a 2% estimate for property taxes, insurance and maintenance, the seasonally adjusted Case-Shiller National Index, and Freddie Mac PMMS 30-year fixed rates.

Related Articles:

  • Why Are Young Adults in the English-Speaking World So Unhappy? — The share of young adults regularly experiencing stress and anger has risen sharply in the US, Canada, UK, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand while remaining largely stable elsewhere in the West. Real house prices since 1995 are up 85% in the US and over 200% in the other five countries.
  • How America’s AI Boom Is Squeezing The Rest Of The Economy — About a sixth of America's 2% real GDP growth over the past year came from investment in computer and communications equipment and data centres, and one estimate puts the artificial intelligence boom's total contribution to growth at 40%. Average electricity bills rose 7%, attributed in part to data-centre demand, while housebuilding and non-AI business investment slumped and real consumption flatlined.
  • Rapidly Growing Treasury Supply Crowding Out Other Types of Credit Growth — Roughly half of all fixed income issuance coming to market over the past year has been US Treasuries, meaning investors must allocate a growing share of dollars to financing the government. The argument is that lower government debt would free up more funds for consumer borrowing and business investment.

AI Summary. Airbus's A320 family of single-aisle jets is poised to overtake Boeing's 737 as the most-delivered commercial aircraft in history, with 12,153 delivered since launch, according to aviation consultants Cirium. After years of a roughly even split, Airbus holds 61% of the single-aisle market by order backlog and 72% by deliveries, while Boeing leads in wide-body aircraft.

Sylvia Pfeifer Financial Times
Date Posted:

Airbus is now at par with Boeing as measured by cumulative deliveries, though the A320 launched 20 years after the 737. Boeing still leads in larger wide-body aircraft.

Has Airbus overtaken Boeing in the single-aisle jet market?

Core argument: Airbus's A320 family, with 12,153 delivered since launch according to aviation consultants Cirium, is poised to overtake Boeing's 737 as the most popular commercial aircraft in history.

The A320 family of single-aisle jets, typically used on short and medium-haul flights, is now poised to overtake the 737 as the most popular commercial aircraft in history with 12,153 delivered since launch, according to aviation consultants Cirium. The success of the A320 family has been the driving force behind Airbus’s ascendancy in its five-decade rivalry with its US competitor. For years, the two companies had a roughly 50:50 split of the market for commercial single-aisle aircraft. But by the end of last year, Airbus held a market share of 61% measured by order backlog and 72% by deliveries, according to Cirium. Boeing still leads in larger, wide-body aircraft types.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Airbus's A320 family, with 12,153 delivered since launch according to aviation consultants Cirium, is poised to overtake Boeing's 737 as the most popular commercial aircraft in history.
  2. Airbus held 61% of the single-aisle market by order backlog and 72% by deliveries at the end of last year, according to Cirium, after years in which the two makers split the market roughly 50:50.
  3. Boeing still leads in larger wide-body aircraft types, while the A320 family has driven Airbus's ascendancy in the five-decade rivalry between the two manufacturers.

Related Articles:

  • Boeing Battles Brain Drain As Engineers Chase the Allure of Space — The average tenure of a Boeing engineer has fallen from 16.4 years to 12.6 years, according to data from the union representing 12,000 Boeing engineers, with tenure shortening in almost every age bracket. Analysts, recruiters and union officials describe this "brain drain" as a drag on operations that could make launching a new plane harder.
  • China Steps Up Drive To Break Boeing and Airbus Grip on Plane Market — China's state-backed planemaker Comac has its subsidised C919 single-aisle jet flying domestic routes with Air China, China Eastern and China Southern, and is expanding to a route between Shanghai and Hong Kong. Aviation consultancy IBA projects Comac can lift output from one to 11 aircraft a month, delivering almost 2,000 C919s by 2040.
  • Crises at Boeing and Intel Are a National Emergency — Intel and Boeing, once benchmarks for high-quality, demanding manufacturing, declined because of their own mistakes rather than cheap foreign competition. Because leading U.S. tech firms' software and devices depend on advanced semiconductors fabricated under contract, especially by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., Chinese subjugation of Taiwan could leave the U.S. tech sector at Beijing's mercy.

AI Summary. US aluminum prices have risen above other international markets, with the US Midwest delivery premium up 81% and the all-in US price near $4,200 a ton versus roughly $2,600 on the London Metal Exchange. The US has only four operating smelters, and domestic capacity is insufficient to meet demand given high energy costs and long lead times for new plants.

Yvonne Yue Li and Joe Deaux Bloomberg
Date Posted:

US aluminum prices are now 48% higher than Europe’s and 56% higher than Japan’s.

Are tariffs raising US aluminum prices above international markets?

Core argument: The US Midwest premium for aluminum delivery has jumped 81% since early June, pushing the US price to almost $4,200 a ton versus roughly $2,600 a ton on the London Metal Exchange.

Aluminum prices in the US have been rising above other international markets since January due to the tariff threat. The so-called US Midwest premium – the amount added to global price benchmarks to deliver the metal to that region – jumped 81% since early June. Aluminum trades around $2,600 a ton on the London Metal Exchange. After adding the Midwest premium, the US price is almost $4,200 a ton. In spite of the surge, prices still haven’t entirely factored in the new tariffs. Alcoa, the largest US producer, said in July that US tariffs on Canadian shipments in the first half cost the company $135 million. “The tariffs are already starting to reshape global aluminum flows, particularly affecting producers in Canada,” said Ewa Manthey, a commodity strategist at ING Groep NV.“ Despite the tariffs, the US aluminum industry remains constrained — only four operating smelters exist. Domestic capacity is insufficient to meet demand, and new plants face high energy costs and long lead times.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US Midwest premium for aluminum delivery has jumped 81% since early June, pushing the US price to almost $4,200 a ton versus roughly $2,600 a ton on the London Metal Exchange.
  2. Alcoa, the largest US aluminum producer, said in July that US tariffs on Canadian shipments cost the company $135 million in the first half, while ING commodity strategist Ewa Manthey said the tariffs are already reshaping global aluminum flows, particularly affecting Canadian producers.
  3. The US aluminum industry has only four operating smelters, with domestic capacity insufficient to meet demand and new plants facing high energy costs and long lead times.

Related Articles:

  • The Boom in New Steel Mills Is Outpacing Demand — US steelmakers have gained market share from imports but have not prevented prices from slipping amid soft demand from major buyers such as the auto and construction industries. About 21m tons of additional US steel production capacity has been announced, started or completed over four years, roughly a quarter of last year's total US output.
  • Steel Productivity has Plummeted Since Trump’s 2018 Tariffs — Output per hour in the U.S. steel industry has fallen 32% since 2017, following the imposition of 25% tariffs on steel imports, while output per hour for the economy as a whole rose 15%. U.S. steel-using firms, which employ roughly 45x as many Americans as steel producers, pay about 75% more for steel than global competitors.
  • Help for the Heartland? The Employment and Electoral Effects of the Trump Tariffs in the United States — The authors find that the combined effect of U.S.-China trade war import tariffs, retaliatory tariffs, and farm subsidies on employment in exposed U.S. locations was at best a wash and possibly mildly negative, while residents of tariff-protected areas became less likely to identify as Democrats and more likely to vote Republican.