Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Friday, August 22, 2025

AI Summary. In developed countries that modernized very rapidly, men do considerably less housework and care for others at home relative to women than in countries with more continuous growth. Larger gender gaps in household and caring hours are strongly correlated with lower fertility rates across these countries.

Claudia Goldin Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
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Addressing fertility decline in response to rapid increases in women’s opportunities, Goldin argues “the more men can credibly signal that they will be dependable dads…the higher will be the birthrate in the face of greater female agency.”

Do larger gender gaps in housework hours accompany lower fertility?

Core argument: Japan's gender gap in household and caring hours is 3.1 hours and Italy's is 3 hours, with 2019 total fertility rates of 1.36 and 1.27, while Sweden's gap of 0.8 hours and Denmark's of 0.9 hours accompany TFRs of 1.7.

Men in currently developed countries that modernized very rapidly do considerably less housework and care for others in their homes, relative to women, than do men in countries that had more continuous growth experiences. The relationship between the time differences and TFR is clear. All six Group 1 nations are in the upper left of Figure 10, with higher fertility and lower time differences between the genders. All six Group 2 nations Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea, Portugal, and Spain, which demographers have termed the lowest low fertility countries are in the lower right, with lower fertility and higher time differences between the genders. The time difference for Japan, for example, is 3.1 hours and is 3 hours for Italy. Their TFRs (in 2019) were 1.36 and 1.27 respectively. But for Sweden, the time difference was 0.8 hours and Denmark’s was 0.9. Their TFRs (in 2019) were both 1.7. The correlation between the country’s TFR and the gender difference in household and caring hours is strong.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Japan's gender gap in household and caring hours is 3.1 hours and Italy's is 3 hours, with 2019 total fertility rates of 1.36 and 1.27, while Sweden's gap of 0.8 hours and Denmark's of 0.9 hours accompany TFRs of 1.7.
  2. Men in developed countries that modernized very rapidly do considerably less housework and care for others at home, relative to women, than men in countries with more continuous growth experiences.
  3. The six countries demographers term "lowest low fertility" — Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea, Portugal, and Spain — combine lower fertility with larger gender gaps in household and caring hours, and the correlation between a country's TFR and that gap is strong.

Related Articles:

  • Babies and the Macroeconomy — Fertility rates have fallen in nearly every country, but timing differed: some developed nations fell below the 2.1 replacement level as early as the 1970s, while others dropped to "lowest low" levels below 1.3. The author argues nations with rapid, discontinuous growth saw sharper declines as women's expectations outpaced tradition-bound men's willingness to share family time.
  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.

AI Summary. Markets have moved to price 125 basis points of Federal Reserve rate cuts, double the amount priced earlier, yet the 30-year Treasury yield has risen from 4.78% to 4.92%, showing policy rate cuts need not lower long-term yields. The author argues doubts about Federal Reserve independence could raise long yields further through higher risk premia.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:

Citing the rise in the 30-year yield as the market prices in more rate cuts, Brooks argues “If the administration wants low interest rates, it should work on narrowing the deficit…not bullying the Fed into rate cuts.”

Do expected Fed rate cuts lower long-term Treasury yields?

Core argument: Interest rate futures price 125 basis points of Fed cuts through end-2026, double the amount priced at the end of last year, as tariffs took their toll on the US economy.

The chart shows the effective federal funds rate (black line), which is the Fed’s policy rate. Markets are forward looking, which means they incorporate information on rate cuts well before any easing actually happens. I therefore also show what interest rate futures imply for the federal funds rate in December 2026 (blue line). As tariffs took their toll on the US economy, markets moved to price aggressive Fed easing, with 125 basis points in cuts priced through the end of next year. At the end of last year, only half that amount of cuts was priced through end-2026. This has not, however, coincided with a fall in the 30-year Treasury yield (red line), which has risen from 4.78% at the end of last year to 4.92% now. This illustrates that rate cuts don’t necessarily translate into lower long-term yields. Indeed, if markets start to worry Fed independence is endangered, long term yields could rise a lot further, driven up by higher risk premia that increase with the scale of public debt.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Interest rate futures price 125 basis points of Fed cuts through end-2026, double the amount priced at the end of last year, as tariffs took their toll on the US economy.
  2. The 30-year Treasury yield has risen from 4.78% at the end of last year to 4.92%, even as markets priced more aggressive Fed easing, illustrating that rate cuts do not necessarily translate into lower long-term yields.
  3. If markets start to worry that Fed independence is endangered, long-term yields could rise a lot further, driven up by higher risk premia that increase with the scale of public debt.

Related Articles:

  • Why Is The Yield Curve Steepening? Because Of Coming Fed Cuts And Fiscal Challenges — The US yield curve is steepening across both the 2-to-10-year and 10-to-30-year segments. The article attributes this to Federal Reserve rate cuts, the risk that markets read those cuts as politically motivated and raise inflation expectations and long-term rates, and growing Treasury debt issuance pushing long rates up.
  • Data Update 4 for 2025: Interest Rates, Inflation and Central Banks! — Interest rates are ultimately driven by macroeconomic fundamentals, with an "intrinsic risk-free rate" defined as the sum of the inflation rate and real GDP growth tracking the observed 10-year Treasury bond yield closely. On this view, central banks' influence comes from preferential access to data on those fundamentals, their capacity to alter them, and their credibility.
  • Rapidly Growing Treasury Supply Crowding Out Other Types of Credit Growth — Roughly half of all fixed income issuance coming to market over the past year has been US Treasuries, meaning investors must allocate a growing share of dollars to financing the government. The argument is that lower government debt would free up more funds for consumer borrowing and business investment.

AI Summary. Pew Research Center estimates the U.S. unauthorized immigrant population reached an all-time high of 14m in 2023, or 4.1% of the total population, after a record two-year increase of 3.5m. The overall immigrant population peaked above 53m before declining by more than 1m in the first half of 2025.

Jeffrey Passel and Jens Manuel Krogstad Pew Research Center
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Pew estimates the unauthorized immigrant population was 14mm in 2023, or 4.1% of the population. They also estimate that in January 2025, 53mm immigrants comprised a record 15.8% of the US population; there was a likely 1mm drop btw then and June.

How large has the unauthorized immigrant population in America become?

Core argument: Pew Research Center estimates the U.S. unauthorized immigrant population reached a record 14 million in 2023, a two-year increase of 3.5 million that is the biggest on record, equal to 4.1% of the total U.S. population.

The number of unauthorized immigrants in the United States reached an all-time high of 14 million in 2023 after two consecutive years of record growth, according to a new Pew Research Center estimate. The increase of 3.5 million in two years is the biggest on record. Data from 2023 is the most recent available for developing a comprehensive and detailed estimate. As of 2023, unauthorized immigrants represented 4.1% of the total U.S. population and 27% of the foreign-born population. The overall U.S. immigrant population reached an all-time high of more than 53 million in January 2025, accounting for a record 15.8% of the U.S. population. However, growth slowed substantially starting in early 2024, and the number declined by more than 1 million between January and June 2025, according to data from the Current Population Survey. This would be the first sustained drop in the U.S. immigrant population since the 1960s. As of mid-2025, the unauthorized immigrant population likely remains above 2023 levels.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Pew Research Center estimates the U.S. unauthorized immigrant population reached a record 14 million in 2023, a two-year increase of 3.5 million that is the biggest on record, equal to 4.1% of the total U.S. population.
  2. Unauthorized immigrants made up 27% of the U.S. foreign-born population in 2023, while the overall immigrant population hit an all-time high of more than 53 million in January 2025, a record 15.8% of the U.S. population.
  3. Current Population Survey data show the U.S. immigrant population declined by more than 1 million between January and June 2025, which would be the first sustained drop since the 1960s, though the unauthorized population likely remains above 2023 levels.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide — Current Population Survey estimates indicate America's foreign-born population surpassed 50m for the first time and exceeded 15% of the national population, above the prior peak of 14.8% recorded in 1890. Mass immigration during that earlier wave was associated in contemporary opinion with widening income and wealth gaps and depressed wages for less-skilled native-born men, and sweeping national restrictions followed.
  • Illegal Population Down Since January — An analysis of the Current Population Survey finds the foreign-born population fell by 957,000 over a four-month period, with the labor force component down 601,000, one of the largest four-month declines in three decades. The decline was entirely among non-citizens, with non-citizens from Latin America arriving in 1980 or later down 1.07m.
  • The Cost of Illegal Immigration — The US foreign-born population rose by 6.6mm to 51.6mm over a roughly three-year span, lifting immigrants to 15.6% of the population, above the prior records of 14.8% in 1890 and 14.7% in 1910. The authors estimate about 13.7mm illegal immigrants now live in the US, a net increase of 3.7mm.

AI Summary. China's total debt has risen to over 300% of gross domestic product from a little over 200% a decade ago, and with the main policy rate at 1.4%, the central bank has limited room to cut. Price declines are more widespread than in past deflationary episodes, and large-scale stimulus remains off the table.

Bloomberg Staff Bloomberg
Date Posted:

China’s regulators are cracking down on “overcapacity” and “over-competition” in key industries to combat deflation. With total debt >300% of GDP and the policy rate at 1.4%, there is little room for fiscal or monetary stimulus.

Is China running out of room to fight falling prices?

Core argument: China's total debt has climbed to over 300% of GDP from a little over 200% a decade ago, and with the main policy rate at 1.4%, the central bank has little room to cut.

More than two years into China’s latest deflation saga, a mega stimulus is still off the table. Total debt has soared to over 300% of gross domestic product — from a little over 200% a decade ago — and with the main policy rate at 1.4%, China’s central bank doesn’t have much room to cut. Price decreases also more widespread this time around, making the task at hand more daunting. Coal output declined last month from a year ago, as government inspectors targeted sites that produce too much. A major lithium mine was suspended for three months, Bloomberg News reported earlier. Bosses from electric vehicle companies and some tech-giants have been hauled before regulators and warned about over-competition.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's total debt has climbed to over 300% of GDP from a little over 200% a decade ago, and with the main policy rate at 1.4%, the central bank has little room to cut.
  2. More than two years into China's deflation saga, a mega stimulus remains off the table, and price decreases are more widespread this time, making the task more daunting.
  3. Coal output declined last month from a year earlier as government inspectors targeted sites producing too much, a major lithium mine was suspended for three months, and electric-vehicle and tech executives were warned by regulators about over-competition.

Related Articles:

  • China Emerges From Trade Chaos With Record Exports, Surplus — China posted a record half-year trade surplus of about $586bn, with exports up 5.8% year-over-year to $325bn and imports up 1.1%. Shipments to the US fell 16.1% from a year earlier, while exports to the 10 Southeast Asian nations in the Asean group rose 17%.
  • China’s Stealth Trade Surplus — China's trade surplus has soared over the past five years, including a shift from a deficit to a large surplus in autos, with net vehicle exports exceeding 6m units, and dominance in renewables manufacturing. Its export volume growth has consistently exceeded global trade growth, consistent with economies leaning on exports after a real estate crisis weakens domestic demand.
  • Our Revamped China Wage Tracker Shows Gradual Softening in Wage Growth — A revamped wage tracker estimates China's wage growth slowed to 4.2% year-over-year in the first quarter and 3.9% in the second, down from 4.5% in the prior fourth quarter and about 1 percentage point below official figures. The authors argue sluggish wage growth may weigh on consumption growth.

Monday, August 25, 2025

AI Summary. The authors estimate that demand for assets has outpaced supply by roughly 400% of GDP versus 100%, making rising asset demand the leading contributor to falling interest rates. They project that debt sustainability requires fiscal consolidation exceeding 10% of GDP, though debt could reach 250% of GDP without raising interest rates.

Adrien Auclert, Hannes Malmberg, Matthew Rognlie, and Ludwig Straub Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Date Posted:
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U.S. asset supply as a % of GDP doubled since 1982, but asset demand – driven by aging, rising inequality, increasing foreign desire for U.S. assets, and falling productivity growth – grew by 4x GDP. “Asset demand won the race, and interest rates fell.”

Has rising asset demand outpaced supply enough to drive interest rates down?

Core argument: Since the early 1980s, asset demand has risen by roughly 400% of GDP against a cumulative asset supply increase of about 100% of GDP, with demand winning the race and interest rates falling.

From 1950 to the present, rapid population aging, rising income inequality, increasing foreign demand for U.S. assets, and declining productivity growth all contributed to a surge in asset demand. Asset supply initially fell, then turned around sharply, mainly driven by increases in government debt and the value of capitalized profits. Overall, asset demand won the race, and interest rates fell. In the left panel, we see that asset supply and demand shifts, shown as shares of GDP, remain small until the late 1960s; then, asset supply declines through the early 1980s. Since then, both have risen dramatically, though asset demand has outpaced supply, rising by ~ 400% of GDP relative to a cumulative asset supply increase of only around 100% of GDP. [The 2nd and 3rd panels] use our recovered supply and demand shifts to decompose equilibrium movements in r∗ and A/Y. Falling asset supply is mostly responsible for the reductions in r∗ and A/Y early on. [Since] the 1980s, rising asset demand has been the leading contributor to the decline in interest rates and the rise in A/Y. Looking ahead, debt sustainability requires a fiscal consolidation of >10% of GDP, but debt could reach 250% of GDP without pushing up interest rates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Since the early 1980s, asset demand has risen by roughly 400% of GDP against a cumulative asset supply increase of about 100% of GDP, with demand winning the race and interest rates falling.
  2. Population aging, rising income inequality, growing foreign demand for U.S. assets, and declining productivity growth contributed to the surge in asset demand, while asset supply rose mainly on higher government debt and the value of capitalized profits.
  3. Falling asset supply accounts for most of the early declines in r* and the asset-to-output ratio, while rising asset demand has led the decline in interest rates since the 1980s; debt sustainability requires a fiscal consolidation exceeding 10% of GDP.

Related Articles:

  • Demographics, Wealth, and Global Imbalances in the Twenty-First Century — Because the elderly hold much more wealth than the young and on average do not draw it down much as they age, the authors' model projects no "great demographic reversal": population aging is estimated to push global rates of return down by about 1.07pp and raise global wealth from 456% to 498% of world GDP.
  • Underlying Trends in the U.S. Neutral Interest Rate — An analysis attributes the pre-pandemic decline in the U.S. neutral real interest rate to international factors and population aging, with fiscal spending pushing rates up; since 2019 international factors have instead put upward pressure on U.S. real rates. The estimates suggest productivity growth has played a very minor role.
  • Foreign Flows Into The US At Record High — Foreign net inflows into long-term US assets, measured as a rolling 12-month sum, are at record highs, with equities showing particularly strong inflows. Flows into other asset classes are weaker but show no sign of an exodus from US assets.

AI Summary. Payroll job growth slowed to an average 35,000 per month over three months, down from 168,000 per month in 2024, but labor supply softened in line with demand—slower labor force growth amid reduced immigration—leaving the labor market in balance with downside risks to employment and upside risks to inflation.

Jerome Powell Federal Reserve Board
Date Posted:

“The labor market appears to be in… a curious kind of balance that results from a marked slowing in both the supply of and demand for workers. Downside risks to employment are rising; risks to inflation are tilted to the upside, a challenging situation.”

Does slower job growth mean the labor market has slack?

Core argument: U.S. payroll job growth slowed to an average 35,000 per month over the past three months, down from 168,000 per month during 2024, according to the July employment report.

The July employment report released earlier this month showed that payroll job growth slowed to an average pace of only 35,000 per month over the past three months, down from 168,000 per month during 2024. But it does not appear that the slowdown in job growth has opened up a large margin of slack in the labor market. Labor supply has softened in line with demand, sharply lowering the "breakeven" rate of job creation needed to hold the unemployment rate constant. Indeed, labor force growth has slowed considerably this year with the sharp falloff in immigration, and the labor force participation rate has edged down in recent months. Overall, while the labor market appears to be in balance, it is a curious kind of balance that results from a marked slowing in both the supply of and demand for workers. This unusual situation suggests that downside risks to employment are rising, [while] risks to inflation are tilted to the upside, a challenging situation. When our goals are in tension like this, our framework calls for us to balance both sides of our dual mandate.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. payroll job growth slowed to an average 35,000 per month over the past three months, down from 168,000 per month during 2024, according to the July employment report.
  2. The slowdown in job growth does not appear to have opened a large margin of labor market slack, as labor supply softened in line with demand, sharply lowering the breakeven rate of job creation needed to hold unemployment constant.
  3. Downside risks to employment appear to be rising while risks to inflation are tilted to the upside, a tension the Federal Reserve's framework calls for balancing across both sides of its dual mandate.

Related Articles:

  • Three Perceptions — Slowing wage growth suggests labor market weakness reflects weaker labor demand rather than a shortage of workers, since reduced immigration would push wages up even as job growth slowed. Real consumer spending has plateaued, and tariffs now taking effect are expected to further reduce corporate profits and consumer incomes.
  • Immigration and the U.S. Economy Since the Pandemic: An Accounting Exercise — The US native-born labor force fell by about 1.2m over four years, a decline driven overwhelmingly by population aging, while foreign-born labor supply grew by about 3m, leaving the overall labor force up roughly 2m. Without immigration, the total US labor force would have shrunk.
  • How Much Has the Cooling Economy Reduced Inflation? — Estimates based on labor market tightness measures — job vacancies relative to unemployment and to all job searchers — imply excess demand peaked at a contribution of 0.75 to 1.15 percentage points to inflation, and has since declined to a contribution of 0.3 to 0.4 percentage point.

AI Summary. Japan's fertility rate stood at 1.15 in 2024 and its working-age population peaked in 1995, with the total population peaking in 2008. Rising labor force participation among women and people 65 and over has more than offset the shrinking working-age population, but further gains are limited since both rates already rank among the highest internationally.

Kazuo Ueda Bank of Japan
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An ~18pp rise in female labor force participation between 2000 and 2025, an ~7pp rise in participation of seniors since 2012, and a 30-year low in youth unemployment have temporarily mitigated the decline in Japan’s labor force, which peaked in 1995.

Can rising participation among women and seniors keep offsetting a shrinking workforce?

Core argument: Japan's total fertility rate stood at 1.15 in 2024, after falling from around 4 to around 2 in the 1950s and resuming its decline in the early 1980s, with the working-age population peaking in 1995 and the total population in 2008.

Japan's demographics have been shaped by two major forces. First, the birth rate (total fertility rate) fell sharply from around 4 to around 2 in the 1950s, resumed its decline in the early 1980s, and stood at 1.15 in 2024. Second, the life expectancy of men rose from 63.6 years in 1955 to 81.1 years in 2024, and that of women rose from 67.8 years in 1955 to 87.1 years in 2024. As a result, the working-age population peaked in 1995, while the total population peaked later, in 2008. Rising labor force participation rates have mitigated the impact of demographics on labor supply. Labor force participation among women and seniors has increased sharply since the early 2010s, more than compensating for the fall in the working-age population. The scope for further increases is limited. The current female labor force participation rate is already comparable to Northern European economies. The labor force participation rate for people aged 65 and over was above 25% in 2024, which was the second highest among OECD countries, after South Korea.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Japan's total fertility rate stood at 1.15 in 2024, after falling from around 4 to around 2 in the 1950s and resuming its decline in the early 1980s, with the working-age population peaking in 1995 and the total population in 2008.
  2. Rising labor force participation among women and seniors since the early 2010s has more than compensated for Japan's falling working-age population, mitigating the impact of demographics on labor supply.
  3. Japan's labor force participation rate for people aged 65 and over was above 25% in 2024, the second highest among OECD countries after South Korea, while the female rate is already comparable to Northern European economies, leaving limited scope for further increases.

Related Articles:

  • Japanese Workers Secure Biggest Pay Rise In Three Decades — Japanese companies including Honda, Nippon Steel, and ANA Holdings granted workers their largest pay rise in more than three decades, with economists expecting large firms to give unionised workers average increases above 4%, up from 3.6% the prior year. The increases strengthen the case for the Bank of Japan to begin raising interest rates.
  • Japan Urged to Use Gloomier Population Forecasts After Plunge in Births — Japanese births fell to a record low of 686,000 in 2024, dropping below 700,000 for the first time since 19th-century records began and reaching a level Japan's official median population forecast had not projected until 2039. Because the government bases economic and fiscal policy on that median forecast, adopting lower estimates would require revising projections for taxes and pension benefits.
  • The Power of Demography and the Fate of East Asia — East Asia's total population has peaked and is projected to decline for at least a generation, with the pace of decline likely accelerating each decade, while US population is projected to keep growing for decades. The author argues such sustained divergence can shift the global balance of power.

AI Summary. Estimates of a falling immigrant population rely on the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey, which the agency cautions against using to track immigrant populations over time because its roughly 60,000-household sample is scaled to possibly outdated population estimates. Noncitizen responses have dropped 18%, versus 3.7% for others.

Paul Kiernan Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Pew and Center for Immigration Studies likely overstate immigration outflows from the US because the CPS calibrates to match out-of-date population estimates, and because non-citizen response to the CPS has dropped 18% since November.

Are survey-based estimates of a shrinking immigrant population reliable?

Core argument: The number of noncitizens responding to the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey fell 18% since November, possibly out of fear their information will be shared with immigration enforcement, versus a 3.7% drop among other respondents.

[The Pew and Center for Immigration Studies analysis] rely heavily on one source: the Census Bureau’s monthly Current Population Survey, or CPS. That survey is used to compute the monthly unemployment rate and other labor market barometers. But the agency cautions against using the CPS to estimate the population of immigrants over time. The CPS is based on a monthly sample of about 60,000 households, which is extrapolated to match independent estimates of the population size that are likely out of date. The estimates aren’t weighted to accurately capture the ratio of native- to foreign-born people. Moreover, since November, the number of noncitizens responding to the CPS plunged 18%, possibly out of fear their information will be shared with immigration enforcement, compared with a drop of 3.7% from others.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The number of noncitizens responding to the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey fell 18% since November, possibly out of fear their information will be shared with immigration enforcement, versus a 3.7% drop among other respondents.
  2. Pew and Center for Immigration Studies analyses of the immigration decline rely heavily on the Current Population Survey, which the Census Bureau cautions against using to estimate the immigrant population over time.
  3. The Current Population Survey samples about 60,000 households monthly and extrapolates to independent population estimates that are likely out of date, without weighting to accurately capture the ratio of native- to foreign-born people.

Related Articles:

  • U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population Reached a Record 14 Million in 2023 — Pew Research Center estimates the U.S. unauthorized immigrant population reached an all-time high of 14m in 2023, or 4.1% of the total population, after a record two-year increase of 3.5m. The overall immigrant population peaked above 53m before declining by more than 1m in the first half of 2025.
  • Illegal Population Down Since January — An analysis of the Current Population Survey finds the foreign-born population fell by 957,000 over a four-month period, with the labor force component down 601,000, one of the largest four-month declines in three decades. The decline was entirely among non-citizens, with non-citizens from Latin America arriving in 1980 or later down 1.07m.
  • America’s Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide — Current Population Survey estimates indicate America's foreign-born population surpassed 50m for the first time and exceeded 15% of the national population, above the prior peak of 14.8% recorded in 1890. Mass immigration during that earlier wave was associated in contemporary opinion with widening income and wealth gaps and depressed wages for less-skilled native-born men, and sweeping national restrictions followed.

AI Summary. Stock performance comparisons of Tractor Supply against Apple, Domino's Pizza against Google, and Old Dominion against Amazon show that unglamorous companies can deliver better and more stable returns than heavily discussed technology stocks. For investors seeking steady returns, boring is often a better strategy than fancy.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:

Since 2000, Domino’s Pizza has outperformed Google, Tractor Supply has outperformed Apple, and Old Dominion has outperformed Amazon. Torsten Sløk notes, “boring is often a better strategy than fancy.”

Do unglamorous stocks deliver better returns than popular tech stocks?

Core argument: Charts comparing Tractor Supply with Apple, Domino's Pizza with Google, and Old Dominion with Amazon underpin the argument that unglamorous companies can match or beat high-profile technology stocks.

The charts compare the stock performance of Tractor Supply and Apple, Domino’s Pizza and Google, and Old Dominion and Amazon. The bottom line is that fancy tech stocks are getting so much attention, and investors spend a disproportionate amount of time discussing their growth strategies and new products. But numerous other stocks and investment strategies can deliver better and more stable returns with fewer sleepless nights. Many people enjoy the adrenaline rush that comes with investing in the latest shiny toy, but for investors looking for steady and stable returns, boring is often a better strategy than fancy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Charts comparing Tractor Supply with Apple, Domino's Pizza with Google, and Old Dominion with Amazon underpin the argument that unglamorous companies can match or beat high-profile technology stocks.
  2. Investors devote a disproportionate share of attention to technology stocks' growth strategies and new products, while numerous other stocks and strategies can deliver better and more stable returns.
  3. For investors seeking steady and stable returns, boring is often a better strategy than fancy, even though many people enjoy the adrenaline rush of investing in the latest shiny toy.

Related Articles:

  • AI Is Holding Up the Sky. The Rest Fell Back to Earth — The equal-weight S&P 500, which treats every company as 0.2% of the index, has hit its weakest performance relative to the market-cap-weighted index in 22 years, as a small group of companies captures a large share of profits. Big Tech's capital spending on AI computing and energy has surged, leaving little free cash flow for buybacks or dividends.
  • Which U.S. Stocks Generated the Highest Long-Term Returns? — Of the 29,078 U.S. common stocks in a database spanning nearly a century, 51.6% had negative cumulative returns, while 17 stocks returned more than 5m% — led by Altria at 265m%. Those top performers averaged annualized returns of just 13.47%, underscoring the value of time invested.
  • Long-Term Shareholder Returns: Evidence From 64,000 Global Stocks — A study of about 64,000 global stocks estimates net global stock market wealth creation of $75.7tn, with returns highly concentrated: the top 159 firms (0.25%) account for half of net wealth creation and the top 1,526 (2.39%) account for all of it. Fewer than half of stocks beat one-month US Treasury bills, 42.6% of non-US and 44.8% of US stocks.

AI Summary. The U.S. government is taking a 10% stake in Intel, becoming the chip maker's largest shareholder, by converting $8.9bn in awarded but unpaid grants from the 2022 Chips Act into equity. The government could receive additional stock depending on the performance of Intel's chip manufacturing business.

Amrith Ramkumar, Robbie Whelan and Brian Schwartz Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

The Federal government is taking a 10% stake in Intel by converting $8.9B in grants previously awarded under the Chips act, but not yet paid, into equity. The government will be the company’s largest shareholder and will not hold a board seat.

Is the government converting chip grants into an equity stake?

Core argument: The U.S. government is taking a 10% stake in Intel by converting $8.9 billion in awarded but unpaid 2022 Chips Act grants into equity, under terms that would make the government Intel's largest shareholder.

The U.S. government is taking a 10% stake in Intel, a deal that caps a two-week frenzy for the troubled chip maker and marks the latest in a series of extraordinary private-sector interventions by President Trump. Under the terms of the agreement, $8.9 billion in grants that had been awarded to Intel from the 2022 Chips Act, but not yet paid, will be converted to equity, the two sides said Friday. The government could get more stock depending on what happens to Intel’s chip manufacturing business. The deal is a remarkable turnaround. Just over two weeks ago, Trump called for Intel CEO Lip-Bu Tan to be fired for his ties to China. After meeting Tan and talking about the business last week, Trump became a fan and saw an opportunity to deepen their partnership, he said Friday. “I said, ‘I think you should pay us 10% of the company,’ and they said yes,” Trump said in the Oval Office. Under the terms of the agreement, the government would become Intel’s largest shareholder. Intel previously received $2.2 billion in Chips Act grants.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. government is taking a 10% stake in Intel by converting $8.9 billion in awarded but unpaid 2022 Chips Act grants into equity, under terms that would make the government Intel's largest shareholder.
  2. The government could receive additional Intel stock depending on what happens to the company's chip manufacturing business; Intel previously received $2.2 billion in Chips Act grants.
  3. Trump called for Intel CEO Lip-Bu Tan to be fired over his ties to China just over two weeks before the agreement, and later recounted telling the company, "I think you should pay us 10% of the company," and they said yes.

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