Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, August 21, 2025

AI Summary. The S&P 500 has outperformed other developed-market equities by a cumulative 150% over the past fifteen years, but the authors attribute about 80% of that gap to a strengthening dollar and expanding relative valuations rather than fundamentals such as dividends, buybacks, and organic growth. U.S. valuations sit around the 90th percentile on price-to-earnings measures.

Ben Inker and John Pease GMO
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Inker and Pease argue that 80% of the S&P’s outperformance relative to advanced economies since 2010 arose from two sources that are unlikely to repeat: dollar strengthening and near all-time high valuation ratios, which “always beggar future returns.”

Has U.S. stock outperformance come from fundamentals or currency and valuation gains?

Core argument: The S&P 500 has beaten the rest of developed market equities by a cumulative 150% over fifteen years, but about 80% of that outperformance came from dollar strength and expanding relative valuations rather than fundamentals.

The S&P 500 has outpaced the rest of developed market equities by a cumulative 150% in the past fifteen years. If we start the clock in December 2014 instead of December 2010, the U.S. fundamentally outperformed the rest of the developed markets by a smidge: an aggregate 3.8%. Fast-forward to December 2019, and the fundamental outperformance since then is nil. Exhibit 1 does not deliver a ringing endorsement of U.S. equities. About 80% of their outperformance came from sources of return that are unlikely to repeat: the dollar strengthening against almost every currency in the world and relative valuations expanding. The dollar is already very expensive, and the U.S. administration is pushing for trade and monetary policies that actively make it less attractive for foreigners to hold dollar assets. U.S. valuations are already somewhere between the 90th percentile on simple ratios like P/E and closer to their all-time records when contrasted with the opportunity cost of investing in other assets (like Treasuries). It pays to remember that higher valuations always beggar future returns, though U.S. stocks did deliver on fundamental returns [dividends, share repurchases, and organic growth].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The S&P 500 has beaten the rest of developed market equities by a cumulative 150% over fifteen years, but about 80% of that outperformance came from dollar strength and expanding relative valuations rather than fundamentals.
  2. Measured from December 2014, U.S. fundamental outperformance versus other developed markets totals 3.8%, and measured from December 2019 it is nil.
  3. U.S. valuations sit around the 90th percentile on simple ratios like P/E and closer to all-time records when contrasted with the opportunity cost of assets such as Treasuries, and higher valuations always beggar future returns.

Related Articles:

  • Summer Mailbag — The share of total US market capitalization held by young unprofitable companies has fallen from its 2021–2022 peak, while over 40% of small-cap companies have negative earnings and the negative-earnings share among large caps is falling. The 10 largest stocks hold about 35% of market cap, a high since 1990, but their share of market earnings has roughly kept pace.
  • AI Is Holding Up the Sky. The Rest Fell Back to Earth — The equal-weight S&P 500, which treats every company as 0.2% of the index, has hit its weakest performance relative to the market-cap-weighted index in 22 years, as a small group of companies captures a large share of profits. Big Tech's capital spending on AI computing and energy has surged, leaving little free cash flow for buybacks or dividends.
  • Long-Term Shareholder Returns: Evidence From 64,000 Global Stocks — A study of about 64,000 global stocks estimates net global stock market wealth creation of $75.7tn, with returns highly concentrated: the top 159 firms (0.25%) account for half of net wealth creation and the top 1,526 (2.39%) account for all of it. Fewer than half of stocks beat one-month US Treasury bills, 42.6% of non-US and 44.8% of US stocks.

AI Summary. The author estimates U.S. GDP was about 0.2%–0.3% larger than it would have been had business spending on data center construction, computers, and communications equipment grown in line with its earlier trend, and about 0.6% larger if the capital spending of Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Oracle were fully captured in official data.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
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Examining official data and company financials, Matt Klein estimates “U.S. GDP would be about 0.4% higher than currently reported…if the [capex] of Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Oracle were fully incorporated into the official data.”

How much has AI-related capital spending added to GDP?

Core argument: U.S. GDP was about 0.2%–0.3% larger in 2025Q2 than it would have been had business spending on data center construction, computers and peripheral equipment, and communications equipment grown in line with its 2011Q1–2022Q3 trend.

GDP was about 0.2%-0.3% larger in 2025Q2 than it would have been if businesses’ spending on data center construction, computers and peripheral equipment, and communications equipment had grown in line with the 2011Q1-2022Q3 trend. Moreover, this impact is likely understated, because existing methodologies are (probably) not fully capturing the investment being done by the five companies responsible for the bulk of the data center buildout: Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Oracle. I estimate that U.S. GDP would be about 0.4% higher than currently reported—or about 0.6% higher than if there had been no AI boom—if the capital expenditures of the big 5 were fully incorporated into the official data. Or put yet another way, the growth in direct AI-related capex by the big 5 since mid-2023 would correspond to about 10% of the total increase in the dollar value of U.S. GDP over the past two years. Including additional capital spending on power plants and electricity generation would lead to an even larger number.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. GDP was about 0.2%–0.3% larger in 2025Q2 than it would have been had business spending on data center construction, computers and peripheral equipment, and communications equipment grown in line with its 2011Q1–2022Q3 trend.
  2. U.S. GDP would be about 0.4% higher than currently reported, or about 0.6% higher than with no AI boom, if the capital expenditures of Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Oracle were fully incorporated into official data, by one estimate.
  3. Growth in direct AI-related capital expenditure by Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Oracle since mid-2023 would correspond to about 10% of the total increase in the dollar value of U.S. GDP over the past two years.

Related Articles:

  • Honey, AI Capex is Eating the Economy — Capital spending on AI data centers is around 20% of railroads' peak spending as a share of GDP and is rising quickly, having already surpassed the dot-com era peak in telecom investment. Unlike long-lived rail infrastructure, data centers are short-lived assets requiring frequent hardware replacement, and the capital is being reallocated from other sectors.
  • Is AI Hitting A Wall? — Artificial intelligence gains have come from a formula of more data and more computing power, but companies have exhausted freely available internet training data and are now striking data-sharing deals with publishers and copyright holders. Training and running large models is energy-intensive, requiring vastly more Nvidia chips with each generation.
  • AI Adoption Is Accelerating In 2025 — Nvidia's data center revenue growth is used as a simple extrapolation to project the broader capital-expenditure impact of AI-specific investment on GDP. The aim is not precision but a timely sense of whether the growth contribution from AI capital spending is accelerating or potentially peaking.

AI Summary. U.S. developers plan to bring 64 GW of new electric generating capacity online in a single year, with utility-scale solar accounting for more than half and battery storage, wind, and natural gas making up virtually all the rest. That would exceed the prior record of 58 GW, of which 57 GW was natural gas.

EIA Staff Energy Information Administration
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If US developers’ plans are realized, they will bring online a record 64 GW of new power in 2025, with solar accounting for 50%. That would surpass the previous record of 58 GW of new energy brought online in 2002, of which 98% was fueled by natural gas.

Does solar account for over half of new U.S. generating capacity?

Core argument: U.S. developers added 12 GW of utility-scale solar in the first half of 2025 and plan another 21 GW in the second half, which would make solar more than half of the 64 GW planned for the year.

Developers added 12 gigawatts (GW) of new utility-scale solar electric generating capacity in the United States during the first half of 2025, and they plan to add another 21 GW in the second half of the year, according to our latest survey of electric generating capacity changes. If those plans are realized, solar would account for more than half of the 64 GW that developers plan to bring online this year. Battery storage, wind, and natural gas power plants account for virtually all of the remaining capacity additions for 2025. Developers could set a record for capacity additions if all 64 GW come online this year. The previous record for U.S. generating capacity additions was set in 2002, when developers added 58 GW to the grid, 57 GW of which was fueled by natural gas.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. developers added 12 GW of utility-scale solar in the first half of 2025 and plan another 21 GW in the second half, which would make solar more than half of the 64 GW planned for the year.
  2. If all 64 GW of planned 2025 additions come online, U.S. developers would set a record for generating capacity additions, surpassing the 58 GW added in 2002, of which 57 GW was natural gas-fueled.
  3. Battery storage, wind, and natural gas plants account for virtually all U.S. capacity additions planned for 2025 outside of solar.

Related Articles:

  • Heliocentrism — An energy use must be electrified before green grid electricity can decarbonize it, and while US grid decarbonization continues at a steady pace, the electricity share of final US energy consumption has grown little. Transmission line growth runs well below Department of Energy targets for 2030 and 2035, and transformer delivery times have stretched from 4–6 weeks to 2–3 years.
  • Economic Growth Now Depends on Electricity, Not Oil — Average annual electricity load growth reached 3% and is projected to continue at that rate for five years, with utilities raising expected peak demand for 2029 by 12%, or 101 gigawatts, driven by data centers, new factories, electric vehicles, heat pumps, and hydrogen production.
  • Electricity 2025 — US electricity demand is projected to grow about 2% annually over 2025-2027, an upward revision from an earlier 1% forecast. A study commissioned by the US Department of Energy found data centre electricity use rose from about 60 TWh in 2014 to 176 TWh in 2023, and could reach 325-580 TWh by 2028.

AI Summary. Analysis of 236,000 respondents in a US government time-use survey found the share of Americans who read for pleasure on an average day fell from 28% to 16% over two decades. The measure counted any reading for enjoyment, including print books, newspapers, magazines, ebooks and audiobooks.

Clive Cookson Financial Times
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An analysis of data from the American Time Use Survey documents a 43% reduction in the percentage of Americans who read for pleasure on an average day over a 20-year period, from 28% in 2003 to 16% in 2023.

Has the share of Americans reading for pleasure declined sharply?

Core argument: The share of Americans who read for pleasure on an average day fell from 28% in 2003 to 16% in 2023, a decline of roughly 40%, according to researchers at the University of Florida and University College London.

Analysing data from the US government’s American Time Use Survey, researchers at the University of Florida and University College London found that of the 236,000 Americans surveyed the proportion who read for pleasure on an average day fell from 28% in 2003 to 16% in 2023. The study included any kind of reading done for enjoyment or purposes other than work or school, including ebooks on screen or listening to audiobooks, as well as traditional books, newspapers and magazines in print. Although electronic media have added many new ways to read, the researchers expressed confidence in their methodology.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of Americans who read for pleasure on an average day fell from 28% in 2003 to 16% in 2023, a decline of roughly 40%, according to researchers at the University of Florida and University College London.
  2. The study drew on the US government's American Time Use Survey covering 236,000 Americans and counted any reading done for enjoyment rather than work or school, including print books, newspapers, magazines, ebooks and audiobooks.
  3. The researchers expressed confidence in their methodology, despite electronic media adding many new ways to read.

Related Articles:

  • Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
  • Have Humans Passed Peak Brain Power? — The share of Americans reporting they read a book in the past year has fallen below half, alongside declining performance in numeracy and problem-solving in most countries. The share of adults unable to use mathematical reasoning to evaluate the validity of statements averages 25% in high-income countries and 35% in the US.
  • Many Children Left Behind: The 2024 National Assessment of Educational Progress Results Indicate a Five-Alarm Fire — The share of US fourth-grade students meeting the National Assessment of Educational Progress reading proficiency standard fell from 35% in 2019 to 33% in 2022 and 30% in 2024. More fourth-graders now score below the basic level than score proficient.

AI Summary. The US population is split evenly among urban, suburban, and rural areas, but 64% of those living at suburban densities reside in prosperous or comfortable ZIP codes, versus 36% in rural and 38% in urban ones. County distress scores correlate strongly with life expectancy, with prosperous counties averaging 5.3 years longer.

Kenan Fikri and Sarah Eckhardt Agglomerations
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An analysis of census data finds residents of the mean “prosperous” (top-quintile) county live 5.3 years longer than those in the mean “distressed” (bottom-quintile) one, with the discrepancy between the top and bottom percentiles widening to 8 years.

Do suburban areas concentrate America's prosperity and longer life expectancy?

Core argument: 64% of the U.S. population living at semi-urban (suburban) densities resides in prosperous or comfortable ZIP codes, far above the 36% in rural areas and 38% in urban ones.

Nationally, the country’s population is evenly divided between urban, semi-urban (which we’ll call suburban), and rural areas. Fully 55% of the population in top-tier ZIP codes live at suburban densities, compared to only 20% in the bottom (distressed) tier. Put differently, fully 64% of the U.S. population living at semi-urban densities reside in prosperous or comfortable zip codes (Figure 2). That is far and above the 36% in rural areas or 38% in urban ones. County distress scores are strongly correlated with life expectancy. Residents of the average prosperous county live over five years longer (5.3 years to be exact) than those in the average distressed one, widening to 8 years in the top and bottom percentiles.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 64% of the U.S. population living at semi-urban (suburban) densities resides in prosperous or comfortable ZIP codes, far above the 36% in rural areas and 38% in urban ones.
  2. 55% of the population in top-tier ZIP codes lives at suburban densities, compared with 20% in the bottom, distressed tier, while the country overall splits evenly among urban, suburban, and rural areas.
  3. County distress scores are strongly correlated with life expectancy, with residents of the average prosperous county living 5.3 years longer than those in the average distressed county, widening to 8 years between top and bottom percentiles.

Related Articles:

  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • “Compensate the Losers?” Economic Policy and Partisan Realignment in the US — The authors argue that partisan realignment by education reflects Democrats' declining supply of "predistribution" policies such as job guarantees, higher minimum wages, protectionism, and stronger unions, which less-educated Americans favor while more-educated Americans prefer taxes and transfers. They estimate changing views of the parties' economic policies explain roughly half the shift.
  • The Economic Geography Of The 2024 Elections — Counties where government transfer programs such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and unemployment insurance make up at least a quarter of personal income gave Trump 63% of the vote, while counties where transfers account for less than 15% gave Harris 56%. Transfers supplied 18% of total US personal income.

AI Summary. Chinese regulators including the Cyberspace Administration of China reportedly sought ways to restrict domestic technology companies from buying Nvidia's H20 artificial-intelligence processors, after US officials said America sells China neither its best nor second-best chips and aims to get Chinese developers hooked on the American technology stack.

Zijing Wu and Cheng Leng Financial Times
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Chinese regulators have mobilized to dissuade China’s tech companies from acquiring Nvidia’s H20 chip. As a result, domestic tech groups are holding off or downsizing their H20 orders.

Do US remarks about downgraded chip exports prompt Chinese purchase restrictions?

Core argument: China's Cyberspace Administration, National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology sought ways to restrict Chinese tech groups from buying Nvidia's H20 chips, according to people with knowledge of the regulatory decision-making.

According to people with knowledge of the regulatory action, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) moved in response to comments made by Lutnick last month. “We don’t sell them our best stuff, not our second-best stuff, not even our third-best,” Lutnick told CNBC on July 15, the day after the Trump administration lifted export controls, implemented in April, on H20 sales. “You want to sell the Chinese enough that their developers get addicted to the American technology stack, that’s the thinking,” he added. Some of China’s senior leaders found the comments “insulting”, leading the policymakers to seek ways to restrict Chinese tech groups from buying the processors, according to two people with knowledge of the latest regulatory decision-making.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's Cyberspace Administration, National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology sought ways to restrict Chinese tech groups from buying Nvidia's H20 chips, according to people with knowledge of the regulatory decision-making.
  2. Howard Lutnick told CNBC on July 15, the day after the Trump administration lifted April export controls on H20 sales, that the US sells China neither its best, second-best nor third-best technology, aiming for Chinese developers to get "addicted to the American technology stack".
  3. Some of China's senior leaders found Lutnick's comments "insulting", leading policymakers to seek restrictions on purchases of the processors, according to two people with knowledge of the regulatory decision-making.

Related Articles:

  • China Wants US To Relax Export Controls On Chips As Part Of Trade Deal — China is seeking relief from US semiconductor export controls as part of a trade deal, and people familiar with the matter say Beijing is more concerned about restrictions on high-bandwidth memory chips than about the H20 chip Nvidia designed for the Chinese market. Those memory controls constrain Chinese companies' ability to develop their own AI chips.
  • China Has Its Own Concerns About Nvidia H20 Chips — China's leaders cite security concerns, including suspicion of hidden back doors in US-designed chips, as a rationale for their drive toward chip self-sufficiency. The dilemma extends beyond chips: US intelligence reportedly found extra modems on Chinese-made port cranes, and the US has banned Chinese components from connected auto systems.
  • The Goal for China’s Chip Giant: Cut Out the U.S. — Huawei's Mate 60 smartphone contained a system-on-chip made with SMIC technology comparable to the 7-nanometer process, despite Chinese chipmakers lacking access to ASML's most advanced lithography machines. Semiconductor engineers say the chips were likely made by exposing silicon to light multiple times, a technique that worsens yields and raises costs and becomes harder at more advanced nodes.

Friday, August 22, 2025

AI Summary. In developed countries that modernized very rapidly, men do considerably less housework and care for others at home relative to women than in countries with more continuous growth. Larger gender gaps in household and caring hours are strongly correlated with lower fertility rates across these countries.

Claudia Goldin Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
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Addressing fertility decline in response to rapid increases in women’s opportunities, Goldin argues “the more men can credibly signal that they will be dependable dads…the higher will be the birthrate in the face of greater female agency.”

Do larger gender gaps in housework hours accompany lower fertility?

Core argument: Japan's gender gap in household and caring hours is 3.1 hours and Italy's is 3 hours, with 2019 total fertility rates of 1.36 and 1.27, while Sweden's gap of 0.8 hours and Denmark's of 0.9 hours accompany TFRs of 1.7.

Men in currently developed countries that modernized very rapidly do considerably less housework and care for others in their homes, relative to women, than do men in countries that had more continuous growth experiences. The relationship between the time differences and TFR is clear. All six Group 1 nations are in the upper left of Figure 10, with higher fertility and lower time differences between the genders. All six Group 2 nations Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea, Portugal, and Spain, which demographers have termed the lowest low fertility countries are in the lower right, with lower fertility and higher time differences between the genders. The time difference for Japan, for example, is 3.1 hours and is 3 hours for Italy. Their TFRs (in 2019) were 1.36 and 1.27 respectively. But for Sweden, the time difference was 0.8 hours and Denmark’s was 0.9. Their TFRs (in 2019) were both 1.7. The correlation between the country’s TFR and the gender difference in household and caring hours is strong.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Japan's gender gap in household and caring hours is 3.1 hours and Italy's is 3 hours, with 2019 total fertility rates of 1.36 and 1.27, while Sweden's gap of 0.8 hours and Denmark's of 0.9 hours accompany TFRs of 1.7.
  2. Men in developed countries that modernized very rapidly do considerably less housework and care for others at home, relative to women, than men in countries with more continuous growth experiences.
  3. The six countries demographers term "lowest low fertility" — Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea, Portugal, and Spain — combine lower fertility with larger gender gaps in household and caring hours, and the correlation between a country's TFR and that gap is strong.

Related Articles:

  • Babies and the Macroeconomy — Fertility rates have fallen in nearly every country, but timing differed: some developed nations fell below the 2.1 replacement level as early as the 1970s, while others dropped to "lowest low" levels below 1.3. The author argues nations with rapid, discontinuous growth saw sharper declines as women's expectations outpaced tradition-bound men's willingness to share family time.
  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.

AI Summary. Markets have moved to price 125 basis points of Federal Reserve rate cuts, double the amount priced earlier, yet the 30-year Treasury yield has risen from 4.78% to 4.92%, showing policy rate cuts need not lower long-term yields. The author argues doubts about Federal Reserve independence could raise long yields further through higher risk premia.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
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Citing the rise in the 30-year yield as the market prices in more rate cuts, Brooks argues “If the administration wants low interest rates, it should work on narrowing the deficit…not bullying the Fed into rate cuts.”

Do expected Fed rate cuts lower long-term Treasury yields?

Core argument: Interest rate futures price 125 basis points of Fed cuts through end-2026, double the amount priced at the end of last year, as tariffs took their toll on the US economy.

The chart shows the effective federal funds rate (black line), which is the Fed’s policy rate. Markets are forward looking, which means they incorporate information on rate cuts well before any easing actually happens. I therefore also show what interest rate futures imply for the federal funds rate in December 2026 (blue line). As tariffs took their toll on the US economy, markets moved to price aggressive Fed easing, with 125 basis points in cuts priced through the end of next year. At the end of last year, only half that amount of cuts was priced through end-2026. This has not, however, coincided with a fall in the 30-year Treasury yield (red line), which has risen from 4.78% at the end of last year to 4.92% now. This illustrates that rate cuts don’t necessarily translate into lower long-term yields. Indeed, if markets start to worry Fed independence is endangered, long term yields could rise a lot further, driven up by higher risk premia that increase with the scale of public debt.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Interest rate futures price 125 basis points of Fed cuts through end-2026, double the amount priced at the end of last year, as tariffs took their toll on the US economy.
  2. The 30-year Treasury yield has risen from 4.78% at the end of last year to 4.92%, even as markets priced more aggressive Fed easing, illustrating that rate cuts do not necessarily translate into lower long-term yields.
  3. If markets start to worry that Fed independence is endangered, long-term yields could rise a lot further, driven up by higher risk premia that increase with the scale of public debt.

Related Articles:

  • Why Is The Yield Curve Steepening? Because Of Coming Fed Cuts And Fiscal Challenges — The US yield curve is steepening across both the 2-to-10-year and 10-to-30-year segments. The article attributes this to Federal Reserve rate cuts, the risk that markets read those cuts as politically motivated and raise inflation expectations and long-term rates, and growing Treasury debt issuance pushing long rates up.
  • Data Update 4 for 2025: Interest Rates, Inflation and Central Banks! — Interest rates are ultimately driven by macroeconomic fundamentals, with an "intrinsic risk-free rate" defined as the sum of the inflation rate and real GDP growth tracking the observed 10-year Treasury bond yield closely. On this view, central banks' influence comes from preferential access to data on those fundamentals, their capacity to alter them, and their credibility.
  • Rapidly Growing Treasury Supply Crowding Out Other Types of Credit Growth — Roughly half of all fixed income issuance coming to market over the past year has been US Treasuries, meaning investors must allocate a growing share of dollars to financing the government. The argument is that lower government debt would free up more funds for consumer borrowing and business investment.

AI Summary. Pew Research Center estimates the U.S. unauthorized immigrant population reached an all-time high of 14m in 2023, or 4.1% of the total population, after a record two-year increase of 3.5m. The overall immigrant population peaked above 53m before declining by more than 1m in the first half of 2025.

Jeffrey Passel and Jens Manuel Krogstad Pew Research Center
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Pew estimates the unauthorized immigrant population was 14mm in 2023, or 4.1% of the population. They also estimate that in January 2025, 53mm immigrants comprised a record 15.8% of the US population; there was a likely 1mm drop btw then and June.

How large has the unauthorized immigrant population in America become?

Core argument: Pew Research Center estimates the U.S. unauthorized immigrant population reached a record 14 million in 2023, a two-year increase of 3.5 million that is the biggest on record, equal to 4.1% of the total U.S. population.

The number of unauthorized immigrants in the United States reached an all-time high of 14 million in 2023 after two consecutive years of record growth, according to a new Pew Research Center estimate. The increase of 3.5 million in two years is the biggest on record. Data from 2023 is the most recent available for developing a comprehensive and detailed estimate. As of 2023, unauthorized immigrants represented 4.1% of the total U.S. population and 27% of the foreign-born population. The overall U.S. immigrant population reached an all-time high of more than 53 million in January 2025, accounting for a record 15.8% of the U.S. population. However, growth slowed substantially starting in early 2024, and the number declined by more than 1 million between January and June 2025, according to data from the Current Population Survey. This would be the first sustained drop in the U.S. immigrant population since the 1960s. As of mid-2025, the unauthorized immigrant population likely remains above 2023 levels.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Pew Research Center estimates the U.S. unauthorized immigrant population reached a record 14 million in 2023, a two-year increase of 3.5 million that is the biggest on record, equal to 4.1% of the total U.S. population.
  2. Unauthorized immigrants made up 27% of the U.S. foreign-born population in 2023, while the overall immigrant population hit an all-time high of more than 53 million in January 2025, a record 15.8% of the U.S. population.
  3. Current Population Survey data show the U.S. immigrant population declined by more than 1 million between January and June 2025, which would be the first sustained drop since the 1960s, though the unauthorized population likely remains above 2023 levels.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide — Current Population Survey estimates indicate America's foreign-born population surpassed 50m for the first time and exceeded 15% of the national population, above the prior peak of 14.8% recorded in 1890. Mass immigration during that earlier wave was associated in contemporary opinion with widening income and wealth gaps and depressed wages for less-skilled native-born men, and sweeping national restrictions followed.
  • Illegal Population Down Since January — An analysis of the Current Population Survey finds the foreign-born population fell by 957,000 over a four-month period, with the labor force component down 601,000, one of the largest four-month declines in three decades. The decline was entirely among non-citizens, with non-citizens from Latin America arriving in 1980 or later down 1.07m.
  • The Cost of Illegal Immigration — The US foreign-born population rose by 6.6mm to 51.6mm over a roughly three-year span, lifting immigrants to 15.6% of the population, above the prior records of 14.8% in 1890 and 14.7% in 1910. The authors estimate about 13.7mm illegal immigrants now live in the US, a net increase of 3.7mm.

AI Summary. China's total debt has risen to over 300% of gross domestic product from a little over 200% a decade ago, and with the main policy rate at 1.4%, the central bank has limited room to cut. Price declines are more widespread than in past deflationary episodes, and large-scale stimulus remains off the table.

Bloomberg Staff Bloomberg
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China’s regulators are cracking down on “overcapacity” and “over-competition” in key industries to combat deflation. With total debt >300% of GDP and the policy rate at 1.4%, there is little room for fiscal or monetary stimulus.

Is China running out of room to fight falling prices?

Core argument: China's total debt has climbed to over 300% of GDP from a little over 200% a decade ago, and with the main policy rate at 1.4%, the central bank has little room to cut.

More than two years into China’s latest deflation saga, a mega stimulus is still off the table. Total debt has soared to over 300% of gross domestic product — from a little over 200% a decade ago — and with the main policy rate at 1.4%, China’s central bank doesn’t have much room to cut. Price decreases also more widespread this time around, making the task at hand more daunting. Coal output declined last month from a year ago, as government inspectors targeted sites that produce too much. A major lithium mine was suspended for three months, Bloomberg News reported earlier. Bosses from electric vehicle companies and some tech-giants have been hauled before regulators and warned about over-competition.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's total debt has climbed to over 300% of GDP from a little over 200% a decade ago, and with the main policy rate at 1.4%, the central bank has little room to cut.
  2. More than two years into China's deflation saga, a mega stimulus remains off the table, and price decreases are more widespread this time, making the task more daunting.
  3. Coal output declined last month from a year earlier as government inspectors targeted sites producing too much, a major lithium mine was suspended for three months, and electric-vehicle and tech executives were warned by regulators about over-competition.

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