Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, August 6, 2025

AI Summary. Among US young adults aged 25–34, the share completing a high school or college degree rose 9 percentage points to 83%, while the share ever married fell 18 points to 44% and the share living with a child fell 16 points to 39%. Economic milestones became more common as family formation milestones became less common.

Paul Hemez and Jonathan Vespa U.S. Census Bureau
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US Census data show that btw 2005 and 2023, the fraction of Americans aged 25–34 who completed their education rose from 74% to 83%, but the % “ever married” fell from 62% to 44%, and the % with “a child in the household” fell from 55% to 39%.

How have young adults' economic and family milestones diverged?

Core argument: Among young adults aged 25–34, the share who had ever married fell 18 percentage points, from 62% in 2005 to 44% in 2023, while the share living with a child in the household fell 16 percentage points, from 55% to 39%.

This study explores changes in young adults’ experiences reaching five markers of adulthood: living independently, completing formal education, labor force participation, marriage, and living with a child.Figure 1 presents the share of young adults (25-34) who experienced each milestone of adulthood in 2005 and 2023. As the proportion of young men and women who experienced economic milestones (such as labor force participation and completed education) increased, the proportion who formed a family through marriage or parenthood declined. The share of young adults who completed their education by attaining a high school or college degree increased by 9 percentage points between 2005 to 2023, from 74% to 83%. Family formation milestones, on the other hand, were experienced less often. In 2005, about 62% of young adults had ever married, a share that declined by 18 percentage points to 44% by 2023. Similarly, the proportion of young adults who lived with a child in the household decreased by 16 percentage points from 55% to 39% over this 18-year period. [Found via Timothy Taylor's terrific blog]

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Among young adults aged 25–34, the share who had ever married fell 18 percentage points, from 62% in 2005 to 44% in 2023, while the share living with a child in the household fell 16 percentage points, from 55% to 39%.
  2. The share of young adults aged 25–34 who completed their education by attaining a high school or college degree rose 9 percentage points between 2005 and 2023, from 74% to 83%.
  3. The study finds that as the proportion of young men and women reaching economic milestones such as labor force participation and completed education increased, the proportion forming a family through marriage or parenthood declined.

Related Articles:

  • Bachelors Without Bachelor’s: Gender Gaps in Education and Declining Marriage Rates — Marriage rates for college-educated women have remained stable over the past fifty years even as the relative supply of college-educated men declined, with the overall decline in marriage driven almost entirely by fewer marriages between non-college women and non-college men. The education gap in women's marriage rates is larger in areas where non-college men face the highest joblessness and incarceration.
  • US College Students’ Well-Being — A study of US college students finds moderate-to-severe depression reported by 26% of students at one elite institution, 22% reporting moderate-to-severe anxiety and 10% contemplating suicide. Poorer mental health is associated with being female, little exercise, low grades, and financial aid; financial stress is associated with higher suicidal thoughts.
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.

AI Summary. US birth-rate declines have been concentrated in states that were historically the most fertile, including Alaska, North Dakota and Utah, while long-low-fertility states such as Connecticut and Massachusetts fell by less than the national average. States with above-average fertility a decade ago account for more than 80% of the national decline.

Economist Staff The Economist
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States that had above average fertility rates in 2014 are responsible for 80% of the decline in American fertility over the last decade.

Are falling US birth rates driven by historically high-fertility states?

Core argument: U.S. states with above-average fertility rates in 2014 account for more than 80% of the decline in American birth rates over the past decade.

In recent years, birth rates have dropped only slightly in places where they have long been low. Four of the five least fertile states in 2014, including Connecticut and Massachusetts, have seen their rates decrease by less than the national average. It is in states that have been historically the most fertile where the fall has been precipitous; Alaska, North Dakota and Utah have seen some of the steepest declines (see map). All told, states that had above average fertility rates in 2014 are responsible for more than 80% of the collapse in American birth rates over the past decade.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. states with above-average fertility rates in 2014 account for more than 80% of the decline in American birth rates over the past decade.
  2. Alaska, North Dakota and Utah, historically among the most fertile U.S. states, have seen some of the steepest fertility declines.
  3. Four of the five least fertile U.S. states in 2014, including Connecticut and Massachusetts, saw their fertility rates fall by less than the national average.

Related Articles:

  • Why Is Fertility So Low in High Income Countries? — Survey data indicate US adults do not rank having children as a top life priority: among adults aged 18–34, 22% say having children is extremely or very important, versus 68% for an enjoyable job or career and 62% for close friends. Among women aged 20–44, the share reporting that work is very important rose from 31.9% to 47.4%.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.

AI Summary. Research on top-ranked investment analysts found that their performance declined relative to peers who stayed put after they changed employers, though those who moved with their teammates saw little effect. A study of American biotechnology firms found that collaborative star employees helped their colleagues become more productive.

Economist Staff The Economist
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The Economist highlights research that suggests high-performing employees who switched to a new firm underperformed relative to colleagues who stayed put.

Do star employees perform as well after switching employers?

Core argument: Boris Groysberg, Linda-Eling Lee, and Ashish Nanda found that top-ranked investment analysts' performance declined relative to colleagues who stayed put after they moved firms, even though analysts often cover the same firms for the same clients.

A variety of studies have tried to tease out how much firm-specific factors matter to the performance of hotshots. Perhaps the best-known research in this area has been done by Boris Groysberg of Harvard Business School. In one paper written with Linda-Eling Lee, of MSCI, and Ashish Nanda, also of Harvard, Mr Groysberg looked at the performance of the best investment analysts, as measured by external rankings, after they had moved firms. In theory, a move ought not to have made much difference to how well they did their job: analysts often cover the same firms for the same clients. In practice, the stars’ performance declined compared with colleagues who stayed put. Changing employers did not greatly affect the performance of top-tier analysts who moved with their teammates, according to the study. The personality of the new recruits also matters: a study of American biotech firms by Rebecca Kehoe of Cornell University and Daniel Tzabbar of Drexel University found that collaborative stars helped their peers become more productive.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Boris Groysberg, Linda-Eling Lee, and Ashish Nanda found that top-ranked investment analysts' performance declined relative to colleagues who stayed put after they moved firms, even though analysts often cover the same firms for the same clients.
  2. Groysberg, Lee, and Nanda found that changing employers did not greatly affect the performance of top-tier analysts who moved together with their teammates.
  3. Rebecca Kehoe of Cornell University and Daniel Tzabbar of Drexel University, studying American biotech firms, found that collaborative stars helped their peers become more productive.

Related Articles:

  • The Growing Importance of Decision-Making on the Job — The share of the U.S. wage bill paid to managers more than doubled from 15% to 32% over six decades, driven by employment growth and rising relative wages in management rather than top executive pay. Over the same period the age of peak earnings shifted from the late 30s to the mid-50s.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.

AI Summary. The International Monetary Fund attributes more than half of the rise in the global debt-to-GDP ratio since 2008 to China, whose ratio is exceeded only by Japan's among major economies and is unusually high for a middle-income country. The author argues this debt reflects extensive unrecognized losses hidden in collective balance sheets, and that delaying recognition raises the eventual cost.

Michael Pettis China Financial Markets
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IMF data show China accounts for > 50% of the increase in the global economy’s government debt-to-GDP ratio since 2008 – a result, Pettis argues, of “the buildup of extensive unrecognized losses across China’s economy, which cannot be ignored forever.”

Does China's rising debt hide unrecognized losses that grow costlier over time?

Core argument: China accounts for more than half of the increase in the global economy's debt-to-GDP ratio since 2008, according to the IMF, with only Japan's ratio higher among major economies.

According to the IMF, debt has grown so rapidly in China that the nation accounts for more than half of the increase in the global economy’s debt-to-GDP ratio since 2008. Among major economies, only Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio is higher, and given that debt-to-GDP ratios tend to rise with income levels, this makes China, as a middle-income economy, even more of an outlier than Japan. While the debt itself may not be the fundamental issue, it reflects a deeper problem: the buildup of extensive unrecognized losses across China’s economy, hidden in collective balance sheets. These losses, albeit unrecognized, are real. While they can be overlooked temporarily as long as banks are able to refinance the associated principal and interest without difficulty, they cannot be ignored forever. The longer China delays in recognizing losses on its collective balance sheets, the higher the ultimate cost will become.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China accounts for more than half of the increase in the global economy's debt-to-GDP ratio since 2008, according to the IMF, with only Japan's ratio higher among major economies.
  2. Because debt-to-GDP ratios tend to rise with income levels, China's status as a middle-income economy makes it more of an outlier than Japan.
  3. China's debt reflects extensive unrecognized losses hidden in collective balance sheets that can be overlooked only while banks refinance the associated principal and interest, with the ultimate cost rising the longer recognition is delayed.

Related Articles:

  • Fiscal Monitor: Putting a Lid on Public Debt — Global public debt is projected to approach 100% of GDP by 2030, with China and the United States largely driving the increase. Debt is projected to stabilize or decline in about two-thirds of countries, but remains higher than before the pandemic.
  • The Rise and Fall of LGFVs — China has nearly 12,000 local government financing vehicles whose aggregated assets and liabilities equal roughly 120% and 75% of national GDP, and whose earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation do not cover their interest payments. Their average borrowing cost of about 5% far exceeds their 1% return on assets, and 80–90% of their annual spending is funded by new debt.
  • China Economy Memo: Tempest in a Teapot or Crisis A-Brewing? — The authors argue China is heading into a protracted debt crisis in which about 40% of local government financing vehicles default, hitting regional banks most exposed to such lending. They estimate total losses for these creditors at roughly $5tn, or about 30% of China's GDP.

Thursday, August 7, 2025

AI Summary. The share of novel patents produced by the 50 largest US firms by sales followed a U-shaped path, falling from 1980 to the early 2000s before rising to its highest level by 2016. The authors find these firms' novel patents since 2001 generate more follow-on patents by other firms, suggesting knowledge diffusion.

Joonkyu Choi, Serguey Braguinsky, Yuheng Ding, Karam Jo, et al. Federal Reserve Board
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After a 20-year decline, the share of novel patents produced by “mega firms” began a sharp rebound in 2001, reaching a peak of 18% in 2016. A relative increase in cash holdings since the early 2000s likely facilitated mega firms’ funding of risky R&D.

Are the largest US firms driving more novel, widely built-upon innovation?

Core argument: The share of novel patents produced by mega firms — the top 50 Compustat firms by sales — followed a U-shape, declining from 1980 to the early 2000s before rebounding sharply to its highest level by 2016.

Our empirical analysis reveals a U-shaped trend in the share of novel patents produced by mega firms [the top 50 firms in Compustat by sales for that year], declining from 1980 to the early 2000s before rebounding sharply to reach its highest level by 2016. Since 2001, novel patents by mega firms have demonstrated greater technological impact, generating more follow-on patents and being more likely to become “hits” compared to those by non-mega firms. The self-follow-on rate—the proportion of follow-on patents generated by the same firm—has remained stable for mega firms over time, showing no evidence of impending knowledge spillover specifically for their novel patents. Combined with the higher volume of follow-on patents post-2001 for these novel innovations, this suggests that mega firms are facilitating knowledge diffusion to other firms through this selected subset of innovations. We find suggestive evidence that the relative increase in cash holdings since the early 2000s may have enabled mega firms to fund risky, experimental R&D, while the broadening technological scope of their inventor teams may have enhanced their capacity to pioneer new combinations.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of novel patents produced by mega firms — the top 50 Compustat firms by sales — followed a U-shape, declining from 1980 to the early 2000s before rebounding sharply to its highest level by 2016.
  2. Since 2001, novel patents from mega firms have generated more follow-on patents and been more likely to become "hits" than those from non-mega firms, while their self-follow-on rate remained stable, suggesting knowledge diffusion to other firms.
  3. Suggestive evidence indicates that mega firms' relative increase in cash holdings since the early 2000s may have enabled funding of risky, experimental R&D, while the broadening technological scope of their inventor teams may have enhanced their capacity to pioneer new combinations.

Related Articles:

  • The Power of One: How Standout Firms Grow National Productivity — An analysis of 8,300 large firms accounting for two-thirds of gross value added in Germany, the UK, and the US finds that fewer than 100 firms generated about two-thirds of positive labor productivity gains in each country. A still smaller group of 55 firms accounted for 50–65% of the firm-level productivity drag.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.
  • Mega Firms and Recent Trends in the U.S. Innovation: Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Patent Data — Analysis of US patent data finds that the largest firms are more likely to file novel patents even after controlling for size, industry, and patent counts, and that firms produce more novel patents as they become mega firms. Venture-backed startups also account for a disproportionate share of novel patents.

AI Summary. Recent college graduate employment in sectors that use artificial intelligence intensively has kept pace with employment in less AI-intensive sectors since the release of ChatGPT, after declining relative to them over the prior four years. Majors identified as most exposed to AI, including mathematics, accounting, and business analytics, are not consistently the worst performers in the labor market.

Will Raderman Employ America
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Employment of college graduates in AI-intensive and non-intensive sectors both grew 5% on net btw the rollout of ChatGPT in Nov. 2022 and the most recent data. Unemployment is up in computer science, but down in a number of other AI-exposed majors.

Is AI driving the rise in recent graduate unemployment?

Core argument: Since ChatGPT's release in November 2022, recent college graduate employment in AI-intensive sectors has kept pace with non-intensive sectors on net, and has performed somewhat better relative to the most recent pre-generative-AI trend.

I plot recent college graduate employment in high and low AI intensive sectors relative to their respective levels in November 2022, the month when ChatGPT was first released. Over the four years prior to ChatGPT, recent graduate employment in AI-intensive sectors actually *declined* relative to recent graduate employment in non-intensive sectors. But, since the release of ChatGPT, recent graduate employment in AI-intensive sectors has kept pace with non-intensive sectors on net. If anything, recent graduate employment has performed a bit better of late (relative to the most recent pre-generative AI trend) in sectors where AI usage is more prevalent.[Further], the majors most exposed to AI (many in STEM fields) are not consistently the worst-performing majors in the labor market.While computer science, computer engineering, and chemistry fields have seen higher unemployment rates, this experience is not widely true of high-exposure majors. Mathematics, accounting, and business analytics majors—all of which are high-AI-exposure majors in Timmerman (2025)—are currently enjoying lower unemployment rates than pre-pandemic.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Since ChatGPT's release in November 2022, recent college graduate employment in AI-intensive sectors has kept pace with non-intensive sectors on net, and has performed somewhat better relative to the most recent pre-generative-AI trend.
  2. Over the four years before ChatGPT's November 2022 release, recent graduate employment in AI-intensive sectors declined relative to employment in non-AI-intensive sectors.
  3. Majors most exposed to AI, many in STEM, are not consistently the worst performers in the labor market: mathematics, accounting, and business analytics, all high-exposure in Timmerman (2025), have lower unemployment rates than pre-pandemic, while computer science, computer engineering, and chemistry have higher rates.

Related Articles:

  • AI Is Wrecking an Already Fragile Job Market for College Graduates — An analysis of labor data finds a shrinking share of each graduating class is landing jobs requiring a bachelor's degree. At the 15 largest tech companies by market value, entry-level hires as a share of total new hires have fallen 50%, and recent graduates made up 7% of new hires, down from 11%.
  • Technological Disruption in the Labor Market — The authors measure US labor market structure since 1880 and find 1990–2017 less disruptive than any earlier period, because past changes from general-purpose technologies like steam and electricity were so profound. They identify four recent signs of accelerating change, including a 50%+ rise in science and technology employment share since 2010.
  • Educated but Unemployed, a Rising Reality for College Grads — Recent college graduates aged 22–27 account for 12% of the 60 basis-point rise in US unemployment, more than twice their 5% share of the labor force. In computer and mathematical occupations, employment for that age group has fallen 8% since 2022 while older workers' employment grew 0.8%.

AI Summary. The Budget Lab estimates U.S. consumers face an overall average effective tariff rate of 18.6%, the highest since 1933, falling to 17.7% after consumption shifts away from tariffed goods. The 2025 tariffs are projected to raise $2.7tn over 2026-35, or $2.2tn after $475bn in negative dynamic revenue effects.

Ernie Tedeschi Yale University
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As of August 7, reflecting new tariffs on India, the US has an overall effective tariff rate of 17.7%. Dynamically scored, Ernie Tedeschi estimates this tariff regime will raise $2.2T over 2026–2035.

How high are tariff rates and how much revenue will they raise?

Core argument: U.S. consumers face an overall average effective tariff rate of 18.6%, the highest since 1933.

Consumers face an overall average effective tariff rate of 18.6%, the highest since 1933. After consumption shifts, the average tariff rate will be 17.7%, the highest since 1934. All tariffs to date in 2025 raise $2.7 trillion over 2026-35, with $475 billion in negative dynamic revenue effects, bringing dynamic revenues to $2.2 trillion.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. consumers face an overall average effective tariff rate of 18.6%, the highest since 1933.
  2. After consumption shifts, the average U.S. tariff rate falls to 17.7%, the highest since 1934.
  3. All U.S. tariffs imposed in 2025 raise $2.7 trillion over 2026–35, with $475 billion in negative dynamic revenue effects bringing dynamic revenues to $2.2 trillion.

Related Articles:

  • Tariffs are Dumb Enough to (Almost) Work — A universal 15% tariff on imported goods could raise roughly $300–$400bn annually, a fraction of what a value-added tax would generate but real revenue given U.S. imports of about $4tn. The author argues tariffs are a poorly designed form of consumption tax that could build political groundwork for replacing them with a more efficient value-added tax.
  • Are Businesses Absorbing the Tariffs or Passing Them on to Their Customers? — About three-quarters of manufacturing and service firms facing tariff-driven cost increases reported passing at least some of those costs to customers through higher prices, while roughly a quarter of each said they absorbed the full increase without raising prices. Nearly a third of manufacturers and about 45% of service firms reported full pass-through.
  • China Emerges From Trade Chaos With Record Exports, Surplus — China posted a record half-year trade surplus of about $586bn, with exports up 5.8% year-over-year to $325bn and imports up 1.1%. Shipments to the US fell 16.1% from a year earlier, while exports to the 10 Southeast Asian nations in the Asean group rose 17%.

AI Summary. Texas-based space company Firefly Aerospace raised $868m in its initial public offering, selling more than 19 million shares at $45 each, after its NASA-funded Blue Ghost lander completed the first fully successful private moon landing. Firefly is working with Northrop Grumman on Eclipse, a larger partially reusable rocket.

Micah Maidenberg and Corrie Driebusch Wall Street Journal
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Firefly Aerospace, whose Blue Ghost lander landed on the moon in March, raised $868mm in its IPO. Firefly is working with Northrop Grumman to develop a partially reusable rocket to compete with SpaceX’s Falcon 9.

Can a private space company raise capital after a successful moon landing?

Core argument: Firefly Aerospace sold more than 19 million shares at $45 apiece in its initial public offering, raising $868 million, five months after its Blue Ghost lander reached the lunar surface.

Firefly Aerospace pulled off a moon landing earlier this year. Its next destination: Wall Street. The Cedar Park, Texas-based space company sold more than 19 million shares in its initial public offering at $45 apiece, raising $868 million. Firefly’s listing comes five months after it successfully guided its Blue Ghost lander to the lunar surface, carrying scientific gear to research moon dust and ground temperatures. The NASA-funded mission marked the first fully successful private moon landing, following misfires on three other flights handled by competitors. Firefly is working with Northrop Grumman to develop a bigger, partially reusable rocket—similar to SpaceX’s market-leading Falcon 9—called Eclipse, aiming to launch it for the first time next year. It has launched its smaller Alpha rocket six times, but during its last flight in April, an engine on part of the vehicle lost thrust and couldn’t deliver a Lockheed Martin test satellite to orbit.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Firefly Aerospace sold more than 19 million shares at $45 apiece in its initial public offering, raising $868 million, five months after its Blue Ghost lander reached the lunar surface.
  2. Firefly's NASA-funded Blue Ghost mission, which carried gear to research moon dust and ground temperatures, marked the first fully successful private moon landing, following misfires on three other flights handled by competitors.
  3. Firefly is developing Eclipse, a bigger, partially reusable rocket similar to SpaceX's Falcon 9, with Northrop Grumman, aiming for a first launch next year; its smaller Alpha rocket lost engine thrust in April and failed to deliver a Lockheed Martin test satellite to orbit.

Related Articles:

  • Has Starlink Already Won the New Space Race? — Starlink has launched more than 8,417 satellites, 39% of all satellites launched since the first artificial satellite reached orbit, and its roughly 7,300 operational satellites make up almost two-thirds of all operational spacecraft. It delivers low-latency broadband to over 5mn customers in 125 countries and is projected to generate $12bn in revenue and $2bn in free cash flow this year.
  • It’s Not a Space Race, It’s the Space Olympics — The US operates 81% of commercial satellites in orbit and 86% of global effective launch capacity, with NATO allies second in satellites at 11% and China second in launch capacity at 9%. China is pursuing mega satellite constellations and reusable rockets, in many cases copying approaches already proven by US companies.
  • Building an Enduring Advantage in the Third Space Age — The United States and China each logged their highest-ever annual launch rates, at 103 and 66 launches, while Russia fell to 19 and Europe recorded three. The US accounted for roughly half of global launches but 81% of effective launch capacity, since Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy comprised 93% of US launches.