Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, July 24, 2025

AI Summary. The International Monetary Fund's latest report recognizes that global current account imbalances began widening, but its forecast that the surpluses of China, Japan, and Korea will fall is questioned. China's customs goods surplus rose $150bn in the first half of the year, pointing to a current account surplus above $600bn versus the Fund's $365bn projection.

Brad Setser Council on Foreign Relations
Date Posted:
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Setser argues the IMF is likely to underestimate China’s 2025 BOP surplus. “The customs goods surplus increased by $150B in the first half of 2025, and a conservative forecast of the current account surplus through Q2 2025 puts it at just over $600B.”

Do trade data contradict forecasts of falling Asian surpluses?

Core argument: China's customs goods surplus rose $150 billion in the first half of 2025, and a conservative forecast puts its current account surplus through Q2 2025 at just over $600 billion, against the IMF's projection of $365 billion.

The IMF [latest report] didn’t repeat the mistake it made in August 2024, when it looked at the fall in the global imbalance between the end of 2022 and the end of 2023 and ignored higher frequency data indicating that imbalances were in fact widening. It also cleverly constructed a chart showing that the pandemic-adjusted imbalance only really started to widen in 2024 (but for China’s whacky data adjustments it would have started much earlier). [However], the IMF’s forward-looking forecasting of imbalances needs some work; it has the surpluses of China, Japan, and Korea all falling in 2025. China’s surplus falls back to $365 billion even as the high frequency trade data points to a big increase in the trade surplus and even after the CNY [renminbi] depreciated another 10%. The customs goods surplus increased by $150 billion in the first half of 2025, and a conservative forecast of the current account surplus through Q2 2025 puts it at just over $600 billion, so the IMF’s forecast is going to be WAY off.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's customs goods surplus rose $150 billion in the first half of 2025, and a conservative forecast puts its current account surplus through Q2 2025 at just over $600 billion, against the IMF's projection of $365 billion.
  2. The IMF forecasts the surpluses of China, Japan, and Korea all falling in 2025, a projection the author argues will be far off given high-frequency trade data pointing to a large increase in China's trade surplus even after the renminbi depreciated another 10%.
  3. The IMF's latest report avoided its August 2024 error of reading the 2022–2023 decline in global imbalances while ignoring higher-frequency data showing imbalances widening, and its pandemic-adjusted chart shows imbalances widening from 2024, which the author attributes to China's data adjustments.

Related Articles:

  • Global Imbalances In A Shifting World — Current accounts of major economies diverged, with the US deficit widening by $228bn to $1.13tn (1% of world GDP) while China's surplus rose by $161bn to $424bn and the euro area's by $198bn to $461bn. Changes in investment rates drove the widening saving-investment gaps, with private saving offsetting only 10–50% of the investment change.
  • The IMF’s Latest External Sector Report Misses the Mark — The global goods imbalance, measured with customs data from major economies, is larger in dollar terms than before the pandemic, and China's share has grown, with Chinese export volumes up about 12% over twelve months versus 4% for imports. The author argues China's prioritization of goods supply over household demand should widen imbalances.
  • Why Global Imbalances Do Matter — From 2008 to 2023 the US household and corporate sectors ran average savings surpluses of 3.5% and 1.6% of GDP respectively, leaving the federal government as the dominant net borrower in the US economy. This suggests the benefit of persistent net capital inflows is the ability to run larger fiscal deficits and grow public debt.

AI Summary. Bank of America Global Research estimates US electricity demand will grow at a 2.5% compound annual rate through 2035, up from 0.5% annually over the prior decade, driven by building electrification, data centers, industrial demand, and electric vehicles. Meeting it requires greater utility investment in grid capacity.

Vanessa Cook Bank of America
Date Posted:
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Bank of America forecasts US electrical demand will increase at a 2.5% CAGR btw 2024 and 2035 relative to its 0.5% CAGR btw 2014 and 2024. Only ⅓ of the utilities’ ~$100B capex spend in 2024 was for expanding grid capacity.

How fast will US electricity demand grow, and what's driving it?

Core argument: BofA Global Research estimates US electrical demand will grow at a 2.5% CAGR through 2035, up from a 0.5% CAGR over 2014–2024, driven by building electrification, data centers, industrial demand, and EV adoption.

Energy demand is surging – and will continue to do so for an extended period, which will require significant additions to power generation capacity and higher capex in order to grow the grid. While the drivers of this growth have changed over time, demand is largely due to 1) building electrification; 2) data centers; 3) industrial demand; and 4) electric vehicle (EV) adoption. BofA Global Research estimates that US electrical demand will increase at a 2.5% compound annual growth rate (CAGR) through 2035E. That compares to just a 0.5% CAGR from 2014-2024. As electricity demand ramps, utility companies will need to invest more in capacity expansion for the grid. In 2024, US utilities invested $35 billion on transmission capex and $60 billion on distribution capex. However, expansion capex represented only 33% of total transmission and distribution capex, with replacements and upgrades the remaining 67%. While US electrical demand grew at a 0.5% CAGR over 2014-24, transmission and distribution spending has grown at an 8.9% CAGR, largely due to the aging nature of the US grid.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. BofA Global Research estimates US electrical demand will grow at a 2.5% CAGR through 2035, up from a 0.5% CAGR over 2014–2024, driven by building electrification, data centers, industrial demand, and EV adoption.
  2. US utilities invested $35 billion in transmission capex and $60 billion in distribution capex in 2024, with expansion accounting for only 33% of the total and replacements and upgrades the remaining 67%.
  3. US transmission and distribution spending grew at an 8.9% CAGR over 2014–2024 while electrical demand grew at a 0.5% CAGR, largely due to the aging nature of the US grid.

Related Articles:

  • AI Demand Drives Record Electricity Supply Costs In Largest US Market — PJM, the largest US power market, procured capacity at a record $329.17 per megawatt-day, up 22% from the prior year, and will pay producers $16.1bn to meet demand over a one-year delivery period, a 10% increase. The grid operator expects customer energy bills to rise 1–5%, depending on how utilities and states pass on costs.
  • Heliocentrism — An energy use must be electrified before green grid electricity can decarbonize it, and while US grid decarbonization continues at a steady pace, the electricity share of final US energy consumption has grown little. Transmission line growth runs well below Department of Energy targets for 2030 and 2035, and transformer delivery times have stretched from 4–6 weeks to 2–3 years.
  • Electricity 2025 — US electricity demand is projected to grow about 2% annually over 2025-2027, an upward revision from an earlier 1% forecast. A study commissioned by the US Department of Energy found data centre electricity use rose from about 60 TWh in 2014 to 176 TWh in 2023, and could reach 325-580 TWh by 2028.

AI Summary. China's reportedly high average IQ is best treated as a stylized fact: few serious studies have measured it across the population, measured IQ levels shift over time, and testing has been concentrated in urban rather than rural areas. Research from Stanford's REAP group reports rural Chinese children average at least one standard deviation below the international norm.

Nicholas Eberstadt American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
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China’s PISA test-takers reportedly outscored the mean Western test taker in math and science by over 100 points. However, 85% of the population, and a higher share of students, reside in regions for which Beijing does not disclose PISA scores.

How reliable is the claim that China has high average IQ?

Core argument: Stanford's REAP group reports mean measured IQs for rural Chinese children one standard deviation or more below the international norm, a result reportedly holding for toddlers, 8th graders, and rural migrant children in urban schools.

We refer to China’s purportedly high IQ levels as a “stylized fact” for three reasons. First: there have been perhaps surprisingly few serious studies attempting to measure this quantity in China’s huge population. Second: given the “Flynn effect” of secular increases in measured IQs for national populations all around the world over the postwar era, IQ in China may well be a moving target. Third: IQ testing in China appears to have been generally conducted in urban rather than rural settings—and it is possible there is an urban-rural divergence in measured cognitive abilities due to developmental differences. This third possibility is strongly suggested by some of the recent research of the REAP group at Stanford University. Their studies consistently report finding a low average for measured IQs for rural Chinese children—a mean one standard deviation or more below the international “norm”. The result also reportedly holds for a range of rural children, from toddlers to 8th graders to migrant children from rural areas currently in urban schools. Using these REAP-PIRLS data, the World Bank modeled an estimated nationwide level of student achievement with its “Harmonized Learning Outcome” (HLO) database for its Human Capital Index (HCI). By this initial reckoning, China’s HLO level would have been comparable to those of countries like Mexico or Turkey. [See his slides here.]

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Stanford's REAP group reports mean measured IQs for rural Chinese children one standard deviation or more below the international norm, a result reportedly holding for toddlers, 8th graders, and rural migrant children in urban schools.
  2. Using REAP-PIRLS data, the World Bank's Harmonized Learning Outcome estimate for China's nationwide student achievement was comparable to levels in countries such as Mexico or Turkey.
  3. China's reputed high IQ level is treated as a stylized fact because few serious studies have measured it in China's population, the Flynn effect may make national IQ a moving target, and testing appears concentrated in urban settings.

Related Articles:

  • Do Adults Own the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
  • Knowledge, Skills, and the Global Balance of Power — China's top global ranking on the international PISA exams for 15-year-olds covers only four regions, Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, while over 85% of China's population lives in regions whose scores Beijing does not disclose. The authors' statistical estimate places China's overall student achievement on par with other upper-middle-income economies such as Turkey and Mauritius.
  • The Power of Demography and the Fate of East Asia — East Asia's total population has peaked and is projected to decline for at least a generation, with the pace of decline likely accelerating each decade, while US population is projected to keep growing for decades. The author argues such sustained divergence can shift the global balance of power.

AI Summary. U.S. weapons makers are reporting rising missile sales, with Lockheed Martin's missiles and fire control division up 11% and RTX's Raytheon unit up 8%, and Raytheon's order backlog reaching $63.5bn. The U.S. Army asked Lockheed to quadruple PAC-3 missile output, while Northrop Grumman expects to produce 25,000 solid rocket motors annually by 2029, up from 13,000.

Drew FitzGerald Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Rearmament in the West is boosting order books and backlogs at defense companies. Lockheed Martin reported an 11% increase in Q2 missile sales and revenue rose 8% in Raytheon’s missile unit.

Is rising Western missile demand lifting U.S. weapons makers' sales?

Core argument: Lockheed Martin's missiles and fire control division, which makes Patriot air-defense missiles and Thaad interceptors, posted an 11% rise in second-quarter sales, and the company expects backlogged orders for its weaponry to hit a record later this year.

Lockheed Martin reported an 11% increase in second-quarter sales within its missiles and firing control division, which makes Patriot air-defense missiles and high-end Thaad interceptors. Revenue rose 8% at RTX’s Raytheon unit, powered by higher sales of its Patriot equipment and of Nasams, another surface-to-air missile system. The U.S. Army asked Lockheed to quadruple production of its PAC-3 missiles for Patriot batteries. The company said it expects backlogged orders for its weaponry to hit a record later this year. The backlog at Raytheon swelled to $63.5 billion at the end of June, nudged higher by Navy contracts for new ship-fired SM-3 projectiles and AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles. Defense contractor Northrop Grumman said it expects to pump out 25,000 solid rocket motors a year by 2029, up from 13,000 units today.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Lockheed Martin's missiles and fire control division, which makes Patriot air-defense missiles and Thaad interceptors, posted an 11% rise in second-quarter sales, and the company expects backlogged orders for its weaponry to hit a record later this year.
  2. Revenue rose 8% at RTX's Raytheon unit on higher sales of Patriot equipment and Nasams surface-to-air systems, with Raytheon's backlog swelling to $63.5 billion at the end of June, nudged higher by Navy contracts for SM-3 and AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles.
  3. The U.S. Army asked Lockheed Martin to quadruple production of PAC-3 missiles for Patriot batteries, while Northrop Grumman expects to produce 25,000 solid rocket motors a year by 2029, up from 13,000 currently.

Related Articles:

  • Why is the U.S. Navy Running Out of Tomahawk Cruise Missiles? — The U.S. Navy has been firing Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles faster than it can replace them, with opening-day strikes in Yemen expending more than 80 missiles against 30 targets. An entire year's purchase of 55 Tomahawks accounted for 68% of the precision munitions fired at the Houthis in a single day.
  • The West Badly Needs More Missiles—But The Wait To Buy Them Is Years Long — Each Nasams air-defense system, made by Norway's Kongsberg, takes two years to build and new buyers face a multiyear backlog, prompting the plant to run 24-hour, seven-day shifts. The defense industry faces a prolonged labor crunch, struggling to find workers with niche skills willing to undergo lengthy security checks.
  • Japan, U.S. Form Working Group For Joint Missile Production — Japan and the United States agreed to create working groups on joint missile production, ship and aircraft repair, and supply chain resiliency as part of a defense industry cooperation forum. U.S. officials say Japan's engineering, industrial, and manufacturing capacity is a significant addition for the U.S. defense industrial base.

Friday, July 25, 2025

AI Summary. The share of young adults regularly experiencing stress and anger has risen sharply in the US, Canada, UK, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand while remaining largely stable elsewhere in the West. Real house prices since 1995 are up 85% in the US and over 200% in the other five countries.

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
Date Posted:

As housing affordability has deteriorated in the Anglosphere, the share of young people (18-29) “who believe hard work brings success” has declined relative to their peers in Western Europe.

Does declining housing affordability explain rising unhappiness among English-speaking young adults?

Core argument: The share of young adults regularly experiencing stress and anger has risen sharply over the past 15 years in the US, Canada, UK, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand, while remaining largely stable elsewhere in the west, according to Gallup World Poll data.

The share of young adults regularly experiencing stress and anger has risen sharply over the past 15 years in the US, Canada, UK, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand. But it has been largely stable elsewhere in the west, according to detailed data from the Gallup World Poll used in the report. While dozens of countries are dealing with deteriorating housing affordability, the issue is especially acute in the Anglosphere. In Germany and Spain real house prices have climbed 32 and 44% respectively since 1995. In the US the equivalent figure is 85%, while the UK, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and Canada all come in north of 200%. The result has been a brutal snatching away of the particularly Anglophone dream of home ownership. Rates of ownership among people aged 25-34 in English-speaking countries have slumped by between 20 and 50 percentage points over the same 30-year period.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of young adults regularly experiencing stress and anger has risen sharply over the past 15 years in the US, Canada, UK, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand, while remaining largely stable elsewhere in the west, according to Gallup World Poll data.
  2. Real house prices since 1995 have risen 85% in the US and more than 200% in the UK, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, against 32% in Germany and 44% in Spain.
  3. Home ownership rates among people aged 25-34 in English-speaking countries have fallen by between 20 and 50 percentage points since 1995.

Related Articles:

  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • The Price of Housing in the United States — Real housing price appreciation in the United States has varied widely across regions, with West Coast cities rising earlier while prices in other regions remained comparable in real terms to decades earlier. The authors find essentially no relationship between real price growth and zoning restrictiveness in the earliest period studied, and progressively steeper gradients in later periods.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.

AI Summary. UK job postings for entry-level roles requiring a degree have fallen by almost two-thirds since 2022, twice the drop for all entry-level roles, with US listings down 43%. Analysis of US data shows no clear correlation between an occupation's exposure to generative AI and whether it lost young workers.

Clara Murray, Delphine Strauss, John Burn-Murdoch and Sarah Lim Financial Times
Date Posted:

Since ChatGPT launched, Adzuna data shows a 43% decline in US entry-level job postings requiring a degree. An FT analysis finds “no clear correlation” btw an occupation’s potential exposure to generative AI and a loss of young workers btw 2022–2024.

Is AI behind the steep decline in entry-level graduate job postings?

Core argument: UK job postings for entry-level roles requiring a degree have fallen by almost two-thirds since 2022, twice the decline for all entry-level roles, while US listings of the same type are down 43%, according to Adzuna.

Job postings for entry-level roles requiring a degree have dropped by almost two-thirds in the UK since 2022 — the year ChatGPT launched — twice as much as for all entry level roles, according to job search engine Adzuna. In the US, such listings are down 43% over the same period. FT analysis of US official data showed there was no clear correlation between an occupation’s potential exposure to generative AI (on an International Labour Organization (ILO) measure of the tasks susceptible to automation), and whether it lost young workers between 2022 and 2024. Looking specifically at occupations considered to be at high or moderate risk from generative AI, some graduate roles such as graphic designers and management analysts have thousands fewer workers aged between 20 and 24 than in the year ChatGPT launched. The drop is also noticeable in some highly exposed non-graduate occupations, such as insurance claim assessors, credit counselors or loan interviewers. But in other graduate sectors, such as accountants and auditors, youth employment was booming as of last year, according to US government statistics — and this holds for many tech sector roles, despite a 2% decline in young people employed in software development.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. UK job postings for entry-level roles requiring a degree have fallen by almost two-thirds since 2022, twice the decline for all entry-level roles, while US listings of the same type are down 43%, according to Adzuna.
  2. FT analysis of US official data found no clear correlation between an occupation's potential exposure to generative AI, on the ILO measure of tasks susceptible to automation, and whether it lost young workers between 2022 and 2024.
  3. Among US occupations at high or moderate risk from generative AI, graphic designers, management analysts, insurance claim assessors and loan interviewers have thousands fewer workers aged 20 to 24 than in 2022, while accountants, auditors and many tech roles saw youth employment booming.

Related Articles:

  • Rising Graduate Joblessness Is Mainly Affecting Men. Will That Last? — The US unemployment rate for recent male graduates has risen from below 5% to 7% over the past year while the rate for recent female graduates is unchanged or slightly lower, leaving young male graduates jobless at the same rate as non-graduates. Entry-level coding employment, however, has rebounded.
  • Educated but Unemployed, a Rising Reality for College Grads — Recent college graduates aged 22–27 account for 12% of the 60 basis-point rise in US unemployment, more than twice their 5% share of the labor force. In computer and mathematical occupations, employment for that age group has fallen 8% since 2022 while older workers' employment grew 0.8%.
  • Technological Disruption in the Labor Market — The authors measure US labor market structure since 1880 and find 1990–2017 less disruptive than any earlier period, because past changes from general-purpose technologies like steam and electricity were so profound. They identify four recent signs of accelerating change, including a 50%+ rise in science and technology employment share since 2010.

AI Summary. China is the world's largest shipbuilder, building 50.8m of the 89m deadweight tons of commercial ships produced in 2024 (57%) and holding 59% of new ship orders, aided by an estimated $90bn in government subsidies covering 15-20% of each new ship's cost. China still lags in the most complex ships, shipyard productivity, and marine components such as engines.

Brian Potter Construction Physics
Date Posted:

As measured by tonnage, China built 57% of ships globally in 2024 and has 59% of outstanding orders going forward. While it lags in production of the most complex ships, it still has ⅓ of the LNG orderbook.

How did China come to dominate global shipbuilding?

Core argument: China built 50.8 million of the 89 million deadweight tons of commercial ships completed in 2024 (57%), holds 59% of new ship orders worldwide, and accounts for 14 of the 20 largest shipyards by order book.

It’s estimated that [the Chinese government] spent $90 billion subsidizing the shipbuilding industry between 2006 and 2013, contributing an estimated 15-20% of the cost of each new ship. Between 2004 and 2007, annual investment in Chinese shipyards rose by a factor of seven. Since 2017, China has been the largest shipbuilder in the world. Of the 89 million deadweight tons of commercial ships built in 2024, 50.8 million of them (57%) were Chinese. China has a similarly large fraction (59%) of orders for new ships worldwide. Of the 20 largest shipyards in the world by the size of their order book, 14 of them are Chinese. According to the US Navy, China’s shipbuilding capacity is over 200 times that of the US. In 2023 China delivered 972 commercial ships; the US delivered 7. Until very recently China struggled to build ships that were as high quality or as complex as those from other countries. Even today, as the undisputed biggest shipbuilder in the world, it seems like China still lags in producing the most complex ships, in shipyard productivity, and in producing various marine components (most engines in Chinese ships, for instance, are still based on foreign designs) — though it wouldn’t surprise me if this gap continues to shrink.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China built 50.8 million of the 89 million deadweight tons of commercial ships completed in 2024 (57%), holds 59% of new ship orders worldwide, and accounts for 14 of the 20 largest shipyards by order book.
  2. The US Navy puts China's shipbuilding capacity at over 200 times that of the United States, with China delivering 972 commercial ships in 2023 versus 7 for the US.
  3. The Chinese government is estimated to have spent $90 billion subsidizing shipbuilding between 2006 and 2013, contributing an estimated 15–20% of each new ship's cost, while annual investment in Chinese shipyards rose sevenfold between 2004 and 2007.

Related Articles:

  • Ship Wars — Shipyards tied to China's defense industrial base account for 15% of the country's active shipyards but 40% of commercial output by tonnage, with over 75% of their production built for firms outside China and Hong Kong. The authors argue these commercial revenues offset fixed costs and effectively subsidize China's naval expansion.
  • How South Korea’s Shipyards Could Save the US Navy — US shipyards had just five commercial ships under construction compared with 1,749 in China, and China's naval fleet is projected to grow from 370 to 475 vessels in a decade versus 297 to between 305 and 317 for the US Navy, whose major shipbuilding programs are behind schedule.
  • Underestimating China — China's productive capacity is three times that of the United States and exceeds the next nine countries combined, with its share of global manufacturing quintupling to 30% while the U.S. share halved to about 15%. The authors argue Washington must convert its alliances into a platform for pooled capacity building.

AI Summary. US THAAD missile-defense operators fired more than 150 interceptors against Iranian ballistic missiles, nearly a quarter of the roughly 650 the Pentagon has purchased at about $13m each. Replenishing that stock would likely take over a year and cost $1.5bn–$2bn, according to a defense-procurement researcher's estimate, while the manufacturer says it can make about 100 interceptors this year.

Shelby Holliday, Anat Peled and Drew FitzGerald Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Israeli officials credit the US Thaad missile defense systems for saving thousands of lives during their recent war with Iran. The US fired ~25% of its stock during the 12-day war. Each missile costs ~$13mm, DoD has budgeted to buy 37 over the next year.

How quickly can the US replace missile interceptors spent in combat?

Core argument: U.S. Thaad operators fired more than 150 interceptors during the 12-day war against Iranian ballistic missiles, nearly a quarter of the roughly 650 interceptors the Pentagon has purchased since 2010, according to U.S. officials.

Operating alongside Israeli systems, Thaad operators burned through munitions at a furious clip, firing more than 150 missiles to shoot down the waves of Iranian ballistic missiles, according to U.S. officials. That is nearly a quarter of the interceptors ever purchased by the Pentagon. Israeli officials credited the American systems for saving thousands of lives. Each Thaad interceptor costs about $13 million, according to budget documents, and the Pentagon has purchased around 650 since 2010. Officials have sought to buy 37 in the next fiscal year. Lockheed Martin, which makes the systems, says it can make about 100 interceptors this year and is working with the government on options to increase production for new orders. It would likely take more than a year and cost between $1.5 billion and $2 billion to replenish the Thaad interceptors fired during the 12-day war, according to Wes Rumbaugh, a CSIS fellow who researches Pentagon missile procurement and budget details.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. Thaad operators fired more than 150 interceptors during the 12-day war against Iranian ballistic missiles, nearly a quarter of the roughly 650 interceptors the Pentagon has purchased since 2010, according to U.S. officials.
  2. Each Thaad interceptor costs about $13 million according to budget documents, and officials have sought to buy 37 in the next fiscal year while Lockheed Martin says it can make about 100 interceptors this year.
  3. Replenishing the Thaad interceptors fired during the 12-day war would likely take more than a year and cost between $1.5 billion and $2 billion, according to CSIS fellow Wes Rumbaugh.

Related Articles:

  • Why is the U.S. Navy Running Out of Tomahawk Cruise Missiles? — The U.S. Navy has been firing Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles faster than it can replace them, with opening-day strikes in Yemen expending more than 80 missiles against 30 targets. An entire year's purchase of 55 Tomahawks accounted for 68% of the precision munitions fired at the Houthis in a single day.
  • The West Badly Needs More Missiles—But The Wait To Buy Them Is Years Long — Each Nasams air-defense system, made by Norway's Kongsberg, takes two years to build and new buyers face a multiyear backlog, prompting the plant to run 24-hour, seven-day shifts. The defense industry faces a prolonged labor crunch, struggling to find workers with niche skills willing to undergo lengthy security checks.
  • Japan, U.S. Form Working Group For Joint Missile Production — Japan and the United States agreed to create working groups on joint missile production, ship and aircraft repair, and supply chain resiliency as part of a defense industry cooperation forum. U.S. officials say Japan's engineering, industrial, and manufacturing capacity is a significant addition for the U.S. defense industrial base.

AI Summary. China's kindergarten enrollment fell by 12mn children from a peak of 48mn, and the number of kindergartens serving children aged 3-5 dropped by 41,500 from a high of nearly 295,000, according to the country's ministry of education. Annual births have fallen by nearly half from a peak of 17.9mn to 9.3mn.

Joe Leahy, Wenjie Ding and Haohsiang Ko Financial Times
Date Posted:

Between 2020 and 2024, enrollments in China’s kindergartens (ages 3 to 5) declined from 48mm to 36mm, a 25% decline.

Are falling births shrinking China's kindergarten enrollment and school numbers?

Core argument: China's kindergarten enrollment fell by 12mn children between 2020 and 2024, a 25% drop from a peak of 48mn, according to data from the country's ministry of education.

Enrollments in China’s kindergartens have declined by 12mn children between 2020 and 2024, from a peak of 48mn, according to data from the country’s ministry of education. The number of kindergartens, serving Chinese children aged 3-5, has also fallen by 41,500 from a high of nearly 295,000 in 2021. While the number of births rose by about 520,000 last year to 9.3mn, following a record low in 2023, they were still outpaced by deaths and have declined by nearly half since the peak of 17.9mn in 2017.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's kindergarten enrollment fell by 12mn children between 2020 and 2024, a 25% drop from a peak of 48mn, according to data from the country's ministry of education.
  2. The number of Chinese kindergartens serving children aged 3-5 has fallen by 41,500 from a high of nearly 295,000 in 2021.
  3. Chinese births rose by about 520,000 to 9.3mn following a record low in 2023, but remained outpaced by deaths and down nearly half from the 2017 peak of 17.9mn.

Related Articles:

  • ‘No Marriage, No Children’ Is China’s Ticking Timebomb — China registered about 6.1m marriages in its most recent year, the lowest since public records began in 1986 and less than half the 2013 peak, with roughly 30% of 30-year-olds unmarried versus 15% a decade earlier. Births of 9.54m were the second-lowest since the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949.
  • The Age of Depopulation: Surviving a World Gone Gray — The United States remains the main outlier among developed countries resisting depopulation, with fertility of just over 1.6 births per woman — high for a rich country but below the 2.1 replacement threshold — plus steady immigration. The Census Bureau projects the U.S. population will peak around 2080 and decline continuously thereafter.
  • The Power of Demography and the Fate of East Asia — East Asia's total population has peaked and is projected to decline for at least a generation, with the pace of decline likely accelerating each decade, while US population is projected to keep growing for decades. The author argues such sustained divergence can shift the global balance of power.