Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, July 2, 2025

AI Summary. The Senate reconciliation bill is estimated to add more than $4tn to the national debt through 2034, about $1tn more than the House-passed version, with deficits averaging roughly 7% of GDP annually. Making its temporary tax cuts and spending increases permanent would raise the total to more than $5.3tn.

Marc Goldwein Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget
Date Posted:

The CRFB team estimates that the Senate’s reconciliation bill will result in a deficit of 7% of GDP next year. This estimate doesn’t account for tariff revenue.

How much would the Senate reconciliation bill add to the debt?

Core argument: The Senate reconciliation bill would add $4.1 trillion to the national debt through FY2034, about $1 trillion more than the House-passed One Big Beautiful Bill Act, rising to more than $5.3 trillion if its temporary tax cuts and spending increases were made permanent.

The Senate passed a reconciliation bill that would add over $4 trillion to the national debt through Fiscal Year (FY) 2034, $1 trillion more than the House-passed One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA). Annual deficits would average about 7% of GDP per year under the Senate bill, including 7.1% in 2027. That’s more than double Secretary Bessent’s proposed fiscal target of 3% of GDP, almost 2% of GDP above current law, and nearly 1% of GDP higher than a simple extension of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act’s (TJCA) individual provisions. If made permanent, deficits would rise to roughly 8% of GDP by the end of the budget window.The Senate bill as written would increase debt by $4.1 trillion through 2034, with more than $3.5 trillion of borrowing from the Finance title (taxes and Medicaid), nearly $300 billion of borrowing from other deficit-increasing titles, about $500 billion of savings from deficit-reducing titles, and nearly $700 billion from interest. If various temporary tax cuts and spending increases were made permanent, the bill would add more than $5.3 trillion to the debt.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Senate reconciliation bill would add $4.1 trillion to the national debt through FY2034, about $1 trillion more than the House-passed One Big Beautiful Bill Act, rising to more than $5.3 trillion if its temporary tax cuts and spending increases were made permanent.
  2. Annual deficits under the Senate bill would average about 7% of GDP, including 7.1% in 2027, more than double Secretary Bessent's proposed 3% of GDP fiscal target and nearly 1% of GDP above a simple extension of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act's individual provisions.
  3. The Senate bill's $4.1 trillion debt increase comprises more than $3.5 trillion of borrowing from the Finance title covering taxes and Medicaid, nearly $300 billion from other deficit-increasing titles, about $500 billion of savings from deficit-reducing titles, and nearly $700 billion of interest.

Related Articles:

  • CBO Score Shows Senate OBBBA Adds Over $3.9 Trillion to Debt — The Congressional Budget Office's score of the Senate reconciliation bill implies it would add over $3.9tn to the national debt against a current-law baseline including interest, with roughly $4.45tn of net tax cuts and nearly $300bn of gross spending increases partially offset by nearly $1.5tn of spending cuts.
  • Rapidly Growing Treasury Supply Crowding Out Other Types of Credit Growth — Roughly half of all fixed income issuance coming to market over the past year has been US Treasuries, meaning investors must allocate a growing share of dollars to financing the government. The argument is that lower government debt would free up more funds for consumer borrowing and business investment.
  • Treasury Issuance Growing — US Treasury auction metrics show no current weakness in demand, with stable bid-to-cover ratios and no systematic tailing, even as debt-to-GDP rises, the term premium increases, and the government must refinance $9tn over the next year. The author argues Treasury issuance will keep outgrowing the economy, likely pushing long-term interest rates higher.

AI Summary. The authors estimate Senate tax and spending provisions extending and expanding the 2017 tax law would raise primary deficits by about $3.1tn over 10 years and lift federal debt from 100% of GDP to 127% by 2034, versus 117% under current law. They project GDP falls 0.3% and average wages 0.3% over 10 years.

Kent Smetters et al University of Pennsylvania
Date Posted:

The Penn-Wharton model finds that, dynamically scored, the Senate-passed reconciliation bill would increase the sum of primary deficits, which do not include interest, by $3.5T over the next 10 years.

How would extending the 2017 tax cuts affect debt, GDP, and wages?

Core argument: The Senate Finance Committee's tax provisions extending and expanding the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act are estimated to raise primary deficits by $4,274 billion over 10 years, with other committees adding $290 billion and spending cuts offsetting $1,460 billion, for a conventional cost of $3,104 billion.

Tax provisions approved by the Senate Finance Committee would extend and expand major components of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which we estimate will increase primary deficits by $4,274 billion ($4.3 trillion) over 10 years. Other Committees increase primary deficits by another $290 billion. These changes would be partly offset by spending cuts of $1,460 billion, for a total conventional cost of $3,104 billion. The bill would increase debt by 7.6% in 10 years, and decrease GDP by 0.3% in 10 years. The average wage falls by 0.3% in 10 years. Primary deficits increase by more (to $3,507 billion $3.5T?) in the budget window when accounting for these economic dynamics. Debt would rise from 100% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) today to 127% by 2034 – compared to 117 percent under current law and 124% under the House bill. After 30 years, GDP falls by 4.6% and wages fall by 3.4% relative to current law due to capital shallowing.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Senate Finance Committee's tax provisions extending and expanding the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act are estimated to raise primary deficits by $4,274 billion over 10 years, with other committees adding $290 billion and spending cuts offsetting $1,460 billion, for a conventional cost of $3,104 billion.
  2. Federal debt would rise from 100% of GDP to 127% by 2034 under the Senate bill, compared with 117% under current law and 124% under the House bill.
  3. The Senate bill is estimated to reduce GDP by 0.3% and average wages by 0.3% within 10 years, and by 4.6% and 3.4% respectively after 30 years relative to current law, reflecting capital shallowing.

Related Articles:

  • CBO Score Shows Senate OBBBA Adds Over $3.9 Trillion to Debt — The Congressional Budget Office's score of the Senate reconciliation bill implies it would add over $3.9tn to the national debt against a current-law baseline including interest, with roughly $4.45tn of net tax cuts and nearly $300bn of gross spending increases partially offset by nearly $1.5tn of spending cuts.
  • Treasury Issuance Growing — US Treasury auction metrics show no current weakness in demand, with stable bid-to-cover ratios and no systematic tailing, even as debt-to-GDP rises, the term premium increases, and the government must refinance $9tn over the next year. The author argues Treasury issuance will keep outgrowing the economy, likely pushing long-term interest rates higher.
  • US Fiscal Sustainability Once More — US federal interest payments were projected to rise from 18% of tax revenues to about 22% by 2034 under the Congressional Budget Office's prior baseline. The author estimates that if the yield curve stays at current levels and policy is unchanged, that ratio would exceed 25% by 2032 and approach 30% by 2035.

AI Summary. The Senate-passed budget bill is estimated to cost $3.0tn over 2025-2034 (0.84% of GDP) and $12.1tn over 2025-2055 (0.71% of GDP), assuming temporary provisions expire. This conventional score excludes distributional effects, macroeconomic feedback, and any impact of added debt on interest rates.

Ernie Tedeschi Yale University
Date Posted:

Ernie Tedeschi estimates that the Senate’s version of the reconciliation bill (conventionally scored) will cost $3T over the 2025–2034 window. Interest payments rise to 3.8% of GDP in 2030 relative to 3.6% under CBO’s current law baseline.

How much does the Senate-passed budget bill add to deficits?

Core argument: The Senate-passed budget bill carries a baseline cost of $3.0 trillion over 2025–2034, equal to 0.84% of GDP over that period, assuming temporary provisions actually expire.

The baseline cost of the bill as passed, assuming temporary provisions actually expire, over the 2025-2034 window is $3.0 trillion (0.84% of GDP over this time period) and over the 2025-2055 window is $12.1 trillion (0.71% of GDP over this time period). This analysis provides a conventional score for these proposals. In this analysis we do not look at the distributional implications of this proposal or its macroeconomic implications. We thus do not account for any additional growth (or slowing of growth) that may emerge in the short or long run from passing this bill, nor do we analyze the impact of the increased debt burden on interest rates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Senate-passed budget bill carries a baseline cost of $3.0 trillion over 2025–2034, equal to 0.84% of GDP over that period, assuming temporary provisions actually expire.
  2. The bill's baseline cost reaches $12.1 trillion over the 2025–2055 window, or 0.71% of GDP over that period.
  3. The analysis is a conventional score that excludes distributional and macroeconomic implications, accounting for neither added or slowed growth from the bill nor the effect of increased debt on interest rates.

Related Articles:

  • CBO Score Shows Senate OBBBA Adds Over $3.9 Trillion to Debt — The Congressional Budget Office's score of the Senate reconciliation bill implies it would add over $3.9tn to the national debt against a current-law baseline including interest, with roughly $4.45tn of net tax cuts and nearly $300bn of gross spending increases partially offset by nearly $1.5tn of spending cuts.
  • Debt Has Always Been the Ruin of Great Powers. Is the U.S. Next? — Historical experience suggests that when a great power spends more on debt interest than on military capability for a sustained period, rivals are likely to challenge its position and domestic stability may suffer as governments fail to satisfy competing claims from the military, bondholders, taxpayers and welfare recipients. U.S. federal interest payments of $1.124tn exceeded defense spending of $1.107tn.
  • Global Debt Report 2025 — About 60% of fixed-rate government debt in advanced economies maturing by 2027 — roughly $9tn — was issued before the recent interest-rate tightening, with weighted average yields below 2% versus projected 10-year rates near 3.6%, implying refinancing at nearly double the original cost. France, Spain, the UK, and the US face heightened vulnerability, with maturing debt exceeding 15% of GDP.

AI Summary. Many Asian economies show deeply undervalued real exchange rates and large current account surpluses, alongside accumulated foreign bond holdings that are often unhedged and worth less than their purchase price in dollar terms. The currency appreciation warranted by balance of payments fundamentals could therefore put financial stability at risk.

Brad Setser Council on Foreign Relations
Date Posted:

Taiwan’s bond portfolio, heavy in low-interest, long-duration bonds, has lost ~12% of its value in dollar terms since 2022 as rates rose. “Appreciation warranted by balance of payments fundamentals,” Setser notes, “may put financial stability at risk.”

Do unhedged foreign bond losses block needed currency appreciation in Asia?

Core argument: Many Asian countries are deeply undervalued on fundamental metrics, with very weak real exchange rates and generally high current account surpluses, particularly with the fall in oil prices.

On a host of fundamental metrics, many Asian countries are deeply undervalued. Real exchange rates are very weak and current account surpluses are generally quite high, particularly with the fall in oil prices. These economies have accumulated a lot of foreign bonds (as ongoing surpluses implied foreign asset accumulation) and those bonds are often both underwater in dollar terms and unhedged. Thus, the currency appreciation that is warranted by balance of payments fundamentals would potentially put financial stability at risk.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Many Asian countries are deeply undervalued on fundamental metrics, with very weak real exchange rates and generally high current account surpluses, particularly with the fall in oil prices.
  2. Asian economies' ongoing current account surpluses have implied accumulation of large foreign bond holdings that are often both underwater in dollar terms and unhedged.
  3. The currency appreciation warranted by balance of payments fundamentals in Asian economies would potentially put financial stability at risk.

Related Articles:

  • Asia’s $7.5 Trillion Bet on US Assets Is Suddenly Unravelling — Asia's 11 largest economies have accumulated $7.5tn in US stocks and bonds, but their annual capital flows into the US fell to $68bn, equal to just 11% of their trade surpluses with the US. Their major currencies, including the yen and yuan, trade on average 57% below exchange rates adjusted for living-cost differences.
  • Taiwan Dollar Surges More Than 2% as Traders Test Central Bank — The Taiwan dollar surged more than 2% amid large foreign inflows and heavy US dollar selling by local exporters, testing the central bank's tolerance for currency strength. Further gains could produce paper losses for Taiwanese life insurers, which have scaled back hedges on foreign assets held largely in US dollars.
  • The Coming Asian FX ‘Avalanche’ — Investment firm Eurizon SLJ argues that Asian exporters have hoarded much of their trade surpluses in dollar deposits rather than repatriating them, creating an overhang the firm roughly estimates at $2.5tn in China plus more from Taiwan, Malaysia, and Korea, growing about $500bn a year. It predicts this raises the risk of a non-linear dollar sell-off.

AI Summary. The euro is up about 14% against the dollar this year, helping curb price gains that now match the European Central Bank's inflation goal. The risk is that further appreciation pushes inflation below the target and damages European competitiveness, with the central bank warning that a move past $1.20 would be problematic.

Jana Randow, Alexander Weber, and Mark Schroers Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The euro’s 14% appreciation against the dollar since the start of the year may start to weigh on exports if the euro moves above $1.20, and may also cause inflation to fall below the 2% target.

Will further currency appreciation push inflation below target and hurt competitiveness?

Core argument: The euro is up about 14% against the dollar this year as confidence in the US dwindles, helping curb price gains that now match the ECB's target.

The [Euro] is up about 14% against the dollar this year as confidence in the US dwindles — helping curb price gains that now precisely match the ECB’s goal. The currency has averaged at $1.1829 since it was introduced in 1999, and traded just below that level on Tuesday. The danger, however, is that the rally propels the euro to levels that cause inflation to undershoot the target, damaging competitiveness in the process. The shift was initially welcomed not just for its inflation-fighting properties but as an opportunity to swell the role of Europe’s common currency on the world stage. [ECB] Vice President Luis de Guindos warned that an advance past $1.20 would be problematic.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The euro is up about 14% against the dollar this year as confidence in the US dwindles, helping curb price gains that now match the ECB's target.
  2. ECB Vice President Luis de Guindos warned that a euro advance past $1.20 would be problematic, given the risk that the rally drives inflation below target and damages competitiveness.
  3. The euro has averaged $1.1829 since its introduction in 1999, and its rise was initially welcomed both for fighting inflation and as an opportunity to expand the common currency's global role.

Related Articles:

  • A Trump Risk Premium in the Dollar — Movements in the trade-weighted US dollar against other major currencies map almost entirely onto changes in forward interest-rate differentials, with the same positive relationship holding across periods despite noisier data. The author argues this leaves no discernible evidence of a separate political risk premium in the dollar.
  • Asia’s $7.5 Trillion Bet on US Assets Is Suddenly Unravelling — Asia's 11 largest economies have accumulated $7.5tn in US stocks and bonds, but their annual capital flows into the US fell to $68bn, equal to just 11% of their trade surpluses with the US. Their major currencies, including the yen and yuan, trade on average 57% below exchange rates adjusted for living-cost differences.
  • German Fiscal Policy On The Move — Germany's budget raises defence spending to €152.8bn by 2029, more than doubling it to 3.5% of GDP. Using International Monetary Fund growth projections and today's yield curve, the author estimates German gross debt rises from 64% of GDP to 76% by 2029, with net debt supply for private investors approaching €250bn a year.

AI Summary. California lawmakers rolled back the California Environmental Quality Act, a law long used by opponents to block development projects, as part of legislation targeting the state's housing shortage. California needs 3.5m housing units but builds only about 100,000 annually, and housing experts identify regulatory barriers to construction as the heart of the problem.

Jim Carlton Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

As part of an effort to increase housing construction and lower housing costs, California rolled back the longstanding California Environmental Quality Act, which had been used to block new housing construction.

Will rolling back environmental review rules ease housing shortages?

Core argument: California needs 3.5 million housing units but builds only about 100,000 annually, a shortage housing experts attribute chiefly to regulatory barriers to construction.

California lawmakers rolled back one of the most stringent environmental laws in the country, after Gov. Gavin Newsom muscled through the effort in a dramatic move to combat the state’s affordability crisis. The Democratic governor—widely viewed as a 2028 presidential contender—made passage of two bills addressing an acute housing shortage a condition of his signing the 2025-26 budget. A cornerstone of the legislation reins in the California Environmental Quality Act, which for more than a half-century has been used by opponents to block almost any kind of development project. California sits at the epicenter of America’s home shortage. The state has faced a homelessness crisis. Nine of the 10 least affordable cities in the country are located there, according to a May 20 report by WalletHub, a personal-finance company. And the heart of the problem, say housing experts, are the regulatory barriers to construction. The state needs 3.5 million units, but only about 100,000 are built annually.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. California needs 3.5 million housing units but builds only about 100,000 annually, a shortage housing experts attribute chiefly to regulatory barriers to construction.
  2. California lawmakers reined in the California Environmental Quality Act, which for more than a half-century has been used by opponents to block almost any kind of development project.
  3. Gov. Gavin Newsom made passage of two housing bills a condition of signing California's 2025-26 budget, in a state holding nine of the 10 least affordable U.S. cities, according to a May 20 WalletHub report.

Related Articles:

  • New Yorkers Make Their Housing Shortage Worse — Housing units rose 17% in the Austin metropolitan area between 2020 and 2024 versus 3% in New York City, and New York housing prices and rents have risen more than Austin's despite far weaker job growth. Rent regulation covering roughly half of New York's units discourages tenants from moving and landlords from upgrading.
  • Why Has Construction Productivity Stagnated? The Role of Land-Use Regulation — Homes built per construction worker boomed after World War II and fell after 1970, a decline the authors link to local land-use regulation that limits project size and keeps construction firms small and less productive. They estimate US residential builders would be roughly 60% more productive if their size distribution matched manufacturing.
  • America’s Housing Affordability Crisis and the Decline of Housing Supply — Housing production intensity has fallen substantially, especially in fast-growing Sunbelt markets once known for building, converging toward the low rates long seen on the coasts and in declining industrial centers. The authors argue incumbent-controlled regulation explains the weakening link between high prices, high demand areas, and new construction.

Thursday, July 3, 2025

AI Summary. The authors project net migration for the year to range from about −525,000 to 115,000, with zero or negative net migration more likely, reducing GDP growth by 0.3–0.4 percentage points. They project immigration policy will become more restrictive the following year before net migration rebounds in subsequent years.

Wendy Edelberg, Stan Veuger, and Tara Watson American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:

Revised projections of net migration for 2025 span a range from −525,000 to 115,000, “reflecting [an] expectation of severely curtailed inflows” and only “somewhat” higher outflows, strongly weighted towards large negative net flows. @stanveuger @AEIecon

How much does restrictive immigration policy reduce GDP growth?

Core argument: The authors project net migration to the U.S. in 2025 in a range from about −525,000 to 115,000, reflecting severely curtailed inflows and somewhat higher outflows than in recent years.

Our projections of net migration for 2025 span a range from about −525,000 to 115,000, reflecting our expectation of severely curtailed inflows and somewhat higher outflows than in recent years. Though small positive net flows are within our projected range and certainly possible, we believe zero or net negative migration for the year is more likely. These changes will reduce GDP growth by 0.3-0.4 percentage points in 2025. We project that immigration policy will be even more restrictive in 2026 before net migration starts to rebound in 2027 and 2028.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors project net migration to the U.S. in 2025 in a range from about −525,000 to 115,000, reflecting severely curtailed inflows and somewhat higher outflows than in recent years.
  2. The authors estimate these migration changes will reduce U.S. GDP growth by 0.3–0.4 percentage points in 2025, and judge zero or net negative migration for the year more likely than small positive net flows.
  3. The authors project immigration policy will be even more restrictive in 2026, with net migration beginning to rebound in 2027 and 2028.

Related Articles:

  • Illegal Population Down Since January — An analysis of the Current Population Survey finds the foreign-born population fell by 957,000 over a four-month period, with the labor force component down 601,000, one of the largest four-month declines in three decades. The decline was entirely among non-citizens, with non-citizens from Latin America arriving in 1980 or later down 1.07m.
  • America’s Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide — Current Population Survey estimates indicate America's foreign-born population surpassed 50m for the first time and exceeded 15% of the national population, above the prior peak of 14.8% recorded in 1890. Mass immigration during that earlier wave was associated in contemporary opinion with widening income and wealth gaps and depressed wages for less-skilled native-born men, and sweeping national restrictions followed.
  • Trump Struggles to Press Deportations Without Damaging the Economy — Goldman Sachs estimates, using census data, that immigrants living in the U.S. illegally make up about 4.4% of the U.S. workforce overall but far more in some industries: 19% of landscaping services, 17% of crop production, 16% of animal slaughtering and processing, and 13% of construction.

AI Summary. The number of Republican-held seats among the one-third of U.S. House districts most reliant on Medicaid has more than doubled since 2009. Five of the 18 Republican-held districts rated competitive and 13 of the 22 competitive Democratic-held districts fall within that most Medicaid-dependent third.

Aaron Zitner, Anthony DeBarros and Danny Dougherty Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Medicaid cuts are a potential liability for the GOP. The GOP represented 26 of the 100 lowest-income House districts in 2009 and 56 in 2023. Of the 145 districts most dependent on Medicaid, the % represented by Republicans has more than doubled to ~37%.

Do Republicans now hold more of the most Medicaid-dependent districts?

Core argument: The number of Republicans elected in the 145 House districts most reliant on Medicaid — one-third of all House districts — has more than doubled since 2009.

The party of middle- and lower-income America is a party that is more reliant on safety-net programs. Consider the 145 House districts—the one-third of all House districts—that are most reliant on Medicaid. The number electing Republicans has more than doubled since 2009. Of the 18 Republican-held House districts that the nonpartisan Cook Political Report says are tossups or merely lean in the GOP’s direction, five are among the most dependent on Medicaid—that is, they are among the top one-third of House districts ranked by Medicaid reliance. Cutting Medicaid could also damage the GOP’s prospects in its best pickup opportunities, in districts where the Democratic hold is tenuous. Of the 22 Democratic-held districts rated as tossups or as merely leaning Democratic, 13 are among the most-dependent on Medicaid.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The number of Republicans elected in the 145 House districts most reliant on Medicaid — one-third of all House districts — has more than doubled since 2009.
  2. Five of the 18 Republican-held House districts that the nonpartisan Cook Political Report rates as tossups or leaning Republican rank among the top one-third of districts by Medicaid reliance.
  3. Of the 22 Democratic-held districts rated tossups or leaning Democratic, 13 are among the most Medicaid-dependent, and cutting Medicaid could damage Republican prospects in those pickup opportunities.

Related Articles:

  • The Economic Geography Of The 2024 Elections — Counties where government transfer programs such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and unemployment insurance make up at least a quarter of personal income gave Trump 63% of the vote, while counties where transfers account for less than 15% gave Harris 56%. Transfers supplied 18% of total US personal income.
  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • Saved by Medicaid: New Evidence on Health Insurance and Mortality from the Universe of Low-Income Adults — Using linked Census and tax records for 37m low-income adults, the authors estimate that state Medicaid expansions raised enrollment by 12 percentage points and cut mortality among low-income adults by 2.5%, implying a 21% reduction in the mortality hazard of new enrollees. They estimate direct budgetary costs of $5.4m per life saved and $179,000 per life-year saved.

AI Summary. Polling has long asked Americans whether the United States is the greatest country in the world, with two-thirds once choosing that view over saying other countries are also great. In recent polling, 53% say America's best days are ahead versus 40% who say they are behind.

Karlyn Bowman American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:

Polling data show that the share of Americans who believe in American exceptionalism has consistently declined over the past 70 years. Just from 2011 to 2024, the number of respondents claiming there are other countries greater than the US tripled.

How do Americans view their country's greatness and future prospects?

Core argument: In Gallup's 1955 poll, two-thirds of Americans said the United States was the "greatest country in the world, better than all other countries in every possible way," 31% said it was a great country but so were certain others, and 1% said other countries were better in many respects.

In 1955, the Gallup Organization asked Americans to suppose they were talking in a general way about the United States and other countries. The organization then asked which of three statements came closer to the respondent’s point of view. Two-thirds chose the response that the United States was the “greatest country in the world, better than all other countries in every possible way.” 31% believed the US was “a great country but so are certain other countries.” And finally, 1% said that in many other respects, certain other countries were better than the US. A version of this question has been asked occasionally by pollsters ever since. Even in these deeply polarized times, most Americans still believe America’s best days are ahead. Like the exceptionalism question, pollsters ask about optimism in different ways, and in most of them, including a new poll from Quinnipiac released last week, optimism beats pessimism. In the new poll, 53% said America’s best days were ahead, and 40% behind.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In Gallup's 1955 poll, two-thirds of Americans said the United States was the "greatest country in the world, better than all other countries in every possible way," 31% said it was a great country but so were certain others, and 1% said other countries were better in many respects.
  2. A Quinnipiac poll found 53% of Americans said America's best days were ahead and 40% said they were behind.
  3. Pollsters have asked versions of the American exceptionalism question occasionally since 1955, and in most formulations of the optimism question, optimism outweighs pessimism.

Related Articles:

  • America Pulls Back From Values That Once Defined It, WSJ-NORC Poll Finds — A Wall Street Journal-NORC poll found 38% of Americans call patriotism very important and 39% say the same of religion, down from 70% and 62% in 1998. Money was the only tested priority to grow in importance, cited as very important by 43% versus 31% in 1998.
  • Why This Extremely Viral Poll Result Might Not Be Real — A widely cited survey showing dramatically different results on patriotism and community values across waves changed collection methods, from telephone interviews to a high-quality online panel. Respondents speaking to a human interviewer by phone are more likely to answer values questions in ways that make them look like upstanding citizens.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.

AI Summary. A US trade deal with Vietnam applies a 40% tariff to goods transshipped through Vietnam, twice the 20% rate on regular Vietnamese imports. The US goods trade deficit with Vietnam has grown to more than $120bn, behind only China and Mexico, while Vietnam's imports from China rose 28% and its exports to the US rose 26% year over year.

Jason Douglas and Jon Emont Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

The US is imposing a 20% tariff on imports from Vietnam and a 40% rate on those “transshipped” through the country in an effort to reduce American trade with China.

Can tariffs on transshipped goods close the back door for Chinese exports?

Core argument: Goods transshipped to the U.S. through Vietnam would face a 40% tariff under the deal announced by President Trump, twice the 20% rate Trump said he is applying to regular Vietnamese imports.

A key provision of the Vietnam deal announced by President Trump Wednesday is that goods “transshipped” to the U.S. through Vietnam would be subject to a punitive 40% tariff, twice the 20% rate Trump said he is applying to regular imports from Vietnam. As recently as 2018, the U.S. deficit in goods trade with Vietnam was smaller than its deficit with Japan or Germany and a 10th the size of its deficit with China. By the end of last year, the U.S. deficit with Vietnam had ballooned to more than $120 billion, putting Vietnam behind only China and Mexico in its share of the U.S.’s $1.2 trillion goods trade deficit. Vietnam’s rise up the rankings in U.S. trade has also drawn scrutiny from the U.S. as a hub for simply rerouting China-made goods bound for the U.S. for firms wanting to dodge tariffs. Chinese exports to the U.S. were about 10% lower in the first five months of the year than the same period a year earlier as tariffs bit into direct trade between the two economic superpowers, Chinese customs data show. Over the same period, however, Vietnamese imports from China were up 28% year over year, Vietnamese data show, while Vietnamese exports to the U.S. rose 26%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Goods transshipped to the U.S. through Vietnam would face a 40% tariff under the deal announced by President Trump, twice the 20% rate Trump said he is applying to regular Vietnamese imports.
  2. The U.S. goods trade deficit with Vietnam exceeded $120 billion by the end of last year, trailing only China and Mexico within the $1.2 trillion total, after being a 10th the size of the China deficit as recently as 2018.
  3. Chinese exports to the U.S. were about 10% lower in the first five months of the year than a year earlier, Chinese customs data show, while Vietnamese data show imports from China up 28% and exports to the U.S. up 26%.

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  • How China Gets Around US Tariffs — China's exports to Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam hit record highs while its imports from them stayed subdued, which the author reads as evidence of transshipment to circumvent US tariffs. The author argues that as long as US demand stays strong, Chinese goods will reach the US, and decoupling would require curbing domestic demand.