Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, June 26, 2025

AI Summary. Manufacturing employment as a share of total US nonfarm employment has been declining since the end of World War II, a trend the author attributes mainly to rising manufacturing productivity rather than international trade, with declines predating both the North American Free Trade Agreement and China's World Trade Organization entry. Average manufacturing wages have been below average services wages.

Michael Strain Center for Economic and Policy Research
Date Posted:

The manufacturing share of US employment has fallen from its 1944 peak of ~38% to its current level of <10%. Far from implying that “the US doesn’t make things anymore,” this reflects technical progress; manufacturing output is at its historical max.

Is rising productivity, not trade, behind falling manufacturing employment?

Core argument: Manufacturing employment as a share of total nonfarm employment has declined since the end of World War II, driven by rising manufacturing productivity and technological progress rather than international trade, the author argues.

Invoking manufacturing employment declines as a justification for protectionism fundamentally misunderstands the root causes of employment dynamics. Manufacturing employment as a share of total nonfarm employment has been declining since the end of World War II because manufacturing productivity has been increasing over that period. The main driver of manufacturing employment declines has been technological progress, not international trade. Figure 1 clearly illustrates declining manufacturing employment well before China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) coming into effect in 1994. If protectionists really wish to boost manufacturing employment, then they should be arguing for reducing manufacturing productivity, not imports. Supporters of protectionism often tout the quality of manufacturing jobs. But the average wage of a manufacturing job has been lower than [that] in a services sector job since 2018. US industrial output reached its post-World War II high in February 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Manufacturing employment as a share of total nonfarm employment has declined since the end of World War II, driven by rising manufacturing productivity and technological progress rather than international trade, the author argues.
  2. Manufacturing employment was falling well before China's WTO accession in 2001 or NAFTA's entry into force in 1994.
  3. The average manufacturing wage has been lower than the average services-sector wage since 2018, and US industrial output reached its post-World War II high in February 2025.

Related Articles:

  • Closing the Trade Deficit Would Barely Raise the Share of US Manufacturing Employment — The authors estimate that eliminating the US manufacturing trade deficit by shifting purchases from foreign to domestic goods would raise manufacturing's share of total US employment by just 1.7 percentage points, from 7.9% to 9.7%. Such gains would be far too small to significantly expand labor market opportunities for men without college degrees.
  • Steel Productivity has Plummeted Since Trump’s 2018 Tariffs — Output per hour in the U.S. steel industry has fallen 32% since 2017, following the imposition of 25% tariffs on steel imports, while output per hour for the economy as a whole rose 15%. U.S. steel-using firms, which employ roughly 45x as many Americans as steel producers, pay about 75% more for steel than global competitors.
  • The Mysterious Slowdown in U.S. Manufacturing Productivity — US manufacturing labor productivity growth slowed broadly after the Great Recession, with the four largest firms in each industry averaging –0.5% growth from 2010 to 2022 versus 3.7% from 1987 to 2007, and smaller follower firms showing an identical 4.2 percentage-point decline. The authors find the slowdown spans all industries and firm sizes.

AI Summary. Knowledge-sector workers in data-intensive, repetitive, or research-focused roles—such as medical schedulers, insurance claims processors, and financial advisers—will likely face a job market requiring skill upgrading, transfer to other industries that use their knowledge for related tasks, or acceptance of lower-skilled, lower-paid work. This "up or out" pattern resembles the skills-biased technological change that previously affected middle-skill manufacturing workers.

Brent Orrell American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:

AI diffusion through “knowledge-based” service sector jobs has increased – and will likely continue to increase – demand for noncognitive “social skills,” with workers who have both cognitive and social skills faring the best.

Will knowledge workers face the same up-or-out pressures as manufacturing workers?

Core argument: Knowledge workers in data-intensive, repetitive, or research-focused roles—including medical schedulers, insurance claims investigators and processors, and financial advisers—will likely face a job market demanding skill upgrading, a move to other sectors, or acceptance of lower-skilled, lower-paid work.

Workers in the knowledge sector whose jobs are data intensive and repetitive or research focused—such as medical schedulers, insurance claims investigators and processors, and financial adviser—will likely face a job market that requires skill upgrading, transferring to other sectors and industries that leverage their knowledge and experience for related tasks, or, in the worst case, accepting lower-skilled (and lower-paid) jobs. This “up or out” feature of the knowledge-workforce future strongly resembles the skills-biased technological change (SBTC) that previously had powerful effects on workers in middle-skill manufacturing jobs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Knowledge workers in data-intensive, repetitive, or research-focused roles—including medical schedulers, insurance claims investigators and processors, and financial advisers—will likely face a job market demanding skill upgrading, a move to other sectors, or acceptance of lower-skilled, lower-paid work.
  2. The "up or out" feature of the knowledge workforce's future resembles the skills-biased technological change that previously had powerful effects on workers in middle-skill manufacturing jobs.

Related Articles:

  • Educated but Unemployed, a Rising Reality for College Grads — Recent college graduates aged 22–27 account for 12% of the 60 basis-point rise in US unemployment, more than twice their 5% share of the labor force. In computer and mathematical occupations, employment for that age group has fallen 8% since 2022 while older workers' employment grew 0.8%.
  • Technological Disruption in the Labor Market — The authors measure US labor market structure since 1880 and find 1990–2017 less disruptive than any earlier period, because past changes from general-purpose technologies like steam and electricity were so profound. They identify four recent signs of accelerating change, including a 50%+ rise in science and technology employment share since 2010.
  • More Than A Quarter of Computer-Programming Jobs Just Vanished. What Happened? — The number of computer programmers in the United States is at its lowest level since 1980, a period in which the total U.S. workforce grew about 75%. Programming jobs, which the government classifies as more routine than software development work, fell 27.5%, while software developer jobs fell 0.3%.

AI Summary. The US Treasury is negotiating with international partners over a global minimum tax on multinational corporations and digital services taxes levied on American technology firms, and says a breakthrough could render a proposed retaliatory tax provision irrelevant. That provision would tax foreign companies and investors from countries deemed to unfairly tax US technology companies.

Daniel Flatley Bloomberg
Date Posted:

Republicans may pull the “Revenge Tax” provision from the reconciliation bill as the Treasury Department nears a deal with OECD partners over global minimum taxes on multinational corporations.

Could an international tax deal make a retaliatory tax provision unnecessary?

Core argument: The "revenge tax" in President Donald Trump's tax legislation would levy foreign companies and investors from countries the US determines have unfairly imposed digital taxes on American technology firms.

The "revenge tax" provision, part of President Donald Trump's signature tax legislation, would impose a levy on foreign companies and investors from countries that the US determines have been unfairly imposing digital taxes on American technology companies.Republicans are weighing whether to pull the revenge tax provision as it nears a deal with European nations and other countries that impose a minimum tax on multinational corporations as part of a global agreement.  That accord may also include the digital services taxes that are imposed on technology firms based in the US by countries such as Canada, the UK, and France. “We continue to have negotiations with our OECD partners and continue to hope that in the very short run we have a breakthrough that would make conversations about 899 irrelevant,” Deputy Treasury Secretary Michael Faulkender said.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The "revenge tax" in President Donald Trump's tax legislation would levy foreign companies and investors from countries the US determines have unfairly imposed digital taxes on American technology firms.
  2. Republicans are weighing pulling the revenge tax provision as the US nears a deal with European and other nations that impose a minimum tax on multinational corporations under a global agreement.
  3. Deputy Treasury Secretary Michael Faulkender said negotiations with OECD partners continue and expressed hope for a breakthrough that would make conversations about 899 irrelevant.

Related Articles:

  • 899 — The Three Numbers Alarming the Bond Market — A provision in US legislation would let the Treasury impose a 5% tax surcharge, rising in stages to 20%, on the US investments of countries it identifies as levying "extraterritorial and discriminatory" taxes on American companies, such as the European Union's digital services tax. The chief financial effects would be a weaker dollar and foreign markets outperforming the US.
  • Obscure Tax Item in Trump’s Big Bill Alarms Wall Street — A proposed US tax provision, Section 899, would raise tax rates on individuals and companies from countries whose tax policies the US deems discriminatory, including those imposing digital services taxes on large technology firms. Analysts say the measure, which could raise rates on passive income such as interest and dividends, would further drive away foreign investors.
  • Are Foreigners Selling US Assets? — European and Japanese investors hold roughly 30% and 20% of their fixed income in foreign debt, versus under 10% for US investors, with US bonds making up about 15% of Eurozone and Japanese portfolios. Because foreign investors are less sticky than domestic ones, turmoil in US bond markets has greater potential to unsettle them.

AI Summary. US casualty insurance prices, covering businesses against legal claims from employees, customers, or others harmed by their operations or products, have risen for 23 consecutive quarters, including 8% in one quarter, even as insurers add exclusions and cut payout limits. One leading carrier's chief executive warns coverage could become unavailable at any price.

Lee Harris Financial Times
Date Posted:

The cost of casualty insurance rose 8% in Q1 2025; costs have risen for 23 successive quarters. Carriers are considering withdrawing from the liability market due to “runaway jury verdicts” & increasing lawsuits driven by the litigation funding industry.

Are rising legal claims pushing business liability coverage out of reach?

Core argument: US casualty insurance prices rose 8% in the first quarter and have climbed for 23 consecutive quarters, according to Marsh, the world's largest insurance broker.

The cost of US casualty insurance, which businesses buy to protect themselves against legal claims from employees, customers or others harmed by their operations or products, has climbed for 23 quarters in a row, according to the world’s largest insurance broker Marsh. Prices for the insurance segment rose 8% in the first quarter of this year, despite insurers carving out new exclusions and lowering the total they promise to pay out for any claim. That could soon mean insurers withdraw from the market altogether, the chief executive of one leading insurance carrier said. “It won’t be a question of how much you’re willing to pay — the cover won’t be available,” Everest chief executive Jim Williamson said at the Financial Times’ insurance summit last week. “No one will offer it at any price. That’s when you start to see a real breakdown.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US casualty insurance prices rose 8% in the first quarter and have climbed for 23 consecutive quarters, according to Marsh, the world's largest insurance broker.
  2. Insurers have carved out new exclusions and lowered the totals they promise to pay for any claim, even as US casualty coverage prices continued to rise.
  3. Everest chief executive Jim Williamson said insurers could withdraw from the casualty market altogether, leaving cover unavailable at any price: "That's when you start to see a real breakdown.".

Related Articles:

  • The World Is Getting Riskier. Americans Don’t Want to Pay for It — Americans' resistance to paying to insure against risks from illness, old age, and natural and financial disasters is growing alongside those risks; JPMorgan estimated wildfires around Los Angeles caused $50bn in losses, of which only $20bn were insured. Socializing risk removes the price signal that encourages the insured to mitigate their own exposure.
  • Reinsurers Little Exposed to LA Fires After Retreat From Disaster Risks — Citi analysts estimate reinsurers could absorb less than 3% of insured losses from the Los Angeles wildfires. Reinsurers' share of modelled catastrophe risk has fallen from about 46% over the past 25 years to 33%, following years of wildfire losses that led major reinsurers to reduce their appetite for such risks.
  • Growing Costs of Natural Disasters are Stressing Property Insurance Markets — U.S. home insurers posted $15.2bn in net underwriting losses, their worst performance since at least 2000, and are responding by raising premiums and withdrawing coverage. State "last-resort" public insurance plans, backed by a state's policyholders or taxpayers, reached a record of just over $1.3tn in exposure, signaling growing unavailability of private coverage.

AI Summary. An analysis of New York City's mayoral vote finds that Mamdani's coalition centered on working-, middle-, and upper-middle-class renters across white, Hispanic and Asian neighborhoods and on the youngest voters, while Cuomo's support came from both the wealthy and the poor and from middle-class Black voters in an older Black electorate.

Michael Lange New York Times
Date Posted:

Michael Lange argues Mamdani’s winning coalition was one of the “in-between,” made up of working, middle, and upper-middle-class renters spanning white, Hispanic, and Asian neighborhoods. Cuomo slimly prevailed among the rich and the poor.

How did class and age divide voters in the mayoral race?

Core argument: Zohran Mamdani trailed Andrew Cuomo by only 9 points in Staten Island, performing best along the racially mixed North Shore and in union-dense, home-owning precincts.

Mr. Cuomo’s core coalition bookended the ends of the economic spectrum (the wealthy and the poor), Mr. Mamdani’s coalition was the in-between (working-, middle-, and upper-middle-class renters spanning white, Hispanic and Asian neighborhoods). The city’s youngest generations gave Mr. Mamdani his shocking success Tuesday night. Mr. Cuomo performed well with middle-class Black voters, but that was at least in part because the Black electorate in New York is older than the Hispanic and Asian electorates. With almost every other group, Mr. Mamdani’s performance across the city was a profound improvement on that of Bernie Sanders and other progressive and socialist candidates. He won a plurality of the Hispanic vote, in addition to sweeping many “Gentrifying Battlegrounds” in Central Brooklyn and Upper Manhattan, and only trailed Mr. Cuomo by 9 points in Staten Island, performing best along the racially mixed North Shore and in union-dense, home-owning precincts. Furthermore, Mr. Mamdani made pronounced inroads with Asian voters, particularly in Queens, performing well in immigrant-heavy enclaves that shifted toward Mr. Trump in November.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Zohran Mamdani trailed Andrew Cuomo by only 9 points in Staten Island, performing best along the racially mixed North Shore and in union-dense, home-owning precincts.
  2. Mamdani's coalition consisted of working-, middle-, and upper-middle-class renters across white, Hispanic and Asian neighborhoods, while Cuomo's core support bookended the economic spectrum among the wealthy and the poor.
  3. Mamdani won a plurality of the Hispanic vote, swept many "Gentrifying Battlegrounds" in Central Brooklyn and Upper Manhattan, and made inroads with Asian voters in immigrant-heavy Queens enclaves that shifted toward Donald Trump in November.

Related Articles:

  • Democrats Need to Face Why Trump Won — Among American voters over 30, the gender gap in presidential support has held at roughly 10%, but among those under 30 it has widened dramatically, with 18-year-old men 23 percentage points more likely than 18-year-old women to support Donald Trump. Similar divides are appearing in other countries.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
  • Why is New York City Shrinking? — New York City's population is shrinking as domestic out-migration has accelerated, with those leaving tending to be younger, higher-income, and with fewer children than the city's overall population. Census Bureau surveys that ask movers their reasons indicate jobs matter more than any other consideration, including housing affordability.

AI Summary. Housing units rose 17% in the Austin metropolitan area between 2020 and 2024 versus 3% in New York City, and New York housing prices and rents have risen more than Austin's despite far weaker job growth. Rent regulation covering roughly half of New York's units discourages tenants from moving and landlords from upgrading.

Greg Ip Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

Since 2020, Austin’s payroll employment and housing prices rose 20% and 44%, respectively, compared with 3% and 48% in NYC. The number of housing units rose 17% in Austin, but just 3% in NYC.

Does restricting new housing supply raise prices and rents?

Core argument: Housing units rose 17% in Austin between 2020 and 2024 versus 3% in New York City, according to census data, while Austin's payroll employment grew 20% since February 2020 against New York's 3%.

Since February 2020, payroll employment is up a whopping 20% in the Austin metropolitan area, versus just 3% in New York City. Yet since then, housing prices have actually risen more in New York, by 48%, than in Austin, by 44%. Austin’s rents at one point were rising 23% a year but have since plummeted and now stand just 11% higher than in early 2020, according to RealPage, which serves the apartment industry, while New York’s are 20% higher. The reason, as you might have guessed, is supply. Between 2020 and 2024, total housing units rose 17% in Austin, but just 3% in New York, according to census data. Rent control or rent “stabilization,” now covering roughly half the city’s units, discourages tenants from moving and landlords from upgrading the quality of units.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Housing units rose 17% in Austin between 2020 and 2024 versus 3% in New York City, according to census data, while Austin's payroll employment grew 20% since February 2020 against New York's 3%.
  2. New York City housing prices have risen 48% since February 2020, more than Austin's 44%, despite Austin's faster job growth.
  3. Austin rents, which at one point rose 23% a year, now stand 11% above early 2020 levels versus 20% in New York, according to RealPage; rent control or "stabilization" covers roughly half of New York's units, discouraging tenants from moving and landlords from upgrading.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Housing Supply Problem: The Closing of the Suburban Frontier? — Quality-adjusted real house prices are historically high in many major US markets, especially in the Sunbelt, while homebuilding has fallen sharply, particularly in higher-price, lower-density areas. The authors find high suburban prices in Sunbelt metros no longer stimulate much new construction, possibly because residents have made new projects difficult to permit.
  • America’s Housing Affordability Crisis and the Decline of Housing Supply — Housing production intensity has fallen substantially, especially in fast-growing Sunbelt markets once known for building, converging toward the low rates long seen on the coasts and in declining industrial centers. The authors argue incumbent-controlled regulation explains the weakening link between high prices, high demand areas, and new construction.
  • The Price of Housing in the United States — Real housing price appreciation in the United States has varied widely across regions, with West Coast cities rising earlier while prices in other regions remained comparable in real terms to decades earlier. The authors find essentially no relationship between real price growth and zoning restrictiveness in the earliest period studied, and progressively steeper gradients in later periods.

Friday, June 27, 2025

AI Summary. The authors estimate that housing inventory below 5.0 months has only a weak relationship with year-over-year home price changes, while above that threshold the relationship turns clearly negative with a 9-month lag. By their rule of thumb, each additional month of inventory above 5 months implies home prices about 3% lower nine months later.

Aziz Sunderji Home Economics
Date Posted:

Historically, housing inventories above 5.81 months have been followed by y/y price declines 9m later. Given current inventories, Aziz Sunderji argues we will hit that tipping point in August, implying price declines would likely begin around May 2026.

What level of housing inventory signals home price declines ahead?

Core argument: The authors estimate an inventory threshold of 5.0 months, above which months of supply has a clearly negative relationship with year-over-year home price changes 9 months later, while below it the relationship is weak.

We answer two questions: Is there a specific level of inventory that reliably signals price declines? What’s the lag between rising supply and falling prices? We estimate the inventory threshold at 5.0 months. Below that level, inventory has only a weak relationship with year-over-year home price changes. But above it, the relationship becomes more clearly negative, signaling price declines 9 months in the future. Based on the model coefficients, we calculate that the predicted change in home prices turns negative at 5.81 months of inventory. The fit is unusually strong: our best-performing model—a 9-month lag with a 5.0-month threshold—yields an adjusted R² of 0.75, indicating that it explains a substantial share of the variation in home price growth. We can extract a simple rule of thumb from these results: once inventory is above 5 months, each additional month of inventory suggests home prices will be about 3% lower than they would otherwise be, 9 months down the road.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate an inventory threshold of 5.0 months, above which months of supply has a clearly negative relationship with year-over-year home price changes 9 months later, while below it the relationship is weak.
  2. Based on the model coefficients, the authors calculate that predicted home price change turns negative at 5.81 months of inventory, with each additional month above 5 months implying home prices about 3% lower 9 months ahead.
  3. The best-performing specification, a 9-month lag with a 5.0-month threshold, yields an adjusted R² of 0.75, indicating it explains a substantial share of the variation in home price growth.

Related Articles:

  • Inflation Adjusted House Prices 1.0% Below 2022 Peak — Inflation-adjusted US house prices are 1.0% below their 2022 peak. An affordability index built from median income, a 15% down payment, and 30-year fixed mortgage rates shows the monthly payment on the same house up 102% over four years, with prices up 34% and mortgage rates at 6.65%.
  • America’s Housing Affordability Crisis and the Decline of Housing Supply — Housing production intensity has fallen substantially, especially in fast-growing Sunbelt markets once known for building, converging toward the low rates long seen on the coasts and in declining industrial centers. The authors argue incumbent-controlled regulation explains the weakening link between high prices, high demand areas, and new construction.
  • The Price of Housing in the United States — Real housing price appreciation in the United States has varied widely across regions, with West Coast cities rising earlier while prices in other regions remained comparable in real terms to decades earlier. The authors find essentially no relationship between real price growth and zoning restrictiveness in the earliest period studied, and progressively steeper gradients in later periods.

AI Summary. Nondisabled, childless Medicaid recipients who report no work spend an average 4.2 hours a day, or about 125 hours a month, watching television and playing video games — more than 50% above the 80 monthly hours of work or community engagement proposed as a requirement. They average 22 minutes a day looking for work.

Kevin Corinth American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:

Kevin Corinth finds that childless, non-disabled, non-working adult Medicaid recipients aged 19–64 spend 14.4 hours a day sleeping and watching tv/video games, 3 hours more per day than their working peers.

How do nonworking Medicaid recipients without children spend their time?

Core argument: Medicaid recipients who do not report working spend 4.2 hours per day, or 125 hours per month, watching television and playing video games — more than 50% above the 80 hours of work or community engagement the reconciliation bill would require in at least some months.

For Medicaid recipients who do not report working, the most common activity after sleeping is watching television and playing video games. They spend 4.2 hours per day watching television and playing video games, or 125 hours during a 30-day month. That is more than 50% higher than the 80 hours they would be required to work or otherwise engage with the community during at least some months under the reconciliation bill. They spend on average 6.1 hours per day, or 184 hours per month on all socializing, relaxing and leisure activities (including television and video games). On the average day they spend about 0.36 hours (i.e., 22 minutes) looking for work, 4.0 hours doing housework and errands, and 0.47 hours (i.e., 28 minutes) caring for others. For Medicaid recipients who report working, the most common activity after sleeping is work. They work an average of 4.2 hours per day, or 126 hours per month, enough for the average working Medicaid recipient to comply with the community engagement requirement. Working Medicaid recipients spend a lower 2.7 hours per day watching television and playing video games, and a total of 4.5 hours on all socializing, relaxing and leisure activities.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Medicaid recipients who do not report working spend 4.2 hours per day, or 125 hours per month, watching television and playing video games — more than 50% above the 80 hours of work or community engagement the reconciliation bill would require in at least some months.
  2. Medicaid recipients who do not report working spend 6.1 hours per day, or 184 hours per month, on all socializing, relaxing and leisure activities, against 22 minutes per day looking for work, 4.0 hours on housework and errands, and 28 minutes caring for others.
  3. Medicaid recipients who report working average 4.2 hours of work per day, or 126 hours per month, enough for the average working recipient to comply with the community engagement requirement, and spend 2.7 hours per day on television and video games.

Related Articles:

  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • Government Benefit Programs Already Do A Lot To Help Low Income Families — For a two-adult, three-child family, existing taxes and government benefits bring take-home resources to about $58,000 with no earnings, $79,000 with $20,000 of earnings, and $90,000 with $80,000 of earnings plus $15,000 in employer health premiums. A $75,000 gap in earnings and work-related benefits narrows to $11,000 in take-home pay.
  • The Employment Effects of a Guaranteed Income: Experimental Evidence from Two U.S. States — In a randomized experiment, 1,000 low-income individuals received $1,000/month unconditionally for three years while a control group of 2,000 received $50/month, and the transfers reduced individual income excluding transfers by about $1,500/year. The authors find no significant effects on human capital investment and conclude the transfers produced a moderate labor supply reduction not offset by other productive activities.

AI Summary. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a Medicaid work-requirement policy would apply to about 18.5m people annually once fully implemented, reducing federal Medicaid coverage by roughly 5.2m adults in 2034. It projects the provision would increase the number of people without health insurance by 4.8m that year, as few of those disenrolled would obtain employment-based coverage.

Phillip Swagel Congressional Budget Office
Date Posted:

CBO estimates that of the 7.8mm Medicaid recipients who will lose coverage under the reconciliation bill, 60% (4.8mm) would lose coverage due to non-compliance with part-time work requirements.

How many people would Medicaid work requirements leave uninsured?

Core argument: CBO estimates that enacting section 44141 of H.R. 1, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, would increase the number of people without health insurance by 4.8 million in 2034.

CBO expects that about 18.5 million people would be subject to the requirement each year, once implemented fully in all states, although some would qualify for an exemption. In 2034, federal Medicaid coverage would decrease by about 5.2 million adults. Few of those disenrolled from Medicaid because of the policy would have access to and enroll in employment-based coverage and none would be eligible for the premium tax credit. CBO estimates that enacting section 44141 would increase the number of people without health insurance by 4.8 million in 2034.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CBO estimates that enacting section 44141 of H.R. 1, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, would increase the number of people without health insurance by 4.8 million in 2034.
  2. CBO projects that federal Medicaid coverage would decline by about 5.2 million adults in 2034, with about 18.5 million people subject to the requirement each year once it is fully implemented in all states.
  3. CBO expects that few people disenrolled from Medicaid because of the policy would have access to and enroll in employment-based coverage, and none would be eligible for the premium tax credit.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. The US Treasury Department announced an agreement with G-7 allies to exempt US companies from certain international minimum taxes under the OECD global tax framework. In exchange, the Treasury asked Congress to drop the proposed Section 899 retaliatory tax measure from the pending tax bill.

Daniel Flatley and Lauren Vella Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The Treasury Department announced a deal with G-7 allies that will exclude US companies from OECD Pillar 2 taxes in exchange for removing the Section 899 “revenge tax” proposal from President Donald Trump’s tax bill.

Can exempting US companies from global minimum taxes replace a retaliatory tax?

Core argument: The Treasury Department announced a deal with G-7 allies excluding US companies from some taxes imposed by other countries in exchange for dropping the Section 899 "revenge tax" from President Donald Trump's tax bill.

The Treasury Department announced a deal with G-7 allies that will exclude US companies from some taxes imposed by other countries in exchange for removing the Section 899 “revenge tax” proposal from President Donald Trump’s tax bill. “OECD Pillar 2 taxes will not apply to U.S. companies, and we will work cooperatively to implement this agreement across the OECD-G20 Inclusive Framework in coming weeks and months,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on social media Thursday. “Based on this progress and understanding, I have asked the Senate and House to remove the Section 899 protective measure from consideration in the One, Big, Beautiful Bill,” he added. The congressional tax committee chairs, Representative Jason Smith and Senator Mike Crapo, quickly responded that “at the request of Secretary Bessent and in light of this joint understanding to preserve U.S. tax sovereignty” they will remove “proposed tax code Section 899 from the One, Big, Beautiful Bill Act.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Treasury Department announced a deal with G-7 allies excluding US companies from some taxes imposed by other countries in exchange for dropping the Section 899 "revenge tax" from President Donald Trump's tax bill.
  2. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said OECD Pillar 2 taxes will not apply to US companies and that Treasury will work cooperatively to implement the agreement across the OECD-G20 Inclusive Framework.
  3. Representative Jason Smith and Senator Mike Crapo said they will remove proposed tax code Section 899 from the One, Big, Beautiful Bill Act at Bessent's request and in light of the joint understanding to preserve US tax sovereignty.

Related Articles:

  • Related: 899 — The Three Numbers Alarming the Bond Market — A provision in US legislation would let the Treasury impose a 5% tax surcharge, rising in stages to 20%, on the US investments of countries it identifies as levying "extraterritorial and discriminatory" taxes on American companies, such as the European Union's digital services tax. The chief financial effects would be a weaker dollar and foreign markets outperforming the US.
  • Obscure Tax Item in Trump’s Big Bill Alarms Wall Street and Are Foreigners Selling US Assets? — A proposed US tax provision, Section 899, would raise tax rates on individuals and companies from countries whose tax policies the US deems discriminatory, including those imposing digital services taxes on large technology firms. Analysts say the measure, which could raise rates on passive income such as interest and dividends, would further drive away foreign investors.
  • Are Foreigners Selling US Assets? — European and Japanese investors hold roughly 30% and 20% of their fixed income in foreign debt, versus under 10% for US investors, with US bonds making up about 15% of Eurozone and Japanese portfolios. Because foreign investors are less sticky than domestic ones, turmoil in US bond markets has greater potential to unsettle them.

AI Summary. Republican support in the 2024 presidential election rose among Hispanic voters (48%, up from 36% in 2020), Black voters (15% from 8%), Asian voters (40% from 30%), and naturalized citizens (47% from 38%). Men backed Trump by 12 points (55%-43%) after splitting closely in 2020, with gains concentrated among men under 50.

Hannah Hartig, Scott Keeter, Andrew Daniller and Ted Van Green Pew Research Center
Date Posted:

Immigrants, 9% of 2024 voters, slightly favored Harris over Trump (51% to 47%). In 2020, those voters favored Biden by 21pp. In 2020, Trump’s narrowly losing coalition was 86% white; 4 years later, Trump’s winning coalition was only 78% white.

Did Republican support rise among minority voters and men in 2024?

Core argument: Hispanic voters split 51% Harris to 48% Trump in 2024, a narrowing from 2020, when Biden beat Trump 61%-36% among that group.

Among Hispanic voters, Trump battled to near parity in 2024 (51% Harris, 48% Trump) after losing to Joe Biden 61%-36% in 2020. Trump won 15% of Black voters – up from 8% four years earlier. Trump also did better among Asian voters. While a majority of Asian voters (57%) backed Harris, 40% supported Trump. This was a narrower margin than Biden’s in 2020 (70% to 30%). Naturalized citizens – immigrants who hold U.S. citizenship – who voted in the election split their votes about evenly, with 51% voting for Harris and 47% for Trump. In 2020, naturalized citizens favored Biden by 21 percentage points: 59% to 38%. In 2024, naturalized citizens made up 9% of voters. Trump made gains among men – especially men under 50. Men favored Trump by 12 points (55%-43%) after being closely divided in 2020. In particular, men under 50 split their votes fairly evenly this year (49% Trump, 48% Harris). In 2020, this group backed Biden by 10 points (53% Biden, 43% Trump).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Hispanic voters split 51% Harris to 48% Trump in 2024, a narrowing from 2020, when Biden beat Trump 61%-36% among that group.
  2. Trump won 15% of Black voters in 2024, up from 8% in 2020, and 40% of Asian voters against Harris's 57%, a narrower margin than Biden's 70%-30% in 2020.
  3. Men favored Trump by 12 points (55%-43%) in 2024 after being closely divided in 2020, with men under 50 splitting 49% Trump to 48% Harris, compared with Biden's 53%-43% edge in 2020.

Related Articles:

  • What Happened In 2024 — Democratic two-way presidential support fell 3 points from 52% to 49% between the two most recent elections, with larger declines among overlapping demographic groups: 12 points among young Latinos, 16 among young Latino men, and 17 among young Latino men who vote irregularly.
  • Democrats Need to Face Why Trump Won — Among American voters over 30, the gender gap in presidential support has held at roughly 10%, but among those under 30 it has widened dramatically, with 18-year-old men 23 percentage points more likely than 18-year-old women to support Donald Trump. Similar divides are appearing in other countries.
  • How Donald Trump Has Remade America’s Political Landscape — An analysis of US county-level presidential voting found that Republicans increased their vote share in each of three consecutive elections in 1,433 counties, home to about 42.7m voting-age Americans, versus 57 counties for Democrats, home to roughly 8.1m. Overall, 2,678 counties shifted Republican by an average of 13.3 percentage points, against 435 shifting Democratic by 8.8 points.

AI Summary. The U.S. imprisonment rate stayed below 120 per 100,000 people from the end of World War II until the mid-1970s, then doubled by 1985 and grew about 8% a year, passing 1m prisoners in 1994 and peaking in 2009 — 18 years after violent crime peaked.

Keith Humphreys The Atlantic
Date Posted:

The US prison population was 1.6mm in 2009 and fell to 1.2mm at the end of 2023 as criminals who were arrested during the crime wave that peaked in 1991 die or are released. Because younger generations are not as violent, the stock of prisoners is declining.

Why did imprisonment keep rising long after violent crime peaked?

Core argument: From the end of World War II until the mid-1970s, the U.S. imprisonment rate never exceeded 120 per 100,000, but by 1985 it had doubled, with more than 200 in 100,000 Americans in a state or federal prison.

From the end of World War II until the mid-1970s, the proportion of Americans in prison each year never exceeded 120 per 100,000. But starting in the late 1960s, a multi-decade crime wave swelled in America. By 1985, the imprisonment rate had doubled from its historical norm, such that more than 200 in 100,000 Americans were in a state or federal prison. The number of people in prison increased an average of 8% a year for the next decade, breaching the 1 million mark in 1994 and continuing to grow until 2009. This had ramifications that were felt for years: Because most people who are released from prison return, the system has been stocked and restocked with the legacy of that American crime-and-punishment wave for a quarter century. The 2009 peak of U.S. imprisonment came 18 years after the 1991 peak in the violent-crime rate.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. From the end of World War II until the mid-1970s, the U.S. imprisonment rate never exceeded 120 per 100,000, but by 1985 it had doubled, with more than 200 in 100,000 Americans in a state or federal prison.
  2. The U.S. prison population grew an average of 8% a year for the decade after 1985, passing 1 million in 1994 and continuing to rise until its 2009 peak, 18 years after violent crime peaked in 1991.
  3. Because most people released from U.S. prisons return, the system has been stocked and restocked for a quarter century with the legacy of the American crime-and-punishment wave.

Related Articles:

  • Number of Young People Accused of Serious Crimes Surges in New York City — New York City Police Department figures show 4,858 major crimes with a minor accused or arrested in the most recent year, up 37% from 3,543 seven years earlier, with robberies and felony assaults continuing to rise. Police officials attribute the increase to a state law diverting most 16- and 17-year-old defendants from adult courts.
  • It’s Time to Talk About America’s Disorder Problem — A meta-analysis of 56 studies found that disorder policing consistently reduces crime, but that indiscriminate "aggressive order maintenance" arrests did not significantly reduce crime while problem-oriented strategies targeting specific sources of disorder often had sizable effects without spillovers. The authors note that a large share of disorder comes from a small number of people and places.
  • The Collapse of Broken-Windows Policing in New York City, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC, 2013–22 — Arrests for minor "broken-windows" offenses—counted as misdemeanors, violations, and infractions per 100,000 residents—fell 74% in New York, 77% in Washington, DC, and 81% in Los Angeles over the period studied, declining steadily in New York and Los Angeles.