Edward Conard

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  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
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  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
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Friday, June 20, 2025

US Trade Policies and the Activity of US Multinational Enterprises in the Euro Area

AI Summary. Euro area affiliates of US multinational companies account for over 5% of euro area value added and 2% of employment, with higher shares in Ireland. The European Central Bank estimates these affiliates were involved in almost 30% of the euro area goods surplus with the US and about 90% of its services deficit.

Lorenz Emter, Michael Fidora, Fausto Pastoris, Martin Schmitz, et al. European Central Bank
Date Posted:
June 20, 2025
Is Database:
Database

An ECB analysis finds Euro Area affiliates of US multinationals account for >5% of EA value added and are responsible for ~ 30% of the EA 2024 goods surplus vis-a-vis the US. Overall, the EA-US current account was ~ at par in 2024.

How much do US multinationals shape euro area trade balances?

Core argument: Euro area affiliates of US multinationals account for over 5% of euro area value added, gross operating surplus and purchases of goods and services, and 2% of persons employed, with substantially higher shares in Ireland.

Euro area [EA] affiliates of US multinational enterprises [MNEs] account for over 5% of euro area value added, gross operating surplus and purchases of goods and services, and 2% of persons employed, with substantially higher shares for Ireland. The euro area current account with the United States was nearly balanced in 2024, as the increasing surplus in goods trade was almost entirely offset by deficits in services trade and foreign direct investment income, with US MNEs contributing significantly to these components. ECB estimates suggest that almost 30% of the euro area goods surplus with the United States in 2024 involved trade by euro area affiliates of US MNEs, while these companies accounted for around 90% of the euro area deficit in services trade.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Euro area affiliates of US multinationals account for over 5% of euro area value added, gross operating surplus and purchases of goods and services, and 2% of persons employed, with substantially higher shares in Ireland.
  2. The euro area current account with the United States was nearly balanced in 2024, as a rising goods trade surplus was almost entirely offset by deficits in services trade and foreign direct investment income.
  3. ECB estimates suggest euro area affiliates of US multinationals were involved in almost 30% of the 2024 euro area goods surplus with the United States and accounted for around 90% of the euro area services trade deficit.

Related Articles:

  • The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
  • A Visualization of Europe’s Non-Bubbly Economy — The Draghi report notes that no European Union company with a market capitalization above €100bn was founded from scratch in the past fifty years, while all six US companies valued above €1tn were. The 13 EU companies founded in that period and worth at least $10bn total about $400bn, versus nearly $30tn for their US counterparts.
  • Message to President Trump: We (Europe) Take As Much From You (The US) As You Take From Us — The US trade deficit with the euro area in goods and services combined is about €57bn, under 0.2% of US GDP, and the euro area pays roughly €49bn more in investment income and wages to the US than it receives. Counting these flows, the euro area's current account with the US is effectively balanced.
  • Trade (not deficits)
  • GDP

Closing the Trade Deficit Would Barely Raise the Share of US Manufacturing Employment

AI Summary. The authors estimate that eliminating the US manufacturing trade deficit by shifting purchases from foreign to domestic goods would raise manufacturing's share of total US employment by just 1.7 percentage points, from 7.9% to 9.7%. Such gains would be far too small to significantly expand labor market opportunities for men without college degrees.

Robert Lawrence Peterson Institute for International Economics
Date Posted:
June 20, 2025
Is Database:
Database

The American manufacturing trade deficit in 2024 was $1.2T. Robert Lawrence estimates that closing it would increase the share of manufacturing employment from 7.9% to 9.7% an increase of 1.7pp.

How much would closing the trade deficit raise manufacturing employment?

Core argument: Eliminating the US manufacturing trade deficit by shifting purchases from foreign to domestic goods would raise manufacturing's share of total US employment by 1.7 percentage points, from 7.9% to 9.7%.

In 2024, total US value added in manufacturing was $2.913 trillion. Thus, the manufacturing value added in the trade deficit equaled 21.5% of US production. Had Americans maintained the same level of spending but met their demand with additional domestic production rather than through imports, manufacturing production would have been 21.5% larger. Even if the tariffs and other trade policies eliminate the US manufacturing trade deficit by switching US purchases from foreign to domestic goods, the share of manufacturing employment in total US employment would increase by just 1.7 percentage points, from 7.9 to 9.7%, and the share of workers in production occupations in US manufacturing would increase by just under 0.9 percentage point, from 3.85 to 4.7%. These results point to the dangers of exaggerating the gains that policies directed at closing the trade deficit are likely to induce. The US manufacturing trade deficit of $1.2 trillion is a large number, but it is a relatively small share of an economy with a GDP of $29.1 trillion in 2024. The changes in employment with balanced trade would be far too small to produce a labor market that significantly increases the opportunities for men without college degrees.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Eliminating the US manufacturing trade deficit by shifting purchases from foreign to domestic goods would raise manufacturing's share of total US employment by 1.7 percentage points, from 7.9% to 9.7%.
  2. The manufacturing value added embedded in the US trade deficit equaled 21.5% of US production in 2024, when total US manufacturing value added was $2.913 trillion, so meeting that demand domestically would have made manufacturing production 21.5% larger.
  3. The $1.2 trillion US manufacturing trade deficit is a relatively small share of a $29.1 trillion economy, and balanced trade would raise production occupations' share of US employment from 3.85% to 4.7%, too small to significantly expand opportunities for men without college degrees.

Related Articles:

  • A Note on Trade Deficits and Manufacturing — The U.S. manufactures trade deficit of about 4% of GDP, if eliminated, is estimated to raise manufacturing value-added by roughly 2.5 percentage points of GDP — about a quarter larger than the current 10% share — because manufacturers also buy many services. That would reverse only about 2.5 of the roughly 17-point fall in manufacturing's employment share since 1970.
  • China is Suffering its Own ‘China Shock’ — Academic analysis of 12 labour-intensive Chinese manufacturing industries estimates average employment fell about 14%, or nearly 4mn jobs, between 2011 and 2019, with textile roles down 40%; a further analysis of the same sectors found 3.4mn more jobs lost through 2023. Researchers argue industrial upgrading and automation are cutting demand for lower-skilled workers and depressing their wages.
  • The Mysterious Slowdown in U.S. Manufacturing Productivity — US manufacturing labor productivity growth slowed broadly after the Great Recession, with the four largest firms in each industry averaging –0.5% growth from 2010 to 2022 versus 3.7% from 1987 to 2007, and smaller follower firms showing an identical 4.2 percentage-point decline. The authors find the slowdown spans all industries and firm sizes.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Workforce

Why Cutting Federal Spending to Pre-Pandemic Levels Is So Hard

AI Summary. Trailing 12-month US federal spending is up $1.4tn in today's dollars, or 25%, since just before the pandemic. Interest payments, Social Security, Medicare and the "health" category (mainly Medicaid) account for 71% of that increase, and adding veterans benefits brings the share to 77%.

Justin Fox Bloomberg
Date Posted:
June 20, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Since February 2020, real Federal spending has risen 25%. Interest payments account for ⅓ of the increase; that spending along with increases in Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and veterans benefits account for 77% of the increase.

What drives the increase in federal spending since before the pandemic?

Core argument: Trailing 12-month U.S. federal spending has risen $1.4 trillion in today's dollars, or 25%, since February 2020, just before the pandemic.

Trailing 12-month federal spending is up by $1.4 trillion in today’s dollars, or 25%, since just before the pandemic in February 2020. One-third of the spending increase is interest payments, which have doubled in real terms because pandemic spending programs drove up the federal debt, and interest rates are higher. Another 23% comes from the country’s two giant social insurance programs for the elderly, Social Security and Medicare, where real spending has risen roughly in line with enrollment as more members of the gigantic baby boom generation, currently 60 to 79, have entered the years of eligibility. An additional 15% of the increase comes from the budget category labeled “health,” which is mainly Medicaid, the federal-state health insurance program for the poor, for which federal grants to the states have risen 25% in real terms since just before the pandemic, right in line with the overall federal spending increase. Interest, Social Security, Medicare and health together account for 71% of the spending increases. Add in veterans benefits and services, which are also mostly health care and are not slated for sharp cuts in current budget legislation, and that gets us up to 77%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Trailing 12-month U.S. federal spending has risen $1.4 trillion in today's dollars, or 25%, since February 2020, just before the pandemic.
  2. Interest payments account for one-third of the federal spending increase since February 2020, having doubled in real terms as pandemic spending programs drove up the federal debt and interest rates rose.
  3. Interest, Social Security, Medicare and "health" together make up 71% of the spending increase, rising to 77% once veterans benefits and services — mostly health care and not slated for sharp cuts in current budget legislation — are added.

Related Articles:

  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • Americans Are More Reliant Than Ever on Government Aid — Research from the Economic Innovation Group finds that in 1970, fewer than 1% of US counties drew at least 25% of personal income from government safety-net and social programs, compared with 53% of counties by 2022, a shift the group associates with population aging.
  • Welfare Is What’s Eating the Budget — The U.S. redistributes 29.4% of its gross domestic product through transfers and taxes, a larger share than any developed country except France at 30.1%. Counting transfers as income and taxes as income lost and adjusting for household size, average households in the bottom, second, and middle income fifths have roughly equal incomes despite large differences in work effort.
  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
  • Politics

All the Hollywood Action Is Happening Everywhere but Hollywood

AI Summary. Film production in Los Angeles benefits from network effects that keep top actors, directors, agents and studio executives clustered together, mirroring finance in New York and technology in Silicon Valley. In those industries a prosperous top coexists with a shrinking middle, as mid-tier jobs and hardware manufacturing move to cheaper locations.

Greg Ip Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
June 20, 2025

Middle-income jobs in the US’s leading sectors are migrating out of high-cost cities. Headcount at securities dealers in New York fell 21% btw 2008 and 2024, film production fell 16% in LA, and tech manufacturing fell 32% in Silicon Valley.

Do network effects keep industry elites clustered while middle-tier jobs relocate?

Core argument: Film production in Los Angeles benefits from network effects, since top actors, lawyers, agents, studio executives and directors must be co-located to work with one another.

​​Like finance in New York and tech in Silicon Valley, film in Los Angeles benefits from the economics of network effects. The top actors, lawyers, agents, studio executives and directors have to be here to work with each other. But New York and Silicon Valley are cautionary tales: in both, a prosperous top masks a shrinking middle. While Wall Street’s top executives, traders and investment bankers are still in New York, mid-tier jobs migrate to places with cheaper housing and lower taxes such as Denver, Miami and Dallas. The top tech firms such as Nvidia, Apple and HP are still in Silicon Valley, but they make their hardware elsewhere, predominantly Asia. Richly compensated actors, directors and studio executives will be fine. It’s the grips, camera operators, costume and set designers, makeup artists and editors, mostly middle-class, being squeezed between a shrinking pool of work and the high cost of living.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Film production in Los Angeles benefits from network effects, since top actors, lawyers, agents, studio executives and directors must be co-located to work with one another.
  2. New York finance and Silicon Valley tech show a prosperous top masking a shrinking middle, as Wall Street mid-tier jobs migrate to Denver, Miami and Dallas and top tech firms such as Nvidia, Apple and HP make hardware predominantly in Asia.
  3. Richly compensated actors, directors and studio executives will be fine, while mostly middle-class grips, camera operators, costume and set designers, makeup artists and editors are squeezed between a shrinking pool of work and the high cost of living.

Related Articles:

  • Housing and the American Worker — Wages net of housing costs were once substantially higher in high-density areas than low-density areas for workers both with and without college education, but over the past half-century that urban wage premium has persisted only for college-educated workers, not for those with a high school degree or less.
  • The Determinants Of Declining Internal Migration — A 10% increase in wages where people live is associated with 3.5% less migration, while a 10% increase in destination wages is associated with 7.8% more migration; a 10% rise in destination home prices is associated with 2.6% less migration. The authors find wage responses alone would have raised migration rates, but housing-related factors more than offset them.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • GDP
    • Housing
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income

Why Today’s Graduates Are Screwed

AI Summary. The unemployment rate for Americans aged 22 to 27 with at least a bachelor's degree is now consistently above the national average, a shift driven by graduates seeking work for the first time. Similar patterns appear in the European Union, Britain, Canada, and Japan, and among business-school graduates.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
June 20, 2025

In the US, recent college graduates have a higher unemployment rate than the overall average; the EU, UK, Canada and Japan are on a similar path.

Are new college graduates facing higher unemployment than the national average?

Core argument: Matthew Martin finds that for the first time in history, the unemployment rate of Americans aged 22–27 holding a bachelor's degree or more is consistently higher than the national average.

Matthew Martin has looked at Americans aged 22 to 27 with a bachelor’s degree or more. For the first time in history, their unemployment rate is now consistently higher than the national average. Recent graduates’ rising unemployment is driven by those who are looking for work for the first time. The trend is not just apparent in America. Across the European Union the unemployment rate of young folk with tertiary education is approaching the overall rate for the age group. Britain, Canada, Japan—all appear to be on a similar path. Even elite youngsters, such as MBA graduates, are suffering. In 2024, 80% of Stanford’s business-school graduates had a job three months after leaving, down from 91% in 2021.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Matthew Martin finds that for the first time in history, the unemployment rate of Americans aged 22–27 holding a bachelor's degree or more is consistently higher than the national average.
  2. Rising unemployment among recent American graduates is driven by those looking for work for the first time.
  3. Some 80% of Stanford's business-school graduates had a job three months after leaving in 2024, down from 91% in 2021, while across the European Union the unemployment rate of young people with tertiary education approaches the overall rate for their age group.

Related Articles:

  • Educated but Unemployed, a Rising Reality for College Grads — Recent college graduates aged 22–27 account for 12% of the 60 basis-point rise in US unemployment, more than twice their 5% share of the labor force. In computer and mathematical occupations, employment for that age group has fallen 8% since 2022 while older workers' employment grew 0.8%.
  • Technological Disruption in the Labor Market — The authors measure US labor market structure since 1880 and find 1990–2017 less disruptive than any earlier period, because past changes from general-purpose technologies like steam and electricity were so profound. They identify four recent signs of accelerating change, including a 50%+ rise in science and technology employment share since 2010.
  • Something Alarming Is Happening To The Job Market — Young college graduates have almost always had a lower unemployment rate than the overall labor force over the past four decades, but that gap recently hit an all-time low. One interpretation is that firms are replacing young workers with machines, though the surge in productivity growth such a shift would imply is hard to find in the data.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income

Million-Dollar Tax Bills Pile Up After Palm Beach Wealth Boom

AI Summary. Property-tax bills in Palm Beach County, Florida totaled $359m last year, a 75% increase from five years earlier, and county tax revenue topped $1.4bn in fiscal 2025. The county's proposed budget would raise employee pay by 6%, add up to 175 fire rescue positions, and lift culture and recreation funding to nearly $500m from $226m five years ago.

Anna Kaiser, Ann Choi, and Erin Hudson Bloomberg
Date Posted:
June 20, 2025

Home prices in Palm Beach have doubled since 2020 reaching a total market value of ~ $40B, according to data from Palm Beach County.

Does an influx of wealthy residents boost local government spending?

Core argument: Total property-tax bills in Palm Beach County reached $359 million last year, a 75% increase from 2018, in a state with no income tax.

Total property-tax bills in Palm Beach County reached $359 million last year, a 75% increase from 2018. In a state with no income tax, that has brought millions more for local government to spend on the island’s upkeep and public services — as well as to address the strains that come with an influx of residents. The county’s tax revenue for fiscal 2025 topped $1.4 billion, up from $951 billion in 2020. As more dollars roll in, the county is looking to increase its employees’ pay by 6% and add as many as 175 new fire rescue positions, according to its most recent proposed budget. It also boosted funding this year toward culture and recreation projects to nearly $500 million, up from $226 million five years ago.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Total property-tax bills in Palm Beach County reached $359 million last year, a 75% increase from 2018, in a state with no income tax.
  2. Palm Beach County's tax revenue for fiscal 2025 topped $1.4 billion, and its most recent proposed budget seeks a 6% employee pay increase and as many as 175 new fire rescue positions.
  3. Palm Beach County boosted funding for culture and recreation projects this year to nearly $500 million, up from $226 million five years ago.

Related Articles:

  • Income and Wealth Inequality in the United States: An Update Including the 2022 Wave — U.S. survey data show the top 1% held 35% of total wealth, down from a peak of 39% in 2016, a decline the authors attribute to strong housing price appreciation that disproportionately benefited middle-class households. Including the 400 wealthiest Americans, the top 1% share fell from 40.2% in 2016 to 36.9%.
  • How To Get Rich in 2025 — Academic estimates compiled by The Economist indicate inheritances, after falling over the 20th century, were worth about 10% of GDP on average by the end of the 2010s, with roughly $6tn inherited across the rich world in a year. Falling family sizes mean each inheritance is spread across fewer heirs.
  • A Preliminary Report on Taxing the Great Wealth Transfer: Revenue and Distributional Effects of Taxes on Estates, Inheritances, and Unrealized Capital Gains at Death — The authors argue that replacing the estate tax, paid by those who die, with an inheritance tax, paid by recipients, could raise more revenue and increase progressivity because it targets large individual transfers rather than estates divided among several family members. They also note unrealized capital gains held until death escape income tax entirely.
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce

Monday, June 23, 2025

Markets Shrug Off Iran

AI Summary. Military strikes in the Middle East left Brent global oil prices roughly unchanged, in contrast to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which severely disrupted global energy markets amid market fears that Russian supply would be taken off the market. Markets are inured to violence in the Middle East, raising the hurdle for severe market fallout.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:
June 23, 2025

In contrast to the March 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the US attack on Iran had “essentially no impact on global oil prices,” with prices settling at the previous week’s level.

Why have oil prices barely moved after Middle East military strikes?

Core argument: Brent crude prices sit roughly where they were last week, showing essentially no impact from this weekend's military strikes, according to a daily time series running from January 2020 to the present.

The chart shows a daily time series for the Brent global oil price from January 2020 through today. This weekend’s military strikes have had essentially no impact on global oil prices, which today are roughly where they were last week. This contrasts with February 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine. That shock severely disrupted global energy markets, because there was no playbook markets could follow. The risk of Russian oil supply being taken off [the] global market was high, at least in [the] markets’ eyes during those early weeks following the invasion. The sad truth is that the same does not hold true for the Middle East. Markets are inured to endless violence, which means that the hurdle for severe market fallout is higher.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Brent crude prices sit roughly where they were last week, showing essentially no impact from this weekend's military strikes, according to a daily time series running from January 2020 to the present.
  2. Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine severely disrupted global energy markets because markets had no playbook to follow and saw a high risk that Russian oil supply would be taken off the global market.
  3. Markets are inured to endless violence in the Middle East, which raises the hurdle for severe market fallout.

Related Articles:

  • Economic Growth Now Depends on Electricity, Not Oil — Average annual electricity load growth reached 3% and is projected to continue at that rate for five years, with utilities raising expected peak demand for 2029 by 12%, or 101 gigawatts, driven by data centers, new factories, electric vehicles, heat pumps, and hydrogen production.
  • In 2024, the United States Produced More Energy than Ever Before — U.S. total energy production reached a record of more than 103 quadrillion British thermal units, a 1% increase over the prior record, with natural gas, crude oil, natural gas plant liquids, biofuels, solar, and wind each setting domestic production records. Natural gas accounted for about 38% of total production and crude oil 27%.
  • A Spendthrift Saudi Arabia Can’t Finance the World Anymore — Saudi Arabia has become a net consumer of foreign capital rather than a provider, accumulating $142bn in foreign debt as heavy spending on economic transformation outpaces oil revenue, with its sovereign wealth fund scaling back some projects. Estimates put the oil price needed to balance its budget near $96 a barrel.
  • Energy
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

U.S. Primary Energy Production, Consumption, and Exports Increased In 2024

AI Summary. The United States produced more energy than it consumed, with primary energy production reaching a record 103.3 quadrillion British thermal units and consumption at 94.2 quadrillion, still below the 2007 peak of 99.0 quadrillion. Energy exports rose 4% to a record 30.9 quadrillion while imports held at 21.7 quadrillion, the largest net exports in records back to 1949.

Brett Marohl Energy Information Administration
Date Posted:
June 23, 2025

US primary energy production hit a record high in 2024, while consumption remained under the 2007 peak, driving record net exports which rose 4% y/y.

Is the United States producing record energy and net exports?

Core argument: U.S. primary energy production reached a record 103.3 quads in 2024, the third consecutive year production surpassed a previous record, exceeding domestic consumption of 94.2 quads.

The United States continued to produce more energy than it consumed in 2024. This surplus energy production helped energy exports grow to a record high 30.9 quadrillion British thermal units (quads) in 2024, up 4% from 2023. Energy imports stayed flat at 21.7 quads in 2024, meaning the United States exported 9.3 quads more energy than it imported, the highest net exports in our records, which date back to 1949. Energy consumption in the United States totaled 94.2 quads in 2024, remaining below the peak of 99.0 quads set in 2007. Primary energy production in the United States increased to a record 103.3 quads in 2024, the third consecutive year that production has surpassed a previous record.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. primary energy production reached a record 103.3 quads in 2024, the third consecutive year production surpassed a previous record, exceeding domestic consumption of 94.2 quads.
  2. U.S. energy exports grew to a record 30.9 quads in 2024, up 4% from 2023, while imports stayed flat at 21.7 quads, yielding net exports of 9.3 quads, the highest in records dating to 1949.
  3. U.S. energy consumption totaled 94.2 quads in 2024, remaining below the peak of 99.0 quads set in 2007.

Related Articles:

  • The New Joule Order — Ample physical capacity keeps inflation low and stable and allows lower interest rates, but when demand catches up to capacity constraints, better returns in the physical economy pull capital back to fund expansion, making a commodity super-cycle a capital-expenditure cycle. In real terms, total energy investment is below its level 15 years ago.
  • Heliocentrism — An energy use must be electrified before green grid electricity can decarbonize it, and while US grid decarbonization continues at a steady pace, the electricity share of final US energy consumption has grown little. Transmission line growth runs well below Department of Energy targets for 2030 and 2035, and transformer delivery times have stretched from 4–6 weeks to 2–3 years.
  • How Xi Sparked China’s Electricity Revolution — Electricity has risen to 30% of China's final energy use while plateauing near 22% in Europe and the US, supported by a decades-long grid expansion and upgrade program projected to cost as much as $800bn by 2030. Chinese grid investment is forecast to grow about 5% annually through 2030, faster than projected economic growth.
  • Energy
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

New York to Build One of First U.S. Nuclear-Power Plants in Generation

AI Summary. New York has directed its public electric utility to add at least 1 gigawatt of new nuclear generation, the first major new U.S. nuclear plant undertaken in more than 15 years. Only five new commercial reactors have come online in the U.S. since 1991, and nuclear capacity is down more than 4% from its 2012 peak.

Ryan Dezember and Jennifer Hiller Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
June 23, 2025

In an effort to take advantage of the Trump administration’s new nuclear regulatory regime, New York State is launching an effort to build a new nuclear-power facility. Only 5 new commercial reactors have come online in the U.S. since 1991.

Is the U.S. restarting construction of large nuclear power plants?

Core argument: New York Governor Kathy Hochul has directed the state's public electric utility to add at least 1 gigawatt of new nuclear generation — roughly enough to power about a million homes — to its aging reactor fleet.

New York intends to build a large nuclear-power facility, the first major new U.S. plant undertaken in more than 15 years and a big test of President Trump’s promise to expedite permitting for such projects. Kathy Hochul said in an interview that she has directed the state’s public electric utility to add at least 1 gigawatt of new nuclear-power generation to its aging fleet of reactors. A gigawatt is roughly enough to power about a million homes. Only five new commercial reactors have come online in the U.S. since 1991, which hasn’t been enough to offset plant retirements. Nuclear-generation capacity is down more than 4% from its 2012 peak.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. New York Governor Kathy Hochul has directed the state's public electric utility to add at least 1 gigawatt of new nuclear generation — roughly enough to power about a million homes — to its aging reactor fleet.
  2. The planned New York facility would be the first major new U.S. nuclear plant undertaken in more than 15 years and a test of President Trump's promise to expedite permitting for such projects.
  3. Only five new commercial reactors have come online in the U.S. since 1991, too few to offset plant retirements, leaving nuclear-generation capacity more than 4% below its 2012 peak.

Related Articles:

  • Plant Vogtle Unit 4 Begins Commercial Operation — The 1,114-megawatt Unit 4 reactor at Georgia's Plant Vogtle entered commercial operation, completing an 11-year expansion that brings the plant's capacity to nearly 5 gigawatts and makes it the largest US nuclear plant. No nuclear reactors are currently under construction in the United States, where nuclear supplies about 19% of electricity.
  • Three Mile Island’s Nuclear Plant to Reopen, Help Power Microsoft’s AI Centers — Constellation Energy will spend about $1.6bn to restart the undamaged reactor at Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island nuclear plant, which closed in 2019, and has signed a 20-year agreement to sell the power to Microsoft. The deal reflects the scale of round-the-clock carbon-free electricity sought for artificial intelligence data centers.
  • Nuclear Power Is Hard. A Climate-Minded Billionaire Wants to Make It Easier — Start-up TerraPower has begun building a sodium-cooled nuclear reactor designed to be smaller and cheaper than conventional water-cooled plants, with completion expected no earlier than 2030 and the design not yet approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The company says the reactors should ultimately generate electricity at half the cost of traditional nuclear plants.
  • Energy
  • Productivity
    • Investment

Illegal Population Down Since January

AI Summary. An analysis of the Current Population Survey finds the foreign-born population fell by 957,000 over a four-month period, with the labor force component down 601,000, one of the largest four-month declines in three decades. The decline was entirely among non-citizens, with non-citizens from Latin America arriving in 1980 or later down 1.07m.

Steven Camarota and Karen Zeigler Center for Immigration Studies
Date Posted:
June 23, 2025

An analysis of recent CPS data by the Center for Immigration Studies suggests that there were 14.8mm illegal immigrants in the US in May 2025, 1mm fewer than the Center’s January estimate.

How much has the foreign-born population declined in recent months?

Core argument: The total foreign-born population in the Current Population Survey declined by 957,000 from January to May 2025, one of the largest 4-month declines in the foreign-born in the last three decades, though not unprecedented.

An analysis of the Current Population Survey (CPS), shows a large decline in the foreign-born or immigrant population (legal and illegal) between January and May of this year. The decline was caused by a falloff in the number of non-citizens from Latin America who arrived in 1980 or later, a population that overlaps significantly with illegal immigrants. The number of foreign-born individuals in the labor force declined by 601,000 from January to May 2025. Our analysis of the raw data shows the total foreign-born population, both in and out of the labor force, declined 957,000 from January to May 2025. This is one of the largest declines over a 4-month period in the foreign-born in the last three decades, but it is not unprecedented. The decline was entirely among non-citizens. The number of naturalized U.S. citizens in the data did not fall from January to May of this year. In particular, non-citizens from Latin America who indicated they arrived in the United States in 1980 or later show a 1.07 million decrease from January to May of this year and a 1.45 million falloff since December 2024.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The total foreign-born population in the Current Population Survey declined by 957,000 from January to May 2025, one of the largest 4-month declines in the foreign-born in the last three decades, though not unprecedented.
  2. The foreign-born labor force fell by 601,000 from January to May 2025, and the overall decline came entirely among non-citizens, as the number of naturalized U.S. citizens in the data did not fall.
  3. Non-citizens from Latin America who reported arriving in 1980 or later, a group overlapping significantly with illegal immigrants, fell by 1.07 million from January to May 2025 and by 1.45 million since December 2024.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide — Current Population Survey estimates indicate America's foreign-born population surpassed 50m for the first time and exceeded 15% of the national population, above the prior peak of 14.8% recorded in 1890. Mass immigration during that earlier wave was associated in contemporary opinion with widening income and wealth gaps and depressed wages for less-skilled native-born men, and sweeping national restrictions followed.
  • Young Graduates Are Facing an Employment Crisis — Unemployment among 20–24 year-olds with at least a bachelor's degree averaged 6.6% over a 12-month period, up from 6% a year earlier, while the national rate stood around 4%. For 18–19 year-old high-school graduates with no college, unemployment averaged 14.5%, up from 13.3%.
  • Trump Struggles to Press Deportations Without Damaging the Economy — Goldman Sachs estimates, using census data, that immigrants living in the U.S. illegally make up about 4.4% of the U.S. workforce overall but far more in some industries: 19% of landscaping services, 17% of crop production, 16% of animal slaughtering and processing, and 13% of construction.
  • Immigration
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics

Like Great-Grandparent, Like Great-Grandchild? Multigenerational Mobility in American History

AI Summary. Using data on multiple ancestors, the authors estimate a small grandparent effect on children's status among white American families and conclude it largely reflects measurement error in the father's status rather than causal transmission. Including Black families raises estimated multigenerational status transmission, as racial economic gaps have converged more slowly than within-race family gaps.

Zachary Ward, Kasey Buckles and Joseph Price National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
June 23, 2025
Is Database:
Database

A 4-generation dataset linking 2.5+ mm adults to their ancestors finds that btw 1850 and 1940, a white American’s socioeconomic status was largely independent of his grandparent’s status after corrections for measurement error and father’s status.

A 4-generation dataset linking 2.5+ mm adults to their ancestors finds that btw 1850 and 1940, a white American’s...

Do grandparents' status influence children's outcomes beyond fathers' status?

Core argument: For white families, the total effect of all three ancestors on a child's status is 9% larger than the father's effect alone, indicating a small but meaningful grandparent effect.

When we predict a child’s status using [all three ancestors], we find a small but meaningful grandparent “effect.” For white families, the total ancestor effect is 9% larger than the father effect. Once we correct for transitory measurement error using repeated observations and IV, these effects shrink substantially, consistent with measurement error driving grandparent effects. With a noisy measure of the father, distant ancestors act as proxies for the father’s true status. If we improve the measurement of the father’s status with repeated observations, the proxies from the [previous generations] no longer provide predictive power. The small grandparent effect that remains for the white population results largely from measurement error that repeated observations do not fully correct, rather than from a causal effect. This “permanent error” occurs because even a complete income or occupational history does not fully capture a person’s productive capability. Including [both] Black [and White families] in our analysis increases the estimated strength of status transmission across multiple generations, as economic gaps between races have converged much more slowly than gaps across families within racial groups over the past 80 years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. For white families, the total effect of all three ancestors on a child's status is 9% larger than the father's effect alone, indicating a small but meaningful grandparent effect.
  2. Correcting for transitory measurement error with repeated observations and instrumental variables shrinks the estimated grandparent effects substantially, and once the father's status is measured with repeated observations, earlier generations provide no predictive power.
  3. Including both Black and white families raises the estimated strength of status transmission across multiple generations, as economic gaps between races have converged much more slowly than gaps across families within racial groups over the past 80 years.

Related Articles:

  • Intergenerational Mobility in American History: Accounting for Race and Measurement Error — Accounting for Black families, who historical studies routinely drop, and for measurement error in fathers' economic status can double estimates of intergenerational persistence in linked United States census data from 1850 to 1940. The author argues historical mobility was lower than previously estimated, implying greater equality of opportunity today than in the past.
  • The Gilded Age and Beyond: The Persistence of Elite Wealth in American History — The authors find that most extremely wealthy Americans fall out of the top tail within their lifetimes, and that grandparental wealth is associated with reaching the top 1% in a non-linear way. Still, over 90% of grandchildren of top 1% grandfathers did not reach that level.
  • The Inheritance Of Social Status: England, 1600 to 2022 — Using a genealogical database of 422,374 English people with rarer surnames, the authors find social status persists strongly even among distant relatives, with status correlations declining by a constant factor of 0.79 per step in the lineage across all status measures and eras studied. The authors argue this constancy suggests social interventions have modest effects.
  • Mobility/Assortative Mating
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

This Loophole Buried in Trump’s Bill Is Anything but Beautiful

AI Summary. U.S. tax law taxes global profits from intellectual property moved offshore at 10.5%, versus 21% on domestic profits, and American companies report roughly $350bn in annual profits in major corporate tax havens such as Ireland, Luxembourg and Singapore. Pharmaceutical companies shifted patents and manufacturing abroad, reporting nearly all income overseas and largely ceasing to pay domestic corporate tax.

Brad Setser New York Times
Date Posted:
June 23, 2025

A loophole in the TCJA allows American corporations to book ~$350B in profits in Ireland, Luxembourg and Singapore. Large American pharmaceutical manufacturers effectively pay no corporate taxes to the US government.

A loophole in the TCJA allows American corporations to book ~$350B in profits in Ireland, Luxembourg and Singapore. Large...

Does a lower tax rate on offshore intellectual property shift profits abroad?

Core argument: American companies report roughly $350 billion in annual profits in major centers of corporate tax avoidance including Ireland, Luxembourg and Singapore, an incentive traced to a provision of the U.S. tax code.

American companies now report earning about $350 billion in profits annually in the world’s major centers of corporate tax avoidance, which include Ireland, Luxembourg, Singapore and a handful of others. The incentive comes from this obscure corner of our tax code. It offers a far lower 10.5% tax rate for global profits if a global company moves the profits from its intellectual property offshore. The tax rate for domestic profits, in contrast, is 21%. The tax break was created by Republicans who were searching for a compromise that would stop companies from moving their headquarters overseas without fully ending tax competition and the associated pressure on U.S. corporate tax rates. That provision did stop the trend of companies moving their headquarters overseas. But it also didn’t take long for pharmaceutical companies to realize that they could cut their total tax bill in half by transferring their intellectual property (like, say, a patent for a new drug) to a subsidiary overseas. And to satisfy a different and equally obscure provision of the tax code, they needed to move their manufacturing as well. Soon, Big Pharma began reporting to the I.R.S. that it earned almost all of its income abroad. They have all but stopped paying domestic corporate taxes.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. American companies report roughly $350 billion in annual profits in major centers of corporate tax avoidance including Ireland, Luxembourg and Singapore, an incentive traced to a provision of the U.S. tax code.
  2. The provision taxes global profits from intellectual property moved offshore at 10.5%, versus 21% on domestic profits, and was created by Republicans seeking to stop companies from relocating their headquarters overseas without fully ending tax competition.
  3. Pharmaceutical companies cut their total tax bills in half by transferring intellectual property such as drug patents to overseas subsidiaries and moving manufacturing abroad to satisfy another tax code provision, and have all but stopped paying domestic corporate taxes.

Related Articles:

  • American Pharmaceutical Companies Still Aren’t Paying Tax in the U.S. — The six largest U.S. pharmaceutical companies by revenue reported a combined U.S. corporate income tax provision of zero or less for their profits, with only Eli Lilly setting aside a significant sum of roughly $1bn. The author attributes this to holding intellectual property offshore, producing patent-protected drugs offshore, and booking profits on U.S. sales offshore.
  • Big Pharma’s Big Tax Dodge — Six major US pharmaceutical firms reported $215bn in US sales versus $170bn abroad, yet attributed $90bn of their combined $100bn in profits to foreign operations and only $10bn to the US. That implies a 5% profit margin in the US and over 50% abroad.
  • Taxation
  • Fiscal Policy

Germany and Italy Pressed to Bring $245bn of Gold Home from US

AI Summary. Germany and Italy hold the world's second- and third-largest national gold reserves, at 3,352 and 2,452 tonnes respectively, and each stores more than a third of its bullion with the New York Federal Reserve as custodian. Both face pressure to bring roughly $245bn of that gold home.

Olaf Storbeck and Amy Kazmin Financial Times
Date Posted:
June 23, 2025

Germany and Italy, which hold the largest gold reserves after the US, are facing domestic pressure to repatriate the 1/3 of their respective reserves currently stored in the US, with a combined value of ~$245B.

Are European countries being pressed to repatriate gold stored in America?

Core argument: Germany and Italy hold the world's second- and third-largest national gold reserves after the US, at 3,352 tonnes and 2,452 tonnes respectively, according to World Gold Council data, and face pressure to repatriate $245bn of bullion from the US.

Germany and Italy hold the world’s second- and third-largest national gold reserves after the US, with reserves of 3,352 tonnes and 2,452 tonnes, respectively, according to World Gold Council data. Both rely heavily on the New York Federal Reserve in Manhattan as a custodian, each storing more than a third of their bullion in the US. Western European countries accumulated huge gold reserves during the economic boom in the two decades after the second World War, when they ran large trade surpluses with the US. Up to 1971, the dollar was converted into gold by the US central bank under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. Storing the precious metal across the Atlantic was also seen as a hedge against a potential war with the Soviet Union. France in the mid-1960s nonetheless moved most of its overseas gold reserves to Paris, after President Charles De Gaulle lost faith in the Bretton Woods system.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Germany and Italy hold the world's second- and third-largest national gold reserves after the US, at 3,352 tonnes and 2,452 tonnes respectively, according to World Gold Council data, and face pressure to repatriate $245bn of bullion from the US.
  2. Germany and Italy each store more than a third of their gold with the New York Federal Reserve in Manhattan, having accumulated large reserves in the two decades after the second World War when Western European countries ran large trade surpluses with the US.
  3. France moved most of its overseas gold reserves to Paris in the mid-1960s after President Charles De Gaulle lost faith in the Bretton Woods system, under which the US central bank converted dollars into gold up to 1971.

Related Articles:

  • Taking Stock: Dollar Assets, Gold, and Official Foreign Exchange Reserves — Gold accounts for about 10% of aggregate official foreign exchange reserves, roughly its level in the early 2000s. International Monetary Fund country data indicate most added official gold holdings came from a few central banks, with over half of reported accumulation from China and Russia and about a quarter from several emerging markets.
  • How Gold Became the World’s Refuge from Uncertainty — Gold prices reached a record intraday high in real terms, surpassing the prior 1980 peak, with roughly a 30% gain over the year. Central banks have bought more than 1,000 tonnes net annually for three years — record levels — led by emerging markets including China, India and Turkey as they scale back dollar exposure.
  • Gold Overtakes Euro as Global Reserve Asset, ECB Says — Gold has overtaken the euro as a global reserve asset, with central bank gold holdings reaching 36,000 tons, near the mid-1960s peak of 38,000 tons, helped by a 30% rise in the gold price. The European Central Bank finds countries geopolitically close to China and Russia accumulated gold more than others.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy


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