Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, June 18, 2025

AI Summary. The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.

Paul Kedrosky Applied Complexity
Date Posted:

Paul Kedrosky argues the American economy is undergoing a fundamental shift from > 3% mean annual real GDP growth to “life under two,” or below 2% annually. If maintained, this shift from “abundance” to “scarcity” will change American life.

How much does slower growth cost the economy over a decade?

Core argument: The author argues that 3% annual U.S. GDP growth rather than 2% would, over ten years, yield an economy $3.36 trillion larger, $3.7 trillion more in tax revenue, 6 million more jobs, and significantly higher real incomes.

The American economy is facing a quiet crackup that's behind much of the frustration and anger among its citizens. For decades, the United States averaged GDP growth rates above 3% annually. Today, 2% growth—or less—is more likely, now and in the near future. The difference between 3% and 2% annual growth is stark. At the higher rate, over ten years, you have: $3.36 trillion larger economy. $3.7 trillion more in tax revenue. 6 million more jobs. Significantly higher real incomes. The gap directly affects opportunities, wage growth, tax revenue, social services, health care, solvency, and optimism about the future. Growing quickly and being awash in income makes people optimistic about the future; the opposite does…the opposite. Americans built their self-image and expectations around decades of strong growth, trusting each generation would surpass the previous one. Sub-2% growth erodes this assurance, shifting psychology from abundance toward scarcity, and even zero-sum thinking. When people don't see abundance they stop sharing. And Americans have stopped sharing.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author argues that 3% annual U.S. GDP growth rather than 2% would, over ten years, yield an economy $3.36 trillion larger, $3.7 trillion more in tax revenue, 6 million more jobs, and significantly higher real incomes.
  2. The United States averaged GDP growth above 3% annually for decades, but the author holds that 2% growth or less is the more likely outcome now and in the near future.
  3. The author contends that sub-2% growth erodes Americans' expectation that each generation will surpass the last, shifting psychology from abundance toward scarcity and zero-sum thinking.

Related Articles:

  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
  • Is The Great Stagnation Actually Just a ‘So-So’ Stagnation? — Long-running U.S. tests show population average reading scores moved from 255 to 256 out of 500 and math from 266 to 271, despite educational attainment rising more than three years. The author argues that if added schooling has not raised productivity, measured total factor productivity growth has been understated, shrinking the apparent "Great Stagnation" by about a third.
  • Productivity During and Since the Pandemic — Total factor productivity growth since early 2021 has run only slightly above its 2010–19 average, suggesting the 2020 productivity surge reflected cyclical dynamics layered on a continuation of the slow pre-pandemic trend. Productivity has since grown somewhat faster than the authors' analysis predicted, but remains well below the 1995–2004 pace.

AI Summary. Monthly US border encounters rose to their highest levels on record under the Biden administration and have fallen to near zero under the second Trump administration, which leaned on Mexico, including by threatening tariffs. The author argues this shows the border is enforceable.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
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Robin Brooks argues the “unprecedented” immigration wave under Biden “collided with a segmented labor market that was leaving more and more people on the sidelines.” He implies the marginal native male worker is worse off due to increased competition.

Is the US border enforceable?

Core argument: Monthly border encounters since 2011 show the immigration wave under President Biden was unprecedented, with the chart marking the start of each administration back to President Obama.

The chart shows monthly [border] encounters back to 2011. It marks the start of every new administration back to President Obama. The immigration wave under President Biden was unprecedented. Some of this reflects pent-up demand, since the COVID pandemic sharply reduced immigration that had been on a rising track in the first Trump administration. Immigration has gone to near zero from February 2025, which the second Trump administration has achieved by leaning on Mexico (including by threatening tariffs). No matter which side of the immigration debate you’re on, this shows that the border is enforceable. The immigration wave under President Biden collided with a segmented labor market that - while it was healthy on the surface - was leaving more and more people on the sidelines.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Monthly border encounters since 2011 show the immigration wave under President Biden was unprecedented, with the chart marking the start of each administration back to President Obama.
  2. Border encounters have fallen to near zero from February 2025, which the second Trump administration achieved by leaning on Mexico, including by threatening tariffs, indicating that the border is enforceable.
  3. Part of the Biden-era wave reflects pent-up demand, since the COVID pandemic sharply reduced immigration that had been on a rising track in the first Trump administration, and that wave collided with a segmented labor market leaving more people on the sidelines.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide — Current Population Survey estimates indicate America's foreign-born population surpassed 50m for the first time and exceeded 15% of the national population, above the prior peak of 14.8% recorded in 1890. Mass immigration during that earlier wave was associated in contemporary opinion with widening income and wealth gaps and depressed wages for less-skilled native-born men, and sweeping national restrictions followed.
  • Trump Struggles to Press Deportations Without Damaging the Economy — Goldman Sachs estimates, using census data, that immigrants living in the U.S. illegally make up about 4.4% of the U.S. workforce overall but far more in some industries: 19% of landscaping services, 17% of crop production, 16% of animal slaughtering and processing, and 13% of construction.
  • Out of Work and On the Dole — Is Uncle Sam Contributing to Young Men’s Malaise? — The share of US men ages 25–40 not in the labor force rose from 5% in 1976 to 11% in 2024, with more than 1 in 4 not working full-time; the increase was 165% among less-educated men versus 79% among college graduates. Of those not in the labor force, 40% received cash or cash-equivalent government benefits.

AI Summary. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that H.R. 1, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, would increase federal deficits by $2.8tn over 2025-2034, with economic effects reducing the primary deficit by $85bn while higher interest rates add $441bn in interest costs. Real gross domestic product is projected to rise by an average of 0.5% over the period.

Phillip Swagel, Devrim Demirel, John McClelland, Chad Chirico, et al. Congressional Budget Office
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The CBO’s dynamic analysis of the reconciliation bill forecasts an increase in the deficit of $2.8T over 2025–2034; increased borrowing raises interest rates on the 10-year by a mean of 14bps and real GDP increases by .5% over that period.

How much would the tax and spending bill raise deficits?

Core argument: CBO estimates H.R. 1 would increase deficits by $2.8 trillion over 2025–2034 relative to its January 2025 baseline, after accounting for the bill's economic and budgetary effects.

Relative to CBO’s January 2025 baseline: the economic effects of H.R. 1 would decrease the primary deficit by $85 billion over the 2025-2034 period, primarily reflecting an increase in economic output. The bill would increase interest rates, which would boost interest payments on the baseline projection of federal debt by $441 billion. Accounting for those budgetary effects, CBO’s estimate is that H.R. 1 would increase deficits by $2.8 trillion over the 2025-2034 period. Real GDP would increase by an average of 0.5% over the period. [The bill] would have small positive effects on the level of TFP. On average over the period, the bill would increase the level of TFP by less than one-tenth of one percent. The changes in TFP growth would slightly increase average annual potential GDP growth over the entire 2025-2034 period. Several factors would have small positive effects on TFP growth, including the bill’s effects on domestic oil and gas production, physical infrastructure investment, investment in research and development, permitting requirements, and spectrum auctions. Other effects of the bill would have small negative effects on TFP growth, including changes in educational attainment and a reduction in the number of individuals working in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics that stems from changes in higher education and immigration policy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CBO estimates H.R. 1 would increase deficits by $2.8 trillion over 2025–2034 relative to its January 2025 baseline, after accounting for the bill's economic and budgetary effects.
  2. CBO estimates the bill's economic effects would reduce the primary deficit by $85 billion over 2025–2034, primarily reflecting higher economic output, while higher interest rates would add $441 billion to interest payments on baseline federal debt.

Related Articles:

  • Comparing Estimates of the House-Passed Reconciliation Bill — Four independent budget models produce broadly consistent projections for the House-passed reconciliation bill: roughly $4.0tn in tax cuts over ten years, partially offset by about $1.5tn in spending cuts. The models disagree on growth effects but agree the legislation would substantially widen future deficits even after accounting for growth.
  • US Fiscal Sustainability Once More — US federal interest payments were projected to rise from 18% of tax revenues to about 22% by 2034 under the Congressional Budget Office's prior baseline. The author estimates that if the yield curve stays at current levels and policy is unchanged, that ratio would exceed 25% by 2032 and approach 30% by 2035.
  • Rapidly Growing Treasury Supply Crowding Out Other Types of Credit Growth — Roughly half of all fixed income issuance coming to market over the past year has been US Treasuries, meaning investors must allocate a growing share of dollars to financing the government. The argument is that lower government debt would free up more funds for consumer borrowing and business investment.

AI Summary. The dollar has lost more than 10% of its value against the euro, pound and Swiss franc and is down against every major currency, a decline comparable in speed to 2010. It nonetheless remains stronger against most major currencies than it was in 2021.

Carter Johnson, Saleha Mohsin, and Ruth Carson Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The dollar is off >10% against the euro, pound, and Swiss franc since January. Paul Tudor Jones argues American fiscal expansion will lead to another 10% $ decline over the next 12 months.

Is the dollar's decline against major currencies as steep as it appears?

Core argument: The dollar has lost more than 10% of its value against the euro, pound and Swiss franc since Donald Trump took office, and is down against every major currency in the world.

Since Donald Trump took office, [the dollar] lost more than 10% of its value against the euro, pound and Swiss franc and is down against every single major currency in the world. The last time the dollar plunged this much, this fast was in 2010, when the Federal Reserve was frantically printing money to prop up the economy in the wake of the financial crisis. The dollar is still stronger today, when measured against most major currencies, than it was when Trump left office back in 2021.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The dollar has lost more than 10% of its value against the euro, pound and Swiss franc since Donald Trump took office, and is down against every major currency in the world.
  2. The last comparable rapid dollar plunge came in 2010, when the Federal Reserve was printing money to prop up the economy after the financial crisis.
  3. Measured against most major currencies, the dollar remains stronger than it was when Trump left office in 2021.

Related Articles:

  • The Dollar has Further to Fall — The author argues the dollar has considerably further to fall, noting Federal Reserve data show its real value nearly two standard deviations above its average since 1973, a level matched only twice before, each followed by depreciations of 25-30%. Financing the $1.1tn US current account deficit requires matching net capital inflows.
  • Why Is the Dollar Falling? — The dollar has fallen while the trade-weighted interest rate differential between the US and the rest of the G10 has remained stable, which the author attributes to equity flows as investors reverse bets on US "exceptionalism." The author argues this weakness is likely temporary and that the dollar remains in a multi-decade strengthening cycle.
  • Asia’s $7.5 Trillion Bet on US Assets Is Suddenly Unravelling — Asia's 11 largest economies have accumulated $7.5tn in US stocks and bonds, but their annual capital flows into the US fell to $68bn, equal to just 11% of their trade surpluses with the US. Their major currencies, including the yen and yuan, trade on average 57% below exchange rates adjusted for living-cost differences.

AI Summary. Germany's finance agency says the scarcity of German government bonds is over, with greater availability in the secondary market driven by the end of the European Central Bank's bond-buying programmes. German bond yields have moved above interest rate swaps of the same duration, a sign of market normalisation.

Ian Smith and Sam Fleming Financial Times
Date Posted:
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After years of near-zero yields, 10-year Bund yields are trading around 2.5% down from March’s 2.9%. The Bund market is “normalizing” with bond yields moving above interest rate swaps of the same duration.

Has the shortage of German government bonds ended?

Core argument: Tammo Diemer, the executive board member overseeing Germany's sovereign debt issuance, said the "scarcity of Bunds is definitely over," with only a number of securities still in short supply in the market.

Tammo Diemer, an executive board member at Germany’s finance agency who oversees its sovereign debt issuance, pointed to the increasing availability of German bonds in the secondary market following the end of quantitative easing. “Scarcity of Bunds is definitely over. There are only a number of securities where there is still shortness in the market.” The constitutional limit on Germany’s debt level has contributed to the country’s status as the Eurozone’s safest borrower and historically created a shortage of its debt that suppressed its borrowing costs. Bunds provide a benchmark against which other countries’ creditworthiness is viewed. The end to the European Central Bank’s bond-buying programmes, which had bought up huge amounts of Bunds and other government debt during previous crises, was a major driver of the greater availability, [Diemer] added. Underlining the normalisation in the market, Diemer pointed to German bond yields moving above interest rate swaps of the same duration, which happened for the first time last year as expectations mounted over debt brake reform.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Tammo Diemer, the executive board member overseeing Germany's sovereign debt issuance, said the "scarcity of Bunds is definitely over," with only a number of securities still in short supply in the market.
  2. Diemer identified the end of the European Central Bank's bond-buying programmes, which absorbed large amounts of Bunds and other government debt during previous crises, as a major driver of the greater availability of German bonds.
  3. Diemer pointed to German bond yields moving above interest rate swaps of the same duration, which occurred for the first time last year as expectations mounted over debt brake reform, as an indication of market normalisation.

Related Articles:

  • Germany’s Spending Push Drives Up Borrowing Costs Across Eurozone — Germany's planned defence spending has pushed 10-year German government bond yields close to 3%, lifting borrowing costs across the eurozone because German debt serves as the bloc's benchmark. Investors warn this intensifies pressure on heavily indebted economies; one simulation projects Italy's debt-to-GDP ratio reaching 153% and France's 122% by 2030 absent spending cuts or faster growth.
  • Global Market Views: Double Trouble for US Exceptionalism — Germany's post-election fiscal proposals mark a change in the country's likely fiscal impulse, prompting forecast upgrades of 0.2 percentage points to 0.2% German growth and 0.1 points to 0.8% Euro area growth. The shift reduces the risk of very weak Euro area growth and very low European Central Bank policy rates.
  • Germany Can Spend Almost €2tn Without Harming Growth, Economists Say — A poll of 28 eurozone economists estimated that Germany could raise its debt from 63% to 86% of GDP over a decade without repercussions for growth, implying about €1.9tn of fiscal space. The calculation assumes German nominal output grows 2% a year, from €4.3tn to €5.4tn.

Thursday, June 19, 2025

AI Summary. Foreign holdings of US Treasuries totaled $9.01tn, the second-highest on record and down $36bn from the prior month, with the decline mainly reflecting net sales of US notes and bonds by foreign private investors while official entities were net buyers of longer-term Treasuries. Japan remained the largest foreign holder at $1.13tn.

Chris Anstey and Ye Xie Bloomberg
Date Posted:
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Foreign holdings of Treasuries at $9.01T held close to a record high in April, down just $36B from March. Private selling accounted for all of the decline; official entities were net buyers.

Did foreign investors pull back from US Treasuries during April's market turmoil?

Core argument: Foreign holdings of US Treasuries totaled $9.01tn in April, the second-highest on record and down just $36bn from March, with the decline mainly reflecting net sales of US notes and bonds by foreign private investors.

Foreign holdings totaled $9.01 trillion in April, the second-highest figure on record and down just $36 billion from March. The drop mainly reflected net sales by foreign private investors of US notes and bonds. Official entities were net buyers of longer-term Treasuries. Japan, the biggest foreign holder of Treasuries, saw its holdings tick up by $3.7 billion in April, to $1.13 trillion. China, which in March slipped to become the No. 3 foreign holder, behind the UK, had $757 billion of Treasuries in April, down $8.2 billion from the previous month. Belgium, whose holdings include Chinese custodial accounts according to market analysts, went up by $8.9 billion, to $411 billion. The UK’s holdings climbed by $28.4 billion, to $807.7 billion. Holdings of the Cayman Islands — viewed as a popular domicile for leveraged investors such as hedge funds — dipped $7 billion. Canada’s holdings slide by $57.8 billion, to $368.4 billion. That still leaves it up from January’s level. Foreign investors were net sellers of long-term agency bonds – a category that includes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debt – and of equities, while they were net buyers of long-term corporate bonds.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Foreign holdings of US Treasuries totaled $9.01tn in April, the second-highest on record and down just $36bn from March, with the decline mainly reflecting net sales of US notes and bonds by foreign private investors.
  2. Japan remained the largest foreign holder with $1.13tn in April, up $3.7bn, while the UK climbed $28.4bn to $807.7bn and China, in third place, held $757bn, down $8.2bn.
  3. Foreign investors were net sellers of long-term agency bonds, a category including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debt, and of equities, while buying long-term corporate bonds; official entities were net buyers of longer-term Treasuries.

Related Articles:

  • Rapidly Growing Treasury Supply Crowding Out Other Types of Credit Growth — Roughly half of all fixed income issuance coming to market over the past year has been US Treasuries, meaning investors must allocate a growing share of dollars to financing the government. The argument is that lower government debt would free up more funds for consumer borrowing and business investment.
  • Are Foreigners Selling US Assets? — European and Japanese investors hold roughly 30% and 20% of their fixed income in foreign debt, versus under 10% for US investors, with US bonds making up about 15% of Eurozone and Japanese portfolios. Because foreign investors are less sticky than domestic ones, turmoil in US bond markets has greater potential to unsettle them.
  • US Fiscal Sustainability Once More — US federal interest payments were projected to rise from 18% of tax revenues to about 22% by 2034 under the Congressional Budget Office's prior baseline. The author estimates that if the yield curve stays at current levels and policy is unchanged, that ratio would exceed 25% by 2032 and approach 30% by 2035.

AI Summary. US corporate bond issuance has grown rapidly, retail investors are entering alongside traditional institutional buyers through bond mutual funds and exchange-traded funds, and trading is shifting toward electronic platforms that compete with the dealer-based model. Post-crisis capital and liquidity rules made banks less willing to hold large bond inventories, leaving unresolved who supplies liquidity when it is most needed.

Maureen O’Hara and Xing (Alex) Zhou Journal of Economic Perspectives
Date Posted:

Corporate bond trading has changed from “a relationship-based business to a more transaction-based [one],” reducing search costs in “normal times,” while replacing the broker dealers who held inventories needed to provide liquidity in times of stress.

How is the growing corporate bond market changing who provides liquidity?

Core argument: Primary issuance in the US corporate bond market has exploded, and retail investors are entering a market long dominated by institutional buyers such as insurance companies and pension funds, associated with rapid growth of bond mutual funds and exchange-traded funds.

The corporate bond market is changing rapidly. Primary issuance has exploded. The buyers in bond markets have long been dominated by institutional investors like insurance companies and pension funds, but retail investors are now entering the market in greater volume, [associated with the] rapid growth of bond mutual funds and exchange-traded funds. Trading is shifting to electronic markets, adding competition to the traditional dealer-based model. Prior to the 2008 global financial crisis, many dealers, particularly large banks, were ready to expand their balance sheets to accommodate customer bond trades. But the financial crisis revealed solvency and liquidity issues for many banks, [resulting in] reforms, including the US Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III international banking regulations, to raise bank capital requirements and increase liquidity. While these regulatory reforms arguably made banks safer and increased the resilience of the financial system, they also increased the cost of capital and restricted risk-taking in a way that made banks less willing to hold large inventories of corporate bonds. Few of the changes in the market address the problem of who is going to provide liquidity when it is particularly needed.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Primary issuance in the US corporate bond market has exploded, and retail investors are entering a market long dominated by institutional buyers such as insurance companies and pension funds, associated with rapid growth of bond mutual funds and exchange-traded funds.
  2. Post-crisis reforms including the US Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III raised bank capital and liquidity requirements, increasing banks' cost of capital and restricting risk-taking in a way that made them less willing to hold large corporate bond inventories.
  3. Corporate bond trading is shifting to electronic markets that add competition to the traditional dealer-based model, but few of the changes in the market address who will provide liquidity when it is particularly needed.

Related Articles:

  • The Growing Role of Private Credit: The Outlook for Corporate Finance — Banks provide a smaller share of corporate credit than before the financial crisis, with bank lending falling from about 27% of total non-financial corporate debt to about 20%.
  • The Secular Decline of Bank Balance Sheet Lending — Traditional bank balance sheet lending has declined as a share of credit intermediation, with credit increasingly channeled through arms-length transactions such as securitization. A structural model attributes falling lending shares to lower securitization costs, savers' behavior driving bank balance sheet size, and implicit bank costs and subsidies shaping balance sheet composition.
  • Who Buys Treasuries When the Fed Reduces its Holdings — Analysis of Federal Reserve balance sheet reduction finds that households and broker-dealers absorbed the additional supply of Treasury securities during the 2017–2019 episode, with household holdings correlated with hedge fund holdings. In the first year of the reduction begun in 2022, households purchased a large share while hedge funds did not, and insurance companies and foreign investors also increased holdings.

AI Summary. U.S. public companies have cut their white-collar workforces by a collective 3.5% over three years, with managers down 6.1% and executive-level roles down 4.6%, according to employment data-provider Live Data Technologies. About one in five S&P 500 companies employ fewer people than a decade ago, including firms whose sales have climbed.

Chip Cutter and Lauren Weber Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:

American public firms have reduced their white-collar workforce by 3.5% over the past three years; managers and executives were more impacted, falling 6.1% and 4.6%, respectively, over the period.

Are the largest U.S. companies shrinking their white-collar workforces?

Core argument: U.S. public companies cut their white-collar workforces by a collective 3.5% over the past three years, according to employment data-provider Live Data Technologies.

U.S. public companies have reduced their white-collar workforces by a collective 3.5% over the past three years, according to employment data-provider Live Data Technologies. Over the past decade, one in five companies in the S&P 500 have shrunk. In all, about one in five S&P 500 companies have fewer employees today in both offices and the field than a decade ago, and it isn’t all due to selling or spinning off some operations, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of public filings. That includes bellwether names such as Walmart, General Motors and Bank of America, whose sales have all climbed over that time. Managers have been an especially ripe target for cutting, though Live Data Technologies’s data show public companies have pared back their nonmanagerial ranks recently, too. The number of managers dropped 6.1% between May 2022 to May 2025. Executive-level roles fell 4.6%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. public companies cut their white-collar workforces by a collective 3.5% over the past three years, according to employment data-provider Live Data Technologies.
  2. The number of managers at public companies fell 6.1% between May 2022 and May 2025 and executive-level roles fell 4.6%, with nonmanagerial ranks also pared back recently, according to Live Data Technologies.
  3. About one in five S&P 500 companies employ fewer people in offices and the field than a decade ago, including Walmart, General Motors and Bank of America, whose sales all climbed, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of public filings.

Related Articles:

  • Technological Disruption in the Labor Market — The authors measure US labor market structure since 1880 and find 1990–2017 less disruptive than any earlier period, because past changes from general-purpose technologies like steam and electricity were so profound. They identify four recent signs of accelerating change, including a 50%+ rise in science and technology employment share since 2010.
  • Something Alarming Is Happening To The Job Market — Young college graduates have almost always had a lower unemployment rate than the overall labor force over the past four decades, but that gap recently hit an all-time low. One interpretation is that firms are replacing young workers with machines, though the surge in productivity growth such a shift would imply is hard to find in the data.
  • What’s Driving the Surge in U.S. Corporate Profits? — U.S. corporate profits reached $4tn, 2.3 percentage points higher as a share of national income than before the COVID-19 pandemic, an increase driven by domestic nonfinancial industries and offset mainly by declines in net interest and miscellaneous asset payments and in income of unincorporated businesses. Employee compensation's share edged down, and higher profits mostly went to shareholders through dividends.

AI Summary. Sudden jumps or accelerations in a time series most often reflect changes in how a phenomenon is measured—definitions, detection technology, reporting incentives, or data coverage—rather than real-world change. Examples include apparent rises in sepsis driven by billing incentives, Lyme disease cases driven by revised surveillance rules, and recorded natural disasters driven by satellite monitoring and cataloguing efforts.

Cremieux Cremieux Recueil
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Citing a number of examples from medicine and meteorology, @cremieuxrecueil argues that “hard-to-explain trend[s]” are often artifacts of shifts in measurement methodology resulting from institutional changes and, in some cases, economic incentives.

Do sudden breaks in data trends usually reflect measurement changes?

Core argument: Reported Lyme disease cases rose 70% in 2022 versus 2017–19 after surveillance methods changed, letting certain jurisdictions report on laboratory evidence alone without clinical confirmation.

When a time-series suddenly jumps, plummets, or accelerates, the likeliest cause is a shift in how the phenomenon is measured—its definition, detection technology, reporting incentives, or data coverage—rather than a real-world change in the phenomenon itself. One common example is “sepsis”. A stark rise in sepsis noticed in insurance claims was not supported when looking at the incidence recorded in electronic health records, deaths, or discharges to hospice. The purported ‘rise of sepsis’ was due to Medicare incentives to upcode patients and the adoption of other billing practices that raised the number of charts labeled “sepsis” without a parallel mortality rise. Similarly, did Lyme disease cases rise 70% in 2022 compared to 2017-19? No! Surveillance methods changed because they began allowing certain jurisdictions to start reporting based on laboratory test-based evidence alone, without the need for clinical confirmation. The frequently-touted 4 to 5-fold increase in natural disaster numbers over the past half-century has more to do with the adoption of satellite monitoring, improved communications technology, the spread of the Internet, and intentional and recent efforts to catalogue disasters.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Reported Lyme disease cases rose 70% in 2022 versus 2017–19 after surveillance methods changed, letting certain jurisdictions report on laboratory evidence alone without clinical confirmation.
  2. The apparent rise in sepsis seen in insurance claims was not reflected in electronic health records, deaths, or hospice discharges, and is attributed to Medicare incentives to upcode patients and billing practices that increased charts labeled "sepsis.".
  3. The often-cited 4- to 5-fold increase in natural disaster counts over the past half-century is attributed to satellite monitoring, improved communications technology, the spread of the Internet, and recent efforts to catalogue disasters.

Related Articles:

  • r-g before and after the Great Wars 1507-2023 — Historical reconstructions show the gap between long-term interest rates and trend growth across four major economies rose by an average 7 basis points a year over 1931-2023, reversing a 2.7bp annual decline over 1507-1931. The authors argue assumptions of favorable debt-sustainability dynamics are questionable, citing sharp historical reversals alongside surging wartime spending.
  • Rethinking Short-Term Real Interest Rates and Term Spreads Using Very Long-Run Data — Multi-century data on short-maturity real interest rates show consistent reversion toward a long-run trend, relatively fast adjustment, and few structural breaks, suggesting caution about claims of a break in short-term real rate behavior. The authors find term spreads secularly rising while inflation volatility trends downward, driven by faster declines in short-maturity yields.
  • Long-Run Trends In Long-Maturity Real Rates, 1311–2022 — Analyzing long-maturity real interest rates across eight advanced economies over seven centuries, the authors find rates are trend stationary with a persistent downward trend since the Renaissance. They argue demographic and productivity factors are not convincing drivers, finding population and output growth negatively predict real rates over long spans.

AI Summary. China accounts for 70-80% of global commercial drone supply and 79% of approved drone patents globally, according to industry analysts and a patent study. The Civil Aviation Administration of China projects the low-altitude economy, which includes flying cars, will grow fivefold to $490bn by 2035.

William Langley Financial Times
Date Posted:

China produces 70–80% of commercial drones and accounted for 79% of approved drone patents globally in 2024.

How dominant is China in commercial drone production and patents?

Core argument: China accounts for 70–80% of global commercial drone supply, according to Drone Industry Insights, and 79% of approved drone patents globally last year, according to a report by law firm Mathys & Squire.

China dominates the production of commercial drones, accounting for 70-80% of global supply, according to analytics provider Drone Industry Insights. The country also has a stranglehold on research and development, accounting for 79% of approved drone patents globally last year, according to a report by London-based law firm Mathys & Squire. DJI alone filed 64 patents among the 7,890 total. The Civil Aviation Administration of China expects the market size of the low-altitude economy, which includes other innovations such as flying cars, to grow fivefold to Rmb3.5tn ($490bn) by 2035. There were nearly 2.2mn drones registered with the CAAC at the end of last year, according to the latest available figures. About a third of the country’s industrial drones are used in agriculture or forestry, while more than a fifth are used for geographical surveys. The next biggest uses are patrols, security monitoring, firefighting and disaster relief, according to 2022 figures from analytics provider Guanyan Tianxia Data Center.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China accounts for 70–80% of global commercial drone supply, according to Drone Industry Insights, and 79% of approved drone patents globally last year, according to a report by law firm Mathys & Squire.
  2. The Civil Aviation Administration of China expects the low-altitude economy, which includes innovations such as flying cars, to grow fivefold to Rmb3.5tn ($490bn) by 2035, and nearly 2.2mn drones were registered with the agency at the end of last year.
  3. About a third of China's industrial drones are used in agriculture or forestry and more than a fifth in geographical surveys, followed by patrols, security monitoring, firefighting and disaster relief, according to 2022 figures from Guanyan Tianxia Data Center.

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