Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Tuesday, April 22, 2025

AI Summary. American workplaces are segregated by education, with workplace isolation particularly high for young and male workers without college degrees. The share of non-college coworkers around the average non-college worker fell from 0.787 to 0.767, but after adjusting for the rising national share of college-educated workers, relative isolation rose from 0.108 to 0.147.

Francis Dillon, Edward Glaeser and William Kerr National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

Over 2000-2020, exposure of non-college workers, particularly young males, to college-educated workers failed to keep pace with the overall increase in college graduation rates, limiting opportunities for on-the-job learning. @william_r_kerr

Are workers without college degrees increasingly isolated in their workplaces?

Core argument: The isolation index, measuring the share of non-college workers at the establishment of the average non-college worker, fell from 0.787 in 2000 to 0.767 in 2020, suggesting slightly less exposure to fellow non-college workers.

American workplaces show an educational segregation, measured by the degree to which the establishment has mostly workers of similar education levels. Workplace isolation was particularly high for young and male workers without college degrees. Table 1 considers the level of education and the workplace segregation by education over time. The first column shows the well-known fact that American workers are becoming more educated. Column 2 shows that the isolation index, [which] measures the share of non-college workers in the establishment of the average non-college worker,has declined from 0.787 in 2000 to 0.767 in 2020, suggesting that non-college workers are exposed to slightly fewer non-college workers than in the past. The third column reports an adjusted isolation index, which subtracts the total share of non-college workers in the LEHD sample from the basic isolation index and shows an increase over time from 0.108 to 0.147. Non-college workers are being exposed to more college educated workers over time, but the increase in exposure is less than what one might expect given the overall increase nationally in education levels.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The isolation index, measuring the share of non-college workers at the establishment of the average non-college worker, fell from 0.787 in 2000 to 0.767 in 2020, suggesting slightly less exposure to fellow non-college workers.
  2. An adjusted isolation index, which subtracts the total share of non-college workers in the LEHD sample, rose from 0.108 to 0.147, indicating non-college workers gained less exposure to college-educated coworkers than the national rise in education levels would suggest.
  3. Workplace isolation by education was particularly high for young and male workers without college degrees.

Related Articles:

  • They Used to Be Ahead in the American Economy. Now They’ve Fallen Behind — An analysis of census and American Community Survey microdata compares the average income of full-time workers in specific demographic groups and occupations with the national average for full-time workers, showing how each group's relative economic standing has shifted over the decades.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.
  • Bringing Home the Bacon: Have Trends in Men’s Pay Weakened the Traditional Family? — Using the 25th percentile of pretax earnings among married sole-breadwinner fathers aged 25–29 as a marriageability threshold, the author estimates the share of young single men earning below it moved from 63% to 58% over four decades. Using an earlier baseline year instead yields a larger change, from 72% to 57%.

AI Summary. U.S. corporate profits reached $4tn, 2.3 percentage points higher as a share of national income than before the COVID-19 pandemic, an increase driven by domestic nonfinancial industries and offset mainly by declines in net interest and miscellaneous asset payments and in income of unincorporated businesses. Employee compensation's share edged down, and higher profits mostly went to shareholders through dividends.

Ricardo Marto Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Date Posted:

Corporate profits averaged 13.9% of national income over the 2010-19 period, rising to 16.2% of national income as of the last quarter of 2024.

What is driving the rise in corporate profits' share of national income?

Core argument: The rise in corporate profits as a share of national income began in late 2020, mostly at the expense of net interest and miscellaneous payments on assets and proprietors' income, while employee compensation slipped from a 2010–19 average of 61.8% to 61.6%.

Corporate profits have been elevated since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. As of the last quarter of 2024, they were $4 trillion—2.3 percentage points higher as a fraction of national income than they were prior to the pandemic. The increase was entirely driven by domestic nonfinancial industries. The surge in corporate profits as a share of national income began in late 2020, mostly at the expense of a decline in net interest and miscellaneous payments on assets (interest paid less interest received and royalty payments) and proprietors’ income (income earned by unincorporated businesses). In contrast, employee compensation as a share of national income marginally decreased. It averaged 61.8% of national income over the 2010-19 period and was 61.6% in the last quarter of 2024. Notably, retail and wholesale trade, construction, manufacturing and health care experienced a marked increase in profitability. Higher corporate profits mostly went to rewarding shareholders via higher dividends.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The rise in corporate profits as a share of national income began in late 2020, mostly at the expense of net interest and miscellaneous payments on assets and proprietors' income, while employee compensation slipped from a 2010–19 average of 61.8% to 61.6%.
  2. Retail and wholesale trade, construction, manufacturing, and health care showed marked increases in profitability, and higher corporate profits mostly went to shareholders via higher dividends.

Related Articles:

  • Corporate Profits in the Aftermath of COVID-19 — Nonfinancial corporate profit margins—profits as a share of gross value added—rose to about 19% before easing to 15%, compared with about 13% before the pandemic. The authors attribute much of the increase to large direct government support for small and medium-sized U.S. businesses and to lower net interest expenses under accommodative monetary policy.
  • The Curious Incident of the Elevated Profit Margins — The US fiscal deficit averaged just under 3% of gross national product from 1950 to 2011 but 6.6% from 2012 to 2022, driven mainly by health and social security spending, a pattern that holds excluding pandemic years. Even assuming permanently elevated profit margins, US equity valuations imply low long-run returns.
  • The Trade War Will Pound Stocks — Efforts to cut U.S. trade deficits and escalate tensions with allies risk deterring foreign capital, and foreigners need only stop buying U.S. assets to hit prices, as China and Russia already have. Bridgewater estimates nonfinancial U.S. firms capture 39% of global profits though the U.S. is 15% of world output.

AI Summary. Despite shaken confidence in US assets, no alternative matches the depth and liquidity of the nearly $29tn Treasury market, with the dollar involved in about 90% of foreign-exchange trades and almost 60% of central bank reserves. The euro lacks the depth of debt instruments required of a reserve asset, and China's yuan is government-managed.

Saleha Mohsin and Carter Johnson Bloomberg
Date Posted:

Given the lack of alternatives to the dollar @EswarSPrasad argues any so-called regime shift away from the dollar “could well hit its limits soon.”

Is there a real alternative to the dollar and Treasury market?

Core argument: The dollar is involved in some 90% of foreign-exchange trades and accounts for almost 60% of central bank reserves, with no real competitor capable of filling any void it leaves.

However much the financial world’s faith in the US has been shaken, it’s short of immediate alternatives. European assets suddenly look somewhat more appealing, but nothing can match the depth and liquidity of the nearly-$29 trillion Treasury market. The dollar is involved in some 90% of foreign-exchange trades and accounts for almost 60% of central bank reserves. It has no real competitor capable of filling any void: The euro still lacks the depth of debt instruments required of a reserve asset and perhaps still the political ties across its 20-strong membership, and China’s yuan is managed by its government. For all these reasons, any so-called regime shift away from the dollar “could well hit its limits soon,” says Eswar Prasad, a professor at Cornell University and author of 2014's "The Dollar Trap." “Rebuilding institutions and foreign investors’ trust in them will be a long and arduous process, if and when it starts,” he says. “But the US certainly has the luxury of not having any serious rival to its financial markets and currency.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The dollar is involved in some 90% of foreign-exchange trades and accounts for almost 60% of central bank reserves, with no real competitor capable of filling any void it leaves.
  2. The nearly-$29 trillion Treasury market is unmatched in depth and liquidity, leaving investors short of immediate alternatives even as European assets look somewhat more appealing.
  3. Cornell University professor Eswar Prasad argues any regime shift away from the dollar "could well hit its limits soon," as the euro still lacks the depth of debt instruments required of a reserve asset and China's yuan is government-managed.

Related Articles:

  • Dollar Upheaval: This Time is Different — Standard interest-rate parity implies a 50 basis-point rise in U.S. long-term yields relative to European yields should appreciate the dollar about 5%, yet the dollar depreciated 3.6%, leaving an 8.6% gap. The authors argue investors have reduced their willingness to pay for the safety and liquidity of all dollar-denominated assets, not only U.S. Treasury securities.
  • Tariffs, the Dollar, and Equities: High-Frequency Evidence from the Liberation Day Announcement — Following a sweeping US tariff announcement, the dollar's effective exchange rate depreciated rather than appreciating as standard international macroeconomic models predict: all G10 currencies gained against the dollar while the most freely floating emerging market currencies gained less or fell. The authors read this as advanced economies rebalancing away from dollar assets.
  • Top Dollar — Foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets exceed American holdings abroad, making the United States a net debtor whose liabilities are denominated in dollars while its foreign assets are largely in other currencies. U.S. foreign liabilities grew from $30tn to over $51tn while U.S. foreign assets grew from $24tn to $33tn, tripling the net debtor position from $6tn.

AI Summary. Gold reached a record $3,500 a troy ounce as attacks by the US president on the Federal Reserve chair fueled concerns over the central bank's independence and the US economic outlook. The Japanese yen strengthened to ¥140 per dollar, the dollar index sat near a three-year low, and gold has climbed roughly 32% this year.

Arjun Neil Alim, Ian Smith and Emily Herbert Financial Times
Date Posted:

Gold hit a record $3,500 a troy ounce amid Trump’s attacks on Federal Reserve chair Jay Powell. So far this year, gold is up 32%.

Do threats to central bank independence push gold to record highs?

Core argument: Gold climbed as much as 2% to a record $3,500.05 a troy ounce, as Donald Trump's sustained attack on Fed chair Jay Powell added to fears over the central bank's independence and the US economic outlook.

Gold hit a record $3,500 a troy ounce for the first time on Tuesday, as Donald Trump’s sustained attack on US Federal Reserve chair Jay Powell added to fears over the central bank’s independence and the prospects for the world’s largest economy. In a rush to haven assets, gold climbed as much as 2% to $3,500.05, cementing its position as one of the biggest winners from Trump’s return to the White House. The Japanese yen strengthened to ¥140 per dollar for the first time since September, as the dollar index languished near a three-year low. Gold, which some investors rely on as a hedge against inflation, has surged around 32% this year. Investors poured at least $19bn into gold-backed exchange traded funds during the first quarter, according to Standard Chartered.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Gold climbed as much as 2% to a record $3,500.05 a troy ounce, as Donald Trump's sustained attack on Fed chair Jay Powell added to fears over the central bank's independence and the US economic outlook.
  2. Gold has surged around 32% this year, with investors pouring at least $19bn into gold-backed exchange traded funds during the first quarter, according to Standard Chartered.
  3. The Japanese yen strengthened to ¥140 per dollar for the first time since September, while the dollar index languished near a three-year low.

Related Articles:

  • Gold Breaks Through $3,000 as Trump Turbocharges Record Rally — Gold has risen above $3,000 an ounce, a 10-fold gain over the past quarter century that outpaces the roughly 4-fold rise in the S&P 500 index of US stocks. Anticipation of tariffs pushed US gold prices above international benchmarks, drawing more than 23m ounces worth about $70bn into New York's Comex depositories.
  • The Dollar and the Bond Market’s Ominous Message for Trump — JPMorgan Chase estimates Treasury yields rise a third of a percentage point for each $300bn decline in foreign official holdings of US Treasuries. Carlyle Group notes gold has strongly outperformed inflation-protected Treasuries, suggesting gold is now the world's preferred safe-haven asset as reserve managers grow more hesitant to add Treasury exposure.

AI Summary. The US defense industrial base has consolidated to five major suppliers with annual revenue above $10bn that collectively receive about 70% of defense contract value, with Lockheed Martin alone at 40%. The number of small suppliers to the Defense Department fell more than 40% over a decade, and nearly two-thirds of major defense programs have only a single bidder.

Foreign Affairs Michael Brown
Date Posted:

The “Peace Dividend” at the end of the Cold War resulted in fewer firms competing for defense work, with firms becoming increasingly specialized. Today ⅔ of major defense programs only have a single bidder.

How concentrated has the US defense industrial base become?

Core argument: Five defense firms, each with annual revenue above $10 billion, collectively receive about 70% of defense contracts by value, with Lockheed Martin alone receiving 40%, compared with more than 50 top defense suppliers at the Cold War's end.

At the end of the Cold War, there were more than 50 top defense suppliers. Today, a total of five firms hold significant shares in the defense market, each with annual revenue that exceeds $10 billion. Collectively, they receive about 70% of defense contracts (measured by contract value), with the largest supplier, Lockheed Martin, receiving 40%. Many of the smaller firms that supplied the Defense Department have gone out of business or pivoted away from the Pentagon: in just the last five years, the defense industrial base has lost 17,045 independent companies. The total number of small companies supplying the Defense Department declined by more than 40% over the last decade. Before the end of the Cold War, the government could shop for tactical missiles from 13 suppliers. In 2022, it could source from just three. The number of fixed-wing aircraft suppliers declined from eight to three, and the number of satellite suppliers fell from eight to four. The number of surface ship suppliers declined from eight to two. Nearly two-thirds of major defense programs have only a single bidder.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Five defense firms, each with annual revenue above $10 billion, collectively receive about 70% of defense contracts by value, with Lockheed Martin alone receiving 40%, compared with more than 50 top defense suppliers at the Cold War's end.
  2. The defense industrial base has lost 17,045 independent companies in the past five years, and the number of small companies supplying the Defense Department fell by more than 40% over the last decade.
  3. Tactical missile suppliers fell from 13 before the Cold War's end to three in 2022, fixed-wing aircraft suppliers from eight to three, satellite suppliers from eight to four, and surface ship suppliers from eight to two, with nearly two-thirds of major defense programs drawing a single bidder.

Related Articles:

  • Ship Wars — Shipyards tied to China's defense industrial base account for 15% of the country's active shipyards but 40% of commercial output by tonnage, with over 75% of their production built for firms outside China and Hong Kong. The authors argue these commercial revenues offset fixed costs and effectively subsidize China's naval expansion.
  • A US Drone Maker Tries to Take Back the Country’s Skies — US drone maker Skydio has produced 45,000 drones in total, while Chinese rival DJI likely makes that many every few weeks — a scale gap that matters because production costs fall predictably with cumulative output. The Pentagon's Defense Innovation Unit says that at attrition rates observed in Ukraine, the US military would exhaust its entire drone supply in five days.
  • Debt Has Always Been the Ruin of Great Powers. Is the U.S. Next? — Historical experience suggests that when a great power spends more on debt interest than on military capability for a sustained period, rivals are likely to challenge its position and domestic stability may suffer as governments fail to satisfy competing claims from the military, bondholders, taxpayers and welfare recipients. U.S. federal interest payments of $1.124tn exceeded defense spending of $1.107tn.

Wednesday, April 23, 2025

AI Summary. US artificial-intelligence-producing sectors' value added quadrupled from $278bn to $1.13tn in constant 2017 dollars between 2010 and 2023, raising their share of GDP from 2.4% to 3.5% while manufacturing's share fell 1.5 percentage points. The authors attribute the data-processing sector's productivity gains largely to elevated physical capital investment and complementary intermediate inputs, including energy.

IMF Staff International Monetary Fund
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

AI’s share of US GDP increased from 2.4pp in 2013 to 3.5pp in 2023. Data processing nearly doubled its share, while that of manufacturing declined by 1.5pp. Labor productivity in the AI sector, driven by CAPEX, grew 4x the rate of the economy as a whole.

How fast have AI-producing sectors grown as a share of GDP?

Core argument: US AI-producing sectors' value added quadrupled from $278 billion to $1.13 trillion in constant 2017 dollars between 2010 and 2023, growing much faster than private nonfarm and manufacturing value added.

In the US, AI-producing sectors’ value added quadrupled from $278 billion (in constant 2017 dollars) to $1.13 trillion between 2010 and 2023, a rate much faster than those for private nonfarm and manufacturing value added. As a result, these sectors’ share in total US GDP increased from 2.4% in 2013 to 3.5% in 2023, with the data-processing sector nearly doubling its share in the same period. Meanwhile, the share of manufacturing declined by 1.5 percentage points. This fast growth of AI-producing sectors was driven by remarkable gains in labor productivity, with value added per employee in the data-processing sector growing about four times faster than that in the whole economy over the past 10 years his productivity growth was largely the result of elevated investment in physical capital and the complementarity of intermediate inputs, contrary to what was the case in computer systems design, in which labor and total factor productivity contributed significantly to output growth. Hence, the high output per employee in data centers, compared with that in other sectors, is the result of rapid capital accumulation, which has increased energy consumption as an intermediate input.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US AI-producing sectors' value added quadrupled from $278 billion to $1.13 trillion in constant 2017 dollars between 2010 and 2023, growing much faster than private nonfarm and manufacturing value added.
  2. AI-producing sectors' share of US GDP rose from 2.4% in 2013 to 3.5% in 2023, with the data-processing sector nearly doubling its share while manufacturing's share fell by 1.5 percentage points.
  3. Value added per employee in the US data-processing sector grew about four times faster than in the whole economy over the past decade, a gain attributed to elevated investment in physical capital and the complementarity of intermediate inputs.

Related Articles:

  • A Severe Case of COVIDIA: Prognosis For An AI-Driven US Equity Market — Computing cycles move from infrastructure to platforms to applications, and NVIDIA data center revenues as a share of market-wide capital spending are projected to reach levels last seen at the 1969 mainframe peak and the dot-com boom. Large cloud providers spend more than twice as much training foundational models as running them for customers.
  • AI Frenzy Leads US Venture Capital to Biggest Splurge In Three Years — Large US venture rounds are concentrated in a few high-growth, well-known companies such as OpenAI and Anduril, while most start-ups cannot access similar capital. Industry researchers describe this as an untested departure from traditional venture investing, which backs very early companies on the expectation that one outsized winner covers portfolio losses.
  • Microsoft Pulls Back on Data Centers From Chicago to Jakarta — Microsoft has halted talks for or delayed data center projects in Indonesia, the UK, Australia, Illinois, North Dakota and Wisconsin. It is unclear how much of the pullback reflects expectations of weaker demand for artificial intelligence and cloud services versus construction constraints such as shortages of power and building materials.

AI Summary. Across countries in the World Bank Enterprise Survey, the share of entrepreneurs who are women rises and then falls with national income, an inverted U-shape that reverses the U-shaped link between female labor force participation and development. Female-owned firms are typically much smaller than male-owned firms and concentrated in low-skill industries.

Nava Ashraf, Alexia Delfino, Edward Glaeser and Irene Solmone National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

The 2006 World Bank Enterprise Survey shows the greatest prevalence of female entrepreneurship in middle-income countries, “where the returns to entrepreneurship are high enough to offset gender-based costs and both sexes typically form simple firms.”

How does women's share of entrepreneurship change as national income rises?

Core argument: In the World Bank Enterprise Survey, the share of entrepreneurs who are women rises and then falls with national income, an inverted U that reverses the known U-shaped relationship between female labor force participation and economic development.

In the World Bank Enterprise Survey, the share of entrepreneurs who are women first rises and then falls with national income, which reverses the well-known U-shaped relationship between female labor force participation and economic development. Women face the most level playing field in middle-income countries, where the returns to entrepreneurship are high enough to offset gender-based costs and both sexes typically form simple firms. Male-owned firms are typically much larger than female-owned firms, large firms yield far higher revenues per employee and female-owned firms are more usually in industries with low levels of skilled workers. Despite the entrepreneurship rate’s reversal of the U-shaped link between female labor-force-participation and economic development, female labor-force-participation and the entrepreneurship rate are highly correlated across countries. Even though middle income countries have the lowest LFP rates and the highest female entrepreneurship rates, the middle income countries with the highest LFP also have the higher levels of female entrepreneurship. The female entrepreneurship rate is also strongly associated with female education, weak kinship ties and Buddhism.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In the World Bank Enterprise Survey, the share of entrepreneurs who are women rises and then falls with national income, an inverted U that reverses the known U-shaped relationship between female labor force participation and economic development.
  2. Women face the most level playing field in middle-income countries, where returns to entrepreneurship are high enough to offset gender-based costs and entrepreneurs of both sexes typically form simple firms.
  3. Male-owned firms are typically much larger than female-owned firms, large firms yield far higher revenues per employee, and female-owned firms are more usually in industries with low levels of skilled workers.

Related Articles:

  • “ — Using Norwegian administrative data, the authors find that businesses owned by women experience a decline in profits after the owner becomes a parent, reaching 30% below baseline ten years after childbirth, while male-owned firms show little decline. The profit decline is most pronounced among highly capable entrepreneurs, majority owners, and women with working spouses.
  • Childbirth and Firm Performance: Evidence from Norwegian Entrepreneurs” — Using Norwegian administrative data, the authors find that businesses owned by women experience a decline in profits after the owner becomes a parent, reaching 30% below baseline ten years after childbirth, while male-owned firms show little decline. The profit decline is most pronounced among highly capable entrepreneurs, majority owners, and women with working spouses.
  • Immigration, Household Production, and Native Women’s Labor Market Outcomes: A Survey of a Global Phenomenon — A survey of existing research finds that migrant domestic workers have large positive effects on the labor supply of highly educated native women and on the gender pay gap in high-powered occupations. Low-skilled immigration to the US raised the probability that top-quartile-earning native women worked over 50 hours weekly by 1.8 percentage points.

AI Summary. US births rose 1% to more than 3.6m, according to provisional federal data, driven by a 5% increase among Asian women and a 4% gain among Hispanic women, while births fell for Black women and slipped among White women. The total fertility rate remained below the replacement level.

Alexandre Tanzi Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The total US fertility rate remained below the replacement rate last year. Births climbed 1% to 3.6mm year-over-year, driven by a 5% increase among Asian women and a 4% increase among Hispanic women. Births declined for Black and White women.

Are rising US births driven entirely by Hispanic and Asian mothers?

Core argument: US births rose 1% to more than 3.6 million last year after falling in 2023, driven entirely by a 5% increase among Asian women and a 4% gain among Hispanic women, per provisional CDC National Center for Health Statistics data.

The number of US births rose last year after falling in 2023, driven entirely by Hispanics and Asians, based on provisional data from the CDC’s National Center for Health Statistics. Births climbed 1% to more than 3.6 million, reflecting a 5% increase among Asian women and a 4% gain among Hispanics, according to data released Wednesday. Births declined for Black women and fell slightly among Whites. Despite the annual increase in births, the total fertility rate remained below the replacement pace — the level at which a given generation can exactly replace itself. By age, the trend of older women giving birth continued. Birth rates declined for females age 15-24, but increased for women in their 30s, particularly among women age 35–39.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US births rose 1% to more than 3.6 million last year after falling in 2023, driven entirely by a 5% increase among Asian women and a 4% gain among Hispanic women, per provisional CDC National Center for Health Statistics data.
  2. Births declined for Black women and fell slightly among White women, even as the overall US total increased, according to CDC data.
  3. The US total fertility rate remained below the replacement pace despite the annual rise in births, with birth rates falling for females age 15–24 and rising for women in their 30s, particularly ages 35–39.

Related Articles:

  • The Demographic Outlook: 2025 to 2055 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the U.S. population will grow from 350m to 372m over three decades, an average of 0.2% per year, less than a quarter of the 0.9% average annual rate from 1975 to 2024. Deaths are projected to exceed births beginning in 2033, with net immigration more than accounting for population growth thereafter.
  • Fifty Shades of Growth — Boom Belt" states combine high birth rates with low death rates, led by Utah at 13.2 births and 6.3 deaths per 1,000 residents for a natural increase of 6.9 per 1,000. Texas records about 12.7 births versus 9.1 deaths per 1,000, with roughly half its population growth from natural increase.
  • World Depopulation: Prospects and Implications — The US is projected to account for a growing share of the rich world's labor force, youth, and highly educated talent, with continuing population and labor force growth and only moderate aging through 2050. Its fertility, though below replacement, exceeds that of East Asian and nearly all European countries, and sustained legal immigration is essential to this demographic advantage.

AI Summary. An analysis estimates the wealthiest 0.00001% of U.S. households — 19 households — hold about 1.8% of total U.S. household wealth, or roughly $2.6tn, up from 0.1% four decades earlier when 11 households made up that group. The wealth growth of the richest Americans has far outpaced that of all other wealth groups.

Juliet Chung Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

According to JPM data, the number of US nominal billionaires rose 45% between 2021 and the end of 2024 to 1,990. A @gabriel_zucman analysis claims the top 19 US households control 1.81% of US wealth, up from .9% in 2000.

Has the wealth share of the richest households outgrown all other groups?

Core argument: The 19 richest U.S. households saw their share of total household wealth rise from 1.2% in 2023 to 1.8%, or about $2.6 trillion, by the end of 2024, the biggest one-year increase on record, according to Gabriel Zucman.

It took four decades for the top 0.00001% of Americans’ share of total U.S. household wealth to grow from 0.1% in 1982—when 11 households made up that rarefied group—to 1.2% in 2023, according to an analysis by Gabriel Zucman, an economist at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Paris School of Economics. In one year, by the end of 2024, the share of total U.S. household wealth for the modern 0.00001%—those 19 households—jumped to 1.8%, or about $2.6 trillion. That is the biggest one-year increase on record, according to Zucman. The average net worth of all groups has climbed since the third quarter of 1990 as the U.S. economy has grown. The growth in wealth of the richest Americans has far outpaced that of all other U.S. wealth groups. JPMorgan Chase’s private bank estimates U.S. billionaires numbered nearly 2,000 last year, up from about 1,400 in 2021.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The 19 richest U.S. households saw their share of total household wealth rise from 1.2% in 2023 to 1.8%, or about $2.6 trillion, by the end of 2024, the biggest one-year increase on record, according to Gabriel Zucman.
  2. Zucman's analysis finds the top 0.00001% of Americans held 0.1% of total U.S. household wealth in 1982, when the group comprised 11 households, reaching 1.2% by 2023.
  3. JPMorgan Chase's private bank estimates U.S. billionaires numbered nearly 2,000 last year, up from about 1,400 in 2021.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Germany's defense spending has risen almost 80% since 2020 to over €90bn, according to NATO estimates, offering hiring growth in a country where nearly 250,000 manufacturing jobs have disappeared since the pandemic began. Four major defense contractors added more than 16,500 employees over three years, a gain exceeding 40%, and plan roughly 12,000 more hires.

Patricia Nilsson Financial Times
Date Posted:

Germany’s historic rearmament marks an industrial shift for a country that has lost ~250,000 manufacturing jobs since the onset of the pandemic, adding at least 16,500 jobs in the defense sector since 2022, with at least 12,000 more planned by 2026.

Is defense spending offsetting Germany's manufacturing job losses?

Core argument: German defence spending has risen almost 80% since 2020 to over €90bn last year, according to Nato estimates, amid a rearmament push in a country that has lost nearly 250,000 manufacturing jobs since the onset of the pandemic.

Germany’s historic rearmament is now offering a rare glimmer of hope in a country where nearly a quarter of a million manufacturing jobs have disappeared since the onset of the pandemic. German defence spending has surged by almost 80% since 2020, reaching over €90bn last year, according to Nato estimates, and Berlin’s rearmament push is only set to intensify competition among arms makers for skilled labour. Rheinmetall, Diehl Defence, Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems and MBDA — four defence contractors with a large presence in Germany — have, over the past three years, together added more than 16,500 employees, an increase of more than 40%. They plan to hire roughly 12,000 more by 2026, they told the Financial Times.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. German defence spending has risen almost 80% since 2020 to over €90bn last year, according to Nato estimates, amid a rearmament push in a country that has lost nearly 250,000 manufacturing jobs since the onset of the pandemic.
  2. Rheinmetall, Diehl Defence, Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems and MBDA together added more than 16,500 employees over the past three years, an increase of more than 40%, and told the Financial Times they plan to hire roughly 12,000 more by 2026.
  3. Berlin's rearmament push is set to intensify competition among arms makers for skilled labour in Germany.

Related Articles:

  • German Army Struggles to Get Gen Z Recruits ‘Ready for War’ — Germany's armed forces commissioner warned the country is not moving closer to its target of 203,000 active troops by 2031, as the military slightly shrank amid high dropout rates, with a quarter of new recruits leaving within six months. Conscientious objector applications reached 2,998, up from 200 in 2021.
  • Germany’s Spending Push Drives Up Borrowing Costs Across Eurozone — Germany's planned defence spending has pushed 10-year German government bond yields close to 3%, lifting borrowing costs across the eurozone because German debt serves as the bloc's benchmark. Investors warn this intensifies pressure on heavily indebted economies; one simulation projects Italy's debt-to-GDP ratio reaching 153% and France's 122% by 2030 absent spending cuts or faster growth.
  • The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers — The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.