Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Monday, March 17, 2025

AI Summary. The authors define "good jobs" as those in industries paying a wage premium and find spatial convergence across US local labor markets: areas initially less specialized in good-job industries saw larger increases in that specialization. This convergence was most consequential for Black, Hispanic, and foreign-born workers, who were overrepresented in fast-converging Southern and Western cities.

Gordon Hanson and Enrico Moretti University of California
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“Good jobs” in industries that pay wage premiums became increasingly dispersed across US commuting zones over 1980-2021, find Hanson and Moretti, moving towards the South and the West, particularly benefiting Blacks, Hispanics, and immigrants.

Has the geography of high-paying jobs converged across US local labor markets?

Core argument: Between 1980 and 2021, U.S. commuting zones that were initially less specialized in "good jobs" — industries paying a positive wage premium after accounting for individual and regional characteristics — saw larger gains in such specialization, a pattern of spatial convergence.

[We define “good jobs” as those] in industries that pay a positive wage premium relative to other sectors, accounting for individual and regional characteristics. The evolution of CZ [Commuting Zone] specialization in good jobs presents a clear picture of spatial convergence: between 1980 and 2021, specialization in good jobs increased by more in CZs that were initially less specialized in good job industries. Spatial convergence in the specialization of good jobs was most consequential for Black, Hispanic, and foreign-born workers. Relative to the national average, these groups were overrepresented in Southern and Western cities that have experienced some of the fastest rates of convergence in good job specialization. As a consequence, the parts of the US that are rich in good jobs today look vastly different than those in 1980: they are more centered around human-capital-intensive tradable services, are surrounded by larger concentrations of low-wage, non-tradable service industries, and are more demographically diverse.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Between 1980 and 2021, U.S. commuting zones that were initially less specialized in "good jobs" — industries paying a positive wage premium after accounting for individual and regional characteristics — saw larger gains in such specialization, a pattern of spatial convergence.
  2. Spatial convergence in good-job specialization was most consequential for Black, Hispanic, and foreign-born workers, who were overrepresented relative to the national average in Southern and Western cities with some of the fastest convergence rates.
  3. The U.S. areas rich in good jobs today are centered more on human-capital-intensive tradable services, surrounded by larger concentrations of low-wage non-tradable service industries, and more demographically diverse than in 1980.

Related Articles:

  • The World’s Rust Belts: The Heterogeneous Effects of Deindustrialization on 1,993 Cities in Six Countries — A study of 1,993 cities in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US finds former manufacturing hubs lost employment on average after each country's manufacturing peak, though a large share fully recovered. After the peak, hubs with a higher initial share of college-educated workers grew significantly faster.
  • Places versus People: The Ins and Outs of Labor Market Adjustment to Globalization — Analysis of U.S. register data finds that employment levels in places exposed to Chinese import competition more than fully rebound, while employment-to-population ratios stay depressed and manufacturing employment continues to shrink. The authors find the recovery comes almost entirely from young adults and foreign-born immigrants taking first jobs in lower-wage service sectors, with both in- and out-migration remaining depressed.
  • Manufacturing Jobs Boom Not Reaching Places Hit By The China Shock — U.S. manufacturing job growth since the pandemic is occurring disproportionately in counties least exposed to Chinese import competition in the 2000s, according to an analysis of federal employment and wage data. The counties hardest hit by that import competition still have fewer manufacturing jobs than before the pandemic.

AI Summary. U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions of people crossing the southern border illegally have fallen to about 8,300 a month, down from a record of more than 225,000 in a single month. Crossings through the Darién Gap, the land bridge between South and Central America, fell to 408 from more than 37,000 a year earlier.

Simon Romero and Paulina Villegas New York Times
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February apprehensions at the southern border were down over 80% from December to 8,347, as the Trump administration’s new border policy came into effect. If the current trend holds, apprehensions could fall to levels unseen since ~ 1967.

Have hard-line enforcement tactics sharply reduced illegal border crossings?

Core argument: Adam Isacson of the Washington Office on Latin America says that if February's pace holds for a full year, U.S. migrant apprehensions could fall to levels unseen since around 1967.

In February, the U.S. Border Patrol said it had apprehended 8,347 people trying to illegally cross the border, down from a record high of more than 225,000 apprehensions in December 2023. Those numbers had already been dropping sharply since the Biden administration unveiled its immigration restrictions last year. In December, the final full month Mr. Biden was in office, the Border Patrol apprehended 47,330 migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border. If that trend holds for a full year, migrant apprehensions in the United States could fall to levels unseen since around 1967, according to Adam Isacson, a migration expert at the Washington Office on Latin America. There are signs that figures are plummeting farther south in the region, too. The number of people trying to reach the United States through the Darién Gap — the forbidding land bridge connecting South America and Central America that is a barometer of future pressure at the U.S.-Mexico border — dropped to 408 in February, down from more than 37,000 in the same month last year, according to Panama’s Immigration Institute.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Adam Isacson of the Washington Office on Latin America says that if February's pace holds for a full year, U.S. migrant apprehensions could fall to levels unseen since around 1967.
  2. Crossings of the Darién Gap, the land bridge between South America and Central America that serves as a barometer of future pressure at the U.S.-Mexico border, fell to 408 in February from more than 37,000 a year earlier, according to Panama's Immigration Institute.
  3. The U.S. Border Patrol apprehended 8,347 people crossing the border illegally in February, down from 47,330 in December, Mr. Biden's final full month in office, and a record of more than 225,000 in December 2023.

Related Articles:

  • Recent Immigration Surge Has Been Largest in U.S. History — An analysis of government data finds the recent U.S. immigration surge is the largest on record, with net migration averaging 2.4m people a year from 2021 to 2023 and the foreign-born share of the population reaching 15.2% in 2023, up from 13.6% in 2020. About 60% of immigrants arriving since 2021 entered without legal authorization.
  • The Demographic Outlook: 2024 to 2054 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the US population will grow from 342mm in 2024 to 383mm in 2054, an average 0.4% a year — less than half the 0.9% pace of the prior five decades. Immigration accounts for about 70% of growth over the next decade and for all population growth beginning in 2040.
  • Two New Estimates of the Fiscal Impact of Immigration — Estimates of immigrants' fiscal impact depend heavily on the assumptions used: the lifetime fiscal impact of a 22-year-old high school dropout shifts from negative $315,000 under one set of assumptions to a small negative number under another. The author argues the accounting approach common in this literature understates immigrants' contribution to fiscal sustainability.

AI Summary. University of Michigan survey data show consumer sentiment declining for households earning both above and below $100,000, with job-loss worries at levels typically seen in recessions and a record-high share of consumers saying business conditions are worsening. Income expectations are falling while inflation expectations are rising rapidly.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
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The March Michigan Survey of Consumers shows both consumer sentiment and employment expectations deteriorating “at an alarming rate.” Torsten Sløk notes, “Consumer worries about losing their jobs are at levels normally seen during recessions.”

Is consumer sentiment declining rapidly across income levels?

Core argument: The University of Michigan's March consumer sentiment survey shows sentiment declining rapidly among households earning both above and below $100,000, with a record-high share of consumers saying business conditions are worsening.

The March survey of consumer sentiment from the University of Michigan shows the following: Consumer sentiment is declining rapidly both for households making more than $100,000 and less than $100,000. Consumer worries about losing their jobs are at levels normally seen during recessions. A record-high share of consumers think business conditions are worsening. Households’ income expectations are declining. Inflation expectations are rising at an unprecedented speed. The bottom line is that consumer sentiment is deteriorating at an alarming rate.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The University of Michigan's March consumer sentiment survey shows sentiment declining rapidly among households earning both above and below $100,000, with a record-high share of consumers saying business conditions are worsening.
  2. Consumer worries about job loss in the March University of Michigan survey stand at levels normally seen during recessions, while households' income expectations are declining.
  3. Inflation expectations in the March University of Michigan survey are rising at an unprecedented speed, part of a broader deterioration in consumer sentiment.

Related Articles:

  • How Do Electoral Votes, Presidential Approval, and Consumer Sentiment Respond to Economic Indicators? — The authors estimate that unemployment, current inflation, and a set of noneconomic factors explain much of the variation in US presidential approval ratings since 1956, with the economic indicators' combined contribution almost always negative. Once noneconomic effects are included, the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index loses its advantage over the economic variables.
  • The Cost of Money is Part of the Cost of Living: New Evidence on the Consumer Sentiment Anomaly — Variation in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index that inflation and unemployment cannot explain is strongly correlated with growth in consumer borrowing costs, such as mortgage and car loan rates. The authors estimate that including interest payments and homeownership costs in the consumer price index would raise measured inflation from 3% to 9%.
  • It’s No Longer The Economy, Stupid — The long-standing link between economic sentiment and government popularity has disappeared in the US while remaining strong in France and Germany and, to a lesser degree, the UK. The author attributes this decoupling to hyper-partisanship, arguing that American voters' political allegiances now shape their economic perceptions rather than the reverse.

AI Summary. European leaders are debating raising defence spending to 3.5% of GDP or more, a level not seen in continental Europe since the late 1960s. Sustaining that share from 1995 to 2023 would have required an extra $387bn a year across EU member states and $35bn a year for the UK, according to Financial Times calculations.

Valentina Romei, Sam Fleming, and Alan Smith Financial Times
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Raising EU defense spending to 3.5% of GDP from 1995-2023 “would have required EU member states to allocate an extra $387B/year.” Defense increases will likely require cuts in social protection, which rose from 36.6% of EU GDP in 1995 to 41.4% in 2020.

What would higher defense spending have cost Europe annually?

Core argument: European leaders are debating defence spending of as much as 3.5% of GDP or higher over the coming decade, a level not seen in continental Europe since the late 1960s.

European leaders are openly debating lifting spending to as much as 3.5% of GDP or higher in the coming decade, a level not seen in continental Europe since the late 1960s. Spending at this level between 1995 and 2023 would have required EU member states to allocate an extra $387bn a year to defence, according to FT calculations based on 2020 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars. The uplift for the UK, which spent 2.3% of GDP on defence in 2023, would have been $35bn per year over the same period — roughly equivalent to annual public spending on housing and local amenities. Across the EU, social protection has grown as a share of total government spending, rising from 36.6% in 1995 to 41.4% on the eve of the pandemic, according to Eurostat.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. European leaders are debating defence spending of as much as 3.5% of GDP or higher over the coming decade, a level not seen in continental Europe since the late 1960s.
  2. Spending at 3.5% of GDP between 1995 and 2023 would have required EU member states to allocate an extra $387bn a year to defence, according to FT calculations in 2020 PPP dollars.
  3. The UK, which spent 2.3% of GDP on defence in 2023, would have needed an additional $35bn a year between 1995 and 2023, roughly equivalent to annual public spending on housing and local amenities, according to FT calculations.

Related Articles:

  • German Borrowing Costs Soar By Most Since 1997 on ‘Historic’ Debt Deal — Germany's incoming governing partners agreed to exempt defense spending above 1% of GDP from the constitutional borrowing limit, create a €500bn off-budget vehicle for debt-funded infrastructure, and loosen borrowing rules for states. Goldman Sachs estimated the package could lift German growth to as much as 2%, versus its 0.8% forecast, if approved and implemented quickly.
  • What Military Catch-Up? — Years of European defence underspending have created a stock problem—depleted weapons, hardware, and technology, plus gaps in operational capacity, full-spectrum battlefield capability, and personnel—that higher spending can only fill slowly. Europe's cumulative shortfall against NATO's 2% of GDP target is about €850bn, and exceeds €2,650bn measured against US spending near 3.5% of GDP.
  • The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers — The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.

AI Summary. The authors argue that in a financial system where capital flows drive trade flows, a U.S. sovereign wealth fund investing abroad at scale would force surplus countries' domestic economies to adjust to those inflows. They contend this creates negotiating leverage for a multilateral currency realignment agreement, backed by the threat of losing privileged access to U.S. markets.

Michael McNair Medium
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.@michaeljmcnair argues that a proposed US Sovereign Wealth Fund would “monetize the asset side of the US balance sheet” and fund foreign asset purchases to weaken the dollar, making imports more expensive and US exports more competitive.

Can a U.S. sovereign wealth fund pressure surplus countries to rebalance trade?

Core argument: In the global financial system, capital flows often determine trade flows rather than the reverse, and foreign capital inflows have shaped U.S. conditions by inflating asset prices and suppressing savings, the authors argue.

In today’s global financial system, it’s often capital flows that determine trade flows, rather than the other way around. Just as foreign capital inflows have shaped U.S. economic conditions by inflating asset prices and suppressing savings, U.S. capital outflows through the SWF would reshape conditions in recipient economies. Their domestic variables must adjust to accommodate these flows, regardless of local policy preferences. By forcing surplus countries to either accept reciprocal flows or lose privileged access to U.S. markets, the SWF creates leverage for restructuring the global financial architecture that has long advantaged surplus countries at U.S. expense. The SWF provides the administration with powerful leverage in pursuing a multilateral agreement for currency realignment — what we’ve called a potential “Mar-a-Lago Accord.” By demonstrating both the capability and willingness to accumulate foreign reserves at scale, the U.S. gains crucial negotiating leverage with surplus countries.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In the global financial system, capital flows often determine trade flows rather than the reverse, and foreign capital inflows have shaped U.S. conditions by inflating asset prices and suppressing savings, the authors argue.
  2. U.S. capital outflows through a sovereign wealth fund would reshape conditions in recipient economies, whose domestic variables must adjust to accommodate those flows regardless of local policy preferences, according to the authors.
  3. By forcing surplus countries to accept reciprocal flows or lose privileged access to U.S. markets, the sovereign wealth fund creates leverage for a multilateral currency realignment the authors call a potential "Mar-a-Lago Accord.".

Related Articles:

  • A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System — During the 2018–2019 U.S.–China trade war, the effective tariff rate on Chinese imports rose 17.9 percentage points while the renminbi depreciated 13.7% against the dollar, leaving after-tariff import prices in dollars up just 4.1%. The author argues this currency offset of more than three-fourths of the tariff explains why inflation pressure was negligible.
  • Trade Intervention for Freer Trade — The authors argue the United States should counter surplus countries' trade policies either by restricting their goods exports through tariffs or by restricting their capital inflows through taxes, volume limits, reserve requirements, transaction approvals, or investor eligibility rules. They contend capital controls are a more targeted alternative to uniform tariffs, which impose equal costs on more and less mercantilist countries.
  • What Is the Mar-a-Lago Accord? — The proposed Mar-a-Lago Accord would have the US offer allies security guarantees and market access in exchange for their intervening to weaken the dollar, expanding US manufacturing, and swapping existing US government debt for new 100-year Treasury bonds. Questions remain about the transition costs, inflation from higher US wage costs, and allies' incentives to participate.

AI Summary. Sustainably weakening the dollar would require the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates while foreign central banks raise theirs, which is unlikely given US inflation above the Federal Reserve's 2% target and weak foreign economies. Tariff threats and security-umbrella pressure might sway Japan and Europe, but China would be less willing to comply.

Steven Kamin and Mark Sobel Financial Times
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A “Mar-a-Lago Accord” that forced foreign investors “to ‘reprofile’ into 100-year zero coupon bonds” would end Treasuries’ role as the bedrock of the global financial system, and “would not succeed.” @steven_kamin @sobel_mark

Can a negotiated agreement sustainably weaken the dollar?

Core argument: A sustained dollar depreciation would require the Federal Reserve to cut rates and foreign central banks to raise theirs, which will not happen while US inflation exceeds the Fed's 2% target and foreign economies languish.

The plan would not succeed. As countless studies have shown, pushing the dollar down on a sustained basis would require the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates and foreign central banks to raise rates; but with US inflation stubbornly exceeding the Fed’s 2% target and foreign economies languishing, that’s not going to happen. By the same token, if foreign governments were busy selling Treasury bonds in order to depress the dollar, it’s unlikely that increasing the duration of their remaining dollar bonds could be enough to keep US interest rates from rising. And while threats of higher tariffs and ejection from the security umbrella might coerce Japan and Europe to play ball, China — which should be America’s main concern — is going to be less willing to kowtow to Trump.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A sustained dollar depreciation would require the Federal Reserve to cut rates and foreign central banks to raise theirs, which will not happen while US inflation exceeds the Fed's 2% target and foreign economies languish.
  2. If foreign governments sold Treasury bonds to depress the dollar, lengthening the duration of their remaining dollar holdings would be unlikely to prevent US interest rates from rising.
  3. Threats of higher tariffs and ejection from the US security umbrella might coerce Japan and Europe into cooperating, but China, which should be America's main concern, would be less willing to comply.

Related Articles:

  • A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System — During the 2018–2019 U.S.–China trade war, the effective tariff rate on Chinese imports rose 17.9 percentage points while the renminbi depreciated 13.7% against the dollar, leaving after-tariff import prices in dollars up just 4.1%. The author argues this currency offset of more than three-fourths of the tariff explains why inflation pressure was negligible.
  • What Is the Mar-a-Lago Accord? — The proposed Mar-a-Lago Accord would have the US offer allies security guarantees and market access in exchange for their intervening to weaken the dollar, expanding US manufacturing, and swapping existing US government debt for new 100-year Treasury bonds. Questions remain about the transition costs, inflation from higher US wage costs, and allies' incentives to participate.
  • Budget Cuts Can Solve Trump’s Trade Deficit Problem — An International Monetary Fund study of 33 countries found that for a large economy like the U.S., each dollar of deficit reduction shifts the current account—trade in goods, services and investment income—by 30 to 50 cents. Applying that math, cutting the U.S. federal deficit from 6.4% of GDP to 3% would trim $300bn–$500bn from the roughly $900bn goods-and-services trade deficit.

AI Summary. The Covid-19 pandemic left a visible break — a spike, dip, or jolt — in data series across the economy, health care, education, work, and family life that will remain identifiable in historical records for decades.

Aatish Bhatia and Irineo Cabreros New York Times
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As of 2023, the amount of time Americans spend socializing with others remains 20% below 2015 levels.

Did the pandemic leave a lasting mark across economic and social data?

Core argument: A collection of 30 charts shows the Covid pandemic, which officially began for Americans five years ago this week, as an unmistakable spike, dip or jolt across the economy, health care, education, work and family life.

Decades from now, the pandemic will be visible in the historical data of nearly anything measurable today: an unmistakable spike, dip or jolt that officially began for Americans five years ago this week. Here’s an incomplete collection of charts that capture that break — across the economy, health care, education, work, family life, and more.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A collection of 30 charts shows the Covid pandemic, which officially began for Americans five years ago this week, as an unmistakable spike, dip or jolt across the economy, health care, education, work and family life.
  2. The pandemic's break in the data will remain visible decades from now in the historical record of nearly anything measurable today.

Related Articles:

  • The Anti-Social Century — Americans spend less time with other people than in any period with reliable data back to 1965, with in-person socializing down more than 20% from 2003 to 2023 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics' American Time Use Survey. Among unmarried men and people under 25, the decline exceeded 35%.
  • Declining Life Satisfaction and Happiness Among Young Adults in Six English-speaking Countries — Eleven studies find declines in life satisfaction and happiness among young adults in the US, Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the UK. In these countries life satisfaction now rises with age across the lifespan, as young people's life satisfaction dropped sharply while that of people 45 and over stayed flat.
  • Disconnected: The Growing Class Divide in American Civic Life — 17% of Americans report having no close friends, and survey data show a wide educational gap: 24% of those with a high school education or less have no close friends versus 10% of college graduates. Three decades ago, Americans with less formal education reported social circles at least as large.

Tuesday, March 18, 2025

AI Summary. An analysis of admissions and transcript records at Ivy-Plus colleges finds standardized test scores predict first-year college grades with a normalized slope 4x greater than high school grade point average, controlling for race, gender, and socioeconomic status. The authors find no evidence test scores underpredict college performance for students from less advantaged backgrounds.

John Friedman, Bruce Sacerdote, Douglas Staiger, and Michele Tine National Bureau of Economic Research
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Students at Ivy-plus colleges whose SAT/ACT scores were at the 99th percentile had 1st-year college GPAs 0.43 points higher than those who had scored at the 75th percentile, while high school GPAs had little predictive power. @John_N_Friedman

Do standardized test scores predict college grades better than high school GPA?

Core argument: Analyzing admissions and transcript records at multiple Ivy-Plus colleges, the authors find SAT/ACT scores predict first-year college grades with a normalized slope four times greater than high school GPA, conditional on race, gender, and socioeconomic status.

We analyze admissions and transcript records for students at multiple Ivy-Plus colleges to study the relationship between standardized (SAT/ACT) test scores, high school GPA, and first-year college grades. Standardized test scores predict academic outcomes with a normalized slope four times greater than that from high school GPA, all conditional on students’ race, gender, and socioeconomic status. Standardized test scores do not underpredict college performance for students from less advantaged backgrounds. Collectively these results suggest that standardized test scores provide important information to measure applicants’ academic preparation that is not available elsewhere in the application file. While some of the raw correlation between these variables relates to students’ demographic characteristics, much remains even when controlling for these variables. In contrast, high school GPA does not predict academic performance nearly as well. We also find no evidence of bias against students from less advantaged backgrounds, as students from such backgrounds do not outperform (and in some cases underperform) other students with the same test score

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Analyzing admissions and transcript records at multiple Ivy-Plus colleges, the authors find SAT/ACT scores predict first-year college grades with a normalized slope four times greater than high school GPA, conditional on race, gender, and socioeconomic status.
  2. Standardized test scores do not underpredict college performance for students from less advantaged backgrounds, who do not outperform and in some cases underperform other students with the same test score.
  3. Much of the correlation between test scores and academic performance remains after controlling for demographic characteristics, which the authors suggest indicates test scores provide information on applicants' academic preparation not available elsewhere in the application file.

Related Articles:

  • Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges — Children from top-1% families are more than 2x as likely as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores to attend an Ivy-Plus college, with two-thirds of the gap attributable to higher admissions rates. The authors attribute this advantage to legacy preferences, weight on non-academic credentials, and athlete recruitment.
  • Standardized Test Scores and Academic Performance at Ivy-Plus Colleges — Using admissions records and first-year grades at multiple Ivy-Plus colleges, the authors find SAT and ACT scores substantially predict college academic success even among students with the same high school grades, while high school grade point average does little to predict it. Conditional on test scores, students from lower- and higher-resourced high schools have virtually identical college grades.
  • Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.

AI Summary. The number of computer programmers in the United States is at its lowest level since 1980, a period in which the total U.S. workforce grew about 75%. Programming jobs, which the government classifies as more routine than software development work, fell 27.5%, while software developer jobs fell 0.3%.

Andrew Van Dam Washington Post
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In 2003, the BLS added a new category of “software developer” with responsibilities for design, planning, and requirements gathering. While computer programmer employment is at its lowest since 1980, software developer jobs are down 0.3% from 2019.

Are routine programming jobs disappearing faster than software development jobs?

Core argument: Computer-programming jobs in the United States have fallen 27.5%, leaving fewer programmers than at any point since 1980, a 45-year span in which the total U.S. workforce grew about 75%.

Today there are fewer programmers in the United States than at any point since 1980. That’s a 45-year period in which America’s total workforce has grown by about 75%! Nationwide, software developers haven’t struggled nearly as much as their programming brethren. In the government’s schema, programmers do the grunt work while the much more numerous — and much faster-growing — software developers enjoy a broader remit. They figure out what clients need, design solutions and work with folks such as programmers and hardware engineers to implement them. Their pay reflects this gap in responsibilities. The median programmer earned $99,700 in 2023, compared with $132,270 for the median developer. And while 27.5% of programming jobs vanished, jobs for developers have only fallen 0.3%, similar to the broader industry.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Computer-programming jobs in the United States have fallen 27.5%, leaving fewer programmers than at any point since 1980, a 45-year span in which the total U.S. workforce grew about 75%.
  2. Software developer jobs have declined only 0.3%, in line with the broader industry, while programming jobs fell 27.5%.
  3. The median programmer earned $99,700 in 2023, compared with $132,270 for the median software developer, who identifies client needs, designs solutions and works with programmers and hardware engineers to implement them.

Related Articles:

  • Technological Disruption in the Labor Market — The authors measure US labor market structure since 1880 and find 1990–2017 less disruptive than any earlier period, because past changes from general-purpose technologies like steam and electricity were so profound. They identify four recent signs of accelerating change, including a 50%+ rise in science and technology employment share since 2010.
  • A Data-Driven Case That AI Has Already Changed The U.S. Labor Market — Retail employment began declining in the early 2010s after holding steady for more than two decades, coinciding with heavy big tech investment in deep learning and the commercial adoption of AI-directed warehouse robots and predictive pricing and inventory tools. The author argues this circumstantial evidence suggests AI has already affected the US labor market, but does not constitute proof.
  • How AI Will Divide the Best From the Rest — New evidence indicates that in complex tasks such as research and management, high performers are best positioned to work with AI, since evaluating model output requires expertise and judgment. AI is likely to widen workforce divides rather than narrow them, commoditising skills and automating the repetitive tasks of lower-skilled roles such as customer service.

AI Summary. Large, volatile shifts in US trade policy are argued to be dampening business sentiment and consumer spending while leaving the Federal Reserve reactive, waiting for concrete signs of deterioration before cutting rates. The author argues this path implies a period of overtightening followed by rapid cuts that would push the 10-year Treasury yield into the 3% range.

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:

.@FedGuy12 notes “slowing business activity and softer consumer spending are beginning to show up in the economic data…This would imply a 3 handle” on the 10-year yield in “the coming months.”

Will trade policy shifts and a reactive Fed push long-term yields lower?

Core argument: The author argues the S&P 500's 10% decline is insufficient to trigger a Fed policy reaction, particularly with Fed staff perceiving valuations as elevated, though further declines should eventually shift that view toward an accommodative stance.

The Administration's policies are on track to deliver a promised lower ten-year yield by weakening demand and forcing the Fed to overtighten. The significant and volatile trade policy shifts have dampened business sentiment and contributed to the recent decline in equity prices. Slowing business activity and softer consumer spending are beginning to show up in the economic data. Furthermore, the rapid policy shifts are causing the Fed to freeze into a position of reactiveness. Fed officials are looking to err to the side of caution by waiting to see concrete signs of economic deterioration. This suggests rapid cuts, but only after a period of overtightening. The 10% decline [in the S&P] so far is not enough to get a policy reaction, especially when Fed staff perceive valuations to be elevated. But further declines should eventually change their view and lead to [an] accommodative policy stance, which would be 4 to 6 cuts away. This would imply a 3 handle on the 10 year yield and significant progress towards the Administration’s goal of a lower 10 year yield.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author argues the S&P 500's 10% decline is insufficient to trigger a Fed policy reaction, particularly with Fed staff perceiving valuations as elevated, though further declines should eventually shift that view toward an accommodative stance.
  2. An accommodative Fed stance lies 4 to 6 cuts away, which the author argues would imply a 3 handle on the 10-year yield and significant progress toward the Administration's goal of a lower 10-year yield.
  3. Volatile trade policy shifts have dampened business sentiment and contributed to the decline in equity prices, with slowing business activity and softer consumer spending beginning to appear in the economic data while the Fed waits for concrete signs of deterioration.

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AI Summary. Inexpensive cars from Chinese makers such as BYD, Chery, Great Wall and SAIC are gaining share in emerging markets, reaching nearly 10% of sales in South Africa, 8% in Turkey and close to a third in Chile. Chinese automakers' market share outside China is projected to rise to 13% by 2030 from 3%.

Chester Dawson, Rachel Gamarski, Mpho Hlakudi, and Patpicha Tanakasempipat Bloomberg
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Chinese car exports surged almost 20% in 2024 to 4.9mm, up from 1mm in 2020; 80% of exports were gas-powered.

Are cheap Chinese cars winning market share across emerging markets?

Core argument: AlixPartners projects Chinese automakers' market share outside China will rise to 13% in 2030 from 3% today, with the worldwide share including China reaching 33% and Africa and the Middle East 39%.

From Bangkok to Johannesburg to Sao Paulo, the streets are increasingly jammed with inexpensive compacts, crossovers and SUVs made by companies like Great Wall Motor Co., BYD Co., Chery Automobile Co. and SAIC Motor Corp. While the Trump administration is expected to shield the US’s Big Three from Chinese rivals at home, and Canada and the European Union have placed tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles, buyers in emerging markets have welcomed Chinese cars and trucks with open arms — posing a new threat to growth-hungry global automakers. In South Africa, China-made vehicles account for nearly 10% of sales, or about five times the volume sold in 2019. In Turkey, Chinese brands claimed an 8% share in the first six months of 2024, up from almost none in 2022. In Chile, they have accounted for nearly a third of auto sales for several years running. Global market share for Chinese automakers outside their home country is expected to climb to 13% in 2030 from 3% today, according to AlixPartners. Including China, that worldwide share jumps to 33%, and in Africa and the Middle East it’s projected to hit 39% by then.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. AlixPartners projects Chinese automakers' market share outside China will rise to 13% in 2030 from 3% today, with the worldwide share including China reaching 33% and Africa and the Middle East 39%.
  2. China-made vehicles account for nearly 10% of sales in South Africa, about five times the 2019 volume, 8% in Turkey in the first half of 2024 from almost none in 2022, and nearly a third in Chile for several years running.
  3. While the Trump administration is expected to shield the US Big Three from Chinese rivals at home and Canada and the EU have tariffed Chinese-made electric vehicles, emerging-market buyers have embraced cars from Great Wall Motor, BYD, Chery and SAIC.

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  • Will China Take Over the Global Auto Industry? — The global auto market has historically been regional, with most cars sold in a region also built there. Overcapacity in China's internal combustion sector, expanding electric-vehicle capacity, ample state bank credit, and a weaker yuan could concentrate global auto production in China absent restrictions such as the US 100% tariff on Chinese electric vehicles.
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  • How German Industry Can Survive the Second China Shock — The European Union has 30mm manufacturing jobs, and China has grown from a $4tn economy producing under 15% of global manufacturing output to an $18tn economy producing over a third, with well over 50% of global capacity in many sectors. European tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles limit import competition but do not offset lost export markets.

AI Summary. Germany's post-election fiscal proposals mark a change in the country's likely fiscal impulse, prompting forecast upgrades of 0.2 percentage points to 0.2% German growth and 0.1 points to 0.8% Euro area growth. The shift reduces the risk of very weak Euro area growth and very low European Central Bank policy rates.

Dominic Wilson and Kamakshya Trivedi Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:

A Goldman Sachs analysis argues fiscal expansion in Germany may create more balanced growth globally and raise 10-year Bund yields to their pre-crisis range. Stronger German growth may reduce US equities’ outperformance.

Does Germany's fiscal shift raise European growth and interest rate forecasts?

Core argument: Economists raised their 2025 German GDP growth forecast by 0.2pp to 0.2% and their Euro area forecast by 0.1pp to 0.8% following the incoming coalition government's post-election fiscal proposals.

The post-election fiscal proposals from the incoming coalition government represent a sea change in the likely fiscal impulse in Germany. Nothing is simple in Europe, and the details will have an important bearing on the degree to which GDP growth increases in 2025—our economists have raised their German GDP forecast by 0.2pp to 0.2% in 2025 and their Euro area forecast by 0.1pp to 0.8% in 2025. These policy shifts are larger and faster than most pre-election investor/analyst expectations. Given the security imperative it is highly likely that some form of substantial fiscal expansion will be implemented. Germany’s aggressive response to the new security outlook shifts the Overton Window for what is possible in terms of Euro area spending. Taken together, this supports a shift in the distribution of market outcomes in the Euro area—sharply reducing the tail of very poor growth and low ECB policy rates. And while some of the market optimism looks to have run too far relative to likely 2025 real outcomes, they do not look out of line with the potential sustained fiscal shift, which would further open up right tails in European equities, Bund yields and the Euro.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Economists raised their 2025 German GDP growth forecast by 0.2pp to 0.2% and their Euro area forecast by 0.1pp to 0.8% following the incoming coalition government's post-election fiscal proposals.
  2. The German fiscal policy shifts are larger and faster than most pre-election investor and analyst expectations, and the security imperative makes some form of substantial fiscal expansion highly likely.
  3. Germany's response to the new security outlook shifts what is considered possible for Euro area spending, sharply reducing the tail of very poor growth and low ECB policy rates, with a sustained fiscal shift potentially opening right tails in European equities, Bund yields and the euro.

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  • Germany Can Spend Almost €2tn Without Harming Growth, Economists Say — A poll of 28 eurozone economists estimated that Germany could raise its debt from 63% to 86% of GDP over a decade without repercussions for growth, implying about €1.9tn of fiscal space. The calculation assumes German nominal output grows 2% a year, from €4.3tn to €5.4tn.
  • Repatriation Flows — U.S. bond and equity markets are vulnerable to European investors repatriating capital, as fiscal policy shifts in Europe weaken the dollar and redirect global capital flows away from U.S. financial assets. Trade conflict is also prompting Chinese fiscal stimulus and Canadian calls for large-scale spending, raising the potential for disorderly repatriation on multiple fronts.

AI Summary. Among American voters over 30, the gender gap in presidential support has held at roughly 10%, but among those under 30 it has widened dramatically, with 18-year-old men 23 percentage points more likely than 18-year-old women to support Donald Trump. Similar divides are appearing in other countries.

Ezra Klein and David Shor New York Times
Date Posted:
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.@davidshor notes a 23pp gap between 18-year-old men’s and 18-year-old women’s support for Trump in 2024. He argues that overall young people are “potentially the most conservative generation that we’ve experienced in 50 to 60 years.”

Is the political gender gap widening among young voters?

Core argument: 18-year-old men were 23 percentage points more likely than 18-year-old women to support Donald Trump, a gender gap described as completely unprecedented in American politics.

The thing I am most shocked by in the last four years [is] that young people have gone from being the most progressive generation since the baby boomers, and maybe even in some ways more so, to becoming potentially the most conservative generation that we’ve experienced maybe in 50 to 60 years. At the bottom, we have age, and at the top, we have the gender gap and support for Kamala Harris, comparing women and men. What you can see is that, for voters over 30, the gender gap was fairly stable at around 10%, which is roughly where it’s been in American politics. I think that a lot of people underestimate how recent the gender gap is. Historically, Republicans did better with women than with men. That shift happened in the United States during the Clinton era and has remained stable since then. What’s crazy is that if you look at people under the age of 30, the gender gap has exploded. 18-year-old men were 23 percentage points more likely to support Donald Trump than 18-year-old women, which is just completely unprecedented in American politics. I think it’s still too early to say exactly what the cause is. What’s interesting, though, is that this is happening in other countries, as well.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 18-year-old men were 23 percentage points more likely than 18-year-old women to support Donald Trump, a gender gap described as completely unprecedented in American politics.
  2. Among voters over 30, the gender gap in support for Kamala Harris stood at roughly 10%, near its level since women shifted toward Democrats during the Clinton era, reversing an earlier Republican advantage among women.
  3. Young Americans may have moved from the most progressive generation since the baby boomers to potentially the most conservative in 50 to 60 years, with similar shifts appearing in other countries and the cause still unclear.

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AI Summary. Germany's armed forces commissioner warned the country is not moving closer to its target of 203,000 active troops by 2031, as the military slightly shrank amid high dropout rates, with a quarter of new recruits leaving within six months. Conscientious objector applications reached 2,998, up from 200 in 2021.

Laura Pitel Financial Times
Date Posted:

Germany may face recruiting challenges to achieve its goal of 203k active troops in 2031. The overall size of the armed forces slightly declined last year, as 25% of the 18,810 people who enlisted in 2023 left the armed forces within six months.

Can Germany meet its troop target amid high recruit dropout rates?

Core argument: A quarter of the 18,810 people who joined Germany's armed forces in 2023 left within six months, and armed forces commissioner Eva Högl warned the country is no closer to its goal of 203,000 active troops by 2031.

Germany’s armed forces commissioner, Eva Högl, this week warned the country was not closer to its goal of having 203,000 active troops by 2031, as the overall size of the armed forces slightly declined last year, partly because of a high number of dropouts. A quarter of the 18,810 men and women who signed up in 2023 left the armed forces within six months. But one senior army commander said members of Generation Z — renowned in the business world for their efforts to reshape corporate culture — were also going into the armed forces with different ideas and outlooks. “People are vulnerable, they cry easily,” he said. “They talk about work-life balance.” “I understand that,” the commander added. “They grew up in a different time. It’s not a bad perspective. But it doesn’t match that well with a wartime situation.” Since Russia’s full-scale Ukraine invasion, Germany has had a steep rise in the number of conscientious objectors (including both regular soldiers and part-time reservists). The figure reached 2,998 last year — up from 200 in 2021.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A quarter of the 18,810 people who joined Germany's armed forces in 2023 left within six months, and armed forces commissioner Eva Högl warned the country is no closer to its goal of 203,000 active troops by 2031.
  2. The number of conscientious objectors in Germany, including regular soldiers and part-time reservists, rose to 2,998 last year from 200 in 2021, after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
  3. One senior German army commander said Generation Z recruits arrive with different ideas and outlooks, crying easily and talking about work-life balance, a perspective he said does not match well with a wartime situation.

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