Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Thursday, March 13, 2025

AI Summary. The share of college-educated 25-34 year-olds without school-age children living in urban neighborhoods fell from 39.2% to 37.0%, a steeper decline than for the population overall, according to the American Community Survey. The urban share of top-10% income households held roughly flat at about 30%, a change from earlier steady increases.

Jed Kolko Slow Boring
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The recent surge in immigration masked internal migration away from urban counties. @JedKolko notes educated young adults are “still more likely to live in urban neighborhoods than other people are, but by a smaller margin than before the pandemic.”

Are educated young adults still moving into urban neighborhoods?

Core argument: The share of college-educated 25–34 year-olds without school-age children at home living in urban neighborhoods fell from 39.2% in 2019 to 37.0% in 2023, a steeper decline than for the total population, per the American Community Survey.

Recent urban growth was driven by a temporary national immigration surge and is likely to reverse. According to the American Community Survey, the college-educated young adults who helped drive last decade’s urban revival moved away from cities during the pandemic. In 2019, 39.2% of 25-34 year-olds with a college degree and no school-age kids at home lived in urban neighborhoods; that slipped during the pandemic to 37.0% in 2023. This was a steeper decline than for the total population. These educated young adults are still more likely to live in urban neighborhoods than other people are, but by a smaller margin than before the pandemic. The story is somewhat different for another especially urban demographic group: rich households. In 2019, 30% of households with top-10% incomes lived in urban neighborhoods; by 2023, 29.8% did. The share of rich households in urban neighborhoods went down slightly in 2021 and 2022 before almost fully recovering in 2023. Still, the share of rich households in urban neighborhoods holding essentially flat between 2019 and 2023 is a change from the pre-pandemic years, when it rose steadily.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of college-educated 25–34 year-olds without school-age children at home living in urban neighborhoods fell from 39.2% in 2019 to 37.0% in 2023, a steeper decline than for the total population, per the American Community Survey.
  2. The share of households with top-10% incomes in urban neighborhoods held essentially flat, at 30% in 2019 and 29.8% in 2023, dipping in 2021 and 2022 before nearly fully recovering, a change from steady pre-pandemic increases.
  3. Recent urban growth was driven by a temporary national immigration surge and is likely to reverse, and college-educated young adults remain more likely than others to live in urban neighborhoods, but by a smaller margin than before the pandemic.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Across 15 destination countries, the authors estimate that about half of the variation in income gaps between children of immigrants and children of the local-born reflects parental income differences, with the remainder tied to differing rates of mobility for those raised at the bottom of the distribution.

Leah Boustan, Mathias Fjællegaard Jensen, Ran Abramitzky et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
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.@leah_boustan et al. study children born in 1979-83 in 15 countries, and find that absolute economic mobility is strongest for sons and daughters of immigrants in destinations that are historically “immigrant-receiving.”

What explains income gaps between children of immigrants and locals?

Core argument: Using parent-child links across 15 destination countries, around half of the cross-country variation in second-generation income gaps is explained by parental income differences, with children of immigrants typically raised in poorer households than children of the local-born.

We use parent-child links to document three new facts about cross-country income gaps between the children of immigrants and children of local-born. (1) Around half of the cross-country variation in second-generation income gaps can be explained by parental income differences. Children of immigrants tend to be raised in poorer households than children of the local born. Thus, countries with a smaller first-generation income rank gap (e.g., the US and Canada) also have smaller second-generation income rank gaps. (2) After accounting for parental income, remaining income gaps for the children of immigrants are driven by differential rates of absolute mobility, i.e. higher or lower income for children raised at the bottom of the income distribution. (3) In most countries, daughters of immigrants exhibit higher absolute mobility than daughters of locals. Sons of immigrants only enjoy this advantage in non-European countries with long histories of immigrant incorporation (Australia, Canada, Israel and the US), as well as in the UK. As a result, daughters of immigrants have higher income than [daughters of non-immigrants] raised at the same point in the income distribution in most destination countries, while sons of immigrants often have lower income.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using parent-child links across 15 destination countries, around half of the cross-country variation in second-generation income gaps is explained by parental income differences, with children of immigrants typically raised in poorer households than children of the local-born.
  2. Countries with smaller first-generation income rank gaps, such as the US and Canada, also show smaller second-generation income rank gaps, and gaps remaining after accounting for parental income are driven by differing rates of absolute mobility among children raised at the bottom of the income distribution.
  3. Daughters of immigrants show higher absolute mobility than daughters of locals in most of the 15 destination countries, while sons of immigrants hold that advantage only in Australia, Canada, Israel, the US and the UK, and often earn less elsewhere.

Related Articles:

  • Recent Immigration Surge Has Been Largest in U.S. History — An analysis of government data finds the recent U.S. immigration surge is the largest on record, with net migration averaging 2.4m people a year from 2021 to 2023 and the foreign-born share of the population reaching 15.2% in 2023, up from 13.6% in 2020. About 60% of immigrants arriving since 2021 entered without legal authorization.
  • Enclaves and Assimilation in the Age of Mass Migration: Evidence from Ethnic Catholic Churches — Among early 20th-century US immigrants, the authors find that new Polish Catholic church openings are associated with slower economic assimilation for Polish residents — lower income scores and a shift toward manual occupations — alongside stronger communal ties such as more within-group marriage and Polish names. These patterns persist into the second generation and are not found for Italians.
  • Trading Places: Mobility Responses of Native and Foreign-Born Adults to the China Trade Shock — U.S. local labor markets more exposed to import competition from China saw substantially larger net reductions in their foreign-born populations, with no significant reduction among native-born residents. Within exposed areas, foreign-born and native-born workers had comparably sized declines in employment-to-population ratios.

AI Summary. Because restrictive planning laws prevent housing supply from responding to demand in rich countries, researchers estimate that a 1% rise in a city's migrant population raises rents by 0.5–1%, with other studies estimating larger effects on house prices and median rents. Since migration has only a small positive effect on wages, housing becomes less affordable for natives.

Economist Staff The Economist
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The ongoing wave of immigration to OECD countries has likely put upward pressure on housing costs. @TheEconomist reports on studies finding that a 1% increase in the migrant population of a region raises housing costs from 1-3%.

Does immigration make housing less affordable where building is restricted?

Core argument: A University of Waikato meta-analysis finds that a 1% increase in a city's migrant population raises rents by 0.5–1%, while Umut Unal of the Czech Research Institute for Labour and Social Affairs estimates a 1% rise in migration to a German district raises house prices by 3%.

Rich-world housing markets are often rigid and bound by restrictive planning laws that prevent supply from responding to demand. The lump of labour may be a fallacy but, without more housebuilding, there is effectively one lump of land that must be divided between a larger population. Research supports this intuition. A University of Waikato [meta-analysis] finds that a 1% increase in the migrant population of a city leads to a 0.5-1% rise in rents. Umut Unal of the Czech Research Institute for Labour and Social Affairs estimates that a 1% rise in migration to a German district leads to a 3% rise in house prices. James Cabral and Walter Steingress, both of the Bank of Canada, calculate that a 1% increase in an American county’s population raises median rents by 2.2%. As migration only has a small positive impact on wages, the rise in costs makes housing less affordable for natives. Housing demand depends not only on the number of people in an area but how densely they live. Often new migrants are willing to accept worse conditions than natives.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A University of Waikato meta-analysis finds that a 1% increase in a city's migrant population raises rents by 0.5–1%, while Umut Unal of the Czech Research Institute for Labour and Social Affairs estimates a 1% rise in migration to a German district raises house prices by 3%.
  2. James Cabral and Walter Steingress of the Bank of Canada calculate that a 1% increase in an American county's population raises median rents by 2.2%.
  3. Because migration has only a small positive impact on wages, rising housing costs make housing less affordable for natives, and restrictive planning laws in rich-world markets prevent supply from responding to demand.

Related Articles:

  • Housing and the American Worker — Wages net of housing costs were once substantially higher in high-density areas than low-density areas for workers both with and without college education, but over the past half-century that urban wage premium has persisted only for college-educated workers, not for those with a high school degree or less.
  • Why Immigration Is an Urban Phenomenon — Because many immigrants send remittances home or plan to return, part of their spending occurs in their origin country rather than where they work, so local prices apply to only part of their budget. The authors argue this makes immigrants less deterred by high local costs, concentrating them in expensive cities.
  • Importing Shelter Inflation — Shelter costs make up about 30% of the consumer price index, and their monthly inflation appears to be stabilizing above pre-pandemic rates rather than delivering the disinflation forward-looking data had implied. The author suggests this may be related to a surge in migration, estimated at 3.3m migrants in a year.

AI Summary. The economic benefits of pro-market policies such as deregulation, faster infrastructure permitting, increased inbound foreign direct investment, and federal spending cuts are expected to take time to materialize, while reciprocal tariffs proceed in the interim. The author suggests deploying excess portfolio liquidity if the S&P 500 falls 12%-15%.

Michael Cembalest J.P. Morgan
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Noting the benefits of deregulation and permits for new infrastructure will take time to materialize, Michael Cembalest argues “When/if 12%-15% correction levels are hit on the S&P 500, I would look at deploying some of a portfolio’s excess liquidity.”

Will pro-market policy benefits take time while tariffs proceed?

Core argument: The author would deploy some of a portfolio's excess liquidity if the S&P 500 reaches a 12%–15% correction level.

It will take time before the benefits from pro-market policies of the administration materialize (deregulation, infrastructure permitting, more inbound FDI, DOGE spending cuts, etc). In the meantime, I expect Trump to proceed with some kind of reciprocal tariff announcement in March or April. When/if 12%-15% correction levels are hit on the S&P 500, I would look at deploying some of a portfolio’s excess liquidity.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author would deploy some of a portfolio's excess liquidity if the S&P 500 reaches a 12%–15% correction level.
  2. The author expects Trump to proceed with some form of reciprocal tariff announcement in March or April.
  3. Benefits from the administration's pro-market policies — deregulation, infrastructure permitting, increased inbound foreign direct investment, and DOGE spending cuts — will take time to materialize, according to the author.

Related Articles:

  • The Alchemists — NVIDIA's share of all US capital spending is projected to approach two 20th-century peaks by 2026, and large cloud providers would need $400–500bn in new revenue to earn their traditional 50% gross margin on roughly $250bn of annual data center spending. After the dot-com collapse, Corning's fiber optic revenues did not surpass 2000 levels until 2018 in nominal terms.
  • Lowering our S&P 500 EPS and Valuation Forecasts As the “Maleficent 7” Pushes the Index to the Brink of Correction — The S&P 500 fell 9% from its record high, with more than half of the decline coming from a 14% drop in the seven largest technology stocks, whose price-to-earnings ratio fell from 30x to 26x. The equal-weighted index declined 6%, leaving it 8% below its own record high.
  • US Exceptionalism: Drivers of Equity Outperformance and What’s Needed for a Repeat — US companies need about 7% earnings-per-share growth to deliver a normal 4% equity risk premium above the risk-free rate, versus about 3% for other developed markets, with the highest expectations embedded in technology and the largest US tech firms. Chinese companies could generate a 4% risk premium over Chinese bonds with no earnings growth.

AI Summary. Dollars that foreigners earn selling goods to Americans must ultimately be spent on U.S. goods and services, invested in U.S. assets such as stocks, government bonds, real estate, or short-term interest-bearing instruments, or sold to others who want those things. A U.S. trade deficit therefore corresponds to an inflow of foreign capital.

Jeremy Siegel Wall Street Journal
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Jeremy Siegel notes that the $1B US trade deficit reflects an equal US $1B capital surplus. He argues that trade policies that reduce US trade deficits would reduce demand and prices for US assets and raise interest rates.

Does a trade deficit necessarily mean an inflow of foreign capital?

Core argument: In the example of an American buying a $40,000 Japanese-made Toyota, Toyota can spend the dollars on $40,000 of U.S. goods or services, in which case there would be no trade deficit.

A simple example shows the relationship between trade and capital flows. Suppose an American buys a $40,000 Toyota made in Japan. Toyota has three options for what to do with these dollars. It can buy $40,000 worth of U.S. goods or services, in which case there would be no trade deficit. Or, because it expects the American economy to grow, it can invest $40,000 in U.S. capital—say, the S&P 500 index, U.S. government bonds or American real estate. It can also temporarily invest the funds in short-term, interest-bearing assets such as Treasury bills, commercial paper or bank deposits that enhance the lending capabilities of American financial institutions and fund short-term corporate borrowing needs. What if Toyota doesn’t want to buy U.S. goods or assets? Then it can sell the dollars on the foreign-exchange market. People purchase these dollars either because they want to buy U.S. goods or assets or because they think the dollar will appreciate in value.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In the example of an American buying a $40,000 Japanese-made Toyota, Toyota can spend the dollars on $40,000 of U.S. goods or services, in which case there would be no trade deficit.
  2. Toyota can instead invest the $40,000 in U.S. capital such as the S&P 500 index, U.S. government bonds or American real estate if it expects the American economy to grow.
  3. Toyota can park the funds in short-term interest-bearing assets such as Treasury bills, commercial paper or bank deposits that enhance U.S. financial institutions' lending capabilities, or sell the dollars to buyers seeking U.S. goods, U.S. assets or dollar appreciation.

Related Articles:

  • A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System — During the 2018–2019 U.S.–China trade war, the effective tariff rate on Chinese imports rose 17.9 percentage points while the renminbi depreciated 13.7% against the dollar, leaving after-tariff import prices in dollars up just 4.1%. The author argues this currency offset of more than three-fourths of the tariff explains why inflation pressure was negligible.
  • Budget Cuts Can Solve Trump’s Trade Deficit Problem — An International Monetary Fund study of 33 countries found that for a large economy like the U.S., each dollar of deficit reduction shifts the current account—trade in goods, services and investment income—by 30 to 50 cents. Applying that math, cutting the U.S. federal deficit from 6.4% of GDP to 3% would trim $300bn–$500bn from the roughly $900bn goods-and-services trade deficit.
  • The Trade War Will Pound Stocks — Efforts to cut U.S. trade deficits and escalate tensions with allies risk deterring foreign capital, and foreigners need only stop buying U.S. assets to hit prices, as China and Russia already have. Bridgewater estimates nonfinancial U.S. firms capture 39% of global profits though the U.S. is 15% of world output.

AI Summary. German arms maker Rheinmetall is considering taking over one of Volkswagen's soon-to-be idle German plants as it searches for extra production capacity, though the company says any acquisition would depend on securing more tank orders. Volkswagen decided to halve its German production capacity, idling three plants, because of a slowdown in European car sales.

Patricia Nilsson Financial Times
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Rheinmetall, one of Germany’s largest weapons manufacturers, may take over some of “Volkswagen’s soon-to-be idle plants” to build tanks.

Can idle car plants be repurposed for tank production?

Core argument: Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger said Volkswagen's Osnabrück plant is a "good fit" for the arms maker's operations, as Rheinmetall searches Germany for additional production capacity.

Rheinmetall is considering taking over one of Volkswagen’s soon-to-be idle plants, as the growing arms maker scours Germany for extra production capacity while struggling carmakers scale back. Chief executive Armin Papperger on Wednesday said VW’s plant in Osnabrück was a “good fit” for Rheinmetall operations, but stressed any decision to acquire idle car factories would depend on securing more tank orders. VW’s Osnabrück plant is one of three set to become idle within the next two years after the carmaker decided in December to halve production capacity in the country because of a slowdown in European car sales.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger said Volkswagen's Osnabrück plant is a "good fit" for the arms maker's operations, as Rheinmetall searches Germany for additional production capacity.
  2. Papperger said any Rheinmetall decision to acquire idle car factories depends on securing more tank orders.
  3. Volkswagen's Osnabrück site is one of three plants set to become idle within two years after the carmaker decided in December to halve its German production capacity because of a slowdown in European car sales.

Related Articles:

  • German Borrowing Costs Soar By Most Since 1997 on ‘Historic’ Debt Deal — Germany's incoming governing partners agreed to exempt defense spending above 1% of GDP from the constitutional borrowing limit, create a €500bn off-budget vehicle for debt-funded infrastructure, and loosen borrowing rules for states. Goldman Sachs estimated the package could lift German growth to as much as 2%, versus its 0.8% forecast, if approved and implemented quickly.
  • Germany Can Spend Almost €2tn Without Harming Growth, Economists Say — A poll of 28 eurozone economists estimated that Germany could raise its debt from 63% to 86% of GDP over a decade without repercussions for growth, implying about €1.9tn of fiscal space. The calculation assumes German nominal output grows 2% a year, from €4.3tn to €5.4tn.
  • The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers — The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.

Friday, March 14, 2025

AI Summary. The share of Americans reporting they read a book in the past year has fallen below half, alongside declining performance in numeracy and problem-solving in most countries. The share of adults unable to use mathematical reasoning to evaluate the validity of statements averages 25% in high-income countries and 35% in the US.

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
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Citing PISA results @jburnmurdoch notes the share of adults in high income countries who can not “use mathematical reasoning when reviewing and evaluating the validity of statements” has risen from 20% in 2004 to 25% in 2023, and to 35% in the US.

Are reading, numeracy, and problem-solving skills declining across rich countries?

Core argument: In 2022, the share of Americans who reported reading a book in the past year fell below half, alongside declining performance in numeracy and other problem-solving in most countries.

In 2022, the share of Americans who reported reading a book in the past year fell below half. Particularly striking however is that we see this alongside decreasing performance in the application of numeracy and other forms of problem-solving in most countries. In one particularly eye-opening statistic, the share of adults who are unable to “use mathematical reasoning when reviewing and evaluating the validity of statements” has climbed to 25% on average in high-income countries, and 35% in the US. So we appear to be looking less at the decline of reading per se, and more at a broader erosion in human capacity for mental focus and application.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In 2022, the share of Americans who reported reading a book in the past year fell below half, alongside declining performance in numeracy and other problem-solving in most countries.
  2. The combination of falling reading rates and weaker numeracy and problem-solving performance suggests less a decline of reading itself than a broader erosion in human capacity for mental focus and application.

Related Articles:

  • Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
  • US PISA Results By Subpopulation — On the international PISA student assessments, American Asian and White students ranked at the top, American Hispanic students outscored Hispanic students elsewhere, and American Black students performed well. In reading, American Asian students placed first and American White students third.
  • TIMSS Shows the Bottom Is Falling Out for US Test Scores — US math scores on the international Trends in Mathematics and Science Study fell 18 points for fourth graders and 27 points for eighth graders, on a scale where about 30 points equates to a year of learning. Declines were concentrated among the lowest-performing students, with fourth-grade scores above the 75th percentile barely moving.

AI Summary. Between 1989–90 and 2019–20, the published sticker price of college rose $13,717 in real terms while net tuition paid by students after aid rose $4,526; net tuition received by institutions rose $8,128. The authors argue colleges captured increases in external aid such as Pell Grants rather than passing them to students.

Preston Cooper American Enterprise Institute
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Between 1990 and 2020, colleges raised tuitions and “captured increases in external financial aid, such as Pell Grants, instead of passing those increases through to students.” @PrestonCooper93

Do colleges capture financial aid increases instead of passing them along?

Core argument: The college sticker price rose $13,717 in real terms between 1989–90 and 2019–20, while net tuition paid by students after financial aid rose $4,526.

Taxpayers have dramatically increased financial aid spending. Unfortunately, colleges raised their prices even more, so the net tuition students pay still went up. Had colleges maintained tuition at 1989–90 levels, the increased generosity of financial aid from governments and other external actors would have delivered free tuition for the average public college student. The sticker price of college rose $13,717 in real terms between 1989–90 and 2019–20, the net tuition students pay after financial aid rose just $4,526. However, the net tuition received by institutions rose by a greater amount ($8,128). This is because institutions captured increases in external financial aid, such as Pell Grants, instead of passing those increases through to students. The NPSAS data series ends in 2019–20. However, higher education has seen remarkable developments since then. College enrollment dropped in the wake of the pandemic, which brought about reductions in real sticker prices.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The college sticker price rose $13,717 in real terms between 1989–90 and 2019–20, while net tuition paid by students after financial aid rose $4,526.
  2. Net tuition received by institutions rose $8,128 between 1989–90 and 2019–20, more than the increase students paid, because institutions captured increases in external aid such as Pell Grants instead of passing them through.
  3. Had colleges held tuition at 1989–90 levels, the increased generosity of financial aid from governments and other external actors would have delivered free tuition for the average public college student.

Related Articles:

  • PLUS or Minus? The Effect of Graduate School Loans on Access, Attainment, and Prices — The authors estimate that uncapping federal graduate student borrowing increased previously constrained students' borrowing and shifted their debt from private to federal sources, but had no effect on graduate enrollment, the racial and gender composition of entering students, human capital accumulation, or later earnings. They find the resulting increase in federal loans significantly raised program prices.
  • What Went Wrong with Federal Student Loans? — Weakened regulations on institutions enrolling aid-dependent students led to rising enrollment of disadvantaged students, but primarily at low-value institutions where loan performance deteriorated. Institutions in the lowest loan-repayment quintile had a 23% completion rate, $27,760 average post-enrollment earnings, and 20% default rates, versus 73%, $48,375, and 3% at the highest.
  • The Total Cost of Student Debt Cancellation — Recent US student debt cancellation policies are estimated to cost a combined $870bn to $1.4tn, with $620bn already implemented through an income-driven repayment program, interest cancellation during repayment pauses, and targeted discharges. The newest cancellation plan is preliminarily estimated to cost an additional $250bn to $750bn.

AI Summary. Benzodiazepines such as alprazolam, clonazepam, lorazepam, and diazepam are among the most commonly prescribed psychiatric medications in America, with nearly 24m Americans using them and more than 86m prescriptions written in a year. The Food and Drug Administration has required manufacturers to warn of serious risks of abuse, physical dependence, and withdrawal reactions.

Shalini Ramachandran and Betsy McKay Wall Street Journal
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Over the past six decades, hundreds of millions of Americans have taken anti-anxiety medications like Xanax, including over 30mm in 2015. Usage dropped to 24mm in 2023, or 7% of Americans.

Do widely prescribed anti-anxiety drugs carry serious risks of dependence?

Core argument: Nearly 24 million Americans use benzodiazepines, and more than 86 million prescriptions were written last year, according to the IQVIA Institute for Human Data Science.

Over the past six decades, hundreds of millions of people have taken Xanax (the brand name for alprazolam) or one of its cousins in the benzodiazepine family—Klonopin (clonazepam); Ativan (lorazepam); and Valium (diazepam)—to lull them to sleep or deliver instant calm in an age of abiding anxiety. Psychiatrists and primary-care doctors regularly prescribe the drugs for everything from mild anxiety to insomnia, making benzodiazepines some of the most commonly prescribed psychiatric medications in America. After a rise in complaints, in 2020 the FDA required drug manufacturers to add a warning on benzodiazepines about the serious risks of abuse, physical dependence and withdrawal reactions. But nearly 24 million Americans are still using them. More than 86 million prescriptions were written last year, according to the IQVIA Institute for Human Data Science.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly 24 million Americans use benzodiazepines, and more than 86 million prescriptions were written last year, according to the IQVIA Institute for Human Data Science.
  2. The FDA in 2020 required drug manufacturers to add a warning on benzodiazepines about the serious risks of abuse, physical dependence and withdrawal reactions, following a rise in complaints.
  3. Psychiatrists and primary-care doctors prescribe Xanax, Klonopin, Ativan and Valium for conditions ranging from mild anxiety to insomnia, making benzodiazepines among the most commonly prescribed psychiatric medications in America.

Related Articles:

  • Declining Life Satisfaction and Happiness Among Young Adults in Six English-speaking Countries — Eleven studies find declines in life satisfaction and happiness among young adults in the US, Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the UK. In these countries life satisfaction now rises with age across the lifespan, as young people's life satisfaction dropped sharply while that of people 45 and over stayed flat.
  • The Girls Are Not Alright: Responses to Three Claims that the Youth Mental Health Crisis Is Exaggerated — U.S. Centers for Disease Control data on nonfatal self-harm show a 518% increase in hospitalizations following emergency department visits among girls aged 10–14, with a large rise also among girls aged 15–19. Because suicide deaths vary by sex and age, low suicide rates among teen girls do not mean teen girls are not struggling.
  • Young Americans are Getting Happier — Data from seven surveys of mental health and well-being, along with reported suicide rates, show teens and young adults in the US improving on every measure in recent years. The share of young adults reporting weekly depression fell from 16.5% to 13.3%, though it remains well above pre-pandemic levels.

AI Summary. US population growth is concentrating in suburban counties rather than urban cores: Texas's Harris and Dallas counties gained residents through international migration and births while losing tens of thousands to domestic outmigration, as surrounding suburban counties recorded large domestic inflows. Census Bureau data show 65.3% of US counties grew, with large suburban counties expanding fastest.

Aziz Sunderji Home Economics
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.@AzizSunderji argues that US “population growth is increasingly concentrated in suburban counties surrounding major metropolitan areas, not in the urban cores themselves,” particularly Sunbelt suburbs.

Are suburban counties outgrowing urban cores in US population growth?

Core argument: Harris County (central Houston) gained 101,126 residents through international migration and 35,833 through natural increase while losing 31,165 to domestic outmigration, and Dallas County added 47,564 internationally and 19,625 naturally while losing 47,168 domestically.

Population growth is increasingly concentrated in suburban counties surrounding major metropolitan areas, not in the urban cores themselves. In Texas, for example, our county-level analysis shows striking differences between urban core counties and their suburbs: Harris County (central Houston) gained 35,833 residents through natural increase and 101,126 through international migration, but lost 31,165 to domestic outmigration. Dallas County (central Dallas) added 19,625 through natural change and 47,564 internationally, but lost a substantial 47,168 domestically. But both of these cities are ringed by fast-growing suburban counties: Kaufman County (Dallas suburbs) saw modest natural growth (1,447) and international migration (588), but explosive domestic in-migration (9,158) – representing nearly 5% of its population in a single year. Montgomery County (Houston suburbs) gained 3,956 through natural increase, 6,480 internationally, and a staggering 23,919 domestically (3.34% of its population). This suburban preference is consistent throughout the country. Census Bureau data shows 65.3% of all U.S. counties grew last year, with large suburban counties showing the fastest rates of expansion.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Harris County (central Houston) gained 101,126 residents through international migration and 35,833 through natural increase while losing 31,165 to domestic outmigration, and Dallas County added 47,564 internationally and 19,625 naturally while losing 47,168 domestically.
  2. Kaufman County in the Dallas suburbs gained 9,158 domestic in-migrants, nearly 5% of its population in a single year, against 1,447 from natural growth and 588 internationally.
  3. Census Bureau data show 65.3% of U.S. counties grew last year, with large suburban counties expanding fastest; Montgomery County outside Houston added 23,919 domestic migrants, 3.34% of its population.

Related Articles:

  • Cities Aren’t Back — The share of college-educated 25-34 year-olds without school-age children living in urban neighborhoods fell from 39.2% to 37.0%, a steeper decline than for the population overall, according to the American Community Survey. The urban share of top-10% income households held roughly flat at about 30%, a change from earlier steady increases.
  • Young Families Have Continued Leaving Big Cities Post-Pandemic — Large urban counties have continued to lose population of young children even as their overall population growth resumed, driven by immigration. Birth rates in large urban counties have declined twice as fast as in rural counties over the past decade, and the number of children under five fell in 58% of all US counties.
  • Snow Belt to Sun Belt Migration: End of an Era? — The correlation between US county population growth or net migration and historical extreme heat and cold days has declined over roughly the past 50 years, and in 2010–2020 was essentially zero. The authors argue this pivoting is likely to continue and reverse the 20th-century Snow Belt to Sun Belt migration pattern.

AI Summary. Gold has risen above $3,000 an ounce, a 10-fold gain over the past quarter century that outpaces the roughly 4-fold rise in the S&P 500 index of US stocks. Anticipation of tariffs pushed US gold prices above international benchmarks, drawing more than 23m ounces worth about $70bn into New York's Comex depositories.

Jack Ryan, Sybilla Gross, and Yvonne Yue Li Bloomberg
Date Posted:

Gold prices broke $3,000 per ounce for the first time, driven by central bank purchases and investors’ perceived flight to safety. Gold remains well under its 1980s all-time real peak of $3,800/oz.

Has gold outperformed US stocks over the past quarter century?

Core argument: Gold broke through $3,000 an ounce, with the price up 10-fold over the last quarter century, outperforming the S&P 500, which quadrupled over the same period.

The move through the psychological $3,000 level drives home gold’s centuries-old role as a store of value in turbulent times and as a gauge of fear in markets. In the last quarter century, the price has risen 10-fold, outperforming even the S&P 500, the benchmark for US stocks, which quadrupled over the same period. As traders braced for tariffs, US prices for gold surged above other international benchmarks, prompting dealers to rush bullion into America in large volumes before the levies come into force. More than 23 million ounces of gold, worth about $70 billion, flowed into the depositories of New York’s Comex futures exchange between election day and March 12. The influx has been so vast that it helped drive the US trade deficit to a record in January.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Gold broke through $3,000 an ounce, with the price up 10-fold over the last quarter century, outperforming the S&P 500, which quadrupled over the same period.
  2. More than 23 million ounces of gold worth about $70 billion flowed into the depositories of New York's Comex futures exchange between election day and March 12, as US prices surged above other international benchmarks ahead of tariffs.
  3. The influx of bullion into the US helped drive the US trade deficit to a record in January.

Related Articles:

  • Taking Stock: Dollar Assets, Gold, and Official Foreign Exchange Reserves — Gold accounts for about 10% of aggregate official foreign exchange reserves, roughly its level in the early 2000s. International Monetary Fund country data indicate most added official gold holdings came from a few central banks, with over half of reported accumulation from China and Russia and about a quarter from several emerging markets.
  • Rich Countries Plan to Buy More Gold Despite Record Price — A World Gold Council survey finds almost 60% of advanced-economy central banks expect gold's share of global reserves to rise over the next five years at the expense of the US dollar, up from 38% a year earlier. About 13% plan to increase their own gold holdings within a year, the highest share recorded in the survey.

AI Summary. US shipyards had just five commercial ships under construction compared with 1,749 in China, and China's naval fleet is projected to grow from 370 to 475 vessels in a decade versus 297 to between 305 and 317 for the US Navy, whose major shipbuilding programs are behind schedule.

Christian Davies, Song Jung-a in and Harry Dempsey Financial Times
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

South Korean shipbuilders’ stocks have surged on indications the US may outsource components of naval maintenance and shipbuilding while Trump “seeks to revive his country’s moribund shipbuilding industry.”

Can allied shipyards help close the naval shipbuilding gap with China?

Core argument: US shipyards had just five ships under construction in 2023 versus 1,749 in China, according to the Congressional Research Service.

Asian shipbuilders have been buoyed by indications that US President Donald Trump may be willing to outsource the production of naval vessels while he seeks to revive his country’s moribund shipbuilding industry. “We need ships, and we may have to go a different route than you would normally go,” Trump said during a radio appearance ahead of his inauguration in January. “We may have to go to others, bid them out, and it’s OK to do that. We’ll bid them out until we get ourselves ready.”US shipyards had just five ships under construction in 2023, according to the Congressional Research Service, compared with 1,749 in China. Meanwhile, China’s naval fleet is projected to increase from 370 vessels to 475 in a decade. The US Navy’s ageing fleet is only forecast to increase from 297 to between 305 and 317 over the same period, with all its major shipbuilding programmes behind schedule, according to the US defence department.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US shipyards had just five ships under construction in 2023 versus 1,749 in China, according to the Congressional Research Service.
  2. China's naval fleet is projected to grow from 370 to 475 vessels in a decade, while the US Navy's ageing fleet is forecast to rise only from 297 to between 305 and 317, with all major US shipbuilding programmes behind schedule, according to the US defence department.
  3. Trump said the US may bid out naval vessel production to others until it is ready, remarks that have buoyed Asian shipbuilders.

Related Articles:

  • Ship Wars — Shipyards tied to China's defense industrial base account for 15% of the country's active shipyards but 40% of commercial output by tonnage, with over 75% of their production built for firms outside China and Hong Kong. The authors argue these commercial revenues offset fixed costs and effectively subsidize China's naval expansion.
  • China’s Shipyards Are Ready for a Protracted War. America’s Aren’t — China produced more than half of the world's commercial shipbuilding output, while Europe accounts for about 5% and the US next to nothing, with most of the remainder built in South Korea and Japan. Analysts argue that in a protracted conflict China's wartime-scale yards could quickly accelerate production, replace lost ships, and repair damaged ones.
  • The Hidden Threat to National Security Is Not Enough Workers — At Newport News Shipbuilding, half of welders now have less than four years' experience, down from an average of 20 years three decades ago, and inexperience reduces productivity and adds delays. Shipbuilding wages starting at $17 an hour no longer carry a premium over local retail and warehouse jobs paying up to $24.