Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup


Wednesday, February 26, 2025

AI Summary. South Korea's fertility rate of 0.7 is the lowest of any nation and may be the lowest in recorded history; if sustained, each generation would be about a third the size of the one before, with every 100 people of childbearing age producing roughly 12 grandchildren. Annual births fell from 1m in 1970 to 230,000 in 2023.

Gideon Lewis-Kraus The New Yorker
Date Posted:

South Korea’s current fertility rate of 0.7 implies “Every 100 contemporary Koreans of childbearing age will produce, in total, about 12 grandchildren.” Gideon Lewis-Kraus notes “population loss is an apocalypse on an installment plan.”

How quickly does a fertility rate of 0.7 shrink each generation?

Core argument: South Korea's fertility rate of 0.7 is the lowest of any nation in the world and may be the lowest in recorded history.

South Korea has a fertility rate of 0.7. This is the lowest rate of any nation in the world. It may be the lowest in recorded history. If that trajectory holds, each successive generation will be a third the size of its predecessor. Every hundred contemporary Koreans of childbearing age will produce, in total, about twelve grandchildren. The country is an outlier, but it may not be one for long. Middle-aged Koreans remember a time when children were plentiful. In 1970, a million Korean babies were born. An average baby-boomer classroom had seventy or eighty pupils, and schools were forced to divide their students into morning and afternoon shifts. It is as though these people were residents of a different country. In 2023, the number of births was just two hundred and thirty thousand.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. South Korea's fertility rate of 0.7 is the lowest of any nation in the world and may be the lowest in recorded history.
  2. If South Korea's fertility trajectory holds, each successive generation will be a third the size of the one before it, with every 100 Koreans of childbearing age producing about 12 grandchildren.
  3. Korean births fell from a million in 1970, when baby-boomer classrooms held seventy or eighty pupils and schools ran morning and afternoon shifts, to 230,000 in 2023.

Related Articles:

  • The Age of Depopulation: Surviving a World Gone Gray — The United States remains the main outlier among developed countries resisting depopulation, with fertility of just over 1.6 births per woman — high for a rich country but below the 2.1 replacement threshold — plus steady immigration. The Census Bureau projects the U.S. population will peak around 2080 and decline continuously thereafter.
  • East Asia’s Coming Population Collapse — United Nations projections show China's population falling 8%, Japan's 18%, South Korea's 12%, and Taiwan's 8% between 2020 and 2050, while the US population rises 12%. Working-age people per person over 65 are projected to drop to about 1.8 in China and 1.2 in Japan and South Korea.
  • Korea Finance Nominee Likens Aging Demographics to Titanic Iceberg — South Korea's finance minister nominee argues the country's aging population requires immediate preparation, noting efforts to raise the world's lowest fertility rate would take at least 30 years to yield benefits. A shrinking workforce is a major cause of South Korea's declining potential growth rate, with births per woman at 0.78.

AI Summary. 23% of recent Harvard Business School graduates were still seeking work three months after graduation, up from 10% in 2022, with similar trends at other top programs. The author argues employers are prioritizing relevant experience and specific skills such as data analysis, digital marketing, and AI literacy over general business degrees.

Brent Orrell American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:

Brent Orrell @AEIecon notes that 23% of last year’s Harvard MBA class had not found a job three months after graduation, vs.10% in 2022. He speculates “Flatter corporate hierarchies mean fewer chairs for people with general business knowledge.”

Are employers valuing specific skills over general business degrees?

Core argument: 23% of recent Harvard Business School graduates were still looking for work three months after graduation, up from 10% in 2022, according to a Wall Street Journal article, with other top-rated programs reporting similar trends.

According to a recent Wall Street Journal article, 23% of recent Harvard Business School grads were still looking for work three months after graduation. In 2022, that figure was only 10%. Other top-rated programs report similar trends. What’s going on? Fundamentally, a rapid evolution is occurring in the labor market. Initially triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, the economy has been shifting toward automation, remote work, and gig-based employment models. Contrary to what an MBA program might offer, companies are evaluating their organization structures and placing a greater emphasis on relevant job experience and specific skill sets—such as data analysis, digital marketing, AI literacy, and big data—over general business knowledge. Moreover, as employers increasingly recognize the value of non-traditional credentials (e.g., specialized certifications, coding bootcamps, etc.), while eliminating lots of management roles, the playing field is now more level, calling into question the value of the vaunted MBA.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 23% of recent Harvard Business School graduates were still looking for work three months after graduation, up from 10% in 2022, according to a Wall Street Journal article, with other top-rated programs reporting similar trends.
  2. Employers are placing greater emphasis on relevant job experience and specific skills such as data analysis, digital marketing, AI literacy, and big data over the general business knowledge an MBA program offers.
  3. Growing employer recognition of non-traditional credentials such as specialized certifications and coding bootcamps, combined with the elimination of many management roles, calls into question the value of the MBA.

Related Articles:

  • The Rapid Adoption of Generative AI — A nationally representative U.S. survey found 39% of people aged 18-64 used generative AI, with more than 24% of workers using it in the prior week and nearly one in nine using it every workday. The authors estimate 0.5-3.5% of U.S. work hours are currently assisted by generative AI.
  • Why Do Wages Grow Faster for Educated Workers? — College graduates sort into professional, non-routine occupations where wages rise much more with job tenure, and the author estimates this occupational sorting explains at least half of the life-cycle growth in the college wage premium. That premium is estimated at 22% at age 26, 49% at age 40, and 56% at age 60.

AI Summary. China's post-pandemic balance-of-payments methodology reports a substantially smaller surplus than its customs trade data, on the rationale that contract manufacturers making goods for foreign firms with offshore intellectual property record inflated export prices. Chinese export prices for smartphones of $300–400 per phone sit near estimated manufacturing costs and well below global wholesale prices, undercutting that rationale.

Brad Setser Council on Foreign Relations
Date Posted:
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.@Brad_Setser argues that after a 2022 change in China’s balance of payments methodology, China’s official numbers substantially underreport its surplus. For 2024, he estimates a $800B surplus vs. China’s official figure of $400B.

Does China's export price data support its smaller reported trade surplus?

Core argument: Chinese export prices for made-in-China smartphones to the U.S., the EU and Japan all fall in the $300–400 per phone range, clearly below the global wholesale or retail price.

After the pandemic, China adopted a new methodology for estimating its BoP surplus that substantially reduces the surplus reported in the balance of payments relative to the underlying customs surplus. China claimed that contract manufacturers producing in China for foreign companies with offshore IP (e.g., Apple) were reporting an inflated exports number in the customs exports data; the number in the customs data was supposedly the global wholesale price for a product like the iPhone, not the actual price that the contract manufacturer received from a firm like Apple. But for mobile phones—by far the largest single category of Chinese exports produced onshore by contract manufacturers, China’s story wasn’t in China’s own data. The export price for Chinese-made smartphones to the U.S., the EU and Japan are all in the range of $300-400 per phone. A recent report found that iPhone 15s generally cost over $450 to make, and iPhone 14s were generally closer to $400. U.S. smartphone imports from China are almost entirely Apple phones. And $400 is clearly well below the global wholesale or retail price. What seems to be a technical debate over how Hon Hai’s made-in-China smartphones enter the Chinese customs and BoP data turns out to have rather large consequences.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Chinese export prices for made-in-China smartphones to the U.S., the EU and Japan all fall in the $300–400 per phone range, clearly below the global wholesale or retail price.
  2. China's post-pandemic balance of payments methodology substantially reduces its reported surplus relative to the underlying customs surplus, on the claim that contract manufacturers for foreign firms with offshore IP reported inflated export values.
  3. A recent report found that iPhone 15s generally cost over $450 to make and iPhone 14s closer to $400, while U.S. smartphone imports from China are almost entirely Apple phones.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Record Manufacturing Surplus — China's manufacturing trade surplus has reached about 2% of world GDP, exceeding the peak surpluses of export powerhouses like Japan and Germany, and shows no signs of shrinking as policy continues to emphasize advanced manufacturing capacity. The main offsetting manufactured-goods deficit is in the United States rather than commodity exporters.
  • China’s Stunning 2024 Export Growth — Chinese export volumes are up 13% year-over-year while import volumes are up only 2%, a gap that with exports at about 20% of GDP implies a net exports contribution to Chinese growth of close to 2% of GDP. Falling Chinese export prices mean export volumes are growing much faster than the dollar value of exports.
  • The Dangerous Myth of Deglobalization — China's manufacturing surplus rose by about 1 percentage point of global GDP over a four-year span and is far larger than those of Germany and Japan. China's $800bn goods trade surplus depends on the large U.S. trade deficit, which is still indirectly financed by China through the large offshore dollar stockpiles held by Chinese exporters.

AI Summary. Shares in the six largest US defence companies have fallen 4% on average, while Europe's top defence groups, led by Germany's Rheinmetall, have risen almost 40%. South Korean firms have also gained from Europe's rearmament, with Hanwha Aerospace up more than 70% on demand from NATO members including Poland and Romania.

Sylvia Pfeifer, Clara Murray and Steff Chávez Financial Times
Date Posted:

Investors are betting on Pentagon cuts and remilitarization in Europe, as the average value of US defense contractors has fallen 4% since Trump’s inauguration, while suppliers in Europe are up 40% and in South Korea, over 70%.

Are US defence stocks lagging European and South Korean rivals?

Core argument: Shares in the six largest US defence companies have fallen 4% on average since Trump returned to the White House, while Europe's top defence groups, led by Germany's Rheinmetall, have surged almost 40% over the same period.

Shares in the six largest US defence companies have fallen 4% on average since Trump returned to the White House, while those of Europe’s top defence groups, led by Germany’s Rheinmetall, have surged almost 40% in the same period. South Korea’s defence companies have also emerged as winners as they tap into Europe’s rearmament drive. Shares in Hanwha Aerospace, the country’s largest player which has benefited from demand from Nato countries such as Poland and Romania, have risen more than 70%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Shares in the six largest US defence companies have fallen 4% on average since Trump returned to the White House, while Europe's top defence groups, led by Germany's Rheinmetall, have surged almost 40% over the same period.
  2. Shares in Hanwha Aerospace, South Korea's largest defence company, have risen more than 70%, with the group benefiting from demand from Nato countries such as Poland and Romania.
  3. South Korea's defence companies have emerged as winners by tapping into Europe's rearmament drive.

Related Articles:

  • Debt Has Always Been the Ruin of Great Powers. Is the U.S. Next? — Historical experience suggests that when a great power spends more on debt interest than on military capability for a sustained period, rivals are likely to challenge its position and domestic stability may suffer as governments fail to satisfy competing claims from the military, bondholders, taxpayers and welfare recipients. U.S. federal interest payments of $1.124tn exceeded defense spending of $1.107tn.
  • US Defence Industry Braced For Tech Shake-up Under Trump — The war in Ukraine has accelerated development of drones and other unmanned systems, and the US Air Force selected Anduril and General Atomics over Lockheed, Boeing and Northrop to build and test drone prototypes for a program aimed at fielding a fleet of unmanned aircraft.
  • Can Europe Defend Itself Without America? — European members of NATO have increased defense spending by almost a third in real terms to $476bn, with 23 of NATO's 32 members meeting the alliance's target of spending 2% of GDP on defense, according to NATO. NATO's secretary-general argues the 2% target is insufficient, though tight budgets, high public debt, and competing priorities constrain further increases.

AI Summary. China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are challenging the regional foundations of Eurasian stability and forming alignments based on hostility to a liberal international system that constrains illiberal rulers. The article argues that international order flows from power and cannot be preserved without it.

Hal Brands Foreign Affairs
Date Posted:

.@HalBrands argues that Trump intuitively understands that “order flows from power and can hardly be preserved without it,” offering an opportunity to challenge revanchist powers who are on the move.

Does preserving international order depend on the exercise of power?

Core argument: China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are attacking the regional foundations of Eurasian stability, forging alliances based on hostility to a liberal system that threatens illiberal rulers and inhibits their neo-imperial ambitions.

All around Eurasia’s vibrant, vital periphery, revanchist states are on the move. China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are attacking the regional foundations of Eurasian stability. They are forging alliances based on hostility to a liberal system that threatens illiberal rulers and inhibits their neo-imperial dreams. War or the threat of war has become pervasive. The norms of a peaceful, prosperous world are under assault. The recurring terror of the last century was that Eurasian aggressors might make the world unfit for freedom by making it safe for predation and tyranny. That danger has flared anew today. Trump isn’t the ideal defender of an imperiled American order. Indeed, one suspects he hardly thinks about international order at all. Trump is a hard-line nationalist who pursues power, profit, and unilateral advantage. He thinks in zero-sum terms and believes the United States has long been made a sucker by the entire world. Yet Trump intuitively understands something that many liberal internationalists forget: order flows from power and can hardly be preserved without it.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are attacking the regional foundations of Eurasian stability, forging alliances based on hostility to a liberal system that threatens illiberal rulers and inhibits their neo-imperial ambitions.
  2. War or the threat of war has become pervasive around Eurasia's periphery, reviving the last century's recurring terror that Eurasian aggressors could make the world unfit for freedom by making it safe for predation and tyranny.
  3. Trump is a hard-line nationalist who pursues power, profit, and unilateral advantage and thinks in zero-sum terms, yet he intuitively understands that order flows from power and can hardly be preserved without it.

Related Articles:

  • China Building New Mobile Piers That Could Help Possible Taiwan Invasion — Satellite images of a Chinese state-owned shipyard show six barge-like vessels with extendable ramps under construction, which analysts said could help an invasion force land heavy equipment such as tanks and artillery over Taiwan's mudflats, seawalls and concrete wave-breaking blocks onto firm ground.
  • Can Europe Defend Itself Without America? — European members of NATO have increased defense spending by almost a third in real terms to $476bn, with 23 of NATO's 32 members meeting the alliance's target of spending 2% of GDP on defense, according to NATO. NATO's secretary-general argues the 2% target is insufficient, though tight budgets, high public debt, and competing priorities constrain further increases.
  • The US and Its Allies Face a $10 Trillion Reckoning in the Race to Rearm — World defense spending reached a record $2.2tn, and security officials say military budgets may need to reach Cold War levels of as high as 4% of economic output to deliver on NATO's plans. Bloomberg Economics calculates that US and Group of Seven allies hitting that level would mean over $10tn in additional commitments over a decade.

AI Summary. The World Health Organization has reported an outbreak of an unidentified illness in northwestern Democratic Republic of Congo, with 53 deaths out of 431 reported cases and nearly half of the deaths in one cluster occurring within 48 hours of symptom onset. Ebola and Marburg viruses have been ruled out, and the cause remains unknown.

Eve Sampson New York Times
Date Posted:

World Health Organization is worried about an unidentified illness, linked to three children who ate a bat, that killed 53 people out of 431 cases in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Is an unidentified deadly illness spreading rapidly in central Africa?

Core argument: An unidentified illness in northwestern Democratic Republic of Congo had killed 53 people out of 431 reported cases as of Feb. 15, according to a bulletin from the World Health Organization's Africa office.

An unidentified illness has killed scores of people and infected hundreds in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the World Health Organization has reported, with preliminary investigations tracing the outbreak to three children who in January ate a bat and died. Fifty-three people in the country’s northwest had died from the disease, out of 431 reported cases as of Feb. 15, and “with nearly half of the deaths occurring within 48 hours of symptom onset” in one of two identified clusters, according to a weekly bulletin published by the W.H.O.’s Africa office. “The outbreak, which has seen cases rise rapidly within days, poses a significant public health threat,” the report said, and “the exact cause remains unknown.” Investigators sent 18 samples to Congo’s capital, Kinshasa, for testing, ruling out Ebola and Marburg viruses.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. An unidentified illness in northwestern Democratic Republic of Congo had killed 53 people out of 431 reported cases as of Feb. 15, according to a bulletin from the World Health Organization's Africa office.
  2. Preliminary investigations trace the Congo outbreak to three children who ate a bat in January and died, with nearly half of the deaths in one of two identified clusters occurring within 48 hours of symptom onset.
  3. Investigators sent 18 samples to Congo's capital, Kinshasa, for testing and ruled out Ebola and Marburg viruses, with the World Health Organization saying the exact cause remains unknown and the outbreak poses a significant public health threat.

Related Articles:

  • Africa Has Entered a New Era of War — Africa is experiencing more conflicts than at any point since at least 1946, with 28 state-based conflicts identified across 16 of its 54 countries, double the count of a decade and a half ago. The continent now hosts nearly half the world's internally displaced people, about 32.5m, triple the level 15 years earlier.
  • Changing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Growth Trajectory — Sub-Saharan Africa's working-age population is growing nearly 3% a year, versus close to zero in much of the world, and is projected to exceed China's within about a decade and reach a quarter of the global total. With modest productivity growth near 2%, the region is likely among the world's fastest-growing.
  • Exploring the Implications of Sub-Saharan Africa’s Demographic Explosion — Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to hold a quarter of the world's working-age population within a few decades and to surpass China's working-age population in roughly a decade. Even with modest productivity growth near 2%, the region's growth is estimated at 4.5–5.5%, raising its share of global output from about 3% while remaining small.

Thursday, February 27, 2025

AI Summary. Academic estimates compiled by The Economist indicate inheritances, after falling over the 20th century, were worth about 10% of GDP on average by the end of the 2010s, with roughly $6tn inherited across the rich world in a year. Falling family sizes mean each inheritance is spread across fewer heirs.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
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As baby boomers die, inheritances as a share of US output are over 10% which is just off a post-WW II high. For every $100 paid in wages, the dead leave behind $20. Given fewer children per family, even this underestimates the “shift to an inheritocracy.”

Are inheritances becoming a bigger source of wealth?

Core argument: Academic estimates gathered by The Economist put annual inheritance flows at an average of 10% of GDP by the end of the 2010s, after values exceeded 20% of GDP in some countries in 1900 and then fell over the 20th century.

The Economist has gathered academic estimates on the annual “inheritance flow”—the value of what people pass on to heirs in art, cash, properties and the like—for a range of countries. In 1900 inheritances were worth over 20% of GDP in some countries, as people passed on vast stock portfolios and estates. The value of inheritances then fell in the 20th century, before more recently roaring back. By the end of the 2010s inheritances were worth, on average, 10% of GDP. This year people across the rich world will inherit on the order of $6trn. In America today, for every $100 employers pay a year in wages, the dead leave behind $20. Such figures, striking though they are, understate the shift to an inheritocracy. The average family size has fallen sharply in recent years. A given inheritance is therefore spread over fewer people. According to our calculations, baby-boomer deaths will rise until 2036, when in America 1.5m of them will pop their clogs. The value of housing and stocks will probably also rise, increasing the size of the pile to be passed on. In a world of higher interest rates, someone who inherits and puts the money in the bank or buys government bonds can do pretty well as a pure rentier.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Academic estimates gathered by The Economist put annual inheritance flows at an average of 10% of GDP by the end of the 2010s, after values exceeded 20% of GDP in some countries in 1900 and then fell over the 20th century.
  2. People across the rich world will inherit on the order of $6trn this year, and in America the dead leave behind $20 for every $100 employers pay annually in wages.
  3. The Economist calculates that baby-boomer deaths will rise until 2036, when 1.5m of them will die in America, while sharply falling average family size spreads a given inheritance over fewer people.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. The global economy is argued to be shifting from globalization to segmentation, as tariffs and geopolitical considerations limit trade, immigration restrictions tighten, and divergent industrial policies make business rules less predictable. Where globalization pushed inflation down, segmentation is argued to push up goods and labor costs, keeping interest rates structurally higher for longer.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:

Torsten Sløk argues that an increasingly segmented global economy burdened with tariffs, restricted immigration, and reduced competition is putting upward pressure on prices in goods and labor markets, making rates “structurally higher for longer.”

Does a shift from globalization to segmentation raise inflation and interest rates?

Core argument: The shift from globalization to a segmented world economy — driven by tariffs, immigration restrictions, and divergent industrial policies — is argued to produce permanently higher inflation everywhere, reversing the downward pressure globalization exerted on prices.

We have gone from a world of globalization where goods were flowing over borders, people were moving across borders, and the rules for businesses were harmonized across countries. In the new world, economies, markets, and policies are more segmented. Tariffs and geopolitical considerations limit the flow of goods. There are more restrictions on immigration. Countries have different industrial policies, which have made the rules for businesses more unpredictable and idiosyncratic. The consequence of moving from a global economy to a segmented economy is permanently higher inflation everywhere. Imported goods are more expensive, domestically produced goods are more expensive, less immigration makes domestic labor more expensive, and different industrial policies in different countries reduce competition. The bottom line is that globalization was putting downward pressure on inflation. Segmentation, or deglobalization, is putting upward pressure on inflation. For markets, the conclusion is straightforward. An increasingly segmented global economy is putting upward pressure on inflation in goods markets and labor markets, which will keep interest rates structurally higher for longer.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The shift from globalization to a segmented world economy — driven by tariffs, immigration restrictions, and divergent industrial policies — is argued to produce permanently higher inflation everywhere, reversing the downward pressure globalization exerted on prices.
  2. Segmentation raises costs through several channels: imported goods are more expensive, domestically produced goods are more expensive, reduced immigration makes domestic labor more expensive, and country-specific industrial policies reduce competition.
  3. Upward inflation pressure in goods and labor markets from an increasingly segmented global economy is expected to keep interest rates structurally higher for longer.

Related Articles:

  • The Surprising Resilience of Globalization: An Examination of Claims of Economic Fragmentation — China's exports have grown faster than its own economy, rising by about 3 percentage points as a share of its GDP, with a nearly $1tn surge over four years. Measured against the GDP of its trading partners, China's manufactured-goods surplus has increased by about three-quarters of a percentage point of world GDP to a record high.
  • Data Update 4 for 2025: Interest Rates, Inflation and Central Banks! — Interest rates are ultimately driven by macroeconomic fundamentals, with an "intrinsic risk-free rate" defined as the sum of the inflation rate and real GDP growth tracking the observed 10-year Treasury bond yield closely. On this view, central banks' influence comes from preferential access to data on those fundamentals, their capacity to alter them, and their credibility.
  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.

AI Summary. Food stamp enrollment held above 41m recipients even as the US unemployment rate fell from 14.8% to 3.6%, unlike after the Great Recession when the share of the population receiving benefits declined from 15.2% to 11.4%. The authors estimate that share is more than double what economic conditions alone would project.

Matt Weidinger and Angela Rachidi American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
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Even as the jobless rate has fallen to near-record lows, the share of the US population receiving SNAP benefits is stuck at an elevated 12.3%, “more than double what economic conditions alone would have projected over the past 20 years.”

Why has food stamp enrollment stayed high as unemployment fell?

Core argument: The US SNAP caseload held above 41 million recipients whether the unemployment rate was 14.8% in April 2020, averaged 6% in 2021, or 3.6% in 2023.

After an initial spike in response to the pandemic, the national SNAP caseload remained remarkably stable at over 41 million recipients, whether the US unemployment rate was 14.8% in April 2020 or an average of 6% in 2021 and 3.6 percent in 2023. After the Great Recession, the share of the US population receiving SNAP benefits peaked at 15.2% in 2013 (when the unemployment rate was almost twice the 2024 level) and then declined to 11.4% through 2019, as the unemployment rate trended toward historic lows. In a forthcoming report [we] find that the current share of the US population receiving SNAP benefits is more than double what economic conditions alone would have projected over the past 20 years. [Note that Figure 2 shows the unemployment rate at 4% in both 2001 and 2024, while the SNAP caseload doubled from 6% to 12%]. @Tqorourke @AngelaRachidi

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US SNAP caseload held above 41 million recipients whether the unemployment rate was 14.8% in April 2020, averaged 6% in 2021, or 3.6% in 2023.
  2. A forthcoming report finds that the share of the US population receiving SNAP benefits is more than double what economic conditions alone would have projected over the past 20 years.
  3. The SNAP participation share peaked at 15.2% of the US population in 2013 and declined to 11.4% through 2019, and at a 4% unemployment rate in both 2001 and 2024 the caseload share doubled from 6% to 12%.

Related Articles:

  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • Government Benefit Programs Already Do A Lot To Help Low Income Families — For a two-adult, three-child family, existing taxes and government benefits bring take-home resources to about $58,000 with no earnings, $79,000 with $20,000 of earnings, and $90,000 with $80,000 of earnings plus $15,000 in employer health premiums. A $75,000 gap in earnings and work-related benefits narrows to $11,000 in take-home pay.
  • How SNAP Expenditures Now Exceed $100 Billion Annually — The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (food stamps) has grown from about $20bn a year to more than $100bn a year over two decades, an increase the authors argue cannot be explained by greater economic need. Unemployment was lower in 2017–2019 than at the prior economic peak, yet millions more people received benefits.

AI Summary. Survey data show 62% of U.S. adults identify as Christian, a 16-point decline from earlier readings, with Protestants at 40% and Catholics at 19%. Religiously unaffiliated adults — atheists, agnostics, and those saying "nothing in particular" — account for 29% of the population.

Gregory Smith, Alan Cooperman, Becka Alper, Besheer Mohamed, Michael Rotolo, Patricia Tevington, Justin Nortey, Asta Kallo, Jeff Diamant and Dalia Fahmy Pew Research Center
Date Posted:

.@pewresearch: The share of Americans who identify as Christian, now around 63%, is no longer declining, but younger people are less religious, with 43% of the 18-24 cohort unaffiliated, nearly matching the 46% who call themselves Christian.

Has the long decline in American Christian identification stopped?

Core argument: 62% of U.S. adults identify as Christians, down 9 percentage points since 2014 and 16 points since 2007, a decline that has slowed and may have leveled off.

62% of U.S. adults identify as Christians. That is a decline of 9 percentage points since 2014 and a 16-point drop since 2007. The largest subgroups of Christians in the United States are Protestants – now 40% of U.S. adults – and Catholics, now 19%. People who identify with all other Christian groups (including the Greek and Russian Orthodox Churches, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jehovah’s Witnesses and many others) total about 3% of U.S. adults. 1.7% of U.S. adults say they are Jewish when asked about their religion, while 1.2% of respondents in the new survey are Muslim, 1.1% are Buddhist, and 0.9% are Hindu. Religiously unaffiliated adults – those who identify as atheists, agnostics or as “nothing in particular” when asked about their religion – account for 29% of the population.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 62% of U.S. adults identify as Christians, down 9 percentage points since 2014 and 16 points since 2007, a decline that has slowed and may have leveled off.
  2. Protestants at 40% of U.S. adults and Catholics at 19% are the largest Christian subgroups, while all other Christian groups combined total about 3%.
  3. Religiously unaffiliated adults — atheists, agnostics and those answering "nothing in particular" — account for 29% of the U.S. population, compared with 1.7% Jewish, 1.2% Muslim, 1.1% Buddhist and 0.9% Hindu.

Related Articles:

  • Opiates of the Masses? Deaths of Despair and the Decline of American Religion — The authors estimate that declines in religious attendance following repeals of laws restricting Sunday commerce explain an important part of the initial increase in middle-aged "deaths of despair" from suicide, liver disease, and poisoning. The effect appears driven by falling formal religious participation rather than by changes in belief or private activities such as prayer.
  • Religious Worship Attendance in America: Evidence from Cellphone Data — Smartphone location data for over 2m Americans indicate that 73% enter a place of worship at least once a year but only 5% attend weekly, far below the roughly 22% who report weekly attendance in surveys. Frequent attenders are less likely to visit strip clubs, liquor stores, and casinos.
  • Religious ‘Nones’ in America: Who They Are and What They Believe — Pew survey data indicate about 28% of U.S. adults are religiously unaffiliated, identifying as atheist, agnostic, or "nothing in particular." Most of these adults believe in God or a higher power, rarely attend religious services, say religion does some harm while many also see some good, and reject the idea that science can explain everything.

AI Summary. Gallup survey data indicate nearly one in 10 U.S. adults identify as LGBTQ, including nearly a quarter of adults aged 18 to 27, more than half of whom identify as bisexual. Identification is about 21% among liberals versus 3% among conservatives, and women are nearly twice as likely as men to identify as LGBTQ.

Claire Cain Miller and Francesca Paris New York Times
Date Posted:

Gallup finds a sharp generational and gender divide on sexual identity: For Gen Z (18-27), 31% of women and 12% of men identify as LGBTQ for an average of 23%, compared with 3% for Baby Boomers, and 9.3% for Americans overall.

How many U.S. adults identify as LGBTQ, and who most often?

Core argument: Nearly 10% of U.S. adults identify as LGBTQ, rising to nearly 25% among Generation Z adults aged 18 to 27, according to Gallup's analysis of 14,000 adults across its telephone surveys last year.

Nearly one-quarter of adults in Generation Z, defined by Gallup as those 18 to 27, identify as L.G.B.T.Q., according to the analysis, which included 14,000 adults across all of Gallup’s telephone surveys last year. More than half of these L.G.B.T.Q. young adults identify as bisexual. Among all respondents, 1.3%identified as transgender, up from 0.6% in 2020. In the surveys, there were large differences in L.G.B.T.Q. identification by political ideology. Twenty-one percent of liberals identified this way, compared with 3% of conservatives. There were also significant gender differences: Women were almost twice as likely as men to identify as L.G.B.T.Q. In Gen Z, 31% did, compared with 12% of men.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly 10% of U.S. adults identify as LGBTQ, rising to nearly 25% among Generation Z adults aged 18 to 27, according to Gallup's analysis of 14,000 adults across its telephone surveys last year.
  2. Gallup found that 1.3% of all respondents identified as transgender, up from 0.6% in 2020, while more than half of LGBTQ young adults identified as bisexual.
  3. LGBTQ identification varied by ideology and gender in Gallup's surveys: 21% of liberals identified this way compared with 3% of conservatives, and 31% of Gen Z women compared with 12% of men.

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  • Declining Life Satisfaction and Happiness Among Young Adults in Six English-speaking Countries — Eleven studies find declines in life satisfaction and happiness among young adults in the US, Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the UK. In these countries life satisfaction now rises with age across the lifespan, as young people's life satisfaction dropped sharply while that of people 45 and over stayed flat.
  • Is There Really a Generational Difference in Identifying as Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual? — General Social Survey data show that increases among young American adults appear in same-sex sexual behavior as well as in identification, with 20% reporting a same-sex partner versus 18.5% identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. The increases are larger among 27- to 41-year-olds.
  • Sexless America: Young Adults Are Having Less Sex — The share of heterosexual men reporting no female sexual partners in the past year rose, driven mainly by fewer men reporting exactly one partner, with no change among men reporting large numbers of partners. The decline is concentrated in approximately monogamous sex, reflecting later or forgone marriage.

AI Summary. Japan recorded 720,988 births, a 5% drop from the prior year and the lowest since records began 125 years ago, with births declining for nine straight years despite government financial incentives for couples to have more children. Combined with a record 1.6mn deaths, Japan's population shrank by almost 900,000 people net of immigration.

Harry Dempsey and Leo Lewis Financial Times
Date Posted:

In 2024, Japan’s population continued to shrink, with births falling to a historic 125-year low of 720,988 while deaths rose to a record 1.6 million for a net native population decline of ~ 900,000.

Are government incentives failing to stop falling births and shrinking population?

Core argument: Japan recorded 720,988 births in 2024 according to preliminary government figures, a 5% drop from the prior year and the lowest since record-keeping began in 1899 during the Meiji era.

The number of babies born in Japan last year fell to the lowest level since records began 125 years ago as the country’s demographic crisis deepens and government efforts to reverse the decline continue to fail. Japan recorded 720,988 births in 2024, according to preliminary government figures published on Thursday. The number has declined for nine straight years and appears to be largely unaffected by financial and other government incentives for married couples to produce more children. The 2024 figure is a 5% drop from the previous year and the lowest since records began during Japan’s Meiji era in 1899. Combined with a record 1.6mn deaths last year, the figures mean Japan’s population shrank by almost 900,000 people, net of immigration figures.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Japan recorded 720,988 births in 2024 according to preliminary government figures, a 5% drop from the prior year and the lowest since record-keeping began in 1899 during the Meiji era.
  2. Japan's births have declined for nine straight years and appear largely unaffected by financial and other government incentives for married couples to have more children.
  3. Combined with a record 1.6mn deaths in 2024, Japan's population shrank by almost 900,000 people, net of immigration.

Related Articles:

  • The Power of Demography and the Fate of East Asia — East Asia's total population has peaked and is projected to decline for at least a generation, with the pace of decline likely accelerating each decade, while US population is projected to keep growing for decades. The author argues such sustained divergence can shift the global balance of power.
  • The Wealth of Working Nations — Because of population aging, growth in GDP per capita and GDP per working-age adult have diverged across advanced economies; from 1998 to 2019 Japan's accumulated growth per working-age adult was 31.9% versus 29.5% in the US. The authors find a standard neoclassical growth model calibrated to each country's working-age population tracks output per working-age adult in most economies.
  • East Asia’s Coming Population Collapse — United Nations projections show China's population falling 8%, Japan's 18%, South Korea's 12%, and Taiwan's 8% between 2020 and 2050, while the US population rises 12%. Working-age people per person over 65 are projected to drop to about 1.8 in China and 1.2 in Japan and South Korea.

AI Summary. South Korea's fertility rate rose from 0.72 to 0.75 births per woman, its first increase in nine years, though it remains the world's lowest and far below the 2.1 needed for a stable population. Officials partly attributed the rise to an increase in marriages following the pandemic.

Song Jung-a Financial Times
Date Posted:

South Korea’s fertility rate rose to 0.75 in 2024 vs. 0.72 in 2023, the first increase in 9 years. Officials partly attributed the rise to a post-pandemic increase in marriage; there were 222,422 marriages last year, the highest number since 2019.

Can a rise in marriages lift the world's lowest fertility rate?

Core argument: South Korea's fertility rate rose from 0.72 in 2023 to 0.75 last year, according to the national statistics office, the first increase since 2015, when the rate stood at 1.24.

South Korea’s fertility rate has risen for the first time in nine years, as a surge in marriages after the pandemic has spurred hopes that the world’s fastest-ageing society may have turned a corner. The country’s fertility rate — the average number of babies a woman is expected to have in her lifetime — increased from 0.72 in 2023 to 0.75 last year, according to the latest data from the national statistics office. Although the rate remains the lowest in the world and far below the 2.1 needed to ensure a broadly stable population, this is the first rise since 2015, when it was 1.24. Officials partly attributed the rise to an increase in the number of marriages after the pandemic. There were 222,422 marriages last year, the highest number since 239,159 in 2019.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. South Korea's fertility rate rose from 0.72 in 2023 to 0.75 last year, according to the national statistics office, the first increase since 2015, when the rate stood at 1.24.
  2. South Korea's fertility rate remains the lowest in the world and far below the 2.1 needed to ensure a broadly stable population, despite the increase.
  3. Officials partly attributed the rise to an increase in marriages after the pandemic, with 222,422 marriages last year, the highest number since 239,159 in 2019.

Related Articles:

  • Small Businesses Are Lowering South Korean Fertility — Just 14% of South Korean jobs are at companies with over 250 employees—the lowest share in the OECD, versus 58% in the US—and studies find small Korean service firms are about 30% as productive as large ones, compared with 84% in the Netherlands and 90% in Germany. The author argues this low productivity yields very low wages, depressing fertility.
  • The Relationship Recession is Going Global — Most of the decline in birth rates reflects a fall in the number of couples rather than childbearing decisions within couples; had US marriage and cohabitation rates held constant over the past decade, the US fertility rate would be higher today than it was then. The drop in relationship formation is steepest among the poorest and appears globally.
  • The End of Children — South Korea's fertility rate of 0.7 is the lowest of any nation and may be the lowest in recorded history; if sustained, each generation would be about a third the size of the one before, with every 100 people of childbearing age producing roughly 12 grandchildren. Annual births fell from 1m in 1970 to 230,000 in 2023.