Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
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Tuesday, December 17, 2024

Why the U.S. Economy Is Trouncing Europe’s

AI Summary. Only about 12% of Americans score at the highest levels on international academic tests versus 34% at the lowest, yet the U.S. has created nearly 250 companies worth over $10bn ($30tn in value) against Europe's 14, and median U.S. disposable household income is 25% above Germany's. The author argues expanding high-skilled immigration is the fastest way to accelerate growth.

Edward Conard Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
December 17, 2024
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

My WSJ OpEd argues that mining the technological frontier motivates America’s talent to take more risk by increasing expected after-tax payoffs, producing a 70X difference in the value of newly created companies—laughably missed by tax elasticity studies.

My WSJ OpEd argues that mining the technological frontier motivates America’s talent to take more risk by increasing...

How does the US outgrow Europe despite weaker test scores?

Core argument: OECD data show about 12% of Americans score at the highest levels on international academic tests versus 34% at the lowest, while Germany's split is nearly even at 18% high and 20% low.

Economists never cite one of the most significant statistics about the U.S. economy. According to data released last week by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, only about 12% of Americans score at the highest levels on internationally administered academic tests, while 34% score at the lowest levels—nearly three low scorers for every high scorer. Germany’s figures are nearly even: 18% score at the highest levels and 20% at the lowest. Put another way, Germany’s ratio of high to low scorers is almost three times America’s. Scandinavia’s is five times; Japan’s, seven.

These enormous differences have profound economic implications. With more talent and fewer needy people, is it any wonder that Northern European countries can afford more-generous welfare policies than their neighbors to the south?

Yet America excels relative to Europe despite these enormous differences. While Europe has created 14 companies worth more than $10 billion in the past 50 years, with about $400 billion of market value in total, Americans have created nearly 250 such companies, worth $30 trillion.

That success has driven up America’s middle-class incomes. The median disposable U.S. household income, according to the OECD, is now 25% greater than the median German household and 60% greater than the median household in Italy.

Europeans’ incomes would be even lower if they weren’t free-riding on American innovation, defense spending and higher drug prices, which incentivize research. America’s median incomes would be higher if we had more talent devoted to supervising and creating jobs for blue-collar workers or Northern Europe-like distribution of test scores.

The outsize success of America’s talented entrepreneurs doesn’t stem from their superior intelligence. It comes from working at companies such as Google and Microsoft, which mine the technological frontier and expose employees to valuable knowledge, insights and opportunities. Apple is worth more than the 30 largest German companies combined. Apple’s employees and its alumni use their knowledge and training to create more value than their counterparts in Europe.

Unlike Europe, the enormous success of American entrepreneurs motivated an army of talented Americans to get valuable on-the-job training, work longer hours, take risks and succeed. A small amount of success bubbles up from a large pool of failure.

The belief that taxing success more heavily will scarcely slow inevitable progress ignores the importance of being first to market and founding successful companies in America rather than the rest of the world, the enormous difference in the training and expected payoffs for successful risk-taking that it creates for America’s talented workers, and the motivational effect higher expected payoffs for successful risk-taking have on our talented workers.

Studies of short-term tax elasticity laughably miss the enormous difference between the success of the U.S. and Europe. Even if Europe cut its tax rates, it would have a trivial short-term effect on the expected returns to risk-taking, because without companies such as Google, entrepreneurs wouldn’t come up with ideas worthy of investment regardless of the tax rate. It takes decades of successful risk-taking to create companies and workers who can spawn the next generation of success.

The argument that we can heavily tax the tail of the distribution of payoffs without discouraging prudent risk-taking—since entrepreneurs such as Bill Gates and Steve Jobs took risks without expecting the enormous success they achieved—fails to recognize that outsize payoffs at the tail of the distribution critically drive overall expected risk-adjusted returns above break-even. Even with these successes, the returns to venture capital over the last 20 years have been mediocre at best.

When entrepreneurs capture as little as 5% of the value they create for others, it makes little sense to encourage successful risk-takers to quit working long before they achieve outsize success. With the effect technological success has on the productivity of talented American workers, who are our constraint to growth, and the effect of their productivity on the growth of middle-class incomes relative to Europe, that’s not a “policy failure.”

The fastest way to accelerate America’s growth and increase tax revenues is to let high-skilled immigration expand our talent pool. Forty percent of America’s billion-dollar startups were founded by high-skilled immigrants—roughly the same percentage of STEM doctorates held by foreign-born American workers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. OECD data show about 12% of Americans score at the highest levels on international academic tests versus 34% at the lowest, while Germany's split is nearly even at 18% high and 20% low.
  2. Europe created 14 companies worth more than $10 billion over the past 50 years, totaling about $400 billion in market value, against nearly 250 such U.S. companies worth $30 trillion, with Apple alone worth more than Germany's 30 largest companies combined.
  3. Median disposable U.S. household income is 25% above Germany's and 60% above Italy's, and expanding high-skilled immigration is argued to be the fastest way to accelerate U.S. growth, given that 40% of America's billion-dollar startups were founded by high-skilled immigrants.

Related Articles:

  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.
  • The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
  • A Visualization of Europe’s Non-Bubbly Economy — The Draghi report notes that no European Union company with a market capitalization above €100bn was founded from scratch in the past fifty years, while all six US companies valued above €1tn were. The 13 EU companies founded in that period and worth at least $10bn total about $400bn, versus nearly $30tn for their US counterparts.
  • Taxation
  • Education
    • Test Scores
  • Fiscal Policy
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Immigration
    • US Workforce
  • Workforce

Are Place-Based Policies Targeting The Wrong Distressed Areas?

AI Summary. The rise in geographic income inequality reflects the richest places pulling further ahead rather than the poorest falling behind, and even the lowest-income places have seen gains in inflation-adjusted income since 1980. Including government transfers or adjusting for local cost of living lowers measured geographic inequality but leaves the upward trend intact.

Jed Kolko Slow Boring
Date Posted:
December 17, 2024

Despite the post-pandemic decline in US income inequality at the national level, geographic inequality as measured by market income per capita reached a new high in 2023, as average incomes in the richest US areas have grown faster than the poorest.

Is rising geographic inequality driven by rich places pulling ahead?

Core argument: Rising geographic inequality reflects the richest places pulling farther ahead rather than the poorest places falling behind, with even the lowest-income places posting gains in inflation-adjusted income since 1980.

The increase in geographic inequality is more about the richest places pulling farther ahead than the poorest places falling farther behind, and even the lowest-income places have seen gains in inflation-adjusted income since 1980. Average incomes have been rising especially sharply for the very richest places starting around 2011. This baseline measure of geographic inequality (the heavy green line) reflects market income. Two alternative measures of income show a lower level of geographic inequality but still trending upward. The first alternative measure includes government transfers. Including transfer income makes things look somewhat more equal: geographic inequality for income including transfers is lower and rising more gently than for market income. The second alternative measure adjusts market income for differences in local cost of living. Higher-income places are more expensive to live in, mostly due to higher housing costs. Adjusting for the cost of living lowers geographic inequality, but the trend remains the same: inequality is rising and reached a new high in 2023. However, adjusting for the cost of living changes which places are richer and poorer.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Rising geographic inequality reflects the richest places pulling farther ahead rather than the poorest places falling behind, with even the lowest-income places posting gains in inflation-adjusted income since 1980.
  2. Average incomes have risen especially sharply for the very richest places starting around 2011, based on a baseline measure of market income.
  3. Including government transfers or adjusting market income for local cost of living lowers measured geographic inequality, but the upward trend holds and cost-of-living-adjusted inequality reached a new high in 2023, while changing which places rank as richer and poorer.

Related Articles:

  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • The Economic Geography Of The 2024 Elections — Counties where government transfer programs such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and unemployment insurance make up at least a quarter of personal income gave Trump 63% of the vote, while counties where transfers account for less than 15% gave Harris 56%. Transfers supplied 18% of total US personal income.
  • “Compensate the Losers?” Economic Policy and Partisan Realignment in the US — The authors argue that partisan realignment by education reflects Democrats' declining supply of "predistribution" policies such as job guarantees, higher minimum wages, protectionism, and stronger unions, which less-educated Americans favor while more-educated Americans prefer taxes and transfers. They estimate changing views of the parties' economic policies explain roughly half the shift.
  • Inequality
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Politics
  • Workforce

Inflation Rising Again

AI Summary. The decline in inflation has stalled, with Federal Reserve and market-implied inflation measures above the 2% target and short- and long-run consumer inflation expectations moving higher. The author argues this uptrend, alongside strong economic momentum, points to an inflation rebound rather than a softening that would justify rate cuts.

Torsten Sløk, Rajvi Shah, and Shruti Galwankar Apollo
Date Posted:
December 17, 2024

Torsten Sløk notes core CPI is 3.3% and headline is 2.7%. Both show signs of reacceleration, as do rising short and long-term consumer inflation expectation surveys. “The probability is rising that the Fed may have to raise interest rates in 2025.”

Is inflation rebounding rather than softening enough to justify rate cuts?

Core argument: Fed and market-implied inflation measures all sit above the Fed's 2% target and show no signs of moving toward it, while recent readings indicate the decline in inflation has stalled.

Will we see a repeat of the 1970s with the Fed easing policy too quickly, triggering a rise in inflation in 2025? Recent inflation readings show signs that the decline in inflation has stalled, and there is a risk of reacceleration, see charts below. Fed and market-implied measures of inflation are all above the Fed’s 2% target and not showing signs of moving down toward the Fed’s 2% inflation target. Short-run and [more worryingly], long-run [consumer] inflation expectations are also moving higher. The recent uptrend, combined with strong economic momentum, is pointing towards a rebound in inflation in 2025 and not a softening to justify Fed cuts. The probability is rising that the Fed may have to raise interest rates in 2025. For investors, the risk is a repeat of 2022, where the 60/40 portfolio underperformed significantly.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Fed and market-implied inflation measures all sit above the Fed's 2% target and show no signs of moving toward it, while recent readings indicate the decline in inflation has stalled.
  2. Short-run and, more worryingly, long-run consumer inflation expectations are moving higher.
  3. The uptrend in inflation, combined with strong economic momentum, points to a rebound in 2025 rather than a softening that would justify Fed cuts, raising the probability the Fed must hike rates and the risk of a repeat of 2022, when the 60/40 portfolio underperformed significantly.

Related Articles:

  • Economic Policy Before and After the 2024 Election — Market expectations for the Federal Reserve's interest-rate path have shifted, with the expected endpoint moving from about 2.8% to 3.8%. The author argues that enacting the campaign agenda—larger deficits from tax cuts, tariffs on all imports, a weaker currency, mass deportations, and pressure on central-bank independence—would produce a substantially larger inflation shock.
  • 2025 Economic Outlook: Firing on All Cylinders — The authors argue the Federal Reserve will deliver fewer rate cuts than markets expect because household spending remains strong and the economy continues to perform well. They see a risk that lower rates overheat the economy, with strong job and wage growth lifting housing demand and prices and pushing inflation back above the Federal Reserve's 2% target.
  • Inflation and the Job Market are Sending Conflicting Signals — U.S. wages and prices are still rising about 1–1.5 percentage points faster per year than before the pandemic, while the share of Americans aged 25–54 with a job has been declining. Federal Reserve officials may expect a modestly weakening job market to curb pay growth, slowing consumer spending and eventually price increases.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
  • Monetary Policy

Debt Risks That Lured Bessent to US Treasury Now Loom Large

AI Summary. Ten-year US Treasury yields are around 4.4%, and the weighted average interest rate on outstanding federal debt is about 3.3% — a 15-year high, yet still below the over-4% yields the Treasury now pays on new debt across all maturities. Bloomberg Economics projects the fiscal deficit widening to 7% of GDP.

Liz Capo McCormick and Viktoria Dendrinou Bloomberg
Date Posted:
December 17, 2024

The weighted mean interest rate on outstanding debt is currently ~ 3.3%, a 15-year high, but still well under current yields of over 4% for new issuances in all maturities.

Are rising federal borrowing costs pushing the deficit higher?

Core argument: The weighted average interest rate on outstanding U.S. federal debt stands near 3.3%, a 15-year high, yet remains below the over-4% yields the Treasury must now pay across all maturities to sell new debt.

Investors appear largely to be giving the incoming Trump team the benefit of the doubt. Ten-year yields are around 4.4%, down from their peak in the immediate aftermath of the Nov. 5 election. Analysts surveyed by Bloomberg last month saw them dropping below 4% by late 2026, while derivatives contracts indicate traders are betting they’ll hold roughly around current levels over that period. The weighted average interest rate on outstanding debt is now around 3.3%. That’s a 15-year high, but still well below the rates the Treasury now has to pay to sell its debt, with all maturities yielding over 4%. And while the Fed is expected to lower interest rates further after beginning its easing cycle in September, few economists anticipate any return to the ultra-low borrowing costs enjoyed before Covid. The baseline forecast at Bloomberg Economics has the fiscal deficit widening to 7% of GDP by 2028.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The weighted average interest rate on outstanding U.S. federal debt stands near 3.3%, a 15-year high, yet remains below the over-4% yields the Treasury must now pay across all maturities to sell new debt.
  2. Bloomberg Economics' baseline forecast has the U.S. fiscal deficit widening to 7% of GDP by 2028.
  3. Ten-year Treasury yields are around 4.4%, down from their peak just after the Nov. 5 election, with analysts surveyed by Bloomberg seeing them below 4% by late 2026 while derivatives contracts indicate traders bet they hold near current levels.

Related Articles:

  • Our Thoughts on Large US Deficits and Their Impact on Bond Yields — Total borrowing in the US is about average despite high government deficits, as high public borrowing has contributed to the need for higher interest rates that have depressed private sector borrowing. Risk premiums on long-dated debt look about average, with no market signs that economic or debt limits are currently being hit.
  • Fiscal Policy Under Trump II: The Role of Scott Bessent and Basic Budget Math — US federal debt has risen from 105% to 123% of GDP, the budget deficit has doubled from 3.1% to more than 6%, and government interest expense has grown from 1.3% to about 3.1% of GDP. The author argues this makes expansive fiscal policy harder to pursue than in the past.
  • The Long-Term Budget Outlook Under Alternative Scenarios for the Economy and the Budget — The Congressional Budget Office projects that if private investment were more sensitive to federal deficits, debt held by the public would exceed 250% of GDP and real national income per person would be 18% ($21,300) lower than its baseline, with the average interest rate on federal debt 2pp higher.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

Prices Won’t Stop Falling in China, and Beijing Is Grasping for Solutions

AI Summary. Prices for goods leaving Chinese factories have fallen year-over-year for 26 consecutive months, and China's gross domestic product deflator, a broad gauge of economy-wide prices, has been negative for six straight quarters, the longest stretch since the late 1990s. As falling prices sap profitability, companies could delay investment or cut jobs, and buyers could postpone purchases expecting further declines.

Hannah Miao Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
December 17, 2024

Prices for Chinese manufactured goods have fallen y/y for 26 consecutive months. As of November, they were down 2.5% y/y, raising the prospect of deflation taking hold with postponement of investment and durables purchases.

Are falling prices becoming entrenched in China's economy?

Core argument: China's factory-gate prices fell 2.5% year-over-year in November, the 26th consecutive month of decline, with little sign of turning up again soon.

Prices for goods leaving Chinese factories have fallen year-over-year for 26 consecutive months, dropping 2.5% in November from a year earlier, and there is little sign of them turning up again soon. China’s gross domestic product deflator, a broader gauge of price levels across the economy, has been in negative territory for six consecutive quarters, the longest stretch since the late 1990s. The fear is that deflation is becoming ingrained in China. As falling prices sap profitability, companies could postpone investments or shed workers, leading more people to cut back on spending. Others might put off purchases because they think prices will drop even more.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's factory-gate prices fell 2.5% year-over-year in November, the 26th consecutive month of decline, with little sign of turning up again soon.
  2. China's GDP deflator, a broader gauge of economy-wide price levels, has been negative for six consecutive quarters, the longest such stretch since the late 1990s.
  3. The concern is that deflation becomes ingrained in China as falling prices sap profitability, prompting companies to postpone investment or shed workers and consumers to delay purchases in anticipation of lower prices.

Related Articles:

  • Chinese Bond Market Grapples With ‘Japanification’ — Yields on 30-year Chinese government bonds have fallen from 4% in late 2020 to 2.21% as China cuts interest rates and investors move into safe assets, while Japan's long-term yields have risen above China's to 2.27%. Chinese core inflation, excluding fuel and food, was 0.2% annually versus 2.3% in Japan.
  • Will China Take Over the Global Auto Industry? — The global auto market has historically been regional, with most cars sold in a region also built there. Overcapacity in China's internal combustion sector, expanding electric-vehicle capacity, ample state bank credit, and a weaker yuan could concentrate global auto production in China absent restrictions such as the US 100% tariff on Chinese electric vehicles.
  • The Wealth of Working Nations — Because of population aging, growth in GDP per capita and GDP per working-age adult have diverged across advanced economies; from 1998 to 2019 Japan's accumulated growth per working-age adult was 31.9% versus 29.5% in the US. The authors find a standard neoclassical growth model calibrated to each country's working-age population tracks output per working-age adult in most economies.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle

China’s Slowdown Has Changed the Trade War

AI Summary. China's share of global GDP has fallen from a peak of just above 18% in 2021 to around 16%, while it accounts for roughly 28% of world investment and 35% of gross manufacturing output but only about 12% of global consumption. The author argues this imbalance leaves Beijing increasingly reliant on exporting excess industrial output.

Daniel Rosen, Reva Goujon, and Logan Wright Foreign Affairs
Date Posted:
December 17, 2024

Chinese mercantilism offers the US an opportunity, as trade partners may be more likely to “align their own policies, including tariffs and technology-related controls, with Washington’s as part of a broader ‘de-risking’ strategy.”

Chinese mercantilism offers the US an opportunity, as trade partners may be more likely to “align their own policies,...

Does a shrinking share of global output increase China's reliance on exports?

Core argument: China's share of global GDP peaked just above 18% in 2021 and stands at around 16% today, even as it accounts for roughly 28% of world investment and 35% of gross manufacturing output.

China’s share of the world economy is shrinking—it peaked at just above 18% of global GDP in 2021 and stands at around 16% today. China remains an investment-led economy: it is the world’s largest source of investment (around 28%) and gross manufacturing output (35%), but it represents only around 12% of global consumption. To create growth, therefore, Beijing has come to rely even more on exports of excess industrial output that cannot be absorbed in the domestic market. But China can only make further relative gains if other countries reduce their manufacturing investment or if Beijing expands its share of global exports. Washington can leverage the influence of U.S. consumer and capital markets, offering its allies and partners a better alternative to being crowded out by Chinese exports.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's share of global GDP peaked just above 18% in 2021 and stands at around 16% today, even as it accounts for roughly 28% of world investment and 35% of gross manufacturing output.
  2. China represents only around 12% of global consumption, and Beijing has come to rely more heavily on exporting excess industrial output that the domestic market cannot absorb.
  3. China can make further relative gains only if other countries cut manufacturing investment or Beijing expands its share of global exports, and Washington can leverage U.S. consumer and capital markets to offer allies an alternative to being crowded out by Chinese exports.

Related Articles:

  • China Economy Memo: Tempest in a Teapot or Crisis A-Brewing? — The authors argue China is heading into a protracted debt crisis in which about 40% of local government financing vehicles default, hitting regional banks most exposed to such lending. They estimate total losses for these creditors at roughly $5tn, or about 30% of China's GDP.
  • We Are All Mercantilists Now — The postwar free-trade system depended on American soft power and broad respect for its rules, and as countries defected to mercantilist policies each defection pushed others to respond in kind. China's economic size and its use of currency management, public procurement, state subsidies and protectionism to build leading industries in electric vehicles, solar power and batteries broke the existing order.
  • Trade Intervention for Freer Trade — The authors argue the United States should counter surplus countries' trade policies either by restricting their goods exports through tariffs or by restricting their capital inflows through taxes, volume limits, reserve requirements, transaction approvals, or investor eligibility rules. They contend capital controls are a more targeted alternative to uniform tariffs, which impose equal costs on more and less mercantilist countries.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
    • Trade (not deficits)

The New Frontier for Drone Warfare Is Deep Underwater

AI Summary. New underwater drones can dive thousands of feet and operate for days with little human intervention, which advocates say suits them to intelligence gathering, protecting undersea infrastructure, and countering threats in the Pacific. Boeing is delivering five 85-foot Orca vehicles to the US Navy, and Australia is developing Ghost Shark with Anduril.

Alistair MacDonald Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
December 17, 2024

Boeing is set to deliver five of its Orca drones to the U.S. Navy by the end of next year. Up to 85 feet long, the Orca can travel almost 7,500 miles with little human intervention.

Boeing is set to deliver five of its Orca drones to the U.S. Navy by the end of next year. Up to 85 feet long, the Orca can...

Are underwater drones becoming a new frontier of naval warfare?

Core argument: Boeing is set to deliver five Orca extra-large uncrewed undersea vehicles to the U.S. Navy by the end of next year, with the up-to-85-foot craft able to travel almost 7,500 miles with little human intervention.

The new underwater drones can typically dive thousands of feet below the surface and operate largely without human interaction for days on end. That ability makes them ideally suited to gather intelligence, protect undersea infrastructure and counter potential threats in the Pacific, advocates say. Boeing is set to deliver five of its Orca extra-large uncrewed undersea vehicles to the U.S. Navy by the end of next year. Up to 85 feet long, the Orca can travel the equivalent of almost 7,500 miles with little human intervention. Australia is working with defense startup Anduril on an underwater drone called Ghost Shark. The project is part of a $4.65 billion investment the country is making in subsea warfare capabilities and new autonomous and uncrewed maritime vehicles.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Boeing is set to deliver five Orca extra-large uncrewed undersea vehicles to the U.S. Navy by the end of next year, with the up-to-85-foot craft able to travel almost 7,500 miles with little human intervention.
  2. Australia is investing $4.65 billion in subsea warfare capabilities and new autonomous and uncrewed maritime vehicles, including the Ghost Shark underwater drone developed with defense startup Anduril.
  3. Advocates argue that underwater drones capable of diving thousands of feet and operating for days without human interaction are suited to gathering intelligence, protecting undersea infrastructure and countering potential threats in the Pacific.

Related Articles:

  • Pentagon Plans Vast AI Fleet to Counter China Threat — The Pentagon plans to field thousands of air-, land- and sea-based artificial-intelligence systems, drones and autonomous platforms within two years to counter threats from China and other adversaries, spending hundreds of millions of dollars on systems intended to be "small, smart, cheap.
  • China Is Rapidly Building Warships. Satellite Images Reveal The Scale — China's shipbuilding capacity now exceeds the United States' by such a margin that it can build more ships in a month than American yards build in a year, with a workforce estimated at nearly 5x the US level. Chinese yards handled more than 1,700 orders in a year, compared with fewer than five for American shipyards.
  • China’s Shipyards Are Ready for a Protracted War. America’s Aren’t — China produced more than half of the world's commercial shipbuilding output, while Europe accounts for about 5% and the US next to nothing, with most of the remainder built in South Korea and Japan. Analysts argue that in a protracted conflict China's wartime-scale yards could quickly accelerate production, replace lost ships, and repair damaged ones.
  • China
  • Security

Wednesday, December 18, 2024

A Preliminary Report on Taxing the Great Wealth Transfer: Revenue and Distributional Effects of Taxes on Estates, Inheritances, and Unrealized Capital Gains at Death

AI Summary. The authors argue that replacing the estate tax, paid by those who die, with an inheritance tax, paid by recipients, could raise more revenue and increase progressivity because it targets large individual transfers rather than estates divided among several family members. They also note unrealized capital gains held until death escape income tax entirely.

William Gale, Oliver Hall, and John Sabelhaus Brookings Institution
Date Posted:
December 18, 2024

Bequeathable wealth/GDP has risen from 256% to 424% over 1997- 2021, but the current estate tax law yields ~$0 revenue. @BrookingsInst researchers propose an inheritance tax on recipients that may be more efficient than a revised estate tax.

Would taxing inheritances instead of estates raise more revenue and progressivity?

Core argument: Returning the estate tax to its inflation-adjusted 2001 parameters would have raised seven times as much revenue in 2021 as the actual estate tax did, the authors estimate.

We investigate three options for wealth transfer taxes: reforming the estate tax; taxing capital gains at death; and converting the estate tax (paid by decedents) to an inheritance tax (paid by recipients). An inheritance tax is better [at reducing inequality] than an estate tax because it targets large individual transfers, rather than large estates which may be divided up among a number of family members. Under current law, no income tax is ever paid on the unrealized gains that occur over the owner’s lifetime if the owner holds the asset until death. This not only loses billions of dollars in revenue but also distorts behavior - individuals are incentivized to hold capital assets for their entire lifetime to avoid taxation when that capital might be more efficiently allocated elsewhere. Alternatively, when we return the estate tax to its (inflation-adjusted) 2001 parameters, we find that it would have raised seven times as much revenue in 2021 as the actual estate tax did. We conclude that switching from the current estate tax to an inheritance tax could raise more revenue, increase overall progressivity, and broaden the income tax base

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Returning the estate tax to its inflation-adjusted 2001 parameters would have raised seven times as much revenue in 2021 as the actual estate tax did, the authors estimate.
  2. The authors argue an inheritance tax paid by recipients reduces inequality better than an estate tax paid by decedents, because it targets large individual transfers rather than large estates that may be divided among several family members.
  3. Under current law no income tax is ever paid on unrealized gains accrued over an owner's lifetime if the asset is held until death, which the authors say loses billions of dollars in revenue and incentivizes lifetime holding of capital assets.

Related Articles:

  • A $105 Trillion Inheritance Windfall Is On the Way for US Heirs — Research firm Cerulli Associates projects about $105tn will pass from older US generations to heirs over the next quarter century, roughly equal to global gross domestic product in 2023. Cerulli estimates more than half of that transferred wealth will come from the roughly 2% of households holding at least $5m in investible assets.
  • Should Governments Tax The Great Boomer Wealth Transfer? — Around $90tn in the US is projected to pass from those born before 1964 to their heirs by 2045, according to research by Cerulli Associates. With government finances strained by pandemic costs and aging populations, debate is growing over whether inheritance taxes—long avoidable through planning—should be made harder to sidestep.
  • The Inheritance Of Social Status: England, 1600 to 2022 — Using a genealogical database of 422,374 English people with rarer surnames, the authors find social status persists strongly even among distant relatives, with status correlations declining by a constant factor of 0.79 per step in the lineage across all status measures and eras studied. The authors argue this constancy suggests social interventions have modest effects.
  • Inequality
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Politics
  • Workforce

China’s Stunning 2024 Export Growth

AI Summary. Chinese export volumes are up 13% year-over-year while import volumes are up only 2%, a gap that with exports at about 20% of GDP implies a net exports contribution to Chinese growth of close to 2% of GDP. Falling Chinese export prices mean export volumes are growing much faster than the dollar value of exports.

Brad Setser and Michael Weilandt Council on Foreign Relations
Date Posted:
December 18, 2024
Is Database:
Database

Chinese export volumes through November are up 13% y/y while imports are only up 2%. A 10 pp gap between growth in exports vs. imports “implies a net exports contribution to Chinese growth of close to 2% of GDP.” @Brad_Setser @Mike_Weilandt

How much are net exports contributing to China's growth?

Core argument: With exports around 20% of Chinese GDP, the 10-percentage-point gap between export and import volume growth implies a net exports contribution to China's growth of close to 2% of GDP.

China’s weak domestic economy and ever-expanding production capacity, juiced with an explicit policy of directing state bank credit toward manufacturing, has led to a surge in Chinese exports. Because Chinese export prices are falling (think of the price of a solar panel), export volumes have been growing much faster than the dollar value of Chinese exports. The phenomenon is clear in their export volume data released by the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (GACC) as well the global data compiled by Dutch CPB. On a year-over-year basis, Chinese export volumes are up 13% (data through November, so it will be close to the 2024 annual number) while import volumes are only up 2%. With exports around 20% of GDP, the 10 percentage point gap implies a net exports contribution to Chinese growth of close to 2% of GDP.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. With exports around 20% of Chinese GDP, the 10-percentage-point gap between export and import volume growth implies a net exports contribution to China's growth of close to 2% of GDP.
  2. Falling Chinese export prices, such as for solar panels, mean export volumes have grown much faster than the dollar value of Chinese exports, amid weak domestic demand, expanding production capacity, and state bank credit directed toward manufacturing.
  3. Chinese export volumes are up 13% year-over-year through November while import volumes are up only 2%, according to data from China's General Administration of Customs and the Dutch CPB.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Record Manufacturing Surplus — China's manufacturing trade surplus has reached about 2% of world GDP, exceeding the peak surpluses of export powerhouses like Japan and Germany, and shows no signs of shrinking as policy continues to emphasize advanced manufacturing capacity. The main offsetting manufactured-goods deficit is in the United States rather than commodity exporters.
  • Will China Take Over the Global Auto Industry? — The global auto market has historically been regional, with most cars sold in a region also built there. Overcapacity in China's internal combustion sector, expanding electric-vehicle capacity, ample state bank credit, and a weaker yuan could concentrate global auto production in China absent restrictions such as the US 100% tariff on Chinese electric vehicles.
  • Trade Intervention for Freer Trade — The authors argue the United States should counter surplus countries' trade policies either by restricting their goods exports through tariffs or by restricting their capital inflows through taxes, volume limits, reserve requirements, transaction approvals, or investor eligibility rules. They contend capital controls are a more targeted alternative to uniform tariffs, which impose equal costs on more and less mercantilist countries.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
    • Trade (not deficits)

The Last-Ditch Efforts to Win Over Critics of the Nippon-U.S. Steel Deal

AI Summary. Nippon Steel's $14.1bn bid for U.S. Steel faces opposition from politicians and union leaders, a national-security review, and souring investor sentiment, with shares trading well below the $55 price shareholders approved. U.S. Steel's chief executive warns that if the deal collapses the company would likely close plants and move its headquarters out of Pittsburgh.

Bob Tita Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
December 18, 2024

Nippon and U.S. Steel are attempting to save Nippon’s proposed acquisition of U.S. Steel, opposed by both Biden and Trump. The latter’s shares trade at $32, well under Nippon’s $55 tender price, as steel prices have fallen 40% y/y.

Will political opposition block a foreign takeover of a domestic steelmaker?

Core argument: U.S. Steel shares closed Tuesday at $31.94, the lowest level since September and well below the $55 a share that U.S. Steel shareholders approved in April for Nippon Steel's $14.1 billion takeover.

A year has passed since Nippon Steel announced that it would buy U.S. Steel for $14.1 billion. The takeover bid has run into opposition from politicians and union leaders as well as skepticism from investors. Now the steel market is weak, and the clock is winding down on a national-security review that could precede President Biden blocking the deal. Biden has yet to formally block the takeover, but the White House last week reiterated his position that U.S. Steel should be domestically owned and operated. President-elect Donald Trump has similarly rejected the Pittsburgh-based company being sold to a foreign firm, warning Nippon Steel in a Dec. 2 social-media post: “Buyer Beware!” Investor sentiment in U.S. Steel is souring. Shares closed Tuesday at $31.94, the lowest level since September and well below the $55 U.S. Steel shareholders approved in April. If the deal collapses, U.S. Steel Chief Executive Dave Burritt has warned that the company can’t match Nippon Steel’s planned investments, and would likely close plants and move its headquarters out of Pittsburgh.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. Steel shares closed Tuesday at $31.94, the lowest level since September and well below the $55 a share that U.S. Steel shareholders approved in April for Nippon Steel's $14.1 billion takeover.
  2. Nippon Steel's bid for U.S. Steel faces opposition from politicians and union leaders and a national-security review, with the White House reiterating President Biden's position that U.S. Steel should be domestically owned and operated.
  3. U.S. Steel Chief Executive Dave Burritt has warned that if the deal collapses, the company cannot match Nippon Steel's planned investments and would likely close plants and move its headquarters out of Pittsburgh.

Related Articles:

  • Chinese Overcapacity is Crushing the Global Steel Industry — China produces about 1bn tonnes of steel a year, as much as the rest of the world combined, and its exports reached 90m tonnes in 2023, up 35% from the prior year. With Chinese mills selling abroad cheaply, foreign steelmakers' profits have fallen and some are seeking anti-dumping duties.
  • “No Inventions; No Innovations,” A History of US Steel — US Steel lagged in adopting steelmaking technology, only moving into minimills through an acquisition and a new Alabama plant, with minimills now making about 25% of its domestic output. Rival minimill producer Nucor passed US Steel in output and is now the largest US steel producer.
  • Labor Market Conflict and the Decline of the Rust Belt — The authors argue that persistent labor market conflict in the Rust Belt's main industries lowered investment and productivity growth, shifting employment to the rest of the country, and estimate it accounts for roughly half the decline in the region's share of US manufacturing employment. Rising foreign competition plays a more modest quantitative role.
  • Trade (not deficits)
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Investment

Microsoft Acquires Twice As Many Nvidia AI Chips As Tech Rivals

AI Summary. Analysts at Omdia estimate Microsoft purchased 485,000 of Nvidia's "Hopper" artificial intelligence chips in a year, roughly twice as many as its next-largest US rival Meta at 224,000. Omdia estimates ByteDance and Tencent each ordered about 230,000 Nvidia chips, including the H20 model modified to meet US export controls.

Tim Bradshaw and Stephen Morris Financial Times
Date Posted:
December 18, 2024

Microsoft likely purchased 485,000 of Nvidia’s “Hopper” chips this year, twice the amount purchased by Meta, Nvidia’s second-largest American customer.

Which company bought the most Nvidia AI chips this year?

Core argument: Omdia estimates Microsoft bought 485,000 of Nvidia's "Hopper" chips this year, more than double the 224,000 purchased by Meta, Nvidia's next biggest US customer.

Microsoft bought twice as many of Nvidia’s flagship chips as any of its largest rivals, as OpenAI’s biggest investor accelerated its investment in artificial intelligence infrastructure. Analysts at Omdia estimate that Microsoft bought 485,000 of Nvidia’s “Hopper” chips this year. That put Microsoft far ahead of Nvidia’s next biggest US customer Meta, which bought 224,000 Hopper chips. With demand outstripping supply of Nvidia’s most advanced graphics processing units for much of the past two years, Microsoft’s chip hoard has given it an edge in the race to build the next generation of AI systems. Omdia estimates ByteDance and Tencent each ordered about 230,000 of Nvidia’s chips this year, including the H20 model, a less powerful version of Hopper that was modified to meet US export controls for Chinese customers. While Nvidia still dominates the AI chip market, its Silicon Valley rival AMD has been making inroads. Meta bought 173,000 of AMD’s MI300 chips this year, while Microsoft bought 96,000, according to Omdia.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Omdia estimates Microsoft bought 485,000 of Nvidia's "Hopper" chips this year, more than double the 224,000 purchased by Meta, Nvidia's next biggest US customer.
  2. Omdia estimates ByteDance and Tencent each ordered about 230,000 Nvidia chips this year, including the H20, a less powerful Hopper version modified to meet US export controls for Chinese customers.
  3. AMD has made inroads against Nvidia's dominance of the AI chip market, with Meta buying 173,000 MI300 chips and Microsoft 96,000 this year, according to Omdia.

Related Articles:

  • Big Tech Groups Say Their $100B AI Spending Spree Is Just Beginning — Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, and Meta together spent $106bn in the first half of the year and pledged further increases over the next 18 months, with Meta projecting capital spending could reach $40bn this year. Analysts at Dell'Oro Group expect as much as $1tn could flow into infrastructure such as data centers within five years.
  • Are We on the Brink of an AI Investment Arms Race? — Spending on AI chips and data centers was a bit below $100bn in 2023, around 0.4% of US GDP, and the broader set of companies exposed to AI-related investment has not yet seen a major jump in sales. The authors argue the underlying dynamics point to a spending surge large enough to shape the business cycle.
  • 2025 Capex Outlook: A Gradual Rebound After the Factory-Building Boom — Business capital spending growth is forecast to be roughly flat in the near term, held back by declining aircraft and manufacturing structures investment, before rebounding to about 5.4% growth over the following year. The projected rebound is attributed to equipment spending for newly built factories, AI investment, lower short-term borrowing rates, improved business sentiment, and reinstated tax incentives.
  • Investment
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

Fusion Start-Up Plans to Build Its First Power Plant in Virginia

AI Summary. Commonwealth Fusion Systems, the best-funded of the fusion start-ups, plans to build a fusion power plant in Virginia with a peak capacity of 400 megawatts, which the company says could power about 150,000 homes but would most likely serve large industrial customers. The company is first building a pilot machine in Massachusetts intended to demonstrate the technology's feasibility.

Raymond Zhong New York Times
Date Posted:
December 18, 2024

Commonwealth Fusion Systems, a fusion startup backed in part by Bill Gates, plans to generate electricity from its first fusion power plant in Virginia by the early 2030s.

Commonwealth Fusion Systems, a fusion startup backed in part by Bill Gates, plans to generate electricity from its first...

Are fusion start-ups moving from pilot machines to commercial power plants?

Core argument: Commonwealth Fusion Systems plans a Virginia fusion power plant with a peak capacity of 400 megawatts, which chief commercial officer Rick Needham said would power about 150,000 homes, though the electricity would most likely serve large industrial customers.

Commonwealth is the best funded of a crop of start-ups that are hoping to realize fusion’s potential soon. The company is first building a pilot machine in Massachusetts, one it says will demonstrate the feasibility of its technology in 2027. Rick Needham, Commonwealth’s chief commercial officer, said it intended to make a “substantial” investment to build the [Virginia] plant, though he declined to say how much. The plant would have a peak capacity of 400 megawatts. That would be enough energy to power about 150,000 homes, Mr. Needham said, though the electricity would most likely go to large industrial customers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Commonwealth Fusion Systems plans a Virginia fusion power plant with a peak capacity of 400 megawatts, which chief commercial officer Rick Needham said would power about 150,000 homes, though the electricity would most likely serve large industrial customers.
  2. Commonwealth is first building a pilot machine in Massachusetts that the company says will demonstrate the feasibility of its fusion technology in 2027.
  3. Commonwealth is the best funded of a group of fusion start-ups hoping to realize the technology's potential soon, and Rick Needham said it intended to make a "substantial" investment in the Virginia plant, declining to specify an amount.

Related Articles:

  • WHAM! Nuclear Fusion Experiment Hits New Record for Magnet Strength — A nuclear fusion experiment at the University of Wisconsin-Madison set a record for the strongest steady magnetic field confining a plasma, reaching 17 tesla — more than twice the field strength used by high-resolution MRI brain scanners. The high-temperature superconducting magnets were built by startup Commonwealth Fusion Systems.
  • China Outspends the U.S. on Fusion in the Race for Energy’s Holy Grail — Scientists familiar with China's fusion facilities estimate that at its current pace of spending and development, China will surpass U.S. and European magnetic fusion capabilities within three or four years. Much U.S. fusion spending goes to legacy programs, while China's roughly $1.5bn is largely directed at building systems that would compete with leading private U.S. fusion firms.
  • European Scientists Set New Nuclear Fusion Energy Record — Researchers at the Joint European Torus facility outside Oxford set a nuclear fusion energy record, generating 69 megajoules from a five-second sustained reaction, up from a previous record of 59 megajoules. The experiment consumed far more power than the reaction produced.
  • Energy
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

We’re Burning More Coal Than Ever Thanks to China

AI Summary. The International Energy Agency estimates global coal demand reached an all-time high of 8,771m metric tons, up 1% from the prior year, as electricity demand rose faster than expected. China consumes nearly 30% more coal than the rest of the world combined, and its coal demand is projected to set records annually through at least 2027.

Javier Blas Bloomberg
Date Posted:
December 18, 2024
Is Database:
Database

An @IEA analysis finds that global coal demand hit a record high in 2024, and projects that demand will likely rise through at least 2027. @JavierBlas notes that China consumes 30% more coal than the rest of the world combined.

Is China driving global coal demand to record highs?

Core argument: The IEA estimates global coal demand reached an all-time high of 8,771 million metric tons in 2024, up 1% from 2023, as electricity demand rose faster than expected.

Coal demand set a record high in 2024. The IEA now estimates that global coal demand surged to an all-time high of 8,771 million metric tons this year, up 1% from 2023, as electricity demand rose faster than expected. The country, worshiped by some green enthusiasts thanks to its embrace of electric vehicles, wind turbines, and solar panels, is the world’s biggest polluter. China alone consumes nearly 30% more coal than the rest of the world together. That’s not ending anytime soon. Now, the IEA assumes that Chinese coal demand will set an all-time high every year until at least 2027.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The IEA estimates global coal demand reached an all-time high of 8,771 million metric tons in 2024, up 1% from 2023, as electricity demand rose faster than expected.
  2. China consumes nearly 30% more coal than the rest of the world combined and is the world's biggest polluter, despite its embrace of electric vehicles, wind turbines, and solar panels.
  3. The IEA assumes Chinese coal demand will set an all-time high every year until at least 2027.

Related Articles:

  • The Energy Transition Is Powered By — Wait for It — Coal — The International Energy Agency now estimates coal consumption in 2030 will be 6% higher than it projected a year earlier — an increase equal to Japan's entire coal use — and above 2010 levels. Fossil fuels met two-thirds of the recent global increase in energy demand.
  • Electravision — The fossil fuel share of global primary energy is falling about 0.40% per year, matching the pace of decarbonization during the 1973–1988 nuclear buildout, though total carbon dioxide emissions have not declined because energy consumption keeps rising. Renewable energy is used almost exclusively for the electricity grid, with little penetration in industry and transport.
  • Electricity 2024 — More than 8,000 data centers operate globally, with about 33% in the United States, 16% in Europe, and close to 10% in China. US data center electricity use is projected to rise from roughly 200 TWh in 2022, about 4% of US electricity demand, to almost 260 TWh, or 6% of total demand.
  • Energy
  • China

The Crumbling Foundation of America's Military

AI Summary. A U.S. Army Science Board report warned that the American industrial base may be incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future conflict with a peer adversary. Much of the reduction in U.S. arms-manufacturing capacity was deliberate, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Mark Bowden The Atlantic
Date Posted:
December 18, 2024

Mark Bowden documents the decline of the US defense industrial base as the country cashed the post-Cold War peace dividend, noting “much of the reduction in America’s arms-manufacturing capacity was deliberate.”

Mark Bowden documents the decline of the US defense industrial base as the country cashed the post-Cold War peace dividend,...

Can the U.S. industrial base meet wartime munitions demand?

Core argument: The U.S. Army Science Board warned in 2023 that the American industrial base "may be incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.".

In 2023, the U.S. Army Science Board expressed concern that the nation’s industrial base “may be incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.” Mackenzie Eaglen, a defense analyst AEI and one of the authors of the Science Board’s report, immersed herself in this world of procurement and manufacturing for nearly a year. “When I was done,” she told me, “the only thing I could think was It’s a miracle the U.S. military has anything that blows up, ever.” This is not just a bump in the road, and it is not just about munitions. The U.S. military, the richest in the world, confronts a deep, institutional deficiency. War planning occurs in a political and strategic context bigger than the Pentagon, which is another reason the U.S. finds itself where it is. Much of the reduction in America’s arms-manufacturing capacity was deliberate—a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. Army Science Board warned in 2023 that the American industrial base "may be incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.".
  2. Mackenzie Eaglen, an AEI defense analyst and co-author of the Science Board report, spent nearly a year examining procurement and manufacturing and concluded it is a miracle the U.S. military has anything that blows up.
  3. Much of the reduction in America's arms-manufacturing capacity was deliberate, a consequence of the Soviet Union's collapse and the end of the Cold War.

Related Articles:

  • Business Spending Is Lining Up to Reinforce Growth — Around 70% of sectors are posting positive year-over-year profit growth, with big tech showing the largest acceleration in demand and profits but strength broadening across the economy. Companies are responding with rising capital spending growth and more optimistic investment plans, as firms typically add capacity with a slight lag after real demand picks up.
  • Why is the U.S. Navy Running Out of Tomahawk Cruise Missiles? — The U.S. Navy has been firing Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles faster than it can replace them, with opening-day strikes in Yemen expending more than 80 missiles against 30 targets. An entire year's purchase of 55 Tomahawks accounted for 68% of the precision munitions fired at the Houthis in a single day.
  • Pentagon Runs Low on Air-Defense Missiles as Demand Surges — U.S. stocks of some air-defense missiles are running low, raising questions about the Pentagon's readiness for conflicts in the Middle East, Europe, and a potential Pacific war. The U.S. has launched dozens of Standard Missile interceptors in single months, while the producer can make at most a few hundred a year, shared with at least 14 allied buyers.
  • Security
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment


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